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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates electoral choice and electoral change in Australia. The main 
purpose of this study is to establish what changes, if any, have occurred in the process of electoral 
choice in Australia. 
The way in which this study investigates changes in the process of electoral choice 
involves several steps. First, the literature is reviewed to find which factors have been found to have 
substantial effects on political preference. The factors that may influence political preference are 
organised into five sets of factors: social structural and background factors, partisanship, ideology, 
issues and candidates. The second step is to a construct a model of electoral choice which specifies 
these groups of factors in a theorefically plausible manner. The main features of the model are (i) 
direct effects of social structural and background factors on partisanship and ideology, (ii) direct 
effects of partisanship, ideology, issues and candidates on electoral choice (vote) and (iii) the 
possibility of reciprocal effects of partisanship with both issues and candidate evaluations. The model 
forms the theoredcal framework for the thesis. Analysis of data employing this model allows 
conclusions to made on the factors that are, and are not, involved in the process of electoral choice. 
Furthermore, comparisons of analyses of data collected at different time points inform on changes or 
consistencies in this process. In addition, when long and short term electoral factors are distinguished, 
analyses of the model allow conclusions to be drawn on enduring electoral advantages that the major 
parties may hold. 
The model is employed in the empirical chapters to investigate changes over time by 
analysing the available data. The scope of the study is limited to the period between 1967 to 1987, 
during which seven appropriate national poliUcal surveys were conducted. The first three empirical 
chapters analyse distinct parts of the model and compare the results over time. The final empirical 
chapter employs the results from these three chapters to investigate a confirmatory model of electoral 
choice. 
Focusing on electoral choice the main findings were: partisanship has the greatest 
effect on electoral choice, ideology is of litde consequence in the process of electoral choice, and 
issues and the evaluations of leaders do influence electoral choice, independently of partisanship, over 
time period studied. Specifically, the Viemam war issue prompted electors to vote contrary to their 
partisan leanings in 1967 and 1969. Furthermore, there is evidence that electors responded to (past or 
perceived future) changes in economic circumstances. Environmental issues were found to effect 
electoral choice in 1984 and 1988, but (unexpectedly) transferred primary votes away from the Labor 
party. Other specific findings are detailed in the text. 
n 
Concerning electoral change the following conclusions were drawn. Generally, social 
structural factors have become less important in the process of electoral choice. The effects of 
occupational class, class identification, and income on party identification have declined and the effects 
of trade union membership and religiosity were found to be more or less constant. The effects of 
partisan background have remained constant indicating a constant degree of intra-familial political 
socialisation in the Australian electorate. Partisanship has become less important in influencing vote 
and in structuring the process of electoral choice. This finding is attributed to mainly not very strong 
and fairly strong party identifiers, who have become less inclined to vote for the party they identify 
with. There is no evidence that the electorate has become more ideological over the time period 
studied. Issues appear to have become more important influences on electoral choice. Evaluations of 
the Prime Minister have become a more important influences on voting, while evaluations of the 
Leader of the Opposition have become less important. 
There is evidence for one of the propositions discussed in the text, that the results of 
elections held since 1967 can to an extent be accounted for by durable electoral advantages that parties 
enjoy. A period of coalition advantage was identified during the late 1960s and a period of Labor 
advantage since 1979. 
Ul 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE STUDY OF ELECTORAL CHOICE AND ELECTORAL CHANGE IN AUSTRALIA 
This thesis investigates electoral choice over time in Australia. Its main purpose is to determine 
if changes have occurred in tiiis process. 
^ive sets of factors are considered to be involved in the process of electoral choice. They are, 
'social structural factors', 'partisanship', 'ideology', 'issues' and 'candidates'. Social strucmral factors 
include the sociological variables such as class, religion, ethnicity and region. Partisanship is defined 
as die voters' psychological attachments to political parties. Ideology refers to the voters' long 
standing political beliefs, values and goals. Issues are the political and economic issues on die 
political agenda at a particular time. Candidates refers to the electors' evaluations of the candidates 
standing for office, especially the leaders of the major parties. 
The smdy is prompted by questions concerning change in the role of these factors in the process 
of electoral choice in Australia, that is 'electoral change'. There are a number plausible accounts of 
change in the influence of diese sets of factors on electoral choice. For each set, four logical 
possibilities may be hypothesised. First, that the factors comprising the set have become more 
important in die process of electoral choice over time, second, that they have become less important, 
third, diat no substantial changes have occurred and finally, die group of factors has had and continues 
to have, littie or no role in the process of electoral choice. To dismiss any of diese accounts is 
premature, since plausible arguments may be mounted to support each. The following discussion 
briefly summarises the four accounts, associated with each of the five sets of factors. 
Social Structural Factors 
Social structural factors may have become more important in tite process of electoral choice. The 
economic problems experienced in Australia since the 1970s may have resulted in a greater disparity 
between die privileged and underprivileged, leading to greater political solidarity among these groups. 
It is likely tiiat 'privilege' is unevenly distributed among class, religious, regional or ethnic groups. A 
second account would argue that tiiere are fewer political differences between social groups, since tiie 
Labor party has endeavoured to broaden its political base. Furtiiermore, representatives of class and 
religious groups are less likely to publicly declare support for a particular party. A tiiird account 
relating to social structural factors, is that the role of social strucmral factors in the process of electoral 
choice has not changed to any great extent. The more privileged groups in society tend to support the 
Liberal party and the less privileged the Labor party, and there is no reason to suppose that these 
tendencies have changed. The final account, focusing on social structural factors, contends that these 
factors have littie or no role to play, in the process of electoral choice. It could be argued diat die 
political preferences of die great majority of voters can be attributed to die political preferences of 
their parents and contemporary political factors, such as issues and candidates. 
Partisanship 
The next group of accounts focuses on die effect of partisanship on electoral choice. The first 
account argues that partisanship has now a greater influence on electoral behaviour dian it had at 
earlier times. It is plausible diat voters have become confused by the complexity of the issues on die 
political agenda and the changes in the ideological positions of the parties. In addition, they are 
unexcited by the present crop of politicians. Therefore, when voting, voters are more likely to resort 
to their partisanship. In earlier times issues and ideology were more important since issues were clear-
cut and ideological differences between die parties were more apparent. Furthermore, die types of 
people in die major parties were quite differcni, die Labor party comprising generally those from trade 
tmion backgrounds and the Liberal party comprising mostiy those with business or professional 
backgrounds. 
The second account focusing on partisanship advocates that partisanship has become less 
important, that voters' attachments to the parties have weakened. Voters are more likely to change 
their vote, in response to dieir evaluations of leaders and issues. Such an account may argue that, 
after nearly two decades of economic problems, voters have become cynical as to die ability of 
political parties to deal widi Australia's economic and social problems. Furthermore, neighbourhoods 
and workplaces have become less political, so the voters' partisan attachments receive less re-
enforcement. 
The tiiird account argues that the effect of partisanship on vote has remained more or less 
constant. The influence of ideology, issues or candidates on electoral choice is considered small and 
have remained small. It could be argued that most voters are not concerned with issues, ideologies or 
candidates, eidier now or in die past, and generally vote in accordance widi tiieir partisanship. 
The final account focusing on partisanship contends Uiat partisanship has never had a substantial 
impact on vote. This account argues that at each election voters vote in accordance with tiieir 
ideological position, or their evaluations of issues or candidates. This account would argue that most 
voters do not have partisan attachments. However, tills account is not likely in die Austialian context. 
since die same (or very similar) political groups have dominated Australian politics, since the early 
part of this century. 
Ideology 
The third group of accounts of electoral change focuses on ideology. The first of these accounts 
argues that the electorate became more ideological, at least during the 1970s. The Whitiam 
government's concern for improving education and welfare and expanding the government sector was 
soon contrasted with the Eraser's government's emphasis on the free market and reducing the role of 
government. This contrast sharply demonstrated to die electorate die distinction between die free-
market approach of the Liberal party and the more public-sector approach of the Labor party. 
Focusing on the 1980s, the electorate could be considered as more ideological with die rise of 
'post-materialism'. Post-materialism relates to 'quality of life concerns' such as die environment, 
equal rights for women and matters relating to nuclear energy. This account argues that post-
materialism has an important influence on electoral choice and has altered die ideological orientations 
of both the electorate and the political parties. Circumstantial evidence for this account is the success 
of the Australian Democrats, who have been advocates of post-materialist concerns, such as stopping 
uranium mining and greater protection of the environment. 
The second account focusing on ideology argues that ideology has become less important. UntU 
the 1960s, the Labor party was a strong advocate of government intervention and government 
ownership of economicaUy important industries. During die Whitiam era tiiis stance was modified, as 
no attempt was made to expand government ownership of industry. The Hawke Labor government of 
the 1980s has moved further away from die traditional ideological position of die Labor party. The 
Hawke government deregulated die banking and airline industries, pursues poUcies of partial 
privatisation of government-owned enterprises, and intends to end the government monopoly on 
telecommunications. The likely effect of diese changes is to undermine the political salience of 
traditional ideologies. 
The next account focusing on ideology would be tiiat the influence of ideology on electoral 
choice has remained more or less constant. Aldiough die position of the Labor party has moved 
towards a more free-market stance, die Liberal party has also moved towards a stronger free-market 
position. During the 1949-1972 coalition government, the government played a major interventionist 
role tiirough subsidies and tariffs, die maintenance of government-owned enterprises and monopolies, 
and a centralised wages system. During die 1980s, die Liberal party has been advocating a more 
radical free-market approach, such as total privatisation of government-owned enterprises, the 
deregulation of labor markets and possibly, the user-pays principle for education and healtii. 
Therefore, ideology has much die same level of political salience, since the relative ideological 
positions of the parties has remained constant. 
The final account focusing on ideology is that ideology has littie or no influence on electoral 
choice. This account may argue diat die bulk of the Australian electorate is not ideological and 
therefore, ideology has littie or no influence on political preference. Furthermore, ideology requires a 
level of political sophistication found only in a small minority of the Australian electorate. 
Issues 
The fourth group of accounts focuses on issues. The first account argues that issues have become 
more important. Compared with the 1960s, the average voter of the 1980s is more aware of issues 
and is more likely to vote on die basis of issues. During the 1980s, environmental issues had a high 
profile and die continuing poor performance of the Australian economy kept economic issues on the 
political agenda. The contention that issues have become more important can be suppiorted by 
reference to a more educated and more politically sophisticated electorate than was die case in earlier 
periods. 
The second account focusing on issues would argue that issues are less important now, compared 
with earlier periods. The great depression of the 1930s coincided widi sometimes quite devastating 
electoral defeats of incumbent governments. The fall of the Chifley Labor government could be 
attributed to the issues of nationalisation, rationing and strikes. During 1950s, issues such as die 
Korean war, die Petrov affair and communism, could all be understood as influencing voters. The 
1960s saw the addition of new issues to the political agenda, such as state aid to non-government 
schools and of course, Australia's involvement in the Viemam war. The political positions of the 
parties on these issues was generally quite distinctive, widi die Labor party and die conservative 
parties taking different positions. Since the late 1970s, no issue has appeared that has been as divisive 
as die Viemam war issue and both parties have simdar goals on die important economic questions. 
A third account argues diat the influence of issues on electoral choice has remained more or less 
constant. Although, political issues such as 'communism' and die Vietnam war have not arisen since 
die 1960s, it may be argued that economic issues of die 1970s and 1980s are just as important as die 
political issues of the 1950s and 1960s. 
A final accoimt concerning issues wotdd be that issues have, and continue to have, litde influence 
on vote. Such an account may argue diat die great majority of voters are unconcerned widi political 
issues, and if they do have an opinion on an issue, that opinion is most often a reflection of their 
partisanship. Only a very smaU proportion of die electorate could be considered issue voters and diis 
proportion has remained more or less constant. 
Candidates 
The final group of accounts of electoral change focuses on candidates, specifically the leaders of 
the major parties. The first account argues that Australian elections have become more 'presidential', 
with electors voting for their preferred prime minister, rather dian for a party to govern. Therefore, 
the popularity of die leaders has a more important effect on election outcomes. This argument could 
be supported by reference to the emphasis on leaders by the media and the increasing use of television 
rather than newspapers for the transmission of political information. 
The second account focusing on candidates argues that leaders have become less important as 
influences on electoral choice. This account may argue that earlier leaders, such as Curtin, Chifley, 
Menzies and Evatt, evoked both strong positive and negative feelings. In contrast, more recent leaders 
may not have evoked similar responses. Furthermore, Australians may have become more cynical 
towards the leaders of the major parties. There is circumstantial evidence to suggest that leaders are 
not as important now as they were during the 1950s. The impopular Fraser won the 1975 and 1977 
elections with landslide victories, whereas die charismatic and very popular Mr Hawke almost lost the 
1984 and 1987 elections. 
The third account focusing on candidates (leaders) argues that die effects of leaders has remained 
constant. It could be argued that the party leaders today evoke simdar responses to those evoked by 
the party leaders of earlier periods. Leaders have always been a major focus of Australia politics, so 
there is no reason to suggest that the effect of leaders has changed. 
The fourth account focusing on candidates or leaders is that leaders have no effect on vote choice. 
For the great majority of voters, evaluations of leaders are substantially coloured by partisanship. 
Labor partisans approve of Labor leaders and disapprove of Liberal leaders. The opposite is likely for 
Liberal partisans. In addition, the voters' evaluations of leaders of the government may be simply a 
reflection of the poptdarity or unpopularity of their government. Popular governments have popular 
leaders and unpopular governments have unpopular leaders. The recent adage diat a "drover's dog" 
could have lead die Labor party to victory (at die 1983 election) is an indication of tiie view tiiat the 
impact of leaders is very much exaggerated. There are also examples of leaders viewed as not 
particulariy popular almost winning elections: Calwell in 1961, Snedden in 1974, Peacock in 1984 and 
1990 and Howard in 1987. 
Summarising, electoral change can be understood in terms of changes in die effects of social 
structural factors, partisanship, ideology, issues and candidates, in die process of electoral choice. 
Each set of factors may have become more or less important, remained more or less stable, or have 
had littie or no impact on electoral choice. It should be noted tiiat diese accounts are not mutually 
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exclusive: changes in one group of factors, are likely to be associated with changes in one or more of 
die odier groups. 
Although some of these accounts may appear more plausible than others, their merits can only be 
adjudicated through extensive empirical investigations. The literature can give some guidance as to 
which of these accotmts are the most plausible. 
Investigating Electoral Change 
The investigation of the research question is important for the following reasons. First, these 
investigations aUow conclusions to be drawn regarding changes in electoral choice in Australia. The 
investigations can assess the accuracy of popular wisdom concerning Australian electoral politics. For 
example, conclusions can be made as to the influence on vote choice of particular issues, such as die 
Viemam war issues in the late 1960s, and economic and environmental issues during the 1980s. 
Similarly, hypotheses that partictdar leaders did or did not have substantial effects on vote can be 
investigated. 
Second, these investigations will give indications as to die future direction of Australia electoral 
politics. For example, will die erosion of major party support observed at recent elections be expected 
to continue, or was it simply a temporary aberration from a stable party system? More specificaUy, 
the findings of this study may indicate the behaviour of governments and political parties in die future. 
If issues have become more important then parties can be expected to avoid adopting unpopular issue 
positions. In contrast, if issues have become less important, governments may be more likely to make 
unpopidar decisions. Similarly, if leaders have become more important, die parties wiU be very 
sensitive to tiie popularity of their leaders, whereas if leaders are unimportant then parties will not be 
too concerned if they enter election campaigns with relatively impopular leaders. 
The investigation of change in tiie process of electoral choice involves three steps. First, the 
literature is reviewed to find which factors have been found to have substantial effects on piolitical 
preference' and where changes have occurred. The second step is to a construct a model of electoral 
choice. The next step is to analyse this model at different time points and compare tiie results. 
There are a number of problems involved in an investigation of the type proposed here; some are 
theoretical and others, empirical. 
The major dieoretical problems concern tiie specification of die model of electoral choice. Such a 
model is necessary, since the plethora of possible influences on electoral choice must be organised in a 
coherent and plausible manner. The model employed in this study is based on diat presented in The 
American Voter (CampbeU et al., I960) and modified during die 1970s. The model specifies 
partisanship and ideology, as long-tenn electoral forces and issues and leaders, as short-term electoral 
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forces. Long-term electoral forces have relatively stable influences on electoral choice, whereas die 
effects of short-term forces are more transient. Both partisanship and ideology are considered to have 
direct effects on vote and indirect effects mediated via issues and candidates. Partisanship is 
understood as sensitive to the effects of issues and leaders, the so-called 'revisionist' account of 
partisanship. Social-strucmral factors, such as occupational class, are specified as having no direct 
influence on vote, their relationship widi vote being mediated through long-term electoral forces. 
The empirical concerns surrounding this study arc die availability of data and the comparabdity of 
the measures. Seven data sets developed from national surveys of the Austialian electorate were 
analysed. Most of the data of diese data sets were collected at the following time points, 1967, 1969, 
1979, 1984-1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988. They are each representative samples of tiie Australian 
electorate. Unfortunately, national studies of political behaviour were not undertaken before the 1967 
smdy. Therefore, this study cannot consider electoral choice before this time. A second concern is 
that similar national surveys were not conducted between 1969 and 1979, not allowing electoral 
change to be Unked to specific events of the 1970s. 
Appendix 1 details the data used in the analyses, how it was coUected, the sampling procedures 
employed. The second part of the appendix focuses on the measures, specificaUy, the questionnaire 
items from which they were developed and the way in which responses to these items were combined. 
In summary die model of electoral choice was able to be analysed in each of the seven data sets. 
Therefore, asstmiing diat die model is correctiy specified and the data include all die important 
influences on electoral choice, the investigations carried out in diis thesis allow conclusions to made as 
to electoral change in Australia. 
Thesis Plan 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. 
Chapter 2 reviews die literamre piertaining to influences on political preference. The five sets of 
factors involved in die process of electoral choice - social stiiictiiral factors, partisanship, ideology, 
issues and candidates - are reviewed in mm. Factors belonging to each of diese sets have been shown 
to be associated witii political preference in tiie Australian context The chapter focuses on Austialian 
smdies, although reference to overseas smdies (mainly British and American) is made. 
Chapter 3 presents the model of electoral choice employed in diese investigations. The model 
specifies the relations between social strucmral and background factors, partisanship, ideology, issues, 
candidates and vote. 
Chapter 4 presents and discusses the results obtained from die analysis of die relationship between 
social strucmral and background factors widi partisanship. This chapter has two aims, first to identify 
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die social structural factors tiiat are and are not associated witii partisanship and second, to observe if 
changes have occiured over time. 
Chapter 5 focuses on ideology. The concept of ideology as comprising three separate dimensions 
is investigated. The restUts obtained in analyses of the relationships between social structural factors 
and die indicators of ideology are presented and reviewed. 
Chapter 6 investigates the second part of the model, die direct effects of partisanship, ideology, 
issues and leaders on vote. From these analyses, the factors that have significant relationships widi 
vote can be identified. Over time comparisons are made and the changes found are discussed. 
Chapter 7 investigates the confirmatory model of electoral choice. This model is based on the 
more exploratory investigations of die previous chapters, since only those concepts found important in 
eartier analyses are included in the model. This chapter presents and discusses changes over time in 
the direct and total effects on vote of the factors involved in the process of electoral choice. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis discussing the conclusions drawn from the smdy and relates diese 
conclusions to the accounts of electoral change presented in this chapter. 
1. Tolitical Preference' is a general term used to include both electoral choice (vote) and partisai^hip. 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In diis chapter literamre relevant to the research question is reviewed. Therefore, diis chapter 
reviews smdies on electoral choice and where possible identifies changes over time. The chapter 
contains six parts. The first five focus on tiie five sets of factors involved in die process of electoral 
choice, social-strucmral factors, partisanship, ideology, issues and candidates. The final part of die 
chapter, briefly summarises the Australian smdies and points to areas where this smdy can contribute. 
'Social-stmcmral factors' refer to the political effects of social location or social group 
membership. 'Partisanship' refers to psychological attachments voters have towards political parties. 
'Ideology' refers to long-standing political beliefs, goals and values. 'Issues' are die political and 
economic issues on die political agenda, especiaUy those issues which are considered to influence vote 
choice. The last of these factors, 'candidate evaluations', refers to the electorate's evaluations of the 
personalities of politics, the party leaders and other prominent political figures. In this chapter, the 
concepmalisation and measurement of, the factors in each group, and their influence on electoral 
choice are discussed. In the section on social-stmctural factors, die review is confined to die 
Australian literamre, since a great deal of work has been carried out in this area. In the later sections, 
reference is made to American and British smdies since diere is far less Australian literamre on 
partisanship, ideology, issues and candidates than on social-stmcmral factors. 
A number of considerations need to be kept in mind when reviewing the Australian literature. 
These concern matters of concepmalisation, measurement of concepts, die namre of the dependent 
variable employed, model specification, the statistical techniques employed and die limitations of die 
data. These concerns are particidarly relevant when endeavouring to come to conclusions about 
changes over time. 
The concepmalisation of tiie individual concepts is important because different understandings 
may ultimately lead to different empirical findings. There are some concepts on which researchers 
have in general, common understandings. For example, die concept of reUgion refers to religious 
denomination, as distinct from church attendance, belief in God or adherence to religious doctiines. 
Similarly, 'trade-union membership' refers simply to membership or non-membership of a trade union. 
The political orientation of die union, or whedier membership was compulsory or voluntary is 
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considered as irrelevant to the concept of tiade union membership. In contrast, tiiere are concepts 
which are understood in different ways. Social class may be concepmalised in terms of two classes, a 
working and middle class, in terms of several occupational groups, in marxist terms or more generally, 
by a number of class-related factors. There are several different approaches to die concept of 
'ideology', such as attimdinal consistency or constraint, underlying ideological dimensions or 
ideological self-placement. The evaluation of candidates can be understood in terms of how voters 
generally 'feel' about a candidate, or by their evaluation of the competency, integrity or charisma of 
the candidate. 
Other concepts may have generally agrecd-on conceptual meanings, but different measurement 
strategies may have been employed in empirical investigations. A simple concept such as religion 
may be measured in terms of being Anglican, Catholic, other Protestant or finer distinctions may be 
made within the 'other Protestant' group. Income can be measured as a high- and low-income 
dichotomy, in raw dollars or by distinguishing between a number of income categories. Education has 
been measured by the number of years spent in formal education or by completion of a primary, 
secondary, or tertiary education or simply distinguishing respondents who have only received a 
minimal education. 
An important issue to clarify is the namre of the dependent variable. In almost all smdies, die 
dependent variable has been party identification or vote. Although measures of these two concepts are 
highly associated, the two concepts are concepmally distinct and in comparing studies where the 
dependent variable differ this fact needs to be kept in mind. In this review, the terms 'political 
preference' and 'party support' are used to encompass botii vote and party identification. 'Electoral 
choice' refers to vote. 
Furthermore, these two concepts have been measured in different ways. Vote can be measured by 
vote at the last election or intended vote. It has been measured by vote for the Labor party or the 
coalition parties usually as dichotomous measures, although three-level indices (with minor party votes 
at the middle level) have been employed'. The party identification measure has been constmcted as a 
dichotomous measure of identification with the coalition parties or the Labor party, or as a diree- or 
seven-level index. In addition, the concept of lifetime vote has been employed which distinguishes 
between electors who have always voted for a major party or have changed dieir vote. 
A further consideration concerns the spiecification of the model of political preference analysed. 
Two general types of models have been employed, bivariate and multivariate models. Bivariate 
models posit a single factor as influencing political preference. Multivariate models asstime that 
political preference is influenced by a variety of factors. The distinction between bivariate and 
midtivariate models is an important one, since the restdts from bivariate models generally inflate the 
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influence of die single independent variable investigated, as otiier relevant factors have been excluded 
frt)m die examination (McAUister & KeUey, 1982:102). The precise specification of multivariate 
models is also important, as die results obtained will tend to vary according to die inclusion or 
exclusion of relevant^  independent variables. For example, the impact of social class on partisanship 
will appear greater when trade-union membership is omitted from consideration, since trade-union 
membership also has an impact on partisanship and is correlated witii class. 
A mrther consideration in reviewing smdies relating to electoral behaviour is the statistical 
technique employed. In bivariate analysis, cross-tabulations are often employed and occasionally 
summary bivariate statistics such as Pearson correlation coefficients. Several multivariate techniques 
have been employed in the investigation of multiple influences on partisanship or vote. In the 
analyses reported by Aiddn (1977 &, 1982b), the Automatic Interaction Detection metiiod (or AID 
analysis) which searchers sequentially for the variable which best distinguishes political preference was 
employed (Aitkin, 1982b: 110)^ The majority of die multivariate analyses investigating electoral 
choice in Australia employ the technique of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression which estimates 
the impact a factor has on political preference, net of other factors included in the analyses, estimated 
for the poptdation from which the sample was drawn"*. In this review the term 'regression analysis' 
refers to OLS regression. A related technique, logistic regression^ has been employed in a few 
Australian smdies (Jones & McAllister, 1989; Gow, 1990). 
In this review, the coefficients obtained from regression analyses are referred to. The coefficients 
(parameter estimates) are expressed either as raw coefficients or percentages. The raw coefficients 
denote die impact a one-tmit change in an independent variable has on die dependent variable, 
controUing for aU other independent variables. In the case of a dichotomous dependent variable, die 
raw coefficients obtained from OLS regression can be multiplied by 100 to denote die increase in die 
percentage likelihood of voting for or identifying with a particular party for tiiat category of an 
independent variable relative to the reference category. The raw coefficients estimated by logistic 
regression are more difficult to interpret, since the logistic fimction is not linear. 
Only a limited number of non-recursive models of electoral choice have been estimated in 
Australian data. Non-recursive models specify reciprocal (or two-way), effects between variables. In 
a comparison of leadership effects, Graetz & McAllister (1986) employed die regression based 
technique of two stage least squares. A more recent smdy of non-recursive effects between several 
predictors of vote employed die regression-based technique of 3 stage least squares (Jackman, 1988)*. 
The ability to reach conclusions about electoral behaviour in Austialia is limited by data. Most of 
die smdies reviewed in diese sections analyse data collected by die small number of surveys conducted 
on political attimdes and behaviour. The Australian National Political Attitudes (henceforth refen-ed to 
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as die ANPA) surveys were conducted in 1967 and 1979 (Aidcin, 1982a; Aidcin, Kahan & Stokes, 
1975). Field work was also carried out in 1969 reinterviewing the 1967 respondents and interviewing 
a small number of additional respondents (Aidcin, Kahan & Stokes, 1976). During die 1980s, a 
number of smdies have been carried out, diree National Social Science Study (hencefortii referred to as 
die NSSS) surveys of 1984 (Kelley, Gushing & Headey, 1987), 1986 (Kelley, Bean & Evans, 1986), 
1988 (KeUey, Bean & Evans, 1988) and die Australian Election Study (hencefortii referred to as die 
AES) surveys of 1987 (McAllister & Mughan, 1987a) and 1990 (Gow et al, 1990). In 1987, a 
proportion of die 1984 NSSS respondents were reinterviewed (KeUey & Bean, 1988a) creating tiie 
1984-87 panel. Although not designed to smdy poUtical behaviour, the 1973 Social Mobility Survey 
has been employed in several analyses of political behaviour in Australia (Broom et al., 1980). In 
addition to these large scale surveys, opinions poUs have been conducted which coUect data on voting 
behaviour and some social attributes. This source of data has been employed in die investigations of 
Alford (1963), Kemp (1978) and Jones & McAlUster (1989). Aggregate data has been employed in 
die investigation of the impact of die economic factors on vote (Mughan, 1987). 
In this review (and in the data, sampling and measures appendix) reference is made to the 
questions and variables of die ANPA, NSSS and AES studies. The letters 'Q' and ' V refer 
respectively to question and variable numbers in the questionnaires and codebooks. 
In reviewing Australian smdies of electoral behaviour, the concepmaUsation, measurement, namre 
of die dependent variable investigated, model specification, the data used and the statistical technique 
employed are mentioned in the text or stunmarised in an end-note. Table 2.3, found at the end of diis 
chapter, presents a summary of the multivariate studies analysing vote or party identification, 
conducted on data coUected in Australia. 
2.1 SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL FACTTORS 
There are numerous social factors which have been observed to be associated with political 
preference. These social factors include ascribed social attributes such as, class background, religion, 
region and ethnicity, and achieved characteristics such as class identification, income, trade union 
membership, education, reUgiosity and sector of employment. 
Social-strucmral accounts of political behaviour emphasise political cleavages, a term used to 
describe a social or cidmral attribute which defines die protagonists of a political conflict (Franklin & 
Page, 1984:526). According to Lipset & Rokkan (1967:13), the European nationalist and industrial 
revolutions of the last three cenmries created four basic political cleavages. The nationalist revolutions 
created two political cleavages, one between the dominant 'nation building culture' and odier culmral 
groups, and a second, between the more secular state and the estabUshed church. These cleavages 
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were reflected by political differences between regional, edinic and religious groups. The industrial 
revolution initiaUy created a political division between die old aristocracy and die new entrepreneurial 
class. Latter, tiie industrial revolution created conflicts between die employees and employers, forming 
die class cleavage (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967:14). PoUtical parties and movements were formed based 
on diese cleavages. According to diis analysis, diere are four basic political cleavages: social class, 
religion, region and edinicity. 
In addition to tiiese four basic cleavages tiiere a number of odier social factors which appear 
relevant to political behaviour. These include factors mainly relating to the class cleavage such as 
income, trade-union membership, class identification, education, housing tenure, self-employment and 
sector of employment. Religiosity measured by church attendance can be tmderstood as relating to die 
basic cleavage of religion. 
This section reviews the influence social-stmcmral factors have on political preference in 
Australia. SpecificaUy, these factors are class and class-related concepts, religion and religiosity, die 
regional factors, state of residence and urban or rural residency and finally, ethnicity. This framework 
foUows die four basic cleavages discussed by Lipset & Rokkan (1967). Political differences relating 
to demographic characteristics such as age and gender wiU not be discussed in this section, since tiiey 
are not generaUy considered as directiy influencing vote choice per se but can be attributed to 
differences in poUtical sociaUsation or issue preferences. These demographic characteristics are 
discussed in later discussions on partisanship, ideology, issues and candidates. Similarly, partisan 
background, that is the political preferences of a voter's parents, is discussed in die next part of this 
chapter on partisanship. 
2.1.1 Social Qass 
Social class has been viewed as die pre-eminent influence on electoral choice. In many western 
countries a simple association was evident, die political party or parties of die left have die support of 
die working class while the middle class support the party or parties of tiie right (Lipset, 1960:223-
224). 
The class basis of AustraUan politics has generaUy been taken for granted (Aitkin, 1982b: 118; 
Kemp, 1978:38-39). A simple association was considered to explain poUtical preference: die working 
class supports the Labor party and the middle class supports the Liberal party. In mral areas, the 
Country party, now the National party, represents the middle class. 
The Conceptualisation and Measurement of Social Class 
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There are a variety of ways in which the concept of social class has been understood. In political 
science and poUtical sociology, social class has been usually understood in terms of two major classes, 
a working class and a middle class. Otiicr undersuindings of class include: direc or more classes based 
on occupational groups, marxist approaches, socio-economic stams or in terms of a variety of class 
related factors, such as income, trade union membership, education and class identification. 
The most common understanding of class in electoral studies is that there are two classes, a 
middle class and a woiking class. The dieoretical basis for this dichotomous understanding of class is 
diat the middle class enjoys superior work and market simations compared widi the working class. 
Market simation refers to the possession of skills which are able to be sold on the market place for a 
given economic remm (Giddens, 1980:78). Work situation is defined by Lockwood (1958:15) as the 
set of social relationshif)s workers experience by virme of their p)osition in the division of labour. The 
distinction between the working and middle class corresponds to distinct maricet and work simations. 
This concepmalisation of class is measured by a dichotomous variable, based on whedier the 
respondent (or head of die household) works in a manual or non-manual occupation. This 
dichotomous measure of class is easy to constmct, reflects common-sense notions of social class and 
aUows convenient measures of class voting in a two party system .^ EmpiricaUy, this categorical 
measure of class is more relevant in terms of vote dian measures of social stams (KeUey & McAUister, 
1985; Robinson & KeUey, 1979). 
A second approach to the concepmalisation and measurement of social class is based on 
categorising occupational groups to different social classes. Instead of grouping occupations into the 
two broad categories of manual and non-manual workers, occupations are categorised into three or 
more class groupings. GeneraUy, distinctions are made between managers and professionals from 
other non-manual groups and between different levels of skiU among manual workers. The 
distinctions can be also justified theoreticaUy on the basis of differing maricet and work situations. 
In Australia, measures of class based on occupational groups have been employed in die analysis 
of electoral behaviour. In a bivariate analysis of party identification and occupational class, Kemp 
(1988:354) employed a five category measure comprising: professionals, semi-professionals, clerical 
and office workers, semi-skiUed and unskiUed workers. In the investigation of changes in the political 
preferences of die non-manual group over time, Kemp (1978:72) distinguished four non-manual 
occupational groups, managers and executives, professionals, smaU business workers, and clerical and 
sales woricers. In a similar analysis of changes in the relationship between class and vote over time, 
by Jones & McAUister (1989) a five category measure was employed, consisting of upper white-coUar 
workers, lower white-coUar workers, skiUed manual workers, otiier manual workers and farmers. 
15 
Support for die Labor and non-Labor parties between 1949 and 1969 was compared by Emy (1980) 
employing a nine-category measure based on census classifications^ 
There have been different ways of aUocating fanners to class groups. A separate category for 
farmers has been constiiicted in several smdies (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:285; KeUey & McAUister, 
1984 «fe 1985; McAUister & Mughan, 1987b). Otiier smdies have included farmers widi non-manual 
workers (Aiticin, 1982b: 126, footiiote; Aiddn & Kahan, 1974:454), or excluded diem from die analysis 
(Alford, 1963:70). 
The classical marxist understanding of class proposes two major classes consisting of a large 
proletariat and a smaU bourgeoisie, who own and control the means of production'. A distinction 
between social class and occupational class is made by Duke & EdgeU (1986-87) who reserve die 
concept 'social class' for marxist and neo-marxist approaches to class and 'occupational class' for 
diose approaches based on occupational group. The work of Lipset & Rokkan (1967) implies a 
classical marxist tmderstanding of class, widi a cleavage between capitalists and workers. This 
understanding of class may have been more or less empiricaUy equivalent to the manual non-manual 
division during die 19di cenmry (Burris, 1987; Przeworski, 1977:355), but cannot be regarded as 
equivalent in contemporary societies. Self-employment or its absence has been used as an indicator of 
marxist class location. Self-employed workers who employ workers have been categorised as part of 
the 'bourgeoisie' or capitalist class, while employees have been categorised as members of the 
proletariat (KeUey & McAUister, 1985; Robinson & KeUey, 1979). Self-employed workers who do 
not employ workers have been also been distinguished and categorised as 'petty bourgeoisie' (KeUey 
& McAUister, 1985). 
The concept of socio-economic or occupational stams is an alternative approach to social class. 
Occupational status has been extensively used in stams-attainment research and has been employed in 
the analysis of poUtical preference'". Socio-economic status is generaUy a composite measure based 
on occupational prestige, income and education (Bean, 1984:306). In one index employed in an 
Australian smdy of poUtical behaviour, higher professionals were scored at the top of the index widi a 
score of 100, lower professionals given a score of 70, and retaU salespersons a score of 51 (KeUey & 
McAUister, 1985). 
The definition of social class has been extended by Rose (1982) and other researchers (Franklin, 
1985b; KeUey & McAUister, 1985) to include other concepts relating to class. These odier aspects, 
termed dimensions of social class, include membership of tiade unions, sup)ervision, identification with 
the working class, minimtun education and tenancy in public housing. 
A separate issue in the conceptualisation and measurement of social class is the question of whose 
occupation is used to assign a class location. There are generaUy two alternatives, tiie occupation of 
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die individual, or die occupation of die 'head of die household'. This issue is of particular importance, 
in die assignment of class locations, to diose individuals not in die paid work force, such as die 
retired, die unemployed, smdents and 'housepersons'. In addition, tiiis issue is important to die class 
location of married working women. These groups are discussed in turn. 
Retired persons are usuaUy assigned a class location on the basis of dieir former main occupation 
(Erikson, 1984), probably a more suitable measure tiian dieir previous job, which may have been part-
time or casual. The aUocation of individuals to classes, based on their previous main occupation, is 
also appropriate for tiiose unemployed who have had a job previously. Using die previous job may be 
appropriate for tiie temporarily unemployed, but not for die long-term unemployed. An alternative 
procedure is to classify die unemployed and odier people receiving welfare benefits into a separate 
category (Rose & McAUister, 1986:51), or exclude diem from die analysis (Alford, 1963:351). 
The class location of smdents is problematic, since they usuaUy have not worked before entering 
coUege or university. Furthermore, if diey have a part-time job it wiU often bear littie simUarity to 
their employment after graduation. In most surveys of political behaviour, die proportion of mU-time 
smdents is very low and therefore this issue is of littie consequence. 
The class location of 'housepersons' may be based on their spouse's occupation, their previous 
main occupation, or in the case of women, their occupation before die birth of tiieir first child 
(Erikson, 1984; Heath & Britten, 1984). In many electoral smdies carried out in AustraUa, women not 
in the work force are assigned a class location on die basis of their spouse's occupation. Information 
on previous occupations was not coUected in die early smdies, leaving few alternatives (Aidcin, Kahan 
& Stokes, 1975 & 1976). 
The class location of married women in the work force is one of the more contentious issues 
regarding the concept of social class. The conventional view is to assign, such women a class location 
based on their husband's occupation. This conventional view rests on two assumptions. First, tiie 
famUy, rather than the individual, forms the basic unit of analysis and second; it is the occupation of 
the male breadwinner which determines the class location of the family unit (Goldthorpe, 1983 & 
1984). When a women's participation in the labour force has been intermittent and part-time, this 
method of assigning a class location wotdd appear reasonable. The increasing proportion of women in 
fuU-time careers casts doubt on the appropriateness of the conventional approach (Aiticin, 1982b:304-
305). In die majority of electoral smdies carried out in Austialia, class location is based on the 
occupation of the head of die household. The Australian surveys conducted during die late 1960s did 
not ask respondents dieir occupation, but ordy the occupation of the head of the household. In the 
case of pubUc opinion poU data, it was not always clear if die occupation of the respondent or of die 
head of household was coUected (Jones & McAUister, 1989). 
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PoUtical Preference and Qass 
InitiaUy, smdies which have measured class in terms of working and middle classes, or in terms 
of a larger number of occupational groups are considered. Next, other measures of 'class', based on 
self-employment and socio-economic stams are examined and finaUy, the influences of class related 
factors on political preference - income, supervision, tiade union membership, class identification, 
education, housing tenure, sector of employment, social context and class background - are reviewed. 
The Manual Non-manual distinction and Occupational Groups 
Early smdies of the relation between class (measured as a manual/non-manual dichotomy) and 
vote indicated that the association found in Australia between 1952 and 1962, was not as stiong as that 
observed in the United Kingdom, but stronger than that observed in the United States and Canada" 
(AU'ord, 1963:101-102). 
Alford's (1963) smdy did not show a very high correspondence between class and vote in 
Australia during die 1940s. In a sample coUected in 1943, 83% of manual woricers voted Labor. This 
percentage in part, reflects the high levels of Labor support in that sample. However, only 59% of die 
non-manual group voted for die Liberal and Country parties. These proportions were not very stable, 
3 years later (in 1946), the respective percentages were 72% and 65% (Alford, 1963:350). 
A stronger association was not observed in later years. From 1949 to the early 1960s, Labor 
support among manual workers and non-manual support for the conservative parties, ranged between 
60% and 70% (Alford, 1963:350). Therefore, during tiiis time, between 30% and 40% of each of die 
manual and non-manual groups did not vote for the party they should support, assuming a close 
relationship between class and vote'^ . 
There is debate as to whether or not the association between class and vote declined during the 
period from the end of the second worid war to the early 1960s. Perusal of Alford's data indicate an 
overaU decline in the association between class and vote (Alford, 1963:103,350), although die decline 
is attributed to a faU in support for Labor in Victoria, rather than a general decline in the relationship 
between class and vote. The decline in Victoria is attributed to the Labor spUt in which the 
breakaway Democratic Labor party (D.L.P.) received considered support from Catholics (Alford, 
1963:291). 
A number of bivariate smdies of the association between occupational class and vote indicate that 
occupational class groups became more similar in their political preferences between the late 1940s 
and the late sixties. Emy (1980) compared the levels of party support among occupational groups in 
the years, 1949, 1951, 1966 and 1969. Managers and professionals had become, more supportive of 
die Labor party. WhUe only 11% of professionals supported the Labor party in 1949, support had 
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risen to 23% by 1969. In most years, managers displayed very low levels of support for die Labor 
party but, in 1969, 22% of managers supported die Labor party. White-coUar woricers displayed 
marivcd flucmations in dieir support for political parties, from 39% supporting Labor in 1949, to 48% 
in 1951, 27% in 1966 and 38% in 1969 (Emy, 1980:197). 
The three groups of manual workers, skiUed, semi-skilled and unskiUed woricers displayed marked 
differences in dieir support for die Labor party. However, Labor support among tiiese groups 
declined. Labor support among die unskiUed group was: 79% in 1949, 85% in 1951 and 62% in 
1966. Labor support among semi-skiUed workers also feU: from 68% in 1949, to 47% in 1966. 
SkiUed manual workers also showed a decline in Labor support, from 61% in 1949, to 41% in 1969 
(Emy, 1980:197). 
Further evidence diat die association between class and political preference had decUned during 
the post-war years comes from the work of Kemp (1978:63-66). Kemp concluded that the explanatory 
power of class with respect to vote, decreased by 75% between 1946 and 1975'^ The decline was 
steeper after 1960 dian before (Kemp, 1978:66). 
In Kemp's analysis, changes in die levels of support for die major parties among several 
occupational groups were observed. Labor support rose marginaUy among the managerial and 
executive group, and among clerical and sales workers. Kemp (1978:77) estimated that, on average. 
Labor support among professionals increased by 2% every diree years. In contrast, support for the 
Labor party declined among smaU-business people (Kemp, 1978:72,75). 
The conclusion diat the association between class and political preference had decUned between 
end of the war and 1960 was not confirmed by the analyses of Jones & McAUister (1989)'". 
Employing a five-category measure of occupational class and controUing for other factors (including 
religion), the association between class and vote was foimd to be constant untU the middle of the 
1960s. In both the 1940s and 1960s, manual workers were over 30% more likely to vote Labor dian 
upper white-coUar workers. 
On die question of whether class voting had declined from die end of the war to 1960, the 
bivariate analyses (of Kemp) indicate a decline and the multivariate analyses (of Jones & McAllister) 
suggest littie or no change. This discrepancy can be accounted for by religion. Since the bivariate 
analyses did not control for reUgion, a decUne in class voting was apparent since Catholicism and 
membership of the working class are moderately associated. The impact of reUgion on vote was fotmd 
to decline substantiaUy between die 1940s and 1960s (Jones & McAllister, 1989). 
The first national smdy of electoral behaviour conducted in 1967 allows a more detailed 
examination of die association between class and political preference. In die 1967 ANPA data, die 
association between a manualAion-manual measure of class and identification witii the Labor party was 
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moderate. Of die non-manual group, 72% identified witii die Liberal and Country parties, whereas 
only 58% of die manual group, identified widi die Labor party (Aiticin, I982b:130)'^ In a 
multivariate (AID) analysis of identification witii die Labor party, occupational class was found to 
explain, a modest 10.5% of die variance (Aidcin, 1982b:lll-ll2)'^ 
Analysis of die 1979 ANPA also revealed a weak association between class and party 
identification. Of tiie non-manual group, only 51% identified witii tiie Liberal or National Counuy 
parties and only 63% of manual workers identified witii die Labor party. A multivariate analysis of 
diese data estimated tiiat white-coUar workers, net of other factors were only 11% more likely to 
identify witii die coahtion parties, compared widi blue-collar woricers (KeUey & McAlUster, 1985)'^ 
In a multivariate analysis of vote choice radier dian party identification, white-coUar woricers were 
found to be 14% less likely dian blue-coUar workers, to have voted Labor at die 1977 election 
(McAUister & KeUey, 1982). 
Comparison of tiie 1979 data widi die 1967 data, indicates tiiat die impact of die manual/non-
manual measure of class on political preference, declined during die 1970s. A much smaller 
proportion of tiie middle class identified witii die coalition parties, 51% in 1979, compared widi 72% 
in 1967. In contrast, die proportion of manual workers identifying widi die Labor party had 
marginaUy increased by 3% (Aiticin, 1982b: 130,319). Focusing on vote radier tiian party 
identification, die difference in die proportion of manual and non-manual workers voting Labor at the 
last election, was about 18% in 1979, compared widi 30% in 1967 (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:285). 
A multivariate (AID) analysis of largely the same variables showed that die overall explanatory 
power of occupational class in relation to party identification, had declined quite dramaticaUy, from 
10.5% in 1967 to 3.5% in 1979 (Aidcin, 1982b:303). A less dramatic decline is indicated by (OLS) 
regression analyses. The impact of social class, measured by die non-manual/manual distinction, on 
lifetime vote had declined from 0.08 in 1967 to 0.05 in 1979 (McAUister & Mughan, 1987b)'l hi 
an analysis of Labor vote, McAUister (1988a) found diat die effect of class on vote was 0.25 in 1967 
and 0.17 in 1979". SimUarly, Bean (1984:309) analysing vote found tiiat tiie coefficient associated 
witii occupational class, had declined from 0.23 in 1967, to 0.14 in 1979. 
Analysis of data coUected in 1983 also indicated a decline in class voting during die 1970s. In 
die late 1960s skiUed and odier manual workers were 33% and 39% more likely to vote Labor, dian 
upper white-coUar workers, compared widi 14% and 16% in 1983. Differences between upper and 
lower white-coUar workers also declined (Jones & McAUister, 1989). 
The 1984 NSSS survey provided a mrtJier time point, at which die relation between class and 
political preference could be investigated. Conclusions as to changes in the relationship are difficult to 
make, since comparative mtdtivariate investigations have not been performed. A further decline in die 
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relationship between class and vote, is indicated by bivariate analyses. The differences in Labor vote 
between manual and non-manual groups was only 13% in 1984, compared widi about 18% in 1979 
(Graetz & McAUister, 1988:285). Regression analysis also indicated a radier weak relationship 
between class and political preference at diis time. ControUing for partisan background, non-manual 
workers were fotmd to be only 5% less likely to vote for die Labor party than manual workers (Graetz 
& McAUister, 1988:292)^. 
Further analyses on the association between class and vote were performed on die 1987 AES data. 
A decline in the association between class and vote, between 1979 and 1987 was not indicated. 
McAUister (1988a) found that members of the working class were 19% more likely to vote Labor in 
1987, dian middle class respondents, compared with 17% more likely in 1979. 
Analysis of the second wave of die 1987 NSSS data indicated diat white-coUar workers were 8% 
more Ukely to vote for the Liberal and National parties in 1987. Further analysis of vote recaU 
questions in the same survey, fotmd that the impact of present location in the working or middle class 
was relatively constant between 1977 and 1987 (Bean & KeUey, 1988). This result is a mrdier 
indication that the relation between class and vote did not decUne mrther during the 1980s. 
An indication of die relationship between class and vote in the mmre comes from comparing die 
relationship between different age cohorts. Analysis of the 1987 AES data showed diat die association 
between the manual/non-manual measure of class and vote is lower, in each successively younger 
cohort (McAUister, 1988a:table 5)^'. When five age cohorts were employed, a weaker association 
between class and vote in yotmger cohorts was observed. The youngest cohort displayed a level of 
class voting one-sixth of that among the older cohorts (McAUister, 1990). 
Farmers 
The decline in the solidarity of die political preferences of occupational class groups contrasts 
with the stability of die poUtical preferences of farmers. Farm-owners displayed low levels of support 
for die Labor party: 15% in 1949, 28% in 1951, 14% in 1966 and 19% in 1969 (Emy, 1980). Further 
bivariate analyses also show a consistendy low level of Labor support among farmers, 21% in 1967, 
26% in 1979 and 18% in 1984 (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:285). 
In a multivariate model, farmers (relative to upper white-coUar workers) were less likely to vote 
Labor in 1982 than during the late 1960s (Jones & McAUister, 1989). However, the results obtained 
by Jones & McAUister (1989) may be more indicative of changes in the political preferences of upper 
white-coUar workers, than of changes among farmers. 
^ 
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2.1.2 Occupational Stams 
Only a limited amount of electoral research conducted in Australia has investigated die 
relationship between occupational stams and political preference. Analysing data coUected in 1965, 
Broom & Jones (1970) found that stams inconsistency^ ,^ had no clear effect on voting behaviour. An 
index of occupational stams was found to be not closely related to party choice in Australia (KeUey & 
McAUister, 1985). Using a four-category measure of socio-economic status. Bean (1984:306) 
concluded, that it makes no contribution to die prediction of vote choice. 
2.1.3 Self-employment 
In Austialia, the self-employed display a marked preference for the conservative parties. 'Self-
employment' is defined in terms of the employment stams of the head of the household" (Graetz & 
McAUister, 1988:285; KeUey & McAllister, 1985), or whether or die respondent is self-employed 
(McAUister & KeUey, 1982). A measiu-e of self-employment could not be constmcted from the 1967 
ANPA data. In 1979, Labor support was only 22% among the respondents whose head of household 
was self-employed. Support for the coalition parties was 76%. By 1984, this level of support (for the 
coalition parties) had decUned to 59% (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:285). Ui 1987, 69% of die self-
employed (defined in the same manner) voted for the coalition parties (McAllister, 1990). 
From a regression analysis of the 1979 ANPA data, McAUister & KeUey (1982) concluded that 
self-employed workers were 18% less likely than manual workers to vote Labor. Further analysis of 
this data showed almost identical results: the self-employed who employed workers (capitalists) were 
fotmd to be 19% more Ukely than employees, to identify widi the coalition parties. Approximately 
one ddrd of this effect of self-employment on party identification was estimated to be mediated 
through middle-class identificatioa The self-employed who worked for themselves and had no 
employees, die 'petty bourgeoisie', were found to be 8% less Ukely to vote Labor (KeUey & 
McAUister, 1985)^. 
2.1.4 Supervision 
Supervision has been included in several analyses of party preference. However, the political 
effects of supervision appear to have decUned since 1967. Analysis of die 1967 ANPA data, indicated 
that respondents whose head of household supervises other workers had 18% higher levels of support 
for die coalition parties dian otiier respondents. By 1979, die difference in die levels of support had 
declined to 8% and to 4% by 1984 (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:285). Analysis of die 1987 AES data, 
indicated Uttie difference between supervisors and non-supervisors, 53% of supervisors supported the 
coalition parties and 42% tiie Labor party (McAllister, 1990). 
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Multivariate analyses show supervision had only minimal effects on political preference until die 
early 1970s and has littie or no effect in data collected since diis time. A regression analysis of die 
1973 social mobiUty data revealed that respondents who supervised were 4% less likely to support die 
Labor party than non-supervisors (KeUey & McAllister, 1984). In the analysis of life-time vote, 
respondents who supervised were significantiy more conservative dian non-supervisors in 1967 but not 
in 1979 (McAUister & Mughan, 1987b). Multivariate analyses performed on the 1979 ANPA and die 
1984 NSSS data indicate tiiat supervision (measured by whether or not die head of the household 
supervises) had no direct impact on vote (Graetz & McAlUster, 1988:292; KeUey & McAUister, 1985; 
McAUister & KeUey, 1982)". 
2.1.5 Income 
Weaker relationships between income and vote than between occupational class and vote have 
been observed in several western nations (Inglehart, 1977:203-205). The political effects of income in 
Australia are also quite weak. In the 1979 ANPA data, the proportion of Labor and coalition 
identifiers was very similar in seven of the eight income groups^ *. The exception is the highest 
income group (about 6% of die sample), of whom 60% supported the coalition parties (Kemp, 
1988:354)". Differences between income groups in die levels of support for die coalition parties 
declined between 1967 and 1979 and again between 1979 and 1984. In 1967, support for die coalition 
parties was 36 percentage points higher in die highest income group compared with die lowest income 
group. In 1979 die difference was 20% and in 1984 only 4% (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:289)^ 1 
Multivariate analyses of the relationship between income and vote has revealed only moderate 
relationships. In the AID analysis of the 1967 data, Aitkin (1977:111) found that income could 
distinguish die political preferences of those in the non-manual class, with a working-class background 
and working-class respondents who were not members of a umon '^. In a regression analysis of the 
1979 ANPA data, an increase of $1000 in income was found to be associated with, a decrease of 0.3% 
in the probabUity of having voted for the Labor party at the 1977 election (McAUister & Kelley, 
1982)^. The direct effect of income on identification with the Liberal and National parties in 1979 
was described as modest (KeUey & McAUister, 1985). A voter earning twice as much money as a 
another voter was ordy 4% more likely to identify widi the conservative parties". Analysing the 
1987 NSSS election panel. Bean & KeUey (1988) found diat a rise of $10,000 in income was 
associated widi only a 3% increase in the probability of voting for the coaUtion parties^ .^ 
There is evidence that the effect of income on poUtical preference decUned between 1967 and 
1979. Employing die same model and using the AID technique, Aidcin (I982b:303) found diatthe 
effect of income on identification witii the Labor party declined between 1967 and 1979. SimUariy, an 
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OLS regression analysis of vote found income significantiy associated witii vote in 1967 but not in 
1979 (Bean, 1984:309). 
2.1.6 Trade-Union Membership 
In Austialia, there are considerable differences in the political preferences of trade-union members 
and non-members. In 1967, trade-union membership was associated with increased support for die 
Labor party amongst aU occupational categories (Aidcin, 1982b: 140). Littie change in diis association 
appears to have occurred over time. In 1967, 54% of respondents from trade-union households voted 
Labor compared widi 29% of respondents from non-trade union households. In 1979, die respective 
figures were 60% and 39% and in 1984, 65% and 45% (Graetz & McAllister, 1988:289). Similar 
restdts were obtained by McAUister (1990). In 1967, the difference in Labor support between 
respondents whose head of household was a union member and respondents whose head of household 
was not a union member was 25% in 1967, 19% in 1979 and 23% in 1987 (McAUister, 1990). 
Multivariate analyses also show that tiade-union membership has a substantial effect on political 
preference. In the 1979 ANPA and the 1984 NSSS data, tiade-tmion members were about 10% more 
likely to vote for die Labor party (Graetz & McAlUster, 1988:292; McAllister & KeUey, 1982). The 
figure of 10% is considerable, since in both models diis effect is net of partisan backgroimd. Of the 
four class-related measures included in an analysis of vote for the coaUtion parties - white-coUar 
employment, income, class identification and trade-union membership - trade-union membership was 
found to have the largest impact on vote at several elections (Bean & KeUey, 1988). 
There are contradictory findings as to changes during the 1970s in the relation between trade-
tmion membership and political preference. According to an AID analysis, trade-union membership 
could account for 6% of die variance in Labor identification in 1967, but only 3% in 1979 (Aidcin, 
1982b:301). In contrast, tiie findings of McAUister (1988a), suggest similar effects in 1967 and 1979. 
In 1967, trade-imion members were 19% more likely to vote Labor in 1967 and 17% more likely in 
1979. If die model is expanded to include subjective class and other attimdinal variables, a stable 
relationship is also indicated, tiade-union members being 14% more likely to vote for die Labor party 
in both 1967 and 1979. A closer correlation between ttade-tinion membership and other variables 
(with significant effects on vote) in 1979 than in 1967 may account for the discrepancy between, the 
results of Aiticin (1982b:301) and McAUister (1988a). 
No substantial changes in the relationship between trade-tmion membership and vote were found 
between 1979 and 1987 (McAUister, 1988a). 
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2.1.7 Class Identification 
Like tt-ade-union membership, class identification or subjective class is found to be consistendy 
associated widi vote choice. Bivariate analyses show that working-class identification is associated 
widi increased support for die Labor party (Aiticin, 1982b:130; Gold, 1980). In 1979, 61% of tiiose 
seeing diemselves as working-class supported die Labor party compared widi 34% of tiiose seeing 
themselves as middle class (Kemp, 1988:351). Differences between working-class and middle-class 
identification in support for tiie Labor party has steadily declined, from 35% in 1967 to 28% in 1979 
and 13% in 1984 (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:289). 
In most midtivariate analyses of party preference, class identification is found to be significantiy 
associated widi political preference, net of other factors including occupational class (Bean & KeUey, 
1988; Graetz & McAUister, 1988:292; Jackman, 1988:69; KeUey, 1988:71; KeUey & McAUister, 1985; 
McAUister, 1988a). In 1984, die impact of subjective class location was of approximately die same 
magnimde as the manualAion-manual measure of class (Graetz & McAllister, 1988:292). 
Regression analyses of the same model by McAlUster (1988a) indicate a decline of the effect of 
class identification over time, confirming the indications of tiie bivariate analyses. The respective 
coefficients were, 0.26 in 1967, 0.20 in 1979 and 0.12 in 1987 (McAUister, 1988a). A decUne in die 
impact of class identification between 1967 and 1979 was also found in the analysis of lifetime vote 
(McAUister & Mughan, 1987b). 
2.1.8 Education 
Education has been included in a number of analyses of poUtical preference. There are 
indications that differences in political support between groups diat achieved different levels of 
education have declined since 1967. In 1967, Labor support among those with ordy primary school 
education stood at 49% compared widi 37% of those with a secondary school education and 30% of 
those who received a tertiary education. By 1984, Labor support among the three groups was similar, 
57%, 54% and 56%, respectively (Graetz & McAlUster, 1988:285). 
In a regression analysis of the 1967, 1979 and 1987 data, where education was measured by 
distinguishing between those who had received only a minimal education from diose who had received 
more dian a minimal education, the impact of education on vote choice was found to have decUned. 
In 1967, those with ordy a minimal education were found to be 9% more likely to vote Labor, in 
1979, 6% and in 1987, less dian 1% more Ukely (McAUister, 1988a). 
When education is measured by years in formal education, no effect of education on political 
preference is observed (Bean, 1984:309; KeUey & McAUister, 1985; McAllister & Mughan, 1987b). 
This result, combined witii McAUister's (1988a) findings, indicate diat in die analysis of political 
25 
preference education is better measured in nominal terms, such as the level of education achieved 
radier than by a continuous measure of years in formal education. 
2.1.9 Housing Tenure 
The poUtical effects of housing tenure in Australia are moderate. Among manual workers, 
support for die Labor party in 1967 ranged from 51% for owner occupiers, 57% for home buyers 
(mortgagees), 65% for private renters and 87% for public tenants. Among die non-manual group, die 
equivalent figures for each group were, 26%, 29%, 34% and 50% (Aiticin & Kahan, 1974:466). The 
high level of Labor support among public tenants has Uttie overaU effect on political preference, since 
only about 5% of the population rent through pubUc agencies (McAUister, 1984). 
In a mtdtivariate analysis of the 1979 ANPA data, McAlUster (1984) found owner occupiers were 
4% less Ukely to support the Labor party, compared widi those who rent privately. No important 
differences were observed between mortgagees and owners (McAllister, 1984). The smaU impact of 
housing tenure on political preference has been attributed to die general consensus Australian political 
parties have towards housing (McAUister, 1984). 
2.1.10 Employment Sector 
Measures of 'employment sector' have been included in models of poUtical preference. 
Employment sector refers to whether the respondent (or die head of the household), works for the 
government or in private enterprise. Unfortunately, information on employment sector was not 
coUected in the 1967 ANPA survey so before 1979 comparisons carmot be made over time. 
In 1979, Labor support among respondents whose head of household worked in the pubUc sector 
was 12% higher than among respondents whose head of household worked in die private sector. By 
1984, die difference was 10% (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:285). A larger difference of 17% was 
found in die 1987 AES data (McAllister, 1990). 
Regression analyses have identified significant relationships between employment sector and 
political preference and littie differences are found comparing 1984 with 1979. In 1979, respondents 
whose heads of household were government employees were 7% less Ukely to identify with coaUtion 
parties than other respondents whose head of household was not a government employee (KeUey & 
McAUister, 1985). In 1984, government employees were 6% more likely to vote Labor than were 
private sector employees (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:292). However, diese two analyses had quite 
different specifications. 
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2.1.11 Social Context 
An additional class-related factor considered in smdies of electoral choice is social context. 
Social context refers to die political influences on voters of die class composition of die area diey live 
in. In both tiie United Kingdom and Australia support for the Labour (Labor) party in geographic 
areas is greater than that support expected, on die basis of die proportion in manual occupations 
(Butier & Stokes, 1974:121-128; Kemp, 1978:116-118; Kemp, 1988:340-344). ControUing for 
individual-level influences, Jones (1981) and McAUister (1987) conclude that there are only smaU 
contexmal effects on vote. McAUister (1987) argues tiiat the small contextual effects found in 
Australia are due to compidsory voting, where voters who would odierwise abstain from voting take 
cues from their local environment. 
The general conclusion is diat contexmal effects in Australia are small (Jones, 1981; McAUister & 
KeUey, 1983b). Excluding contexmal influences from the analysis of electoral choice wiU not 
markedly effect the results (Jones, 1981). 
2.1.12 Class Background 
Class background, measured by whether the voter's father had a manual occupation, appears to be 
associated widi party preference. However, ordy a limited number of studies have been carried out. 
In die AID analysis of the 1967, class background contributed to explaining the variation in 
identification with die Labor party among non-manual respondents (Aitkin, 1982b: 111-112). Widi 
respect to reducing the variance in Labor identification, it was the third most important predictor after 
occupational class and trade union membership (Aitkin, 1982b:303). However, regression analyses 
indicate class backgroimd has no general effect No significant relationship between fadier's 
occupational grade and vote was found in the 1979 ANPA data (McAUister & Kelley, 1982), nor with 
lifetime vote in bodi die 1967 and 1979 ANPA samples (McAlUster & Mughan, 1987b). 
2.1.13 ReUgion and ReUgiosity 
Religion has been viewed as a factor relevant to political preference. Generally, Australian 
CathoUcs have supported the Labor party and Protestants die conservative parties. The Labor party 
split of the middle 1950s created a splinter party, the D.L.P, which received much of its support from 
CatiioUcs (Alford, 1963:190-220). The D.L.P. has been regarded as a tiansition party, for middle-class 
CathoUcs to break dieir aUegiance witii die Labor party (Alford, 1963:208). 
The decline in religion as an influence on political preference appears to have occurred between 
the 1940s and 1960s (Jones & McAUister, 1989), covering the period of die Labor split. A similar 
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conclusion was reached by Kemp (1978:192), who found a 10% faU in CatiioUc support for die Labor 
party between 1947 and 1974. 
Bivariate analyses indicate weak associations between reUgion and political behaviour and littie 
change since 1967. Labor support is consistentiy highest among Cadiolics and tends to be lowest 
among non-Anglican Protestant denominations. In 1967, 51% of Cadiolics supported the Australian 
Labor party (A.L.P.), compared witii 42% of Anglicans (Aiticin, 1982b: 166). In 1979, 55% of 
CathoUcs identified with the Labor party, compared witii 44% of AngUcans and 35% of diose of otiier 
Protestant denominations (Kemp, 1988:352). In 1984, Labor support was found to be 59% among 
CathoUcs, 54% among Anglicans and 47% among those attached to the Uniting Church (Graetz & 
McAUister, 1988:284). Between 1967 and 1984 a higher proportion of each religious group voted for 
die Labor party, with a rise of 14% among AngUcans, 12% among Cadiolics and 15% among diose 
affiUated witii die Uniting Church (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:284). These results indicate littie 
change in the relationship between reUgious denomination and political preference, between the years 
1967 and 1984. 
Employing the AID technique, Aitkin (1982b:303-306) found an increase in the effect of religious 
affiliation on identification witii the Labor party in 1979, compared with 1967. In contrast, regression 
analyses indicate littie change occurred during the 1970s. In 1967, CatiioUcs were 13% more likely 
dian Protestants to vote for die Labor party and in 1979, 14% more likely (McAUister, 1988a). 
Similar effects of being Catholic on life-time vote in 1967 and 1979 were found by McAUister & 
Mughan (1987b). 
A decline has been observed in the association between reUgion and vote during the 1980s. In 
1987, Cadiolics were found to be 9% more Ukely to vote Labor than non-Catholics (apart from die no 
religion group), compared with 14% more likely in 1979 (McAUister, 1988a). Odier analyses which 
include measures of political background also indicate a decline in the effect of religion during die 
1980s. Analysis of die 1984 NSSS data indicated no significant effects of religious affiliation on 
Labor vote (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:292-293), altiiough significant effects were found in the 
analyses of vote at die 1977 election in tiie 1979 ANPA sample (McAlUster & KeUey, 1982). 
There is a tendency for those professing no religion to prefer the Labor party. In 1979, 52% of 
those who declared they did not have a reUgion identified widi the Labor party, whereas only 27% 
identified witii the Liberal party (Kemp, 1988:353). In 1984, 65% of tiiose witii no reUgion voted for 
die Labor party (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:284). A regression analysis of die 1987 AES data found 
diat those widi no reUgion were 16% more likely to vote for die Labor party (McAUister, 1988a). 
PoUtical effects of reUgiosity or church attendance have been observed. In 1967, only 33% of 
men who were regular churchgoers identified with the Labor party, compared widi 45% who 
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occasionaUy atiend church and 60% who never attended church. Among women, die differences were 
less striking, 33% of regular churchgoers identified with die Labor party compared witii 47% who 
never went to church (Aidcin, 1982b: 170). Religiosity is also associated widi higher levels of non-
Labor partisanship among manual workers (Gold, 1979). Church attendance was also observed to 
have an impact on vote in a multivariate analysis performed by Graetz & McAUister (1988:292-293). 
Between 1967 and 1979, church attendance, measured dichotomously by attending church more or 
less often dian once a mondi, was found to have marginaUy increased its effect on vote, from 0.04 in 
1967 to 0.10 in 1979 (McAUister, 1988a). Ui contrast. Bean (1984:309) found similar effects of a 
continuous measure of reUgiosity on vote in 1967 and 1979. Therefore, it is difficult to come to a 
conclusion about changes in the effect of church attendance on vote during die 1970s. 
The only smdy of changes during die 1980s come from the work of McAUister (1988a), who 
found simdar effects in bodi 1979 and 1987. 
2.1.14 Region 
The two aspects of region discussed relevant to Austialian politics are differences between die 
states and between urban and rural areas. 
State 
There are sizeable differences in terms of die vote parties receive and die swing between parties 
between the states at most federal elections. The difference in Labor vote between the states most 
supportive and least supportive of the Labor party often exceeds 10% (Bean, 1991). In addition, diere 
are instances where the swing in one state is in the opposite direction to the national swing (Bean, 
1991). However, no clear pattems between the states can be discerned. There is debate as to whedier 
die differences between the states are smaU and represent minor variations to a uniform pattern, or are 
indicative of considerable diversity between die states (Bean, 1991). 
No clear pattern of party support in relation to state of residence was observed in the analysis of 
the 1967, 1979 and 1984 data. In 1967, die Liberal and National parties had a greater proportion of 
supporters in each state. By 1984, the situation was almost reversed, the Labor party having more 
supporters dian die coalition parties in aU states except Queensland (Graetz & McAllister, 1988:267-
277). 
The differences in support for the Labor party between die states may be due to differences in die 
distribution of occupational class and class related factors. In a multivariate analysis of vote, 
McAUister (1988a) found only smaU political differences between die residents of New Soudi Wales 
and other states, net of social-class factors. An earlier smdy also found no significant differences 
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between die states diat could not be explained by reference to social factors (McAUister & KeUey, 
1983c). 
Urban and Rural Regions 
The Labor party tends to receive less support in rural areas than in die cities. Between 1946 and 
1972, the Labor vote was approximately 6% lower in rural areas than in urban constimencies (Kemp, 
1978:274). Residents of countty towns show a 15% lower level of support for the Labor party 
compared widi major urban areas (McAUister & Ascui, 1988:227). Bean (1991) calculated an average 
difference of 7% between metropolitan and non-metropoUtan areas, in the ten federal elections held 
between 1972 and 1987. The analysis of a multivariate model including partisan background, 
indicated tiiat in 1984, urban residents were 19% more likely to vote for die Labor party compared 
widi non-uri3an residents (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:292-293). 
There is evidence from bivariate analyses that differences in support for the Labor party between 
urban areas and mral areas have increased since 1967. In 1967 the difference was 7%, in 1979 11% 
and in 1984, 24% (Graetz & McAlUster, 1988:275). 
Midtivariate regression analyses also indicate that differences between rural and urban regions 
have increased since 1967. Living in an urban area had littie influence on vote in 1967, but in 1979 
and 1987 had considerable effects (McAlUster, 1988a). In 1967, urban residents were 3% more likely 
dian non-urban residents to vote Labor, in 1979, 13% more likely and in 1987, 12% more likely. 
2.1.15 Edinicity 
In Australia, political differences attributable to etimicity are apparent. In 1967, 38% of non-
British migrants identified widi die coaUtion parties and 30% widi the Labor party, while a high 
proportion (26%) had no party identification (Aiddn, 1982b: 157). In 1979, 57% of soutiiem 
Europeans identified widi the Labor party, compared with 37% of eastern Europeans, 33% of nordiem 
Europeans and 52% of those bom in the United Kingdom. These figures compare to the 44% of the 
Australian bom identifying witii the Labor party (Aitkin, 1982b:335). Since there are only smaU 
numbers of migrants in these samples, considerable sampling error is Ukely to be associated witii these 
estimates. 
Immigrant groups from southern Europe have shown an increasing tendency to support the Labor 
party (McAUister & KeUey, 1982). In 1967, 35% of tiiose bom in Mediterranean countries voted for 
die Labor party. This figure had increased to 52% by 1973 and to 57% by 1979; by 1984 it stood at a 
very high 72% (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:282; KeUey & McAUister, 1984"). 
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The tendency for soutiiem Europeans increasingly to support the Labor party is confirmed by 
multivariate regression analyses, hi the late 1960s, soutiiem Europeans were significant less likely 
(dian die Australian bom) to support Labor, by 1979 this difference had disappeared. Those bom in 
soutiiem Europe were 16% less Ukely to vote for tiie ALP in 1967, but in 1979, 2% more likely to 
vote Labor (McAUister, 1988a). Similar results were obtained by Bean (1984:309), who found diat 
southem Europeans, relative to tiie AustraUan bom, were 27% less lUcely to vote Labor in 1967 but 
were not significantiy different in 1979. The analyses presented by McAUister (1988b) also show an 
increase in Labor support among southem European immigrants between 1967 and 1979. The increase 
in support for die Labor party among soutiiem Europeans has been attributed to the policies of 
midticulmralism espoused by the Labor party since the time of the Whitiam government (McAUister & 
KeUey, 1983a). 
The evidence suggests that, since 1979, soutiiem Europeans have become more Ukely to support 
die Labor party. Regression analysis of die 1987 AES data found that those bom in southem Europe 
were 8% more Ukely to vote Labor, compared with 2% more Ukely in 1979 (McAUister, 1988a). 
McAUister (1988b) found an increase of 4% in Labor support among southem European immigrants 
between 1979 and 1987 and comments that the alliance between southem Europeans and the Labor 
party is an enduring one. 
In contrast to southem European immigrants, eastem Europeans exhibit low levels of support for 
the Labor party. Support for the Labor party among east Europeans stood at 38% in 1967, 41% in 
1973, 27% in 1979 and 47% in 1984 (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:282; KeUey & McAUister, 1984). In 
1987, die level of Labor support had declined to 23%, widi a substantial 71% of east Europeans voting 
for the coalition parties (McAUister, 1988b). 
Mtdtivariate analyses confirm that East Europeans are less supportive of the Labor party 
controUing for otiier social-stmcmral factors (McAUister, 1988b; McAUister & KeUey, 1983a). 
Therefore, the differences in party support between East Europeans and the AustraUan bom is 
attributed to birthplace per se. The low levels of support for die ALP among East Europeans has been 
attributed to the anti-communist sentiments of East Europeans, engendered by the commimist 
governments in their countries of origin. The portrayal of the Labor party as being sympathetic to 
communism may have led to a rejection of the Labor party (Aitkin, 1982b: 158-159; KeUey & 
McAUister, 1984; McAUister & KeUey, 1983a). 
Support for the Labor party among East Europeans has decUned since 1967. Bean (1984:309) 
found that East Europeans were less Ukely to support Labor in 1979 than in 1967. The coefficient 
increased in magmmde from 0.15 to 0.19. A more dramatic change was found by McAUister (1988a). 
In 1967, those bom in eastem Europe were 10% less likely than the AustraUan bom to vote ALP, in 
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1979 and 1987, 30% less likely (McAUister, 1988a). A decline in botii tiie estimated and acmal Labor 
vote among East Europeans, between 1967 and 1987, was observed in a slightiy different analysis 
(McAUister, 1988b). 
The levels of support for the Labor party among Northem Europeans immigrants (mainly from 
tiie United Kingdom) are generaUy slightiy higher dian diose of die Australian bom. Forty per cent of 
northem Europeans voted Labor in 1967, 52% in 1973, 50% in 1979, 58% in 1984. The respective 
figures for tiie Austialian bom were 40% in 1967, 48% in 1973, 46% in 1979 and 54% in 1984 
(Graetz & McAUister, 1988:282; KeUey & McAlUster, 1984). In 1987, nordiem European immigrants 
supported the Labor party at a level of 53% compared with 45% of the Australian bom (McAUister, 
1988b:13). 
Multivariate analyses indicate that there are only minimal political differences between northem 
Europeans and the Australian bom, net of other social-strucmral influences (McAUister & KeUey, 
1983a). Analysing data coUected in 1987, McAlUster (1988b) found that those bom in northem 
Europe were 8% more likely to vote for the Labor party compared with the Australian bom. Only 1% 
of diis difference could be attributed to birdiplace per se, die remaining 7% being attributed to social-
stmcmral factors. Littie effect attributable to birthplace was also found in die analysis of die 1979 
ANPA data (McAUister, 1988b). 
The social-stmcmral factor important among northem Europeans immigrants appears to be trade-
union membership. Separate analyses of each of the major ethnic groups revealed that class related 
factors were less associated with poUtical preference among immigrant groups, than among the 
Australian bom The exception was trade-imion membership among northem European immigrants, 
which had a stronger association with Labor support than among the AustraUan-bom (KeUey & 
McAUister, 1984). 
Separating British immigrants from other nordiem European inunigrants revealed that the two 
groups are poUticaUy dissimilar. In 1979, immigrants from die British Isles showed a 7% higher level 
of support for the Labor party, compared with die overaU level of Labor support. In contrast, diose 
from northem Europe exhibited 12% higher levels of support for the coalition parties (Bean, 1984:252-
254). However, separating immigrants from the British Isles and Northem Europe, did not reveal 
significant political differences between these two groups and the AustraUan bom due to birthplace per 
se once social factors are controUed for (Bean, 1984:309). 
2.1.16 Summary of Social-strucmral Influences 
There are a number of conclusions diat can be drawn from tiie literamre. The relationships 
between occupational class and vote remained more or less constant from the end of world war II until 
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die 1960s. A decline is only apparent when changes in die influence of religion are not considered. 
After die 1960s the relationship declined until the end of die 1970s and appears to have remained 
more or less constant since diea Labor support is highest among manual workers and lowest among 
managers and professionals. Over time, tiiese differences have become smaUer. Farmers have 
consistentiy displayed quite low levels of support for die Labor party. 
Focusing on the class-related factors, self-employment is associated with high levels of support 
for the coalition parties, although this support may have weakened during the 1980s. Measures of 
occupational stams appear to have no independent effect on political preference. The political effects 
of supervision were smaU in 1967 and have declined since the 1970s. Income has a small effect on 
political preference and its effect also appears to have decUned since 1967. Trade-union membership 
is associated widi increased support for the Labor party; this relationship probably remained more or 
less constant between 1967 and die 1980s. Class identification is quite strongly associated with 
political preference, but again a decline since 1967 appears to have occurred. Differences in education 
level achieved are also associated with political preference and these differences are becoming less 
apparent. Housing tenure is not strongly associated with poUtical preference in Australia. There are 
ordy minimal effects of social context on political preference after controUing for individual 
characteristics. Government employees tend to be more supportive of the Labor party than are private 
sector employees. Class background has been found to be associated with political preference by AID 
analyses but regression analyses show littie or no effect. 
CathoUcs are most supportive of the Labor party, and non-AngUcan Protestants tend to be the 
least supportive. Voters professing 'no reUgion' display an increased tendency to support the Labor 
party. The influence of reUgious denomination on political preference declined sharply between the 
1940s and 1960s. Between 1967 and 1979 the relationship remained constant and a small decUne may 
have occurred during the 1980s. Religiosity measured by church attendance is associated widi 
increased support for the coalition and over time changes in its influence are not conclusive. 
There are political differences between the states in terms of both the levels of party support and 
the swings between parties from election to election. However, there is no discemible pattem and 
relationships between state of residence and political preference, net of other social-stmctural factors 
have not been observed. Rural regions are more conservative than urban regions and this difference 
increased between 1967 and 1979. 
Soudiem Europeans were more likely to support the conservative parties in 1967, but since this 
time have shown an increasing tendency to support the Labor party. Eastem Europeans were more 
likely to support die coalition parties in 1967, tiiis disposition strengtiiening during the 1970s. There 
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are no important political differences between the Northem Europeans from the Australian bom, once 
social-stmcmral factors are controUed for. 
2.2 PARTISANSHIP 
The concept of partisanship is central to the investigation of electoral choice. To the 
overwhelming majority of voters, vote choice is based on die attachments electors have to political 
parties, rather than rooted in their social location. The section wiU discuss several aspects of 
partisanship: die concepmalisation of partisanship, its measurement, the relationship between party 
identification and vote, and the origin and development of partisanship. In this section a distinction is 
made between the concept 'partisanship' and die most commonly used measure of partisanship, 'party 
identification'. 
2.2.1 The Concept of Partisanship 
Partisanship is defined as a long-term affective attachment to a political party (CampbeU et al., 
1960:121). The concept of partisanship incorporates two elements, an extended • - .' period and 
partisan feeUngs of some intensity (Converse & Pierce, 1985). Partisanship can be understood as 
mediating the relationship between social-stmcmral factors and vote (CampbeU et al., 1960:26-31; 
Goldberg, 1966; Knoke, 1976:71). Furthermore, the concept of partisanship is compatible widi group 
norms (Gold, 1980) or party loyalty (Alford, 1967:68-70) explanations of the relationship between 
social factors and vote. 
Partisanship explains why candidates endorsed by major political parties have a far better chance 
of election, even if they are generaUy unknown to die electorate. In cases where members of 
parUament have resigned from their parties and sought re-election in the seat they had held, it is usual 
that they receive far fewer votes than the candidate endorsed by their former party. 
Partisanship is a low-cost mechanism by which voters can be involved in die fX)litical world. 
Party identification gives cues to electors that aid in their understanding of the politics and guide their 
beUefs and attimdes (MUler, 1976:23). Since the cost to the individual voter in being informed on 
political issues and economic poUcies is high, partisanship provides a basis on which such political 
information can be processed. 
Other Related Concepts 
Partisanship is a concept distinct from otiier related concepts such as, party loyalty, membership 
of a political party and importantiy vote choice. 
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The concept of partisanship should not be confused widi party loyalty (Jenson, 1975). Party 
loyalty is a measure of die consistency of vote choice during an elector's adult life. Partisanship is 
defined as the psychological attachment to a political party. Party loyalty is associated with 
partisanship and smdies have indicated tiiat stronger partisans tend to vote more consistentiy for 
candidates of the party with which tiiey identify tiian do weaker partisans (Aiddn, 1982b:42-43). 
Furthermore, partisanship is a concept distinct from membership of a political party (CampbeU et al., 
1960:121). However, members of poUtical parties are very likely to identify themselves with the 
political party they have joined. 
There are four reasons why partisanship is distinct from vote choice. First, partisanship refers to 
a voter's psychological attachment to a political party, whereas vote is an act at a particular point in 
time. Second, it is unUkely that voters make dieir choice de novo at each election - most voters 
having a general political disposition (Aiticin, 1982b:26). Third, the great deal of stabiUty in both 
voters' voting behaviour arid the party system can be attributed to partisanship (Aitkin, 1982b:36-37). 
In addition, there is empirical evidence that partisanship is more stable than vote. 
The ratio of those who changed their vote without changing their party identification to those who 
changed tiieir party identification and not their vote was 2.5:1 between 1967 and 1969 and 2:1 
between 1984 and 1987 (calculated from results presented by Aiticin, 1982b:41; Bean & KeUey, 1988). 
This ratio is similar to diat observed for the British electorate but is smaUer than the ratio of 8:1 
calculated for the American electorate (Butier & Stokes, 1974:41-42; Thomassen, 1976:77). However, 
the American ratio becomes comparable to the British, if American independents or British Liberals 
are excluded from the calcidation (Cain & Ferejohn, 1981; Mughan, 1981). 
The Classical and Revisionist Conceptions of Partisanship 
The original (or Michigan) concepmalisation of partisanship was as a stable, affective and positive 
attachment to a major poUtical party, a uni-dimensional concept incorporating both direction and 
strength. Furthermore, partisanship referred to a general, not a sp)ecific attachment to a federal or state 
parliamentary party. In contrast, the revisiomst model maintains that partisanship is less stable than 
originaUy conceived and has a larger rational component The important difference is that, die 
revisionist model considers partisanship sensitive to contemporary poUtical stimuli, such as issues and 
leader evaluations. 
The classical model of partisanship developed by the Michigan school maintained that 
partisanship was a stable disposition towards political parties (CampbeU et al., 1960:148). Partisanship 
can change in response to significant shifts in social mUieu, such as marriage or a new job (CampbeU 
35 
et al., 1960:149). The autiiors point out tiiat such changes in party identification are rare, influencing 
approximately one elector in twenty (CampbeU et al., 1960:150). 
Empirical smdies have confirmed tiiat changes in party identification are infrequent. Only 20% of 
American voters were found to have changed dieir party identification tiiroughout tiieir Ufetime 
(CampbeU et al., 1960:149). The analysis of panel smdies carried out in die United States during die 
1950s and again in die 1970s, indicate diat partisanship is one of the most stable attimdinal measures 
(Converse, 1976b; Converse & Markus, 1979; Jennings & Markus, 1984). During times of poUtical 
stability, most of die changes in party identification appear to be random (Dreyer, 1973). 
In contrast to those smdies cited above, tiiere are a niunber of smdies which indicate diat 
partisanship was not as stable as originaUy conceived. The random changes noted by Dreyer (1973) 
were found more frequentiy among those with high levels of poUtical involvement (Dobson & St. 
Angelo, 1975). The instabiUty of partisanship during the short period of an election campaign was 
found to be similar to that found over the much longer time period of a panel study (Meier, 1975). 
Meier concluded diat party identification was more unstable dian generaUy assumed. Botii AUsop & 
Weisberg (1988) and Brody & Rotiienberg (1988) also smdied party identification over an election 
campaign and found a great deal of change in party identification. However, the changes were mairdy 
in the strength of party identification widi less than a quarter of the sample changing die direction of 
dieir identification and only 12% acmaUy changing parties (Brody & Rotiienberg, 1988). 
In Australia, the proportion of the electorate with stable party identifications is very high. A high 
association was observed between first partisanship and present partisanship in data collected in 1979 
(McAUister & KeUey, 1985). The stabiUty of party identification during the 1980s was found to be 
greater or at least comparable widi die stabUity observed during the late 1960s. In the 1984-1987 
panel smdy, the proportion of tiie electorate widi stable identifications at bodi waves was 92%, 
compared witii 87% in tiie 1967-1969 panel smdy (Bean & KeUey, 1988). 
The concept of party identification was originaUy conceived as an affective orientation by an 
individual to a poUtical party (CampbeU et al., 1960:121). Rooted in the psychology of social groups, 
party identification is understood as a non-rational identification with a party (MiUer, 1976). However, 
the original concepmalisation did have a rational component. Changes in party identification may also 
occur rationaUy, as a response to intense feelings an individual may have about issues or candidates, 
which conflict widi die party the voter identifies widi (CampbeU et al., 1960:169). Therefore 
according to the classical view, changes in party identification can in rare circumstances, be a rational 
response to contemporary political stimidi. 
The revisionist account of party identification contends that identification with a party has a larger 
rational component and is in general, sensitive to contemporary political stimuli. Voters are 
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considered as identifying widi a political party, because that party is perceived as having better 
poUcies, more competent representatives, or as best serving the voter's interests. In contrast to the 
original formidation of partisanship as an affective attachment, the revisionist school contends tiiat 
partisanship has a larger rational component (Fiorina, 1981:86-102; Page & Jones, 1979). 
One revisionist account of partisanship argues that partisanship is adjusted on die basis of die 
performance of the incumbent party, a running-balance taUy of the electors' evaluations of die parties 
(Fiorina, 1981:74-83,84). Party identification is understood as a function of prior expjeriences witii 
political parties (Fiorina, 1977). The subsequent identification is a rational response of the voter, to 
the perception of the effects of party policies. Changes in party identification are therefore attributed 
to the accumulation over time of rational responses to issues and otiier short-term poUtical stimuli. 
The two models of partisanship are compatible. Party identification through group membership 
may be both affective and rational: affective, because attachments to parties may occur through die 
socialising influences of family or social group membership, and rational because that party may better 
serve the interests of individuals or groups. Identification through the influence of group norms can 
also be seen as rational, since rational voters also seek to minimise the costs of obtaining political 
information (Goldberg, 1969). Partisanship can be tmderstood as comprising both cognitive and 
affective components, the cognitive component being tiie abUity to rationaUy evaluate information 
pertaining to political parties (Gant & Luttbeg, 1987). Similarly, Shively (1980) concludes diat party 
identification is a mix of a 'standing decision' and responses to contemporary political stimuli. 
The emphasis of the Michigan model is on positive rather than on negative orientations towards 
parties. Altematively, partisanship may incorporate negative feelings towards other parties (Crewe, 
1976:50; Maggiotto & Piereson, 1977). Party identification is found to be a composite measure of 
loyalty to one party and hostiUty to the odier party (Maggiotto & Piereson, 1977). Between 40% and 
55% of the American electorate have positive feeUngs towards one of the parties and negative feelings 
toward the other party (Stanga & Sheffield, 1987). American electors were in general found to 
understand the terms RepubUcan and Democrat as inversions of one another (Bastedo & Lodge, 1980). 
In Austialia, Bean (1984:377) foimd that party identifiers tend to express a high number of likes to die 
party diey identify with and express dislikes to the odier major party. 
The original concepmalisation of partisanship in die United States considered party identification 
to be a single imderlying dimension ranging from stiong identifiers through to weak identifiers of one 
party, to independents, through to weak and stiong identifiers of the other party. Attachment to one 
political party is understood as part of the same continuum, as attachment to the odier party and 
independence. Non-partisans and independents are understood as a half-way along die continuum. 
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More recentiy evidence has suggested that tiiis uni-dimensional concept of partisanship requires 
modification. Several smdies conducted in America have found two separate dimensions of 
partisanship - partisanship and independence (Katz, 1979; Valentine & Van Wingen, 1980; Weisberg, 
1980). Weisberg (1980) argued that the identification as a Democratic, RepubUcan or an independent 
should be viewed as separate dimensions. In the United States, the argument that partisanship has two 
or more dimensions has mrther implications. The correlations between party identification and 
candidate evaluations are much stronger among respondents who perceive the parties as forming a one-
dimensional continuum, than among other respondents (Jacoby, 1982). Therefore, diere appears to be 
a degree of heterogeneity in the relationship of party identification widi other factors. 
In federal systems where there are multiple levels of government, partisanship can relate to the 
parties at a specific level of government, or to a general orientation, independent of the level of 
government. There are two schools of diought concerning party identification in federal systems. The 
original concepmalisation of party identification saw the level of government as irrelevant, whereas 
other researchers have argued that the concept of partisanship should be related to a level of 
government (Niemi, Wright & PoweU, 1987). 
A proportion of the electorate, identify with different parties at different levels of government. In 
the United States, approximately 20% of the electorate identify with different parties at die Federal and 
state levels (Niemi, Wright & PoweU, 1987). In Australia, the proportion of die electorate identifying 
with different parties at the state and federal levels increased from 6% in 1967 to 11% in 1979 
(Aiddn, 1982b:286). 
2.2.2 The Measurement of Partisanship 
Partisanship is usuaUy measured by three questions, asking voters about the party widi which they 
identify with. It is one of the few concepts in the social sciences which has a standard measiu-e 
(Petrocik, 1974). In the United States, party identification is measured by initiaUy asking respondents 
if diey see themselves as a Democrat, Republican or independent and then subsequentiy asking diem, 
how strong is that identification. Those who, in response to the initial question, do not indicate a 
party identification, are asked if they have a leamng towards a political party^. 
In Austialia, a simUar group of questions is employed, although the 'independent' option is not 
included in the initial question^ .^ The second question on the strength of identification has been 
asked in almost aU AustraUan election smdies, the major exception being the second wave of the 
1984-87 NSSS election panel. The tiiird question on partisan leanings is not included in die surveys 
conducted during die 1980s, except the second wave of die 1984-87 election panel. Similar questions 
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to those used in AustraUa have been employed in the measurement of party identification in Britain 
(Crewe, Sarlvik & AU, 1977). 
There are a variety of ways of categorising the responses to the party identification questions. 
The subsequent questions can be ignored to form a diree category measure of RepubUcan and 
Democrat identifiers and independents (Converse, 1966; Nie, Verba & Petrocik, 1979:70-73). In some 
smdies, independent leaners (that is respondents who initiaUy declare diemselves independents or non-
partisans and subsequentiy admit to a leaning to a party) are combined with weak partisans (Markus, 
1988). In American smdies, the responses to the party identification questions are most often used to 
constmct a seven point index of party identification which incorporates both direction and strength. 
Five and three point classifications can also be constmcted, by combining categories of the seven point 
scale. 
Indices similar to the American index can be constmcted from die responses to die Austialian 
party identification questions. However, in investigations carried out on data collected in Australia 
mostiy dichotomous or three-level indices have been employed. Party identification has been 
measured as identification with tiie Labor party contrasted with not identifying with diat party (Aitkin, 
I982b:l 11,307), identification witii either of the coalition parties (KeUey & McAUister, 1985) or as a 
three point index (Bean & KeUey, 1988; KeUey, 1988:71). The seven point index was extensively 
employed by Aitkin (1982b) and also by Jackman (1988). 
Other Indicators of Partisanship 
There are several other indicators of partisanship besides party identification. An altemative 
measure of partisanship employs notions of support and closeness for parties rather than how voters 
tiiink of tiiemselves politicaUy (Dermis, 1988a & 1988b; Weisberg, 1983). This index appears to 
measure the imderlying concept of partisanship as weU as the tiaditional measure of party 
identification (Weisberg, 1983). In Austialia, a question on 'closeness' to political parties was used in 
die AustraUan values smdy (Edgar et al., 1986:Q7a-c). However, only 25% of this sample considered 
themselves close to a party. 
Another indicator of partisanship are voters' attitudes towards the parties. These questions 
attempt to measure the negative feeUngs respondents have towards parties, as weU as positive 
attachments. The addition of such a measure to tiie standard measure of party identification improves 
the abiUty to predict voting preferences (Maggiotto & Piereson, 1977). Attimdes towards die parties 
can be measured by asking respondents their likes and disUkes towards the parties (Bean, 1984:369; 
Nie, Verba & Petrocik, 1979:57; Wattenberg, 1981 & 1982), or how warm or cold tiiey feel toward a 
party on a 'feeUng tiiermometer' (Converse & Pierce, 1985; Feldman & Zuckerman, 1982; Weisberg, 
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1980). Questions on likes and disUkes towards die parties were included in die tiiree ANPA surveys 
and feeUng thermometer questions have included items on die poUtical parties in die 1986 and later 
NSSS surveys. 
Issues Concerning the Measurement of Party Identification 
There are a number of issues conceming die measurement of party identification. These are the 
option of independence, other effects of question wording, the classification of respondents who 
identify with minor parties and questions on the transitivity and cardinality of the index of party 
identification. 
With the American measure the option of 'independent' is offered in die initial question. In 
Australia and Britain this option is not presented. The notion of an 'independent' has a certain 
currency in die United States, whereas in Britain and AustraUa it usuaUy refers to candidates not 
endorsed by political parties. The omission of the term independence does cast doubt on the 
appropriateness of comparisons of party identification between Australia and the United States. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that the concept of independence in the American context is 
inappropriate. When the term 'independent' is omitted from the American question, the proportion of 
independents declines substantiaUy (Kenney & Rice, 1988). Many respondents of the (United States) 
1968 presidential election survey mistook the term 'independent' for the American Independent party, 
die party of presidential candidate George WaUace (CampbeU, 1980:88). Uidependent leaners may 
understand the third party identification question as a question on intended vote, since die cortelation 
between party identification and vote is higher in this group (Shively, 1980). Furthermore, 
independent leaners appear to be more partisan than independents (Keith et al., 1986; LeBlanc & 
Merrin, 1979). 
A mrther issue relating to question wording is the inclusion of the names of the parties, in the 
initial question asking respondents to declare dieir partisanship. Two party-identification questions 
were included in separate West German surveys, one in which the names of the parties were presented 
and the other simply asked if respondents considered themselves a supporter of a party or not (Kaase, 
1976:87). In response to the question where die parties are named, 54% of die electorate expressed a 
party identification, whereas when die names were omitted, the level of partisanship dropped to 28%. 
These changes coidd not be accoimted for by changes in the level of partisanship, since ordy two years 
separated the smdies. In die party identification questions employed in Australian studies, the names 
of die parties are always included in the initial question. However, the wording of question has 
changed sUghtiy, the Democratic Labor party is included in the ANPA surveys conducted in the late 
1960s, and die Australian Democrats in surveys conducted since 1977. 
40 
The responses to the initial party identification question are sensitive to whetiier a general 
attachment is asked for, or die respondent's identification at tiiat particular point in time. Substimting 
tiie words 'GeneraUy speaking' for 'In Politics as of today' has a substantial effect on die distiibution 
of partisanship (BorteUi, Lockerbie & Niemi, 1987). hi Australia, die phrase 'GeneraUy speaking' has 
always been employed in the initial party identification question. 
There are differences in the wording of the question on the strength of identification in the 
Australian smdies. The ANPA and NSSS surveys refer to the strength of the voter's 'feeling' (Aiddn, 
1982a:V104; Aiddn, Kahan & Stokes, 1975:V134; 1976:V101; KeUey, Bean & Evans, 1986:Q22b, pg. 
11; 1988:Q23b, pg. 12; KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:V282), whereas die 1987 AES survey refers 
to how strongly respondents are 'supporters' of the party they identify with (McAllister & Mughan, 
1987a:13). 
The constmction of the index of party identification is difficult in mtdti-party systems, such as 
those in westem Europe. In party systems where tiiere are more tiian two major parties, for example, 
France, Italy and West Germany there are simply too many parties to constmct a single index of party 
identification. In Australia, a simUar problem would arise in constmcting an index of party 
identification for the Queensland electorate since there are three major parties and the Liberal and 
National parties refrain from forming a coaUtion. This is not a serious problem in the smdy of post-
war Federal poUtics since the Liberal and National (Country) parties have been in coalition except for 
a brief period in 1987 (Woodward & Costar, 1988). The measures of party identification used in 
Australian electoral smdies usuaUy combine die National party identifiers with Liberal party identifiers 
(Bean & KeUey, l988:note 4) although in one analysis separate variables were constmcted for Liberal 
and National identification (KeUey, 1988:71). Minor-party identifiers are either assigned a score half-
way between die two groups (Bean & KeUey, 1988; KeUey & McAUister, 1985) or implicitiy 
combined with conservative party identifiers when analysing Labor identification (Aitidn, 1982b:110-
111). 
The seven point index of party identification is often treated as if it were an interval or cardinal 
measure. The magnimdes between the ordinal categories are one umt but one-unit changes in 
magnimde have widely different meanings. A one-unit movement can indicate a change between 
independence and identification with a party or changes in die stiength of identification. Moreover, 
die relationship between party identification and vote is decidedly non-linear, as Republicans are 
generaUy less inclined to vote contrary to tiieir partisanship than Democrats (CampbeU et al., 
1960:125; MiUer, 1979; Petrocik, 1989:55; Repass, 1971). In Australia, die seven point index is also 
not linearly related to vote. Inspection of the tables presented by Aitidn (I982b:42,43,289), show tiiat 
a one-unit change from no party identification to a not very strong identification, is associated widi a 
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substantial increase in tiie probability of voting for a particular party. In contrast, a change from a 
fairiy stiong to a very stiong identification, is associated witii only a small change in the probability of 
voting for tiie party identified with. Therefore, equal distances between die categories do not reflect 
the tme partisan intensities. 
To overcome the assumption that the party identification index is a cardinal measure. Lodge & 
Tursky (1979) and Markus (1983) assigned scores to die categories on differing bases. The non-
cardinal namre of the Australian index has not been widely debated, altiiough the issue is relevant to 
the measures used in AustraUan electoral research. 
2.2.3 Party Identification in the AustraUan Electorate 
In Austialia, much die greater proportion (between 85% and 90%) of die electorate report a party 
identification. If responses to the tiiird question asked on party leanings are included in the 
constmction of the measure, the proportion rises to over 90% (Bean, 1984:316). 
The overaU level of party identification in Australia has not declined in Australia between the late 
1960s and die 1980s (Bean & KeUey, 1988; and table 2.1). In 1967, 11% of respondents indicated 
tiiey did not identify widi a party in response to die imtial question (calculated from Aidcin, Kahan & 
Stokes, 1975: V129). In 1969, die figure was 10% (calculated from Aitidn, Kahan & Stokes, 1975: 
V98), in 1972 9% (Kemp, 1973), and in 1979, die proportion had risen slightiy to 15% (calculated 
from Aitkin, 1982a: VlOl). A similar proportion (13%) did not indicate a party identification, in 
response to the initial question in the 1984 NSSS smdy (Bean, 1988:46). The proportion of non-
identifiers in die 1986 and 1988 NSSS surveys was around 8% (table 2.1). 
The proportion of the electorate who do not admit to a party identification after the foUow-up 
question was asked has also remained constant since die late 1960s. In 1967, 7% of the sample could 
be classed as tme non-identifiers (calcidated from Aitkin, Kahan & Stokes, 1975:V140) and in 1969, 
die figure was 6% (calculated from Aiddn, Kahan & Stokes, 1976:V107) and in 1979, 5.5% 
(calculated from Aitidn, 1982a:Vl09). The second (1987) wave of the National social science survey 
found that approximately 7% of the sample, did not identify with a party or indicate a leaning (KeUey 
& Bean, 1988a:V645-V646). 
In the late 1960s, die coalition parties had a plurality of identifiers over the Labor party. 
However, by the late 1970s the coalition had lost this advantage and the Labor party enjoyed a 
plurality of identifiers. In 1967, 50% of the electorate identified with the coalition parties compared 
with 39% for the Labor party. By 1979, the division was almost equal, 44% of the electorate were 
coalition identifiers compared with 45% for die Labor party (McAUister, 1990). A 2% difference is 
indicated by die raw figures (table 2.1). A decrease in identification for the Liberal party occurred 
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during die 1970s, fix)m 40% of die electorate in 1969 to 33% in 1977 (table 2.1). Focusing on 
lifetime vote, radier tiian party identification, McAUister & Mughan (1987b) also conclude diat die 
Liberal party suffered a decline in core support between 1967 and 1979. According to die figures 
presented in table 2.1, die proportion of coalition and Labor identifiers was almost equal as early as 
1972. By 1977, tiie Labor party had a plurality of identifiers, tiie same year as it suffered one of its 
worst electoral defeats (Kemp, 1979). 
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TABLE 2.1: PARTY IDENTIHCATION IN AUSTRALIA' 
1967^ 1969^ 1972^ 1977^ 1978' 1979' 
Liberal 
Labor 
National (Country) 
Democratic Labor Party 
Australian Democrat 
Other 
Does not identify with a 
Refused 
Don't Know 
Not Applicable 
party 
3 9 . 6 
3 7 . 6 
6 . 9 
2 . 7 
na 
0 . 3 
1 0 . 9 
0 . 7 
1 .3 
0 . 0 
3 9 . 8 
3 9 . 5 
6 . 5 
2 . 5 
na 
0 . 5 
9 . 9 
0 . 3 
0 . 7 
0 . 0 
3 5 . 9 
4 2 . 5 
6 . 9 
3 . 5 
na 
-
1 1 . 3 
-
-
-
33 
39 
4 
1 
5 
1 
15 
2 
37 
42 
5 
1 
4 
1 
10 
-
-
3 5 . 9 
4 1 . 7 
3 . 9 
— 
2 . 5 
0 . 3 
1 3 . 9 
0 . 6 
0 . 6 
0 . 2 
n 2054 1837 2500 2112 686 2016 
1983' 1984' 1986^° 1987" 19871^ 1988" 
Liberal 34 .8 3 3 . 1 3 5.8 30 .7 3 3 . 3 36 .0 
Labor 53 .2 45 .2 45.4 45 .5 48 .2 4 5 . 3 
National (Country) 8.0 5 .1 7 .3 6 .1 6 .1 6 .9 
Democratic Labor Party 0 .3 - 0 . 1 - - 0 
Australian Democrat 1.7 2 . 3 2 .4 3 .6 2 . 1 3 .9 
Other 2 .0 0 .3 0 .8 2 . 3 1.7 0.4 
Does not identify with a party na 10 .7 8 .3 11 .9 6 .1 7 .7 
Refused 1.2 1.9 2 . 3 
Don't Know 2 .0 0 . 1 
Not Applicable -' - -
n 298 3012 1528 1311 1825 1663 
na Not Applicable. 
1. Note the wording of the quesdons is presented in the end-notes. For references (date: question, variable number). 
2. From Aitkin, Stokes & Kahan (1975:Q35(A), V129). [1967 ANPA] 
3. From Aitkin. Stokes & Kahan (1976:Q37(A), V98). [1969 ANPA] 
4. From Saulwick & Aitchison (1973). 
5. From Kemp (1979:30). Survey conducted by I. Saulwick and Associates. 
6. From Kemp (1979:30). Figures from a survey conducted by Bruce Headey. 
7. From Aitkin (1982a;Q49a, VlOl). [1979 ANPA] 
8. From Australian Values Study (Edgar et al., 1986:Q7b, V411). These frequeiKies are in response to a question on 
which party respondents feel close to. Less than 25% of the 1228 respondents considered themselves as close to a party 
(V410). 
9. From KeUey, Cashing & Headey (1987:Q78a, V281). [1984 NSSS] 
10. From 'Role of Government' survey (KeUey. Bean & Evans, 1986:Q22a, pg. 11, PTYID) [1986 NSSS] 
11. From KeUey & Bean (1988a:Q4a, pg. 3, V279). [1984-87 NSSS 2nd Wave] 
12. From McAUister & Mughan (1987a:Q12, V29). [1987 AES] 
13. From 'InequaUty' survey (Kelley, Bean & Evans. 1988:Q23a, pg. 12, PTYID) [1988 NSSS] 
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During die 1980s, tiie shift to Labor identification stabiUsed. According to die 1984 NSSS, 45% 
of respondents identified widi die Labor party, 38% with die Liberal and National parties, a difference 
of 7% (Bean, 1988:46). The plurality of Labor identifiers over coalition identifiers was only 3% in 
die 1987 AES; 47% were Labor identifiers and 44% identified witii die Liberal and National parties 
(McAUister & Ascui, 1988). Analysis of tiie second wave of die 1984-87 NSSS panel put die 
proportion of Labor identifiers at 44% and die proportion of coalition identifiers at 38%, a difference 
of 6%. 
The distribution of die strength of party identification in the Austialian electorate did not change 
greatiy between die late 1960 and die late 1970s. Similar proportions of very strong identifiers were 
found in die 1967, 1969 and 1979 ANPA data (Bean, 1984:320). However, tiiere are indications of a 
decline in die strength of party identification during die 1980s. Bean (1988:46-47) noted a slight drop 
of 5% in the proportion of very strong identifiers between 1979 and 1984. The 1987 AES data 
provides further evidence of a decline in the overaU stiength of party identification during the 1980s. 
The proportion of very strong identifiers declined to 20% (McAUister & Mughan, 1987a: 13), 
compared witii 34% in tiie 1979 ANPA survey (Bean, 1988:46). 
The decline in the overaU strength of identification, has been greater among Labor identifiers than 
coalition identifiers. The proportion of the very strong Labor identifiers decUned 16%, from 37% in 
1967 to 21% in 1987. Among Liberal and National identifiers the proportion of very strong identifiers 
also decreased but not as dramaticaUy as among Labor identifiers, from 27% in 1967 to 19% in 1987 
(McAUister, 1990; McAUister & Ascui, 1988). 
2.2.4 Partisanship and Vote 
Partisanship represents a major point of departure for the act of voting. In its original 
conceptualisation, partisanship effects vote choice directiy or indirectiy via voters' judgments about 
issues and candidates (CampbeU et al., 1960:128). Psychological attachments to parties is an 
important factor in the process, by which parties gain support. The importance of partisanship in 
Australia was summarised by Aiddn's (1982b: 142) comment tiiat "Austialian politics is tiie poUtics of 
parties rather than of classes and it is on parties that AustraUans focus". As die stiength of party 
identification increases, electors are more likely to vote in accordance with the party they identify 
with. 
Empirical analyses undertaken in Australia, show diat the party identification measure and vote 
are closely related. During die late 1960s, close to 90% of party identifiers voted in accordance witii 
dieir party identification (Aiddn, 1982b:228). The conflation between party identification and vote, 
has been estimated at 0.87 in 1984 (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:291). 
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Comparison of die electorate between 1967 and 1979, indicates diat die (bivariate) relationship 
between party identification and vote had not changed, hi botii years, 93% of party identifiers voted 
in accordance witii tiieir identification. However, diis level was not constant over die twelve year 
internal, since in 1969 tiiis figure had declined to 86% (Aiddn, l982b:288-289; Aiddn, 1983). During 
die 1980s, approximately 90% of identifiers were found to vote in accordance, widi dieir identification 
(Bean & KeUey, 1988). These results indicate diat diere has been Uttie or no change in die bivariate 
relation between party identification and vote. 
Voters who identify more strongly witii a party are more likely to vote for tiiat party. As 
indicated earlier, the relation between stiength of identification and vote is not linear. In 1967, 99% of 
strong coaUtion identifiers voted for die coaUtion parties, compared witii 96%, 94%, and 90% for 
fairiy stiong, not very strong and leaner coaUtion identifiers. In 1969, die relationship had changed, 
widi a smaUer proportion of each group of coalition identifiers, voting for the coalition parties. The 
1969 figures were, 93% of stiong coaUtion identifiers voting for the coaUtion, 91% of fairly strong 
identifiers, 75% of not very strong identifiers and 72% of leaners. In 1979, die figures were similar to 
those for the 1967 survey. Of very strong coalition identifiers, 98% voted for die coaUtion parties, 
compared witii 95% of fairiy strong coaUtion identifiers, 93% of not very strong identifiers and 68% 
of leaners (Aiddn, 1982b:42^3:298). 
2.2.5 The Normal Vote and Electoral Change 
The concept of the 'normal vote' was first developed by Converse (1966). A normal vote is die 
proportion of the electorate expected to vote for a party, when voting corresponds with party 
identification^*. The normal vote is the vote expected when the only influence on vote choice is 
party identification and short-term forces (such as issues or candidates) are eidier absent or in balance 
(Converse, 1966). When party identification and vote do not coincide, short-term forces are held 
responsible for the deviation. 
The concept of the normal vote is very useful in the analysis of identification of electoral periods. 
Elections can be classified as maintaining, deviating or realigning elections (CampbeU, 1966). A 
maintaining election is an election in which die normal vote prevails and the party with die majority 
(or plurality) of identifiers wins the election. The proportions voting for each party wiU approximate 
the 'normal vote' (CampbeU, 1966). At a deviating election, short-term forces favour tiie party diat 
does not have a plurality of party identifiers, diis party winning the election. The distribution of party 
identification is not disturbed, but a significant proportion of identifiers for the party widi a plurality of 
identifiers, suspend dieir party loyalties to vote for another party. 
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A reaUgning election is an election in which a change in the distribution of party identification 
occurs. Short-term forces are strong enough not only to influence a large proportion of identifiers of 
die party widi a plurality of identifiers, to vote for die opposing party (as in die case of a deviating 
election), but also to engender an enduring change in the distribution of party identification. After a 
realigning election, the party that had a plurality of identifiers loses this advantage and anotiier party 
enjoys a plurality of identifiers. Realigning elections are often associated with national crises such as 
wars and economic depression (CampbeU, 1966:74). A realigning election also signals a change in die 
issue concerns of the electorate and a change in the political complexion of government institutions 
(Bumham, 1970:10). In die United States, a realigning election is considered to have occurted during 
die time of RooseveU's New Deal (Andersen, 1979:74-96). 
Australian elections have also been classified in this manner. Using CampbeU's classification, 
both Blewett (1971) and Jaensch (1989a:76) identified the 1949 election as a realigning or critical 
election. Both die 1972 and 1975 elections were identified as realigning elections, in one of the two 
altemative classifications presented by Jaensch (1989a:76). In another review, Jaensch (1989b:32) 
divided the post-war poUtics into four time periods, the period between 1945 and 1951 of growing 
coalition dominance, the Menzies era between 1951 and 1966, a transition period to Labor dominance 
between 1966 and 1982 and the Hawke era. Three possible explanations to Australian post-war 
politics were proposed by Bean & Mughan (1988). The first explanation is the 'stams-quo' model, 
which argues that the Labor party's recent electoral success is tiansient and is not founded on any 
dramatic changes in die balance between the parties. The second explanation, the 'zero-sum' model, 
argues that Labor party's success is at the expense of the coaUtion parties, the Labor party now 
enjoying a competitive advantage. The third explanation, the 'convergence' model, lies somewhere 
between the first two more extreme explanations. From the analysis of marginal and safe seats, the 
audiors conclude that the convergence model is the most platisible and a more competitive party 
system has emerged. 
Altematively, realignment may occur over a substantial period of time, rather tiian at a single 
election. The concept of secidar realignment was proposed by Key (1959), to account for such gradual 
changes. The difficulty in pinpointing a single realigning election in die United States between 1928 
and 1936 prompted CampbeU (1966:75) to propose the concept of a realigning era. A secular 
realignment may be die result of changes in die identifications among die whole electorate or due to 
younger voters entering die electorate identifying witii the party widi a minority of identifiers, until it 
becomes tiie majority party (Andersen, 1979:75-76). The figures presented in table 2.1 suggest diat 
die partisan realignment from a coaUtion plurality to a Labor pluraUty was a secular realignment, since 
tiie changes cannot be linked to a single election. 
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2.2.6 Origin and Development of Party Identification 
The influences on partisanship are previous partisanship, partisan background and social-strucmral 
factors. According to die revisionist account, partisanship is sensitive to contemporary political 
stimuli. Furthermore, diere are age and gender differences in party identification. 
Given its general stability, party identification wiU be very strongly associated witii previous party 
identification. Cortecting for measurement ertor, tiie correlation between party identification in 
successive waves of American panel smdies was found to be over 0.8, compared witii less than 0.5 for 
domestic issues (Converse & Marcus, 1979). Previous partisanship was fotmd to have a large impact 
on present partisanship, when vote at previous elections and issue and candidate preferences had aU 
been controUed for (HoweU, 1981). 
In the analysis of party identification in AustiaUa in 1987, the strongest influence was partisanship 
in 1984 (Bean & KeUey, 1988). First partisanship measured by first party preference has been fotmd 
to be stiongly associated with present party identification. This relationship overcomes the relation 
between partisan backgroimd and present party identification (McAUister & Kelley, 1985). This 
finding indicates a causal sequence where first partisanship intervenes between partisan background 
and present partisanship '^. 
Apart from previous partisanship, the major influence on partisanship is considered to be partisan 
backgroimd. A close association between partisan backgroimd and present party identification has 
been demonstiated in both the United States and Great Britain (Butier & Stokes, 1974:52; CampbeU et 
al., 1960:147; Himmelweit, Humpheries & Jaeger, 1985:181; Jennings & Langton, 1969; Jennings & 
Niemi, 1968; Jennings & Niemi, 1974:38-39; Jennings & Niemi, 1981:89-91; Sears, 1975:123-124). 
In Austialia there is a high correspondence between the party identifications of individuals and 
the reported political preferences of tiieir parents. In 1967, 78% of electors whose parents (both) 
preferred the coalition parties, were coalition identifiers. The equivalent figure for voters with Labor 
parents was 66% (Aiddn, I982b:94). In a simUar analysis of tiie 1979 ANPA data, where Liberal and 
National parents were grouped together, the transmission of Labor identification was slightiy lower (at 
65%) dian the transmission of a coalition identification at 70% (Bean, 1984:350). 
A decline in the transmission of Liberal party identification occurred between 1967 and 1979. In 
1979, 68% of voters whose parents were (both) Liberals identified witii the conservative parties 
compared witii 78% in 1967. The transmission of Labor identification remained constant at 67% 
(Aitkin, 1982b:297). Studying transmission over a longer time frame, McAUister (1990) suggests that 
the intergenerational transmission of party identification has, if anything, increased between 1967 and 
1987. 
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An interesting aside is die tendency for parents to have the same party identifications. Ui 1987, 
almost two-diirds of electors reported diat dieir parents had die same political preferences. Only 12% 
came from famiUes where parents had conflicting political preferences (McAllister, 1990). These 
results indicate diat eidier voters tend to marry people of similar poUtical persuasions, or tiiat some 
form of poUtical sociaUsation occurs during marriage. 
The party identification of tiie mother has been found to be more important when die 
identifications of both parents are known and dissimUar (Aitidn, 1982b:92-93,297). In contrast, 
Jackman (1988:66-69) found very simUar effects of fadier's and motiier's party preference on party 
identification in the analysis of tiie 1967 ANPA data and a significant effect of modier's party 
preference was not foimd in the analysis of the 1987 AES. However, since the correlation between 
mother's and father's political preference is so high, it is difficult to definitively conclude which is 
more important. 
According to the revisionist school, a major influence on partisanship are contemporary political 
stimidi, that is the short-term factors, issues and candidates. EmpiricaUy, party identification has been 
observed to be sensitive to issues (Franklin & Jackson, 1983; Jackson, 1975), candidate evaluations 
(Graetz & McAllister, 1986) and evaluations of the economy (Brody & Rotiienberg, 1988; Fiorina, 
1981:100). 
In Austialia, significant effects of comparative issue and leader evaluations on party identification 
were found by Jackman (1988:66-69) in die analysis of botii tiie 1967 ANPA and die 1987 AES data 
sets. In the analysis of the 1979 ANPA, die effects of leadership evaluations on party identification, 
were found to be greater than the effects of party identification on vote (Graetz & McAUister, 1986). 
Social-structural factors may also influence partisanship. Social factors are not considered to 
directiy influence partisanship, but are surrogate measures of further political socialisation through, the 
workplace, social interaction and membership of social groups. Social-strucmral factors are 
hypothesised as causaUy prior to party identification, encapsulating the political influences of 
socialisation and social miUeu (Knoke, 1976:71; Goldberg, 1966). Party identification in Australian 
appears to be transmitted by the family and reinforced dirough social milieu (Irvine & Gold, 1980). 
In bivariate models investigated by Aiddn (1982b), party identification is observed to vary 
according to measures of a variety of social factors. These social factors include: social class 
(1982b:130,319), religion (1982b:166), region (1982b:196), edinicity (1982b:157,335), class 
identification (1982b: 130), religiosity (1982b: 170), tiade union membership (1982b: 140), age 
(1982b:328-329), gender (1982b:327) and education (1982b:330). 
In multivariate models predicting party identification in die United States, Cassel (1982) specified 
measures of religion, class, region^* and partisan background as independent influences. Class 
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identification, occupation, religion, income, and region were included in a similar model, analysed by 
Knoke (1976:102). MiUer (1986) included union membership, income, religion, race, party 
performance and ideology as influences on party identification. Education was specified as influencing 
party identification by Page & Jones (1979). In tiie United States, social-structural factors, togedier 
widi partisan background, accounts for a tiiird (27-33%) of die variation in present party identification 
(Knoke & Hout, 1974). 
In Austialia, a number of multivariate investigations of the association between social-stmctural 
factors and party identification have been undertaken, hi Aiddn's (1982b) AID analyses, measures of 
income and class background were included as weU as class, union membership, religiosity, gender, 
home ownership and reUgion (Aiddn, 1982b:l 11,303). Family income, class identification, sector, 
farming occupation and class were employed in the prediction of Liberal and National identifications 
by KeUey & McAUister (1985). Of die social-stiuctiiral factors tiiat influence party identification, 
social class appears to have die major impact (Aitidn, 1982b:lll). However, tiie overaU effect of 
social-stmctural factors appears to be low, explaining only 17% of the variation in Labor identification 
in 1967, 15% in 1969 and 11% in 1979 (Aitidn, 1982b:303)''. 
Relative to the parental transmission of partisanship, social miUeu has only a smaU influence on 
Labor identification (McAUister & KeUey, 1985). Analyses of measures highly correlated widi party 
identification, vote and life-time vote, also show the greater effects of partisan background, compared 
widi social-stmcmral factors (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:292; McAUister & KeUey, 1982; McAUister 
& Mughan, 1987b). 
The direction of party identification may differ between age groups. The poUtical miUeu diat 
young voters find themselves in as they enter die electorate may have a lasting effect on partisanship. 
Age cohorts have been as imderstood as imdergoing different sociaUsation experiences (Ryder, 1965). 
The party identification of young adults has been shown to be more sensitive to political issues 
(Franklin, 1984; Markus, 1979). 
In Austialia, Aitkin (1982b:95-106) found considerable differences in the poUtical preferences of 
age cohorts in Australia. The Labor party's support was foimd to be considerably lower among those 
voters who came of age between 1955 and 1966 compared widi earlier times. In 1979, very high 
levels of Labor identification were observed among the youngest age group (between 18 and 30), 
whereas the next yoimgest generation (31-40) exhibited the highest level of identification for the 
Liberal and National parties (Aitidn, 1982b: 328-329). In 1975 and 1977, diose aged 18 to 24 had 
higher levels of Labor identification dian those over 24 (Goot, 1980). In a multivariate analysis of tiie 
1967 ANPA data, Jackman (1988:66-69) found differences between age cohorts in relation to party 
identification, die oldest age cohort (bom between 1889 and 1898) had the lowest levels of 
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identification witii die Labor party. However, no significant differences between age cohorts, were 
found in die analysis of die 1987 AES data (Jackman, 1988:66-69). 
Radier dian party identification differing between age cohorts, getting older may be related to 
partisanship. Aging may or may not be associated widi increasing conservatism (Crittenden, 1962; 
Glenn & Hefner, 1972). No effects of age in years on party identification in 1987 was found in 
KeUey's (1988:71) study. Analyses on vote or life time vote have generaUy found no effects of 
continuous measures of age (Bean & KeUey 1988; Graetz & McAUister, 1988:292; McAUister & 
Mughan, 1987b), although two studies have reported smaU effects (Bean, 1984:309; KeUey & 
McAUister, 1984). 
One model of partisanship contends that throughout adult life die direction of partisanship 
generaUy remains the same, but the strength of partisan attachments increases as voters get older 
(CampbeU et al., 1960:161-165; Knoke & Hout, 1974). A curvUinear relation between stiength of 
identification with age has been observed. Increases in age among younger voters were associated 
with a larger increase in the strength of identification, than identical increases in age among older 
voters (Converse, 1969; Converse, 1976a:51)'"'. Converse (1969) argued that botii die shift from non-
identification to identification and the increasing stiength of partisan attachments, are due to die 
duration of poUtical experience. However, this explanation has been disputed by smdies of newly 
enfranchised groups (Niemi et al., 1985). 
In addition to cohort and age effects on partisanship, there are also gender differences. In 1967, 
44% of men identified with the Labor party compared with 33% of women. The differences in 
partisanship between the sexes had declined during die 1970s, the equivalent figures in 1979 being 
49% and 42% (Aitidn, 1983). 
Ideology may also influence partisanship. Those with left wing ideologies would be expected to 
have a Labor partisanship and those widi more conservative ideological stances, would be coaUtion 
partisans. Commenting on the increase of Labor identification among women, Aitkin (1982b:331-333) 
impUcitiy understands ideology as influencing identification, as feminism is included in the 
explanation. 
Empirical studies on the relationship between ideology and party identification are inconclusive. 
Ideology has been foimd as a direct influence on party identification (MiUer, 1986; Page & Jones, 
1979; Weatherford, 1983b). Other empirical work has found only weak associations between ideology 
and party identification (Enelow & Hinich, 1984:170; Wright, Erikson & Mclver, 1985). In Australia, 
strong party identifiers are more likely to think of themselves in ideological terms (Aitkin, 1982b:74). 
Bean (1988:47-48) found a close correspondence between left-right ideological position and party 
identification. 
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2.2.7 Summary 
Partisanship is a durable and stable attachment to a political party. In tiie original 
conceptualisation, partisanship was imderstood as an affective orientation. The 'revisionist school' has 
argued that partisanship is sensitive to contemporary political stimuU, such as issues and odier short-
term political factors. Partisanship is usuaUy measured witii standard questions on party identification, 
altiiough other measures have been employed. There are a number of issues conceming die party 
identification measure of partisanship including the wording of the questions, the consdoiction of the 
index and the cardinality of the index. 
The overaU levels of party identification in the Australian electorate have not changed since the 
late 1960s. However, there has been a change in the party which has die most identifiers (a plurality), 
from the coalition parties in the 1960s to the Labor party in the 1980s. There is some evidence of a 
decline in the strength of identification since die 1970s, especiaUy among Labor identifiers. The 
overaU relationship of party identification widi vote, does not appear to have changed. The major 
influences on present party identification are previous party identification, partisan background, issues, 
other short-term influences and social-stmctural factors. The dieory of political generations contends 
that the political context in which voters enter the electorate, has a lasting effect on dieir partisanship. 
In the United States, aging has been foimd to be associated with increasing strength of party 
identifications. 
2.3 IDEOLOGY 
Ideology is considered as a durable influence on electoral choice, complementary to partisanship. 
In a simUar though less frequent fashion to the way people are partisans, people do identify themselves 
or odiers, as 'capitaUsts', 'economic rationalists', 'feminists' and 'environmentalists'. Each of tiiese 
ideological identifications may not have a precise meaning, but is an indication of poUtical orientation. 
From such ideological identifications, opinions on issues such as higher taxes, privatisation, child care 
and mining can be inferred. Possibly, vote choice can also be inferred as 'ideologues' perceive 
particidar parties as more sympathetic to their ideological orientations than other parties. 
Ideology has several characteristics similar to that of party identification. Political ideology is a 
relatively stable orientation (Levitin & MiUer, 1979)"", and values, arguably the basis of ideologies, 
are to an extent transmitted from parents to child (Dalton, 1980; Jennings &. Niemi, 1968; Sears, 
1975:124). Also values are determined, in part, by social-stmctural factors (ConneU, 1972). Like 
party identification, ideology is a cost-saving device (Downs, 1957:98) and gives voters links to the 
political system (Levitin & MiUer, 1979). Ideology mediates die relationship between social factors 
and vote (Himmelweit, Humphries & Jaeger, 1985:57-58; Przeworski & Sprague, 1986:45-52; 
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Robertson, 1984:17). Ideology and partisanship can be understood as die two long-term 
complementary elements in die process of electoral choice (Rabinowitz, Gurian & MacDonald, 1984). 
Ideology differs from party identification in a number of important ways. To tiiink of poUtics 
ideologicaUy requires a reasonable level of political knowledge, whereas identifying widi a party does 
not (Downs, 1957:100). Therefore, die influence of ideology on poUtical behaviour is Ukely to be 
more Umited tiian that of partisanship. 
This discussion on ideology is organised in a maimer simUar to the previous part of the chapter 
on partisanship. The first section discusses die concepmalisation and measurement of ideology, die 
second its relationship witii vote and die diird die influences on ideology. 
2.3.1 The ConcepmaUsation and Measurement of Ideology 
The investigation of the role of ideology in die electoral process and by extension its role in 
electoral change is complicated by die variety of ways in which ideology can be concepmalised, 
measured and thus investigated. One approach is to distinguish 'ideologues' from the rest of 
electorate. Otiier approaches include consideration of attimdinal consistency and attitudinal constraint, 
core beUefs and ideological self-placement. 
Ideologues and Non-ideologues 
The 'level of concepmaUsation' approach to ideology is based on die notion, diat different groups 
of voters have differing levels of ideological sophistication. The number of groups considered to be in 
the electorate with different levels of ideological sophistication, has ranged from two with Converse's 
(1970) black-and-white model to five in die approach adopted by Butier & Stokes (1974:205-211). 
Ideologues have a clear understanding of ideological terms and are able to sensibly employ these terms 
in dieir political opinions (Nie, Verba & Petrocik, 1979:112; Pierce, 1970). 
An early approach classified voters as ideologues who, in response to open-ended questions made 
explicit use of ideological terms such as 'Uberal' and 'conservative', and made some reference to 
issues and poUtical groups (Nie, Verba & Petrocik, 1979:403). Using this approach, the proportion of 
ideologues in the American electorate was estimated to be 3% during the 1950s (CampbeU et al. 
1960:195). In Britain, during the 1960s, a similar proportion (2%) were classified as having a 
dynamic interpretation of ideology. A further 20% coidd use ideological terms (Butier & Stokes, 
1974:205-211). Although a similar analysis could not be performed on Austialia data, Aitkin 
(1982b:74) supposed that a similariy smaU proportion of die Austialia electorate could be classed as 
'tme ideologues'. 
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Using Australian data, Graetz & McAUister (1988:245) classified 'ideologues' as respondents who 
had clear views on economic power and had a party identification consistent witii tiiis view. Only 
11% of die electorate were considered ideologues by diis criterion. 
Attitudinal Consistency and Constraint 
A second concepmalisation understands ideology as guiding the formation of attitudes. A belief 
system was defined by Converse (1964:207) as a 'configuration of ideas and attitudes in which 
elements are bound together by some form of constraint and functional importance'. Similarly, Sartori 
(1969) understands an ideology as an unique explanatory concept, widiin which a rational framework 
guides die formation of attimdes and opinions. Therefore, consistent responses to a range of 
attimdinal questions would be evidence of ideology. Correlations between attimdes are seen as 
reliable evidence of some stmcmring of attimdes on the part of individuals (CampbeU et al., 
1960:191). 
Litde evidence for ideological consistency and constraint was found in die American pubUc 
during the 1950s. Littie consistency was fotmd in the responses to attitudinal questions and it was 
concluded that there was oidy 'a rather slight degree of stmcture in the attitudes of the mass 
electorate' (CampbeU et al., 1960:195). From die analysis of a tiiree-wave panel sttidy (1956-1960), 
Conserve (1964) concluded that Americans do not derive their attitudes from general ideological 
principles. 
A major criticism of Converse's work was that measurement error was not considered in the 
analyses. When correcting for measurement error, higher correlations were observed between the same 
attimdes over time and among different attimdes (Achen, 1975; Pierce & Rose, 1974), indicating 
ideological constraint. In AustraUa, a similar debate focusing on measurement error has not arisen, 
due maiidy to the difficulties in estimating measurement error in the data avaUable'*^ . 
Multiple Underlying Dimensions 
The third approach to the investigation of ideology focuses on identifying underlying ideological 
dimensions. Investigations of the overaU consistency between attimdes impUes a single underlying 
left-right ideological dimension. However, it is possible that a Umited number of ideological 
dimensions exist. For instance there may be two liberal/conservative dimensions, an economic 
dimension and a non-economic dimension (Knoke, 1979:772). The economic dimension guides 
attitudes to such matters as welfare, taxation and trade unions, whereas die non-economic dimension 
guides attitudes towards civil liberties and moral matters. Other general ideological dimensions may 
be isolated. 
54 
In an early smdy, Stokes (1966) distinguished between attitudes towards domestic and foreign 
poUcies. Analysing Converse's original correlation matiix witii factor analysis''\ Luttbeg (1968) 
found several imderiying dimensions which explained a great deal of variation in social and political 
attimdes. After investigating a hierarchal model of attitude constiaint, Peffley & Hurwitz (1985) 
concluded tiiat an individual's policy attitudes are constrained by abstract beliefs about economic, 
foreign poUcy, moral and racial matters. Knoke (1979) found general dimensions relating to social, 
economic and racial orientations. These smdies indicate tiiat ideology should not be understood as 
single overarching ideological dimension. However, these studies are not definitive evidence of a 
limited number of ideological dimensions. In Luttbeg's study using exploratory factor analysis many 
of die factors isolated do not relate to general ideological orientations. For example, 4 of die 5 factors 
isolated were labeUed 'school problems', 'metropoUtanism', 'wiUingness to accept technical advice' 
and 'appeal to industry'. These factors relate closely to the specific items included in the analysis, 
rather than general ideological orientations. Furthermore, the smdies by Knoke (1979) and Peffley & 
Hurwitz (1985), were based on confirmatory factor-analytic models, leaving open the distinct 
possibility that less restrictive models may have led to better fits of the data. 
In data coUected in Great Britain, five underlying dimensions were isolated by Smdlar & Welch 
(1981). Again, most of the factors isolated'*^  do not relate to unambiguous and general ideological 
dimensions. 
A number of imderlying dimensions in Australian data have been isolated by exploratory factor 
analysis. By exploratory factor analysis of economic questions in the 1984 NSSS, Graetz & 
McAUister (1988:219, 222, 240) isolated 6 factors'*^ The audiors contend (1988:240) tiiat tiiese six 
underlying dimensions constimte a separate and distinct beUef system, concerned widi die distribution 
and use of economic power. A separate (factor) analysis of responses to questions on non-economic 
matters produced a further 8 factors"*. However, analysis of the 14 attimde scales did not indicate a 
limited number of ideological dimensions, aldiough die audiors report tiiat an economic dimension was 
identified (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:261, note 4). 
In a separate analysis of the same data, KeUey (1988:61) isolated a total of 18 factors''^  General 
ideological orientations were not indicated by this analysis since most of the factors isolated related to 
specific political or social matters. The author concludes that aldiough Australians have consistent and 
clear views on poUtical and social issues, these views are not organised into a single rigid ideology 
(KeUey, 1988:74-75). In addition, die results of this smdy also indicate that these views are also not 
organised by a limited set of ideological dimensions. 
Although there is littie conclusive evidence of separate economic and non-economic ideological 
dimensions, there is a tendency for researchers to make a priori distinctions, between economic and 
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non-economic attimdes. In botii tiie United States and Great Britain several studies distinguish 
between economic and non-economic ideologies (Himmelweit, Humphries & Jaeger, 1985:138-139; 
Knoke, 1979; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985:883; Roberston, 1984:17). In AustraUa, bodi Graetz & 
McAUister (1988:240) and KeUey (1988:58-70), analysed attittides to economic matters separately 
from non-economic attitudes. 
Post-Materialism 
A 'post-materialist' ideological dimension has been proposed by Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1981 & 
1984). Post-materialism is understood as an ideological dimension distinct from the tiaditional left-
right continuum. Post-materialist values include a sense of belonging and self-acmalisation. Post-
materiaUst values are measured by the priorities given to such non-materialist concerns as moving 
towards a less impersonal society, individuals having more say in their workplaces and in political 
decision-making, and protecting freedom of speech. In contrast, materialism refers to overriding 
concerns with economic growth, keeping inflation imder control, maintaining law and order and die 
development of industry'**. It is asserted that post-materialism values have arisen because basic needs 
of civU order and economic growth have been met in westem societies (Inglehart, 1977:21-24). 
The concept of post-materialism appears attractive, since it can be employed to explain the rise of 
anti-nuclear and environmental poUtical groups. However, the rise of these groups could also be 
explained in terms of single issue movements, in die same manner as anti-abortion, women's and 
'Grey' movements may attract political support. Furthermore, there are doubts as to whetiier 
Inglehart's measure of post-materiaUst values is distinct from more traditional ideological orientations 
such as authoritarianism and economic versus non-economic priorities (Hanagan, 1982a; Flanagan, 
1982b). 
Empirical work has shown that only smaU proportions of westem electorates can be considered 
post-materialists. Less than 15% of voters in European electorates could be classified as post-
materiaUsts (Inglehart, 1977:38). In Australia, bodi a post-materialist and a materialist dimension were 
isolated by Graetz & McAUister (1988:250). The data presented indicate that materialist goals are 
more highly valued dian post-materialist goals (Graetz & McAlUster, 1988:249-250). 
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Core Attitudes 
Approaching ideology in terms of attimdinal consistency or in terms of underlying dimensions is 
problematic for the investigation of electoral behaviour. The difficulty is that attitudes may be 
considered as attitudes to issues and therefore the distinction between ideology and policy preferences 
is obscure. Ideology is not a smnmary measure of issue positions (Levitin & MUler, 1979) and 
ideological orientations are more stable dian policy preferences. 
The confusion of poUcy preferences witii ideology is overcome somewhat by die concept of core 
beUefs. Core beliefs are the assumptions, values and goals which are considered to be die essence of 
ideologies (Scarborough, 1984:28-34). Examples are the desirabUity of government intervention in tiie 
economy, the government provision of welfare services and general beUefs conceming protection of 
the environment. Feldman (1988) argued that three core beliefs - support for equality of opportimity, 
economic individualism and support for free enterprise - were important in the stmcmring of attimdes 
of American voters. Attimdes toward racial issues have also been considered a core beUef, in the 
American electorate (Carmines & Stimson, 1982). In Australia, littie work has focused on core 
beUefs. 
Ideological Self-placement 
A further approach to the investigation of ideology is by focusing on ideological self-placement or 
general ideological aUgnment. This approach to ideology has two major advantages. First, ideological 
self-placement can be measured by one or two questions so it is not dependent on the attitude items 
included in a particidar survey. Second, it avoids the problems involved in distinguishing between 
issues and indicators of ideology, since it unambiguously relates to ideology. 
There are several approaches to the measurement of ideological self-placement. In the initial 
election smdies conducted in Austialia and the United Kingdom, respondents were first asked if they 
diought of themselves in ideological terms and if diey did, they were then asked if diey saw 
diemselves as to die left, die right or die centre"' (Aiddn, 1977:278; Butier & Stokes, 1974:468). Ui 
the NSSS surveys, ideological orientation was meastu-ed slightiy differentiy. Respondents were not 
initiaUy asked if they thought of themselves ideologicaUy, but directiy asked dieir ideological position, 
as being stiongly or somewhat to the left or die right, or in the centre. A ten point scale, with no 
middle position was presented to respondents in the 1987 AES (McAUister & Mughan, 1987a) and in 
die 1983 AustraUan values study*. 
In Australia, only 29% of the 1967 ANPA sample thought of themselves in ideological terms 
(Aitidn, I982b:73). Of tiiis 29%, 12% tiiought of diemselves being left, 56% diought of diemselves 
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being of die centie and 34% to die right (Aitidn, 1982b:75). Two years latter, die proportion who 
diought of diemselves as having an ideological position had risen to 34% (Aiddn, I982b:75). 
By 1979 a greater proportion of respondents saw diemselves in ideological terms. Among men 
die proportion rose from 40% in 1967 to 58% in 1979 and an even more dramatic rise was observed 
among women from 18% in 1967 to 41% in 1979 (Aitidn, 1982b:332). The percentage who saw 
tiiemselves as to die left increased from 2.8% in 1967 to 6.7% in 1979. The percentage to die right 
increased marginaUy from 9.7% in 1967 to 11.2% in 1979 (Aitidn, 1982a:V93; Aiddn, Kahan & 
Stokes, 1975:V120). 
In die 1984 NSSS smdy, of the 90% of die sample who diought of diemselves as being, left, right 
or centre, 3% were strongly to the left, 12% somewhat left (a total of 15% for left), 9% were strongly 
to die right, 22% somewhat right (a total of 31% for on the right), and 55% placed themselves in die 
centre (Bean, 1988:47). 
On the 10 point scale included in die 1987 AES survey, 17% put themselves to the left of centre 
(points 1 to 4), 37% to the right of centre (points 7 to 10) and 46% at die centie (points 5 and 6) 
(McAUister & Mughan, 1987a). A simUar measure was employed in the 1983 AustraUan values smdy, 
18% of the respondents placed themselves as left of centre (between points 1 and 4), 32% placed 
diemselves on die right (points 7 to 10) and 50% at the centre (points 5 to 6) (Zagorski, 1988). 
These findings show that the largest group place diemselves at the centre, or do not see 
themselves in ideological terms and die proportion on the right tends to be twice die proportion on the 
left. 
2.3.2 Ideology and Vote Choice 
Although less pervasive than party identification, ideology has been observed to influence 
electoral choice. 
Smdies in the United States indicated diat once once party identification is controUed for, 
ideology can be seen to influence vote choice. Ideology has been found to influence vote choice, net 
of party identification, at presidential elections (Levitin & MiUer, 1979). The major influence of 
ideology at the 1972 election was to increase the effect of issues on electoral choice (MUler & MiUer, 
1976). Self-reported ideology accounted for a considerable amount of variation in candidate choice at 
die 1980 election (MiUer, MerriU & Shanks, 1982:352). 
Other smdies have foimd ideology to have only a limited influence. A scale measuring ideology 
was found to add nothing to die prediction of vote choice at die 1972 election (Repass, 1976). 
Furthermore, ordy 9% of the sample mentioned McGovem as a Uberal and only a handful of 
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respondents spoke of Nixon in liberal or conservative terms (Repass, 1976). Only minimal effects of 
ideology on vote choice were noted by Knight (1985) in a smdy of die 1984 presidential electioa 
A measure relating to ideology has been found to be associated widi electoral choice in the 
United Kingdom (Scarborough, 1984:177-192). A dimension relating to social class and economic 
issues, isolated by Studlar & Welch (1981), was die ideological dimension most closely associated 
with vote. However, these relations are likely to be exaggerated because party identification was not 
included in the analyses. 
In Austialia, there are some recent smdies investigating the relationship between ideology and 
vote. Over 80% of respondents categorised as 'to the left' voted Labor compared widi 30% of diose 
on die right (Zagorski, 1988). ControUing for party identification reveals a weak or non-existent 
relation between ideology and vote. A weak but significant relationship was found between a measure 
of economic ideology and vote, after controUing for party identification and leader evaluations. 
However, non-economic ideology measured by 'social issues' and an arguable aspect of post-
materiaUsm 'protection of die environment' were found to be not significantiy related to vote (Graetz 
& McAUister, 1988:259). Analysing die 1984-87 NSSS panel data. Bean and Kelley (1988) found diat 
measures of 'economic conservatism', 'royaUsm' and 'attimde to tiade unions' were not significantiy 
related to vote choice, when controUing for party identification. Materialism/post-materialist values 
were found by Graetz & McAUister (1988:253,259) as having no direct effect on vote. A three-
category measure of post-materialism was not found to be significantiy related to vote in data coUected 
in 1990 (Gow, 1990) '^. 
2.3.3 Influences on Ideology 
The influences on ideology appear to be previous ideological position, political interest, age, 
education and other social-stmcmral factors. It is also possible that ideological orientations are 
stmcmred by partisanship and by the more ideological candidates who are standing for election. 
Previous ideological position is Ukely to be a major influence on present ideological position. 
The StabUity of ideological orientation is comparable widi that of party identification. In the analysis 
of American panel data, Levitin & MiUer (1979) found the correlation of a measure of ideological 
orientation was 0.65, compared witii 0.80 for party identification. Littie change was observed in die 
aggregate distribution of ideological self-placement, during course of the 1980 presidential election 
campaign (Maricus, 1982:549). 
Ideological identifications are more common in yotmger age groups (Fleishman, 1986), the more 
educated (Barton & Parsons, 1977; MiUer et al., 1976) and are associated with political interest 
(Fleishman, 1986). However, the extent of attitudinal consistency is only slightiy higher among diose 
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widi more education (Nie, Verba & Petrocik, 1979:149). A combined index of education and px)Utical 
information, designated cognitive abiUty, was found by Stimson (1975) to be strongly associated widi 
ideological constraint. 
In a smdy of die effect of ideology on issue positions, Jackson (1983) posited age, race, 
education, religion, region, education, union membership and income as influences on ideology. A 
relationship was found between a measure of class and attitudes towards support for increased welfare 
spending and the redistribution of wealth (Burris, 1987). Littie consistency was observed in the 
relationships between social-stmcmral factors and a variety of ideological indicators (Himmelstein & 
McRae, 1988). 
In the United Kingdom, class, religion, education, trade union membership and region were found 
to be associated with an imderlying dimension associated with economic matters (Studlar & Welch, 
1981). In two of the five dimensions isolated, over 20% of dieir variation could be accounted for by 
social-stmcmral factors. The relationship between ideological self placement and class in European 
electorates has been found to be quite weak (Inglehart & Klingemarm, 1976). 
In Australia, only weak associations between social-stmcmral factors and ideology have been 
observed. Ideologues were not easUy distinguished from non-ideologues in terms of social 
characteristics, although they tended to be male, older, have less education and higher incomes (Graetz 
& McAUister, 1988:246-247). Tertiary education was the only social-stmcmral factor found to be 
significantiy associated with a left-wing ideological orientation (Zagorski, 1988). Ideological self-
placement on the right was associated with higher incomes, business ownership, older age groups and 
being female, and a centrist position was found to be associated with being female, being young, low 
education and low income. OveraU, social-stmcmral factors could not explain much variation in 
ideological identification (Zagorski, 1988). 
Post-materialist values are more common in younger age groups and the rising levels of 
education, are understood as facUitating the development of post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1977:30-
33,9-10). In Australia, post-materialists tend to be younger and weU educated (Graetz & McAUister, 
1988:251). 
Ordy a weak association between ideological self-placement and party identification was observed 
in die United States by Wright, Erikson & Mclver (1985). In contrast, Enelow & Hinich (1984:170) 
fotmd that partisanship was not correlated with non-economic ideology, but strongly correlated with 
the economic left-right continuum. The relationship between ideological self-placement and 
partisanship is higher in Britain dian in die United States (Inglehart & KUngemann, 1976)". 
In Austialia, ideological self-placement and the economic dimension have been found to be 
associated widi party identification. Over 90% of tiiose who place themselves as strongly left identify 
60 
witii tiie Labor party. Similariy, tiiose on die right tend to identily widi die coalition parties. Strong 
ideologues also tend to be stiong identifiers (Bean, 1988:47-48). A measure of 'economic power' was 
found to be stiongly associated with being a Labor voter. In contrast, measures of 'social issues' and 
'protection of the environment' were found to be not significantiy related to diis measure (Graetz & 
McAUister, 1988:252-253). 
Ideology may also be influenced by the appearance of more ideological candidates on die political 
stage. The increase in the proportion of ideologues at the 1964 presidential election was attributed to 
the more ideological RepubUcan candidate, Barry Goldwater (Pierce, 1970). The popularity of Reagan 
as a candidate for president was not found to be associated with a change in the American electorate 
to Reagan's ideological positions (Fleishman, 1986; Markus, 1982). Littie research in AustraUa has 
been conducted on die effect of candidate evaluations on ideology. However, the higher proportion of 
left and right ideological orientations observed in the 1979 ANPA survey may be attributed to the 
more ideological image of the Prime Minister at the time, Mr Fraser. 
2.3.4 Summary 
The previous section has discussed the concept of ideology. Ideology can be understood as a 
long-term electoral force, complementary to party identification. There are a number of different 
approaches to the concepmaUsation and thus measurement of ideology. These include die abiUty to 
use ideological terms, attimdinal stability and constraint, several underlying ideological dimensions, 
post-materialism and core beUefs. By most accotmts, there is littie evidence diat the Australian 
electorate is ideological. Of those who see themselves ideologicaUy, those on die right oumumber 
diose on the left. Measures of ideology do not have strong effects on vote, controUing for party 
identification. Ideology is relatively stable over time and associations widi social-stmctural factors 
have been observed. In Australia, relationships between ideological self-placement and economic 
power with party identification have been observed. 
2.4 ISSUES 
Day-to-day politics is largely about issues. PoUtical parties and other poUtical groups advocate 
different policies. Issues are often viewed by the media as having positive or negative electoral 
consequences for political parties. Furthermore, issues form the 'stuff of election campaigns (Aitidn, 
1982b:216). 
At AustraUan elections issues are often considered as important to the levels of party support. 
Issues that have been considered as effecting electoral outcomes include nationalisation, communism. 
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tiie Petrov affair, the Viemam war and conscription, the FrankUn dam and economic issues such as 
inflation, unemployment and die national debt. A summary of issues prominent in Australian politics 
is presented in table 2.2. 
In diis section the foUowing aspects of 'issue voting' are discussed, die concepmalisation of 
issues, the relations between issues and vote choice and influences on issues. 
TABLE 2.2: ISSUES IN AUSTRALL^LN ELECTIONS 
Election Issues 
1949 
1951 
1955 
1958 
1961 
1963 
1966 
1969 
1972 
1974 
1975 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1984 
1987 
1990 
Socialism, Rationing. 
Economic growth, jjensions, taxation. 
Labour's ties with communists, social services. 
Commimist influence in trade unions, economic growth. 
Credit Squeeze, Social Services, Health Scheme. 
Defence, economic growth, state aid, social services, housing. 
Viemam War. Conscription, economic growth, pensions, education. 
Viemam War, Economic Growth, Health Scheme, Union power. 
Conscription, Economic growth. Relations with China, Health Scheme. 
Foreign ownership, High Inflation. 
Inflation, Unemployment, Government Scandals, Constitutional Crisis, Free Market. 
Labor's record. Unemployment, Taxation, Industrial unrest. Uranium mining. Union power. 
Wealth Tax, Unemployment, Resource Development. 
Franklin Dam, The 1981-1982 economic downturn. 
Economic Management 
Liberal Tax policy, Joh for Canberra, Queensland rain forests. 
Environmental policies. Economic Management. 
From; 
1949: 
1951-1981: 
1975: 
1977: 
Viemam 
Union Power 
Franklin Dam 
Tax policies 
Conservative 
Party Disimity 
Joh for Canberra 
Queensland 
Rain forests 
The Sunday Herald (Sydney Morning Herald) December 11, 1949, page 1 Editorial 
Budge & Farlie (1983:177-178) 
Rawson (1977:93); Beed (1977:167-182) 
Butler (1979:13); Goot & Beed (1979) 
Aitkin (1982b:223-227) 
McAllister (1990) 
Maddox (1988:21) 
Woodward & Costar (1988:99) 
Warhurst (1988:35) 
McAllister & Ascui (1988:222) 
Warhurst (1988:41) 
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2.4.1 The ConcepmaUsation of Issues and 'Issue Voting' 
An early model of issue voting developed by Downs (1957:137) posits dynamic relationships 
between issues, political parties and voters. Voters seek to maximise benefits and political parties seek 
to maximise votes. 
Later accounts of issue voting incorporated issues within die Michigan model which centred on 
die concept of partisanship. PoUcy voting was defined by Brody &. Page (1972) as tiie extent to which 
people vote in accordance witii their policy preferences. Three conditions for issue voting were 
proposed by CampbeU et al. (1960:171): (1) diat voters must have some idea of die issue, (2) tiiat tiiey 
have some intensity of feeUng toward die issue and (3) they recognise that parties or candidates differ 
on that issue. A further condition was added by Nie, Verba & Petrocik (1979:158), that issue voting 
must be distinguished from just preferring one candidate (or party) over another. A total of six 
conditions were proposed by Meier & CampbeU (1979). 
In contrast to tiiese rather stringent conditions, Fiorina (1981:10-11) argues diat issue voting does 
not require such stringent criteria, voters can vote in accordance with issues if they simply pass 
judgement on higher prices, unemployment, or government cormption and vote accordingly. A party 
identification measure was included in the models investigated by Fiorina. Therefore, one condition 
common to many accounts of issue voting is that issue positions shoidd just not be a reflection of 
partisanship. 
An important distinction made in discussions of issues and issue voting is the distinction between 
political and economic issues. PoUtical or non-economic issues refer largely to non-economic 
concerns, such as die Viemam war, trade union power and environmental issues. Governments have 
been seen as responsible for the economy since Keynesian economic policies were introduced at the 
time of the depression (Weatherford, 1983a). In Australia, the expression the 'hip pocket nerve' has 
entered the political folklore. Also, there was once a political maxim that no AustraUan government 
could survive if unemployment levels rose above a certain level (cited by Aitkin, 1982b:227). 
Further Points concerning Issue Voting 
Issues may be considered as valence or position issues, belonging to a party's 'issue domain', 
evaluated retiospectively or prospectively, or salient to oidy a proportion of die electorate. The issue 
positions of voters may be open to projection, persuasion or rationalisation. Furthermore, the issue 
positions of parties or candidates may be unclear, leading to defensive or credulous issue voting. 
Voters may reward or pimish an incumbent government for changes in the economy or ordy punish 
incimibent governments. Economic issues may be evaluated by voters in terms of their personal 
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simation or the simation of die entire nation. FinaUy, die policy positions of voters on issues may be 
considered as a rational process or as an affective response to 'poUtical symbols'. 
PoUtical issues may be considered as either position or valence issues. Position issues are issues 
toward which political parties have different poUcies, whereas valence issues are issues on which die 
political parties have similar goals (Stokes, 1963). Position issues fit the classical model of issue 
voting, where a voter has a preferred issue position witii some intensity of feeUng and perceives policy 
differences between the parties (CampbeU et al., 1960:173) and subsequentiy votes in accordance widi 
his or her policy preferences (Brody & Page, 1972). 
In Austialia, a limited number of issues could be considered position issues. The Viemam war 
and conscription were both position issues where die coalition parties supported involvement in 
Viemam and the continuation of conscription and the Labor party opposed diese policies. The issue of 
the Franklin dam at the 1983 election can also be considered a position issue. A Liberal/National 
party government would have aUowed a dam to be buiU on the FrankUn River, while a Labor 
government would (and did) use its external affairs powers to stop the dam. 
Economic issues are generaUy valence issues. AU parties have the same goals - low inflation, 
unemployment and a steadUy increasing standard of living. Parties appeal to die electorate by 
claiming that they are more Ukely to achieve these goals. However, political parties may propose 
different poUcies to solve economic problems, such as cutting government spending or aUowing 
interest rates to rise, creating position issues. 
Issue domains refer to groups of issues (either valence or position issues) where one party enjoys 
a distinct advantage. Political parties are generaUy reluctant to debate issues openly but promote those 
issues that they perceive are to their electoral advantage and ignore issues which are to their electoral 
disadvantage (Budge & Fariie, 1983:22-26). 
In Austialia, issues that could be considered as belonging to the Liberal and National parties' 
issue domain during the post war period are 'communism', economic development, strikes, defence 
and taxation. Examples of issues diat coidd be considered as belonging to Labor party's issue domain 
are those issues relating to education, healdi and social welfare. The recent electoral success of die 
Australian Labor party may in part be attributed to die party incorporating issues relating to 
'responsible economic management' into its issue domain. 
A concept related to 'issue domains' is the concept of issue priority (Qarke, Stewart & Zuk, 
1986). Parties of die left gain electoral support when unemployment rises and conservative parties 
gain support when inflation is high. Therefore, unemployment and inflation are respectively the issue 
priorities of left and right wing parties. 
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The electoral impact of issues may be either retrospective or prospective. Voting in accordance 
with judgments made on the performance of the incumbent administiation or political figure is 
retrospective, whereas prospective issue voting occurs when voters evaluate policies or economic 
outcomes in terms of die future (Fiorina, 1981:3-12). Retiospective voting requires less cost to tiie 
individual voter than assessing the effects of party policies in die future (Fiorina, 1981:9). 
Retrospective judgements may persist for long periods of time: a large number of references to die 
great depression were noted in American studies of die 1950s (CampbeU et al., 1960:42). The 
distinction between retiospective and prospective judgements is particularly relevant in relation to the 
smdy of die political effects of changes in die economy. 
The question of issue saliency is a further consideration of issue voting. The issues of an election 
campaign or changes in the economy are not likely to be equaUy important to aU voters. Voters wiU 
more accurately assess die issue stands of parties and tend to be more influenced in dieir vote (or 
candidate) choice by those issues they consider the most saUent (Rabinowitz, Protiiro & Jacoby, 1982; 
Repass, 1971). For example, a rise in die level of imemployment is Ukely to be of greater concern to 
those electors working in more vuUierable occupations. A concept similar to 'issue salience' is the 
notion of personal agendas. A voter's personal agenda consists of those issues that he or she feels to 
be important (Young et al., 1987). 
The assessment of the electoral impact of issues is complicated by projection. Projection occurs 
when the voter's perception of party policies is influenced by the voter's own issue stands. Voters 
may project their preferred party's position on an issue as closer to their own than is acmaUy the case 
(Brody & Page, 1972; Conover & Feldman, 1987; Repass, 1976). An extension of die concept of 
projection, 'positivity' and 'negativity' bias, was proposed by Sniderman et al. (1982). Positivity bias 
refers to voters evaluating the issue positions of their preferted candidate or party as closer to their 
own, and negativity bias refers to voters perceiving a greater distance between their own policy 
positions and that of the candidate or party they do not prefer. 
Smdies conducted in the United States indicate that voters perceptions about party issue stands are 
not projections from their own issue stances (Markus, 1982; Maiicus & Converse, 1979). Only limited 
evidence of projection was found by Feldman & Conover (1983). Similarly, Jacoby (1988) concluded 
that perceptions of the issue stands of parties are not substantiaUy derived from the respondent's own 
issue positions. 
A further complication to the study of issue voting is the possibiUty of 'persuasion'. Persuasion 
refers to voters' issue positions being influenced by the issue stands of candidates or parties. No 
evidence of persuasion by presidential candidates was found from the analysis of American panel data 
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(Feldman & Conover, 1983), aldiough Jacoby (1988) concluded diat partisanship does provide cues for 
personal issue orientations. 
A fiirther complication is rationalisation. Rationalisation concerns the causal order between issue 
position and vote choice. Voters may indicate they do not support the policy position of a party after, 
ratiier than before, tiiey decide to vote against diat party. Littie evidence was found for rationalisation 
in tiie analyses of Brody & Page (1972). 
Voters' perceptions of the issue stands of parties and candidates is dependent on how clearly 
political figures espouse dieir poUcy stands. Ambiguous policy positions have been considered to be 
to the advantage of parties and candidates (Page, 1976). More recent woric has indicated that 
uncertainty of a candidate's issue positions was detrimental to the level of support for presidential 
candidates (Bartels, 1986). A development of die concept of 'issue uncertainty' is die concepts of 
defensive and credulous voting. In die context of issue imcertainty, the defensive voter wiU vote for a 
centrist position, while the credulous voter wiU give the party or candidate the benefit of the doubt 
(Weisberg & Fiorina, 1980). 
In general, issue positions have been imderstood as rational responses based on self-interest. 
Voters vote for a party because they perceive die poUcies of that party to be beneficial to them. An 
altemative approach is to consider issue positions as symbolic responses to more general concems. 
Many issues can be understood as symbols of voters concems (Lau, Brown & Sears, 1978; Sears et 
al., 1980). For instance, most voters are not directiy affected by environmental issues, but such issues 
provoke emotional responses conceming protecting the environment and economic development. A 
further example is the issue of abortion, where die issue is a symbol of other concems such as changes 
in the role of women and acceptable sexual behaviour. To vote in accordance widi one's preferences 
on 'symbolic issues' does not require the level of political sophistication required for 'rational' issue 
positions (Carmines & Stimson, 1980). 
Economic voting was originaUy understood as an expression of self-interest (Kinder & Kiewiet, 
1979) as voters react to their personal economic situatioa An altemative understanding is that voters 
react to the state of the national economy. Therefore, the political effects of the economy may come 
about in two ways, through changes in personal economic simation and changes in the perception of 
die overaU state of the national or local economy. Pocket-book or egocentric voting refers to voting in 
accordance with one's personal economic simation whereas sociotropic voting refers to voting in 
accordance with the perception of changes in the larger economy (Hibbing, 1987; Kinder & Kiewiet, 
1979 & 1981). Sociotropic and egocentric voting may be considered as the end points of a 
continuum, ranging from self-interest to tiie national interest (Weatiierford, 1983a). 
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The reward/punishment and die symmetrical/asymmetiical models of economic voting are further 
considerations surrounding economic voting. Voters may respond to economic conditions by 
rewarding or punishing die incumbent government (from V. O. Key, cited by Fiorina, 1981:6). The 
relationship between tiie state of tiie economy and government support can be symmetiical or 
asymmetrical. In a symmetrical model, the better (or worse) the economic situation perceived by 
voters, the more a government's popularity increases (decreases) (Peffley, 1984:279). An 
asymmetrical model contends that governments are punished for poor economic performances but not 
rewarded for improved economic conditions (Monroe, 1979:148)^ .^ A recent modification is the 
notion of responsibUity, where voters wiU only reward or punish an government if they perceive die 
government as responsible (Peffley, 1984). 
2.4.2 Issues and Vote Choice 
Political Issues 
The general conclusion reached by early smdies of issue voting in America is diat issues play 
only a minor role in electoral choice. In America during the 1950s, seven out of ten voters could not 
express a view on the major political issues of the time (CampbeU et al., 1960:172). Only 40-60% of 
this informed segment of the population perceived party differences and could locate one or more 
parties as closer to dieir own position (CampbeU et al., 1960:172-180). The audiors concluded tiiat 
electors pay less attention to issues than is generaUy believed. In a later article, CampbeU (1964) 
concluded that there was littie or no evidence of issue voting during the 1950s. 
In America, issues appeared to have become more important between the 1950s and 1970s. The 
correlations between party identification and issue voting have been decreasing, while the correlations 
between issues and vote have been increasing (Nie, Verba & Petrocik et al., 1979:170). Issues were 
found to be more important to the 1964 and 1968 presidential elections than in earUer elections 
(Pomper, 1972; Repass, 1971). The 1972 election has been considered an issue-based election (MiUer 
et al., 1976), although this view has been contested (Popkin et al., 1976; Repass, 1976). The contrary 
view has also been put by Margolis (1977), who argues tiiat the extent of issue voting in America 
during the decade from the late 1960s has been overstated. 
In Britain, there is considerable evidence that the electorate was influenced by issues during the 
1970s. Issues were found to explain a third of the variation in Labor vote and 40% of the variation in 
vote for the Conservative party (Studlar & Welch, 1981). The immigration issue has been estimated 
to have added 3.3% to the Conservatives' proportion of the vote at die 1970 general election (Studlar, 
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1978). Sarlvik 8L Crewe (1983:283) concluded that issues were responsible for die defeat of die 
Labour party at die 1979 election. 
During tiie 1980s a variety of issues have been found to be related to vote in Great Britain. For 
example, the issue of strikes were foimd to have a significant positive effect on the formnes of the 
Conservative party (Mishler, Hoskin & Fitzgerald, 1989). The FaUdands war improved die Thatcher 
government's standing during 1983 (Clarke, Stewart & Zuk, 1986; Mishler, Hoskin & Fitzgerald, 
1989; Norpoth, 1987). The nuclear weapon issue was found to be detrimental to die Labour party at 
die 1983 election (McAUister & Mughan, 1986). 
Issues appear to have become more important to tiie British electorate. During die early 1980s, 
fewer than 6% of die British electorate could not name an important issues diat helped decide their 
vote. Twenty years before die figure was closer to 40% (Franklin, 1985a; Franklin, 1985b: 128). 
SimUarly, FrankUn (1985a & 1985b: 159) argues that issue voting was not an important feamre of 
British elections until 1970. 
There is oidy a Umited number of empirical smdies which have investigated the effect of political 
issues on vote in Australia. The issue of the Viemam war has been foimd to be partiaUy responsible 
for the gain in support for die Labor party between 1967 and 1969 (Aitkin, I982b:227). However, 
Goot & Tiffen (1983) contend that the Viemam issue had a weaker influence on the swing to the 
Labor party. 
The average effect of issues on vote for the Labor party, during the post-war period, was 
estimated at 0.62% of die vote. For the coaUtion parties the effect of issues was estimated to be only 
0.40% (Budge & Fariie, 1983:69). In die analysis of die 1987 AES, political issues were found to 
explain 9% and 5% of the variation in the vote for the Labor party and the coalition parties 
respectively (McAUister, 1990). In the same article, McAUister (1990) concludes that political issues 
have become more important between 1967 and 1987. Employing a summary measure of comparative 
policy assessments and controUing for party identification, Jackman (1988:66-69) found issues were 
significantiy related to vote in 1967, but not in 1987. 
Economic Issues 
In contrast to the general fmding from aggregate data that die level of disposable income is 
related to vote in the United States, investigations of survey data reveal littie evidence that 
retrospective evaluations of changes in personal finances affect vote. Measures relating to 
retrospective changes in personal simation were found to have littie effect on vote choice (Kinder, 
Adams & Gronke, 1989; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979 & 1981). Personal (or pocketbook) retrospective 
evaluations have been found to be considerably less important in relation to vote, than sociotropic (or 
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coUective) retiospective evaluations (Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979 & 1981; Markus, 1988). hi contrast, 
prospective evaluations of one's personal fmancial simation have been found, to be significantiy 
related to vote at American Senate elections (KuUnski & West, 1981). 
The effect of personal economic simation on vote is to an extent mediated tiirough evaluations of 
government performance (Feldman, 1982; Fiorina, 1981:108-121,179). Conversely, sociotropic 
evaluations of the economy are influenced by one's personal economic simation (Conover, Feldman & 
Knight, 1986). 
In Britain, both coUective (sociotropic) retiospective and coUective prospective evaluations of the 
economy were found to have significant effects on vote controUing for party identification (Hibbing, 
1987). As in the United States, personal retrospective evaluations were not significantiy related to 
vote (Hibbing, 1987). Similarly, coUective mediated evaluations were found by Lewis-Beck (1986) as 
a major impact on vote in the United Kingdom, whereas personal economic circumstances had littie or 
no influence. 
In Austialia, Mughan's (1987) analysis of aggregate data found Uttie evidence for die 'hip-pocket 
nerve' being a major factor in AustraUan elections. Measures from survey data relating to tiie 
National debt were foimd to be significantiy related to vote at the 1987 election, but measures of 
unemployment and inflation were found not to be significantiy related to vote (Bean & KeUey, 1988). 
From bivariate analyses of die 1967, 1979 ANPA and 1987 AES data, McAUister (1990) concludes 
that prospective economic evaluations are just as important as retrospective economic evaluations and 
voters' evaluations of the economy are at least as important as more general political issues. Net of 
party identification, attimdes to the economy could explain 9% and 5% of the variation in the vote for 
die Labor and coalition parties respectively at the 1987 election (McAUister, 1990). In the analysis of 
the 1990 AES data, Gow (1990) controUing for party identification foimd diat both personal and 
sociotropic prospective economic evaluations and sociotropic retrospective evaluations had significant 
effects on vote, while personal retiospective evaluations did not 
2.4.3 Influences on Issues 
The model of electoral choice proposed by the authors of The American Voter understood 
'partisanship' as a perceptual screen dirough which objects of die poUtical landscape are evaluated 
(CampbeU et al., 1960:170). In other words, an elector's position on issues is coloured by his or her 
partisanship. Issues have been foimd to be influenced by partisanship (Archer, 1987; Asher, 1984; 
Markus & Converse, 1979; Page & Jones, 1979). In the case where voters have equal evaluations of 
the issue positions of candidates, most electors (two thirds) vote in accordance with their party 
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identification (Brody & Page, 1973). In Australia, party identification was found to have a large 
impact on a measure of comparative policy assessments (Jackman, 1988:66-69). 
The Stiength of partisan attachments influences the Ukelihood of issue voting. Issues are more 
strongly derived from partisanship among strong identifiers, tiian among independents and 'leaner' 
partisans (Jacoby, 1988). Party Identification has only a minimal role in influencing die issue 
preferences of young adidts who ordy have weak partisan attachments (Franklin, 1984). 
Evaluations of the economy also appear to be closely aUied to party loyalties. Partisanship was 
found to have a major influence on the evaluation of government economic performance (Fiorina, 
1981:108-118). In 1987, Labor voters were found to be more positive about the effect of the (Labor) 
governments' poUcies on the national economy (McAUister, 1990). 
Ideology is a further influence on poUcy preferences. The rational voting models of Downs 
(1957:117-141) assume that the poUcy preferences of voters Ue on a single left-right ideological 
continuum. An elector's position on issues is to some extent derived from beUef systems (CampbeU et 
al. 1960:191; Jackson, 1983). A relationship between poUcy positions and ideology was foimd by 
Page & Jones (1979), and moderate correlations between policy preferences and a measure of liberal 
conservative ideology were observed by Wyckoff (1980). 'Values' were foimd to be associated widi 
issue positions by Conover & Feldman (1984). In Australia, 'economic conservatism' was found to be 
associated with comparative poUcy assessments in 1987, but not in 1967 (Jackman, 1988:66-69). 
The relationship between issues and vote may vary between social groups. Greater effects of the 
economy on voting were foimd among the working class in the United States during the 1950s and in 
Britain during die 1970s (Hibbs, 1982; Himmelweit, Humphreys & Jaeger, 1985:57-59; Weatiierford, 
1978). In AustraUa, the issue of unemployment was found to be more important to blue-coUar 
workers tiian to white-coUar woricers (Kemp, 1978:320). 
The voters whose votes appear to be most affected by issues are those electors with higher levels 
of education and a high level of interest in poUtics. The more educated groups in die electorate are 
more Ukely to be familiar with poUtical issues (CampbeU et al., 1960:175). The relationship between 
economic perceptions and vote choice is strongest among those with die most interest in poUtics 
(Hibbing, 1987). Fiorina (1981:49-54) also found that the politically more sophisticated are more 
likely to vote economicaUy. However, voting in accordance witii issue preferences on issues that are 
considered less complex does not require significantiy higher levels of education or political interest 
than is required for voting in accordance with preferences on more difficult issues (Carmines & 
Stimson, 1980). 
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2.4.4 Summary 
In die preceding sections, issues and issue voting have been discussed. The main points are (1) 
numerous issues have been considered as influencing electoral choice in Austialia altiiough Uttie 
empirical woric has been undertaken, (2) issues have generaUy been categorised as eidier political 
(non-economic issues) or economic issues, (3) die 'tme' issue positions of voters must be distinguished 
from dieir partisanship, (4) there are a number of aspects relating to issues such as position and 
valence issues, issue domains, issue saUence, the possibility of projection, persuasion and 
rationaUsation, issue ambiguity, and whether issue voting can be understood as rational or a response 
to symbolic concems, (6) issues have been found as affecting vote choice, independent of party 
identification, (7) it has been suggested that political issues have become more important in Australia 
since die late 1960s, (8) there is some evidence for economic voting in AustraUa and (9) die major 
influences on issue positions are partisanship and ideology, and issue voting is more likely among the 
politicaUy sophisticated. 
2.5 CANDIDATES 
The concept of candidates encompasses the leaders of the major parties, the candidates in 
individual electorates, government ministers and other prominent political figures. Voters' evaluations 
of candidates are Ukely to influence electoral choice. Since candidates are less abstiact than parties or 
issues, voters are expected to have some opinion on candidates (MiUer, Wattenberg & Malanchuk, 
1986). 
In Austialia and Britain, most of die research on 'candidates' has focused on die leaders of die 
major parties. Party leaders have often been cited as responsible for movements in the level of party 
support in Austialia (Kemp, 1978:228). The party leader has been understood as one of the most 
important components of a party's appeals for electoral support (Jaensch, 1989a:115). 
In Austialia, particidar leaders are understood as beneficial or harmful to a political party's 
electoral fortimes. The political skills of Menzies have been viewed as contributing to the success of 
the coalition parties during die 1950s and 1960s (McAUister, 1988a). Whitiam was a more popular 
figure than his opponent (McMahon) at the time of the 1972 election (Saulwick & Aitchison, 1973). 
However, by 1977, Whitiam was considered to be an electoral liability (Butier, 1979:14; WeUer, 
1983:248). Menzies and Fraser are understood as contributing to the electoral success of die Liberal 
party, whereas Snedden, Gorton and McMahon have been viewed as electoral liabilities, as were the 
Labor leaders CalweU and Hayden. 
There appears to be an association between a party's electoral standing and die popularity of its 
leader. Whitiam's accession to die Labor leadership in 1967 was associated with increased levels of 
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support for die Labor party (Aitidn, 1982b:206). The Liberal party's electoral standing rose after 
Gorton became prime minister in 1968 (Aitidn, 1982b:207). The decUne in die standing of die Liberal 
party at die 1969 election has been attributed to a weaker puU of its post-Menzies party leaders 
(Aitidn, I982b:237). The leadership of Fraser appears to be have been beneficial to die coalition 
parties at die 1977 election (Goot & Beed, 1979:182-184). The recovery of die Labor party during 
1987 coincided with the image of Howard's inability to cope with dissension witiiin the coalition 
(McAUister & Ascui, 1988). 
2.5.1 The ConcepmaUsation and Measurement of Candidate Evaluations 
The 'evaluations of candidates' have been conceptualised and thus measured in a variety of ways, 
including, likes and dislikes towards a candidate, feelings of warmtii or coldness, or through the 
qualities candidates may or may not possess. 
One approach is to gauge if electors Uke or dislike political figures. This approach entaUs asking 
respondents open questions on their Ukes and dislikes to candidates**. These questions were included 
in die 1967, 1969 and 1979 ANPA surveys. It is hypothesised diat respondents wiU cast their vote for 
die candidate witii the greater number of net likes (Brody & Page, 1973; KeUey & Mirer, 1974) or 
that summary measures of candidate likes and dislikes wiU be associated with party preference (Bean, 
1984:406). 
A second approach is to ascertain how electors feel towards political figures. Respondents are 
asked how warm or cold they feel towards certain poUtical figures using a feeling thermometer'^  or 
how favourable or unfavourable they feel using a 10 point rating scale'*. These measures were 
included in the NSSS and AES surveys. 
A third approach is to focus on the particidar qualities of political figures that are beUeved to be 
desirable, such as effectiveness, competence and integrity. There are two different ways in which the 
'quaUties' of poUticians can be assessed. Widi the first way, respondents are presented with a Ust of 
personal qualities and asked to evaluate which quaUties, diey thought, each poUtical figure possessed 
(Bean & Mughan, 1989; McAUister, 1990). Widi die second metiiod, die responses to die like and 
disUke questions are used to note positive and negative references to personal qualities of the 
candidates (Aitidn, l982b:241-247; Bean, 1984:384-387; Bean & Mughan, 1989; Brown et al., 1988; 
McAUister, 1990; MiUer, Wattenberg & Malanchuk, 1986). 
2.5.2 Candidates and Vote Choice 
In American presidential elections, the presidential candidates are considered as one of the most 
important influences on vote choice (KeUey & Mirer, 1976; Repass, 1976; Stokes, 1966). Over 96% 
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of voters who preferred one candidate over the otiier candidates, voted for that candidate (Brody & 
Page, 1973). 
The evaluations of presidential candidates appear to have a greater affect on vote than issues. In 
a smdy of the 1972 election, Popkin et al. (1976) found diat evaluations of George McGovem as an 
unsuitable president were important. Support for him waned among those electors who had similar 
issue stands to him, as he was increasingly viewed as incompetent (Popkin et al., 1976). At die 1984 
presidential election, Wattenberg (1987) found tiiat tiie effects of presidential approval were four times 
die effects of policies. Marcus (1988) also concluded diat feeUngs about candidates have a stronger 
electoral impact than policy positions. There is evidence that 'candidates' have become more 
important in presidential elections since 1952 (Kirkpatrick, Lyons & Fitzgerald, 1975; MiUer & MiUer, 
1976). 
The importance of leadership on the levels of party support in Australia has been demonstrated by 
recent midtivariate analyses. A significant effect of comparative leader evaluations on vote, not 
controUing for party identification, was observed in the analysis of the 1979 ANPA data (Graetz & 
McAUister, 1986). The evaluation of Prime Minister Hawke (in 1984) was found by Graetz & 
McAUister (1988:258-259) to have a considerable impact on vote for the Labor party, second to that of 
party identification. ControUing for party identification, the evaluations of Hawke and changes in the 
evaluation of the opposition leaders (since 1984) were found to be significantiy related to vote at die 
1987 election (Bean & KeUey, 1988). Even the evaluations of the premier of Queensland, Sir Joh 
Bjelke Petersen have been foimd to be significantiy associated widi vote, when party identification was 
controUed for (Bean & KeUey, 1988). 
At the level of local candidates most Austialians were found to be unfamiUar with their local 
candidates, with approximately 65% of the 1967 electorate not knowing the name of their local 
member of federal parUament (Aiticin, 1982b:251). In contrast, more recent woric indicates tiiat local 
candidates are important in relation to vote. Using a single measure based on the respondent's 
'feeling' towards the local candidate, evaluations of die local member were found to be significantiy 
associated widi vote choice, controlling for party identification and leader evaluations (Bean, 1990). 
In American smdies there is no clear indication of which personal quality is most important in 
relation to vote. In one study, 'experience' and 'incimibency' were found to have the considerable 
impacts on vote in congressional elections. 'Personal qualifications' were found to be die strongest 
component in the presidential vote (Hinckley, Hofstetter & Kessel, 1974). 'Competence' was found to 
be the criterion most strongly related to the evaluation of candidates measured by feeling diermometers 
(MiUer, Wattenberg & Malanchuk, 1986). In Australia, Bean & Mughan (1989) found diat perceived 
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'effectiveness' had die strongest effect on vote foUowed by 'listens to reason', 'caring' and 'sticking to 
principles'. 
2.5.3 Uifluences on Candidate Evaluations 
The major influence on evaluations of candidates is partisanship. Other factors such as ideology, 
education and issues also have effects. 
The American Uterature has generaUy considered die evaluation of candidates as endogenous to 
partisanship (Asher, 1984; CampbeU et al., 1960; Markus, 1982). Voters may simply approve of 
candidates because they belong to the party the voter identifies witii. The American Uteramre suggests 
diat there is considerable evidence for an association between party identification and candidate 
evaluations (Brody & Page, 1973; Markus & Converse, 1979; Page & Jones, 1979). However, 
measuring candidate evaluations in terms of candidate characteristics radier than by summary 
measures, MiUer, Wattenberg & Malanchidc (1986) concluded that party identification had no role to 
play in judgments of candidates. 
In Australia, partisanship is also associated widi leader evaluations. A measure of relative likes 
and disUkes of die leaders was associated with party identification, the correlation being about 0.5 
(Bean, 1984:405, 409). Feelings towards Hawke and Fraser, measured by feeling thermometers, were 
strongly associated with partisanship, 29% and 17% of the variation in these measures was explained 
by party identification. Large standardised effects of Labor identification on both die evaluations of 
Hawke and Fraser were observed in an analysis of data coUected in 1984 (Graetz & McAUister, 
1988:256-257). Jackman (1988:66-69) found diat party identification influenced the comparative 
evaluation of candidates in the 1967 ANPA (using the likes dislikes measures) and in the 1987 AES 
(using the favourable unfavourable measures). SimUarly, Graetz & McAUister (1986) found a 
significant effect of party identification on the evaluations of leaders measured by comparative Ukes 
and dislikes of the leaders in die 1979 ANPA data. 
The association between party identification and die evaluation of leaders, is higher widi measures 
based on relative Ukes and dislikes or thermometer scores than those based on candidate 
characteristics. Employing measures of candidate characteristics, Bean & Mughan (1989) could ordy 
fmd moderate correlations between party identification and specific candidate characteristics. 
Ideology may also play a far more Umited role. In Austialia, less than 3% of the variation in the 
evaluations of poUtical leaders was explained by 'ideology'. Oidy a measure of 'economic ideology' 
was found to be significantiy related to die evaluations of Hawke and Fraser in die 1984 NSSS (Graetz 
& McAUister, 1988:257-259). 
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Of social-stmcmral factors, education appears to influence tiie evaluation of political figures. 
While die higher educated tended to place more emphasis on performance-based criteria such as 
competence, integrity and reliability, the less educated base tiieir judgements more directiy on die 
observable attributes of the candidates. Education distinguishes between groups of voters employing 
different task traits to evaluate leaders. The more educated respondents emphasising competence 
(Brown et al., 1988; MUler et al., 1986). In AustraUa, a measure of years of education was found not 
be significantiy related to comparative leader evaluations in botii 1967 and 1987 (Jackman, 1988:66-
69). OveraU, social-stmcmral variables could explain very Uttie of the variation in leader evaluations 
in Australia (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:257). 
'Issues' may also affect the evaluations of party leaders. In America, die evaluation of candidates 
has been found to consist of at least two dimensions, parties and issues (Weisberg & Rusk, 1970). In 
Australia, Jackman (1988:66-69) fotmd that a measure of comparative poUcy assessments were 
significantiy related to comparative candidate evaluations in 1967, but not in 1987. 
2.5.4 Summary 
'Candidates' are important to die understanding of electoral choice. Most of die work on 
'candidates' in AustraUa has focused on the leaders of the two major parties who are viewed as 
important to dieir party's electoral fortimes. There are several ways that candidate evaluations have 
been measured, through open questions on likes and dislikes, feeling thermometer ratings and in terms 
of 'candidate characteristics'. In Australia, effects of candidate evaluations on vote, net of party 
identification have been observed. The major influence on candidate evaluations is partisanship and 
social-stmcmral factors have Uttie effect on the evaluations of Australian party leaders. 
2.6 SUMMARY OF AUSTRALIAN STUDIES 
There have been at least 27 separate multivariate investigations of party support performed on 
data coUected in AustraUa. The results of the investigations cited in the literamre review are presented 
in table 2.3. Inspection of this table aUows comparisons between studies to be readily made. 
From the literamre, there are a number of problems in drawing conclusions as to the process of 
electoral choice in Australia and changes in this process over time. First, the models analysed have 
different specifications. Different model specifications are likely to produce different results. This 
point is apparent Irom pemsal of table 2.3(iii) where quite different model specifications have been 
employed in the analysis of the same dependent variable. 
75 
Second, apart from die work of McAUister (1988a), tiie same general model has not been 
analysed in data coUected at different times. Therefore, conclusions on changes in die process of 
electoral choice in Australia over time are difficult to make witii confidence. 
Third, die investigations do not cleariy distinguish between tiie factors tiiat influence party 
identification and die factors diat influence vote. The two concepts are conceptuaUy distinct and bodi 
should be included in a general model of electoral choice. 
Fourth, more work has been carried out on social-stmctural factors than on the odier factors 
involved in electoral choice, especiaUy issues. The Uteramre allows some tentative conclusions to be 
drawn on changes in the effects of social-stmctural factors. However, not enough work has been 
undertaken on changes in the effects of partisanship, ideology, issues and candidates on electoral 
choice. 
Fifth, there is the question of measurement. Investigations including the same concepts do not 
always employ identical measures of those concepts. The employment of standard measures allows 
conclusions to be drawn more confidentiy. 
FinaUy, fuU reciprocal models foUowing from the revisionist school of partisanship have not been 
thoroughly investigated in the Australian context. This is an important point since reciprocal and non-
reciprocal models are unlikely to lead to die same conclusions. 
The most detaUed examination of over time changes in Australia is the work of McAllister 
(1988a). However, his model was Umited to die associations between social-stmctural factors and 
vote, whereas a more properly specified model would specify social-stmctural factors (together widi 
partisan backgroimd) as influencing partisanship, and partisanship, issues and candidates as influencing 
vote. Furthermore, many variables in diis analysis were measured by simple dichotomies and die 
investigation was limited to three time points. 
This smdy endeavours to contribute to the understanding of electoral behaviour by addressing die 
points summarised above. This is performed by the analyses of a model of electoral choice, widi as 
far as possible identical measures, at seven different time points. This model specifies a causal 
sequence between social-stmcmral factors, partisanship, ideology, issues and candidates in relation to 
electoral choice. This model is the subject of the foUowing chapter. It is Ukely that these analyses 
wiU aUow conclusions to be drawn confidentiy, on both electoral choice and electoral change in 
Australia. 
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TABLE 2.3(i): SUMMARY OF MULTIVARIATE STUDIES ANALYSING VOTE OR PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN AUSTRALIA 
Study 
Method 
AID 
OLS RegTCMion 
Logistic Regreuion 
Dau 
1967 ANPA 
1979 ANPA 
1984 NSSS 
1987 AES 
Public Opinion PoU* 
Dependent Variable 
Labor Vote v other 
Labor Vote v LCP Vote 
Labor Id. (v other) 
LNP Id.(l); minor parties (.5); Labor (0) 
Independent Variables 
Manual Occupation H of H v Other 
Lower white-coUar v Upper white-collar 
Skilled manual v upper white-collar 
Other Manual v upper white-coUar 
Farmer v upper white-coUar 
Occupational Status 
H of H non-manual v other 
H of H Farmer v not white-coUar 
H of H Capitalist 
H of H Petty Bourgeoisie 
Religion (no reUgion v some icUgion) 
Religion (CEJIC v Uniting.other Protestant) 
Religion (Uniting v Other) 
ReUgion (None v Protestant) 
ReUgion (CathoUc v Protestant) 
ReUgion (CE v RC) 
ReUgion (Other Protestant v RC) 
ReUgion (Other religion v RC) 
ReUgion (No reUgion v RC) 
Religion (CathoUc v other) 
ReUgion (No reUgion v other) 
Region (urban v other) 
Region (outside large cities v other) 
Urban Resident (v other) 
Length of residence in area 
New South Wales resident (v other) 
Sute 
NationaUty at Birth (Foreign v Aust.) 
Bom in Eastem Europe (v Aust. Bom) 
Bom in Southem Europe (v Aust Bom) 
Age 40s,60> v Other 
Age 35-49 V <35 
Age >50 V <35 
Age (yean) 
Gender (men v women) 
Gender (female) 
Education (<Comp. Sec. v Comp. Sec) 
Education (tertiary v Tertiary) 
Minimum Education (Dummy) 
Education (years) 
Respondent Trade Union Member 
Trade Union Household (v other) 
Supervisor (H of H) 
Supervisor (R.) 
Subjective Woijdng Class (v other) 
Subjective Middle Class (v other) 
H of H Government employ (v other) 
H of H Self-employed 
Ch. A. < 1 n a month 
Ch. A. (0) to 1: > U a wk.(l) (7 leveU) 
Churchgoing v non-churchgoers 
Father Manual occupation v other 
Income H of H (<$1250 v >$1250) 
Income H of H (<$4250 v >$4250) 
Income H of H 
Family Income log,(l(XX)s) 
Home Owners v Buyers.tenants 
Spouse's Occupational grade 
No Phone 
No Car 
Election yew 
Parents Labor (1 Yes.O otherwise) 
R Square for OLS 
Aitkin Aitkin McAllister McAllister McAllister Jones & 
(1982>:lU)(1982b:3(r7) (1988a) (1988a) (1988a) McAUister 
(1989) 
Yes 
Yes 
1* 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
3* 
3* 
4* 
4» 
3* 
4* 
3* 
!• 
1* 
1* 
!• 
1* 
2 
4* 
l*/4* 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
3* 
2 
2 
3* 
0.04 
-0.03 
-0.12 
-0.18 
19 
03 
,14 
.26 
.04 
Yes 
Yes 
-0. 
02 
.14 
.20 
.10 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.14 
0.15 
0.09 
13 
04 
28 
04 
0.12 
0.00 
-0.32 
0.08 
0.04 
0.16 
0.12 
0.09 
Yes 
,42 
33* 
87» 
,21 
33 
.W 
37* 
40* 
79* 
,44* 
40* 
Jones & Jones & KeUey & Qstz 
McAlUster McAllister McAllister .Vfa* 
(1989) (1989) (1985) ister 
Yes Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
(late 40s) 
Yes 
Yes 
Gate 60s) 
Yes 
Yes 
(early 80s 
+values sty) 
Yes 
-0 
67 
,42* 
,77* 
09 
04 
74* 
10 
09 
-0, 
29 -0, 
12 -a 
28* 
,40* 
56* 
32 
69 
16 
,46 
25 
17 
50 
Yes 
12 
62* 
73* 
27* 
0.11* 
0.16* 
0.19* 
0.08* 
-0.05 
(R.) 
;292) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
e.Qi 
0.07 
(U9* 
16* 
0.00 
0.03 
Oil* 
(Ror 
im 
0 
-0.05 
(m 
•015* 
0.03* 
(multipUed 
by ln(2) to 
reflect 
doubling of 
income) 
0.21 0.16 0.12 0.35 
036* 
0.22 
77 
TABLE 2.m): SUMMARY OF MULTIVARIATE STUDIES ANALYSING VOTE OR PARTY IDENTmCATION IN AUSTRALIA 
Study Bean& 
KeUey 
(1988) 
Kdley & McAllister 
McAUister & Mughan 
(1984)" (1987b) 
McAlUster McAlUster Bean 
& Mughan & KeUey (1990) 
(1987b) (1982) 
Bean 
(1984: 
309) 
Bean 
(1984: 
309) 
Graetz & 
McAllister 
(1986) 
Method 
OLS Regression 
Logistic Regression 
2 Suge Least Squares 
Dau 
1973 Social MobUity 
1967 ANPA 
1979 ANPA 
1984 NSSS 
1984-7 NSSS Panel 
1987 AES 
Dependent Variable 
LNP Vote (1), minor (.5), Labor (0) 
Lifetime Voting [1 Lib.,.5 ch'ged.O Lab.] 
Labor Vote (1977) v not Labor 
Labor Vote v Other 
Vote (Unspecified) 
Independent Variables 
R. non-manual (White-coUar) v other 
H of H non-manual worker 
Occupational Status 
Farmer v noi farmer 
ReUgion (Protestant v other) 
ReUgion (CathoUc v other) 
ReUgion (No reUgion v other) 
Region (urban v rural) 
Rurality of Electorate 
Length of residence years 
Long-term residence (>=10 yrs) 
Sute 
Bom in British Isles (BI) 
Bom in N. Europe (ex. BI) 
Bom in N. Europe (+ BI) 
Bom in Eastem Europe 
Bom in Mediterranean 
Bom in S. Europe 
Age (years) 
Age (decades) 
Gender (female) 
Gender (male) 
Education (years) 
Education (0 no schooL-1 Comp. Uni. 8 cat.) 
R. Trade Union Member 
Subjective Middle.upper Oass v other 
Government employee V other 
Capitalist/employer V other 
Supervisor 
Income 
Family Income (100s) 
Family Income GoglO(X)s) 
Fanuly Income (1000s) 
Family Income (10,000s) 
Church Attend (0.never - 1 x wk. or more) 
Church Attendance(0.neveT- > 1 x week) 
Fathers Occupational Sutus 
Father non-manual worker 
Father is Farmer 
Father's subjective class upper or middle 
Family Prosperous 
Father Capitalist 
Father Supervisor 
Father farmer 
Fathers' education years 
Pie or Post election survey 
ParenU (1 bth. Lab,0.5 one,0 bth. Ub) 
Parents (1 bth. Lab,0.S ane,0 bth. not Lab) 
Favours (Tensoiship-low 0 to hi 1 
Opposes Aust. Republic-low 0 to hi 1 
Favours big business-low 0 to hi 1 
Favours death penalty-low 0 to hi 1 
Opposes Immigration-low 0 to hi 1 
Likely to be class conflict-low 0 to hi 1 
PoUtical Interest-low 0 to hi 1 
Patty Identification 
Relative Evaluations of Leaders 
Feeling! to Howard 
FeeUngi to Hawke 
FeeUngs to Local member 
Tnist" 
Efficacy" 
R Square for OLS 
Yes Yes 
i' 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 1984 
Yes 
Aust. 
Bom 
-
Yes 
0.13* 
0.03 
np 
np 
-0.01 • 
-0.21* 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes 
(urban 
only) 
Yes 
Yes 1987 
Yes 
-0.14* 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
(urban 
only) 
Yes 
Y « 
Yes 
Yes 
np 
np 
np 
tW' 
np 
np 
np 
0.23* 
0.13* 
np 
np 
-0.32* 
-0.13* 
. 
-0.04* 
-0.06* 
0 
0.08* 
-0.17* 
-0.04* 
0.08* 
0.13* 
-0.05* 
-0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.22* 
-0.00 
-0.04* 
0.00 
-0.12* 
0.O4* 
0.05* 
0.12* 
-0.06* 
0.03* 
-0.00 
0.02 
0.27* 
0.03 
-0.00 
-0.06* 
0.00 
-0.08* 
0.02 
-0.13* 
0.07* 
0.14* 
-0.02 
0.00 
•0.17* 
0.12* 
-0.004 
0.01 
0.01 
0.09* 
0.08* 
-0.18* 
0.02 
np 
np 
-0.03* 
np 
np 
np 
np 
np 
np 
np 
-0.23* 
-0.15* 
0.06 
-0.03 
-0.18 
-0.15 
-0.27* 
-0.002* 
-0.12* 
-0.02 
-0.14* 
-0.12* 
0.06 
0.07 
-0.13 
-0.19 
0.05 
0.004 
-0.07 
-0.02 
. 
-0.04* 0.01 
0.04* 
0.03 
0.01 
0.03* 
0.13* 
0.03 
-0.003* 
-0.15* 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
np 
np 
0.23* 
0.08 
0.03 
0.03 
0.01* 
• 
. 
. 
0.48* 
0.04* 
0.02 
0.07* 
0.10* 
0.06* 
0.01 
0.02 
• 
0.39* 
0.01 
0.16* 
0.34* 
0.13* 
0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
np 
0.40* 
np np 0.47 0.40 0.28 
0.65* 
0.16* 
-0.30* 
0.10* 
0.77 0.16 0.10 
0.15 
031 
009 
na 
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TABLE 2.3(m): SUMMARY OF MULTTVARUTE STUDIES ANALYSING VOTE OR PARTY IDENTIHCATION IN AUSTRALL\ 
Study 
Method 
OLS Regression 
3 Suge least Squares 
Dau 
1967 ANPA 
1984 NSSS 
1984-7 NSSS Panel 
1987 AES 
Dependent Variable 
LNP Vote (1), minor (.5), Labor (0) 
Party Id. 1987 (1 LNP,.5 minor, 0 Ub) 
Party Id. 1984 (1 LNP,.5 minor, 0 Ub) 
LNP Vote in 1987 
Ubor Voter v Other 
7 level measure of party id. (Ub. +) 
Independent Variables 
Unspecified Social-structural Variables 
R. non-manual (White-coUar) v other 
Religion (CathoUc v Other) 
ReUgion (No reUgion v Other) 
Region (rural v urban) 
Bom in Southem Europe v Other 
Lives in Major urban area 
Age (years) 
Year of Birth since 1959 
Year of Birth 1949-1959 
Year of Birth 1939-1948 
Year of Birth 1929-1938 
Year of Birth 1919-1928 
Year of Birth 1909-1918 
Year of Birth 1899-1917 
Gender 
Education (years) 
Supervisor 
Respondent Trade Union Member 
Years trade union member 
Subjective Middlcupper Qass v other 
Working Class self-placement 
Government employee v other 
Capiulist/employer v other 
Family Income (1000s) 
Family Woiking Class 
Income logged 
Pre or Post election survey 
ParenU (1 both Lib. or Nat,0.S one,0 both Ubor) 
Father's party Ubor 
Mother's party Ubcr 
Ubor Partisan 
Party Identification (1984) 
Party Id. 1987 Liberal v Ubor 
Party Id. 1987 National v Ubor 
Party Id. 1987 Other v Ubor 
No Party v Ubor 
Vote 1984 
Change Party Id. 1984-87 
7 Level measure of Party Id. 
Comparative Leader Evaluations 
FeeUng! to Fraser (1984) 
FeeUng! to Fraser (1987) 
FeeUngs to Peacock (1987) 
FeeUngi to Howard (1987) 
FeeUngi to Peacock/Howard (1984) 
Change (Peacock-Howard) 1984-87 
FeeUng! to WhiUam (1987) 
FeeUngs to Hayden (1987) 
FeeUng! to Hawke (1987) 
FeeUngs to Hawke (1984) 
Change (Hawke) 1984-87 
FeeUngs to Sinclair (1984) 
Change (Sinclair) 1984-87 
Social issues 
Comparative PoUcy Assessments 
Protection of the Kivironment 
Uw Enforcement 
Economic Power 
Economic Conservatism 
Attitudes to Royalism 
Attitudes to Trade Unions 
Attitudes to Economic Organisation 
Attitudes to Relative InequaUty 
Attitudes to Anticommimism 
Attitudes to Pro-American 
Attitudes to Christian BeUef 
Attitudes to Social Spending 
Attitudes to Aborigines 
Attitudes to Environment 
Attitudes to Uranium 
Attitudes to Inequality of Earnings 
Attitudes to Confidence in Business 
Attitudes to Punitiveness 
Attitudes to Abortion 
Attitudes to Military Threat 
Attitudes to Women's Careers 
R Square for OLS 
Bean Bean Bean KeUey 
& KeUey & KeUey & KeUey (1988 
(1988) (1988) (1988) :71) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0 
36* 0.51« 
).ll* 
ns 
ns 
ns 
Yes Yes 
(Stn'd) 
Yes 
Yes 
lis. 
lis 
nl 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
0.03* 
0.08'* 
np 
np 
np 
np 
np 
24* 
18* 
22* 
24* 
29* 
11* 
08* 
0.27* 
0.53* 
6.07ns 
0.17* 
-0.21* 
-0.30* 
0.08ns 
0.02ns 
0.84'* 
0.84'* 
0.45'* 
0.44'* 
ns 
0.09* 
0.15* 
ns 
-0.10 
-0.29 
0, 
65'* 
19** 
74'* 
Yes 
Yes 
m 
m 
0.03* 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
-6.05* 
ns 
ns 
np 
np 
-0.19** 
o.n** 
np 
np. 
0.03'* 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.07 
0.74 0.79 0.77 
05* 
02 
33* 
13* 
24* 
16* 
10* 
06* 
04* 
(M* 
03 
02 
02 
01 
02 
01 
00 
01 
02 
03 
53 
CJraetz & Jackman Jackman Jackman Jackman 
McAllister (1988) (1988) (1988) (1988) 
(1988:259) 
Yes 
(Stn'd) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
21* 
0.51" 
0.08* 
0.28* 
ns 
ns 
ns 
0.08* 
0.63* 
Yes 
08ns 
84* 
62* 
58* 
65* 
59* 
01* 
20* 
01ns 
or 
a3r 
Yes 
Yes 
17ns 
08ns 
32ns 
02ns 
07ni 
12ns 
lOns 
02ns 
10"' 
0.19* 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
73* 
18 
0.39 
0.02 
05* 0.02 
79 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares (Regression) 
H of H Head of household 
cat Categories 
CE Chureh of England 
RC Roman CathoUc 
R. Respondent 
Ch. A. Church Attendance 
Id. Identification 
bth. Both 
ch'ged Changed 
Lab Ubor 
Lib Liberal 
• Concluded as Significant (p<0.05). 
ns n a significant 
np Measure included in analysis but results not presented 
na Not AppUcable 
1* Included in AID model and contributed to the reduction of variance in the dependent variable. 
2 Included in AID model but was fotmd not to be important in the reduction of variance in the dependent variable. 
3* Important only in model for males but not for females. 
4* Important only in model for females but not for males. 
5 Important in models for both males and females. 
6 Not included in model since separate models were analysed for males and females. 
7 It is unclear whether this measure refers to the head of the household or the respondent 
8 Total effects rather than direct effecu (Appendix to Bean & Kelley, 1989). 
9 Calculated by author 
10 Analysis peifonned only on respondent's who were Australian bom 
11* Probability of Null hypothesis 0.05 between 0.10 
12 Trvist - the evaluations of the government as honest and trustworthy (Cjraetz & McAllister, 1986) 
13 Efficacy - to what extent electors beUeve their views are taken into account by govemmenU, the pubUc service and poUticians (Chaetz & McAlUster, 
1986) 
Note 
-The results fa McAllister (1988a) are fi-om the extended analysis. Significance not reported for McAllister (1988a). 
-OLS coefficienu are the unstandardised coefficients except the standardised coefficients (Stn'd) for KeUey (1988) and Graetz & McAllister (1988:259). 
-the significance of the logistic coefficienu in Jones & McAllister (1989) are estimated from the size of the 95% confidence Umiu. The actual t-lesu were not 
presented. 
- 2 suge least square coefficienu for Graetz & McAlUster (1986) are standardised coefficienu. 
1 In the studies of Bean (1990), Bean (1991) and Bean & Kelley (1988), the three-level approach was employed. 
2 What is meant by 'relevant' is that the factor in question has a non-trivial (significant) impact on the dependent variable of 
interest. 
3 The AID technique has also been employed in the analysis of electoral behaviour in Britain (Rose, 1974:48, Rose & 
McAllister, 1986:83-100). 
4. Several papers in the Sage series on quantitative methods provide good introductions to multiple regression. These are volumes 
22 (Lewis-Beck, 1980), 29 (Achen, 1982), 50 (Beny & Feldman, 1985) and 57 (Schroeder, Sjoquist & Stephan, 1986). 
5. Logistic regression differs from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in that the dependent variable is treated as a 
dichotomy, rather than as a continuous (interval) variable. For the dependent variable vote, logistic regression is statistically more 
appropriate, although the results are usually similar to those found by OLS regression. Logistic regression is discussed in detail 
in volume 45 of the Sage series on quantitative methods (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984). 
6. Three-stage least-squares is a method of estimating simultaneous equations. Three-stage least-squares is discussed by Maddala 
(1977:483-486). 
7. A number of indices of class voting have been constructed appropriate to an electorate with two classes and two poUtical 
parties. One party is to the left and the other to the right and the two social classes are the (non-manual) middle and the (manual) 
working classes. The best known measure of class voting was the measure developed by Alford. This measure is defined as the 
percentage of the manual group voting for the party of the left, minus the percentage of the non-manual group voting for the party 
of the left (Alford, 1963:79-80). This measure of class voting is known as the Alford index. A similar index is the class aligiunent 
(or class polarisation) index which compares the support, within classes for the party of the right rather than party of the left 
(Butler & Stokes, 1974:203-204; Crewe, Sarlvik & Alt, 1977). Korpi (1972) proposed two summary measures, class 
distinctiveness and political distinctiveness. Class distinctiveness of a party is the proportion of that party's support received from 
its 'natural' class. Political distinctiveness is the degree to which a class supports its party. Campbell et al. (1960:348) used a 
another measure, defined as the degree to which class groups deviate from the random assigiunent of 50 % of their votes to each 
of the two parties. In the analysis of the association between class and vote over time, Kemp (1978:63-66,91) used the phi-square 
statistic to summarise the strength of the association. 
8. The occupational groups distinguished were professionals, managers and owners of large businesses, small business owners, 
white-collar workers, skilled workers, semi-skilled workers, unskilled workers, farm owners and farm labourers (Emy, 1980:197). 
9. A marxist conception of class generally defines class in terms of the relationship groups have with the means of production. 
The means of production refer to materials that can be used to produce capital returns such as land, raw materials and machinery. 
The bourgeoisie own and control the means of production and the proletariat (or working class) are non-owners and work the 
means of production (Giddens & Held, 1982:3-4). 
10. Major works in sutus attainment are the works of Blau & Dtmcan (1967) and Treiman & Terrell (1975). In Australia, the 
major works on status attairunent are Broom & Jones (1976) and Broom et al. (1980). 
11. The extent of class voting was compared by calculating the Alford index, which is defined as the percentage of the manual 
class voting for the party of the left minus the percentage of the non-manual class voting for the same party (Alford, 1963:79-80). 
12. Class was measured by the manual non-manual dichotomy. Manual occupations included skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled 
manual occupations. Non-manual occupations included professionals, owners and executives of large businesses, small business 
people, clerks and sales workers. Farm owners, pensioners and members of the armed forces were excluded. The class location 
of housewives was based on their husbands occupation. The dependent variable was vote for the Labor or Coalition parties and 
after 1955 a third category was added, vote for the Democratic Labor party (D.L.P.). In some surveys, respondents were asked 
their vote at the last federal election and in other surveys, intended vote at the next federal election (Alford, 1963:70,351). 
13. Kemp (1978:62-63) used a measure based on the occupation recorded in the opinion poll surveys. These occupations were 
grouped into a manual and non-manual groups. There is uncertainty as to whether the occupation recorded was that of the 
respondent or their spouse (Jones & McAllister, 1989). 
14. Jones & McAllister (1989) used a five category measure of class, consisting of the following categories; upper white-collar, 
lower white-collar, skilled manual, other manual and farming. In this study using opinion poll data collected since the war, the 
respondents occupation was recorded and if the respondent was not working, then the occupation of the head of the household 
was recorded. The authors note that it was not always clear whose occupation was recorded (pg. 8). 
15. The measure of class used by Aitkin (1982b:131,302) was based on whetiier the head of the household (or main bread winner) 
had a manual or non-manual occupation. Unless the respondent was head of the household, tiie occupation of tiie respondent was 
not recorded. 
16 The dependent variable used in this analysis was party identification measured by identification and non-identification widi 
the Labor party. The variable of interest, class, was measured by whether or not the head of die household had a manual or non-
manual occupation. 
The other independent variables employed in this AID analysis of the 1967 data were (concept (dichotomous measure)}; 
union membership (head of household member/non-member), class background (father manual/non-manual), income (manual;head 
of household earns above $1250/below $1250:non-manual;head of household earns above $4250/below $4250), religiosity or 
church attendance (manual;attend church more than once per year/less tiian once per year:non-manual; churchgoers/never go to 
church), sex (male/female), home ownership (home owners/buyers and tenants), religious affiliation, state, education, region 
(town/country), length of residence and age (in 40s or 60s/not in 40s or 60s). Separate measures for income and church attendance 
were used for the manual and non-manual groups (Aitkin, 1982b: 110-112, 306). 
The dichotomous measures for religious affiliation, education and residence were not specified for die 1967 analysis altiiough 
die presentation of the 1979 analysis indicates that education was measured by distinguishing tiiose who had completed secondary 
school from diose who had not for males, tertiary education and less tiian tertiary education for females. Religion was measured 
by diree dichotomous variables (no religion/not no religion), (Church of England, Catiiolic and Uniting/other Protestant), (Church 
of England, CatiiolicAJniting and otiier Protestant religions). (Aitidn, 1982b: 306-307). 
In die analysis of die 1979 data, tiie respondent's, ratiier tiian the head of household's, trade union membership status, was 
employed (Aiddn. 1982b:303). 
17. The dependent variable was party identification, scored 1 for identification with the Liberal or National parties, 0.5 for 
identification with die Australian Democrats and 0 for Labor party identifiers. The independent variable of interest, class was 
measured dichotomously, in terms of whether the head of the household had (or did not have) a white-collar occupation. Farmers 
were grouped into a separate category. 
The odier independent variables used in this analysis were {concept(measure)); employment sector (head of household 
government employee/non-govemment worker), supervision (head of household supervisor/non-supervisor), petty bourgeoisie 
(head of household self-employed but no employeesAiot petty bourgeoisie), capitalist (head of household self-employed with 
employeesAiot capitalist), farmer (head of household farmerAiot farmer), occupational status (from a low of 0 to a high of 100), 
income (annual family income measured as the log of income converted to $ 1,000s), middle class self-image (middle class self-
image/not middle class self-image), and education (years at school for head of household) (Kelley & McAllister, 1985). 
18. The measure of lifetime vote consisted of 3 categories, always voted Liberal (coded 1), always voted Labor (coded 0) and 
had changed vote (coded 0.5). The variable of interest, class, was measured based on whether the household had a non-manual 
occupation or did not have a non-manual occupation. Farmers were assigned to a separate category. 
The other independent variables included in this analysis were {concept(measure or measures)}; class background (farther 
non-manual worker/father not a non-manual worker), partisan background (1= both parents Labor partisans, 0.5= one parent a 
Labor partisan, 0=no parent a Labor partisan), age (measured in years), gendw (male/female), rural residence (ruraVnon-rural), 
lengdi of residence (in Australia in years), ethiucity (bom/not bom in Northem Europe;bom/not-bom in Eastem Europe;bom/not 
bom in Mediterranean coimtries;the excluded category consisting of the Australian bom), education (measured in years), farmer 
(farmer/not farmer), supervision (supervisor/not a supervisor), income (measured by the log of aimual family income expressed 
in 1,000s), trade union membership (member/not a member), religious denomination (CatholicAion-Cadiolic), religiosity or church 
attendance (scored from a low of 0 never, to 1 attends once a week or more). 
In tills analysis the following political attitudes were included. Favours censorship, opposes an Australian Republic, favours 
big business, favours death penalty, opposes immigration, likely to be class conflict, political interest, all coded from a low of 
0 to a high of 1 (McAllister & Mughan, 1987b). 
19. The dependent variable in this analysis consisted of two categories, vote for the Labor party at the election immediately prior 
to die survey or vote for some other party, including the D.L.P. and Australian Democrats. Voters for parties odier than the Labor, 
Liberal, National (coimtry). Democratic Labor and Australian Democratic party are excluded from the analysis. The variable of 
interest class, also a dichotomy was measured by whether the head of the household had a manual or non-manual occupation. 
The other variables included in die core analysis were: state (residency in New South Wales/residency in other states), urban 
residency (urban/not-urban), age (under 45 years old/over 45 years old, gender (female/male), education (minimum education/more 
than minimum education), trade uruon membership (respondent member/non-member). 
The expanded (overall) analysis included: class identification (identifying with the working class/ not identifying with the 
working class), religiosity or church attendance (attends church less than once a mondi/more than once a mondi). A furtiier 
expanded analysis included: Religion measured by two dummy variables (CathoUc/non-Catholic), (no religion/not no religion), 
tiie excluded, or comparative category consisting of Protestants, Ethiucity was measured by two dichotomous variables (bom/not 
bom in Eastem Europe), (bomMot bom in Southem Europe), the excluded or comparative category, being the Australian bom 
were mcluded. Six political attitude items (on the monarchy, the power of big business and trade unions, the death penalty, 
immigration, and censorship) were included in tiie expanded analysis (McAllister, 1988a). 
20. The dependent variable was vote. For the variable of interest, class, the measure was based on whether the head of the 
household had or did not have a non-manual occupation. 
The other independent variables included in this regression analysis were (concept(measure or measures)}: partisan 
backgroimd (both parents Labor partisansAio parent Labor partisan), age (measured in years), gender (male/female), urban 
residency (urban/not urban), religious denomination (catiiolic/non-catiiolic; no religion/not no religion; tiie excluded or 
comparative category consisting of maiidy Protestants), religiosity or church attendance (a seven point scale, ranging from 0, does 
not attend to 7, attends more than once a week), supervision (respondent supervisor/not a supervisor), self-employment (self-
employed/not self-employed), employment sector (government employee/non-govemment), trade union membership (member/non-
member) and class self-image (upper or middle class self image/odier) (Graetz & McAllister, 1988:285, 292, 297-298). 
21. The three age cohorts were (i) bom before 1930, (ii) bom between 1930 and 1945 and (iii) bom after 1945 (McAllister, 
1988a). 
22. Status inconsistency is defined as a status which commands differing levels of prestige from society (Broom & Jones, 1970). 
23. If tiie respondent is male, he is usually die head of die household. 
24. In this study, the measures were based on die head of the household rather than respondent. 
25. These studies employed a measure based on whether the head of the household, rather than the respondent, supervised otiier 
workers. 
26. In the 1967 and 1979 ANPA income was collected by asking respondents the income of the head of the household. 
Respondents were initially asked the yearly income of die head of die household, or if die respondent could not think in terms 
of annual income, weekly income. If respondents could not give a figure, they were presented a card, and asked which of eight 
income groups displayed on the card, the head of the household's income falls into (Aitkin, Kahan & Stokes, 1975:384 & 1976, 
Ml). The two data sets contain a variable (V324 in 1967, V300 in 1969) of the incomes grouped into the 8 categories. 
In the 1979 ANPA, the incomes of both the respondent and (if applicable) his or her spouse were collected. A similar group 
of questions were asked, firstiy asking respondent's dieir (or their spouse's) annual income, if not known, weekly income, or 
which income group the respondent's (and spouse's) income fell into. An 8 category variable was constructed for both the 
respondent (V276) and die spouse (V278) (Aitidn, 1982a). 
The 1984 NSSS respondents were asked their income from a number of sources: from wages or salaries; business; welfare 
benefits; pensions and superannuation; dividends, interest and rent; and from other sources. In each case respondents were asked 
die amount diey received, whedier this amount was weekly, fortnightiy, monthly or yearly, and in those cases where a figure was 
not given, were asked to choose an income group from a card. The data contains these 18 (3x6) variables (V181-V198) for the 
respondent, and a constructed variable summing the incomes received from all sources was constructed by the principal 
investigators (V199). For the spouse, spouses of urban respondents were asked to fill out a questionnaire and for otiier 
respondents, proxy data was obtained for their spouse's income. Incomes from wages and salaries, its periodicity and die amoimt 
of income the spouse received from business; welfare benefits; pensions and superannuation; dividends, interest and rent; and 
odier sources (V573-V579) was collected. A measure of spouse's total annual income was constructed from these measiu-es 
(V580). In both measures of total income (V199, V580), raw incomes were not categorised into income groups as they were in 
previous studies (Kelley, Gushing & Headey, 1987). 
Income was not coUected in the 1987 AES and furdier questions on income were not asked of second wave panel respondents 
in die 1987 NSSS panel. 
27. Kemp employed the 8 category measure of income available on the 1979 ANPA data. 
28. In tiie analysis by Graetz & McAllister(1988:289) income was measured by five categories, widi die mean set to equal 100. 
In die 1967 and 1979 samples, die means were only approximate because die data only contained a variable, in which die incomes 
had been grouped into 8 income categories. 
29. In diis AID analysis, income appears to be measured in terms of die head of die household earning more tiian S4250 or less 
dian $4250, when distinguishing between die political preferences of middle class respondents from a working class background. 
A second measure (above or below $1250) was employed when distinguishing die political preferences of working class non-
unionists (Aitidn, 1977:110-113). 
30. Income was measured in terms of family income, income of die respondent and if the applicable die respondent's spouse were 
summed. The income categories were re-coded to $1000s of dollars (McAllister & Kelley, 1982). 
31. In diis study (Kelley & McAllister, 1985) income was also measured by family income. The variable income used in die 
analysis had been constmcted by converting die income categories to $1,000 and taking die natural logaridim of tius result. The 
natural logaridim of income is sometimes used since die distribution of (raw) incomes is highly skewed. When raw incomes were 
employed, die small proportion of tiie population tiiat earn very high has a considerable influence on die estimated impact of 
income on die dependent variable. 
32 In tills analysis (Bean & Kelley, 1988), the measure of income used was family income in 10,000s of dollars. 
33 The analysis performed by Kelley & McAllister (1984) used data from die 1973 Australian National University Social 
Mobility Survey. The measure of party support employed was partisanship coded 1 for Labor supporters and 0 for tiiose not Labor 
supporters (Kelley & McAUister, 1984). 
34. In American surveys on Political Behaviour die foUowing questions are used to measure party identification (Converse, 
1966:15, 16; Converse & Pierce, 1985). 
Generally speaking, do you consider yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or what? 
(ff REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT) 
Would you caU yourself a strong (Republican Democrat) or a not very strong (RepubUcan Democrat) ? 
(IF INDEPENDENT) 
Do you diink of yourself as closer to die RepubUcan or Democratic party? 
35. In die 1967 and 1969 AustraUan Political Attitudes Survey (Aitidn, Kahan & Stokes, 1975:64-65,66-67,69; Aitidn, Kahan 
& Stokes, 1976:57,58,60). 
GeneraUy Speaking, Do You UsuaUy Think of Yourself as Liberal, Labor, Country Party or D.L.P. ? 
(IF IDENTIFY WTTH A PARTY) 
Now, Thinking of Federal Parties, How Strongly {name of party identified with) do You Feel, Very Strongly, Fairly Strongly or 
Not Very Strongly? 
(IF DO NOT IDENTIFY WITH A PARTY) 
Well, in Federal Politics Do You Think of Yourself as a Littie Closer to One of tiie Parties than the Odiers? (Which Party is 
diat?). 
In die 1972 Saulwick PoU the question wording for the initial question and the question on strength of partisanship was slightiy 
altered (Kemp, 1973:284). The third question identifying party leaners does not appear to have been asked. 
GeneraUy Speaking, in politics, do you think of yourself as Liberal, ALP, Country Party, DLP or what? 
(IF IDENTIFY WTTH A PARTY) 
How Strongly (name of party identified with) do You feel? 
In die 1979 AustraUan Political Attitudes Survey (Aitidn, 1982a:41,42,44). 
GeneraUy Speaking, Do You UsuaUy Think of Yourself as Liberal, Labor, National Country party or AustraUan Democrat? 
(IF IDENTIFY WITH A PARTY) 
Now, Thinking of Federal Parties, How Strongly (name of party identified with) do You Feel, Very Strongly, Fairly Strongly or 
Not Very Strongly? 
(IF DO NOT IDENTIFY WTTH A PARTY) 
Well, in Federal Politics Do You Think of Yourself as a Littie Closer to One of die Parties tiian tiie Odiers? (Which Party is 
diat?). 
In die National Social Science Surveys (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:121). 
GeneraUy speaking, in Federal PoUtics, Do You UsuaUy Think of Yourself as Liberal, Labor, National Country party or Australian 
Democrat? 
(IF IDENTIFY WTTH A PARTY) 
How Strongly (name of party) Do You Feel, Very Strongly, Fairly Strongly or Not Very Strongly? 
(IF DO NOT IDENTIFY WITH A PARTY) 
Do You Think of Yourself as a Littie Closer to One of die Parties dian die Odiers ? 
The 1987 AustraUan Election Study (McAlUster & Mughan, 1987a; 13). 
GeneraUy Speaking, Do You UsuaUy Think of Yourself as Liberal, Labor or What? 
Would You CaU Yourself a Very Strong, Fairly Strong, or Not Very Strong Supporter of diat Party? 
36 The normal vote is calculated by regressing die two party vote for each class of party identifier, on die national or population 
two party division. The resulting coefficient is multipUed by die mean of die two party vote, giving die normal vote for diat class 
of identifiers. The estimates are adjusted for ttimout and different defection rates (Converse, 1966:23). Achen (1979) points out 
diat tiiis mediod biases die estimate of the normal vote, since the national two party vote and die two party vote among each class 
of identifiers is influenced by die same short-term forces. Petrocik (1989) has overcome diis problem by estimating an 'out of 
a sample' normal vote. 
37. First partisanship is problematic since there is a substantial error in recall. Respondents tend to recaU their partisanship as 
die same as dieir present partisanship (Katz, Niemi & Newman, 1980; Niemi, Katz & Newman, 1980; Reiter, 1980). 
38. In American studies, die concept 'region' usually refers to residence in the southem or non-southem states. 
39. Bean (1984:309) found diat social-structural factors could only accoimt for 16% of the variation in the vote for die major 
parties in 1967 and 10% in 1979. SimUarly, McAUister (1988a) found die amount of variance explained ranged from a high of 
21% in 1967 to 12% in 1987. Since vote and partisanship are highly conelated, similar results would be obtained in relation to 
party identification. 
40. Converse (1976a;51) estimated diat for each year increase of age, the strengdi of partisanship increased by 0.008 units on 
a 4 point party identification scale, scoring 3 for strong identifiers, 2 for weak identifiers, I for iiutial independents who admit 
to a leaning and 0 for bodi independents and the apoUtical (Converse, 1976a; 166). 
41. Levitin & MUler (1979) found ideological location almost as stable as party identification, the correlation across panel studies 
of 0.65 for ideological location, 0.80 for party identification and only 0.46 for policy preferences. 
42. In these American studies correcting for measurement error, use was made of the three-wave panel studies and techiuques 
for die estimation of measurement error developed by Wiley & WUey (1970). 
43. Factor analysis a mathematical technique for the isolation of hypothetical underlying concepts that are responsible for the 
observed correlations between a group of measures (Kelley, 1988:60). The Sage series on Quantitative Applications in the Social 
sciences include two useful volumes (numbers 13 & 14) on factor analysis (Kim & MueUer, 1978a & 1978b). 
44. The factors isolated were named, 'socio-econonuc class', 'environment', 'ethnocentrism', 'morality' and 'law and order'. 
45. These factors isolated from the 'economic items' related to 'equaUty and redistribution', 'social welfare', 'inequaUty of 
opportunity', 'socialism', 'trade uiuons' and 'business power' (Graetz & McAllister, 1988:219-220). 
46. These factors related to 'abortion', 'mUitary threat', "women's economic role", 'uranium', 'the environment', 'moral 
conservatism', 'royaUsm' and 'law enforcement' (Graetz & McAlUster, 1988:241-242). 
47. The analysis was performed on separate groups of attitudes. The factors isolated from economic attitudes related to 'unions', 
'economic organisation', and 'confidence in business'. On attitudes to inequality and social spending, factors relating to 'inequality 
of earnings', 'relative inequality' and 'spending on social services' were isolated. On attitudes to foreign policy, factors relating 
to 'royalty', 'America' and 'mUitary threat' were isolated On social issues, factors relating to 'Aborigines', 'die environment', 
'uranium' and 'punitiveness' were isolated. On attitudes to moral issues, factors relating to 'christian belieF, 'abortion' and 
"women's careers" were isolated (Kelley, 1988:58-77). 
48. Surveys conducted in a number of west European countries of the early seventies used the following questions to distinguish 
between post-materialists from materiaUsts (Inglehart, 1977:28). 
If you had to choose among die foUowing tilings, which are die two that seem most desirable to you? 
-maintaining order in die nation 
-giving die people more say in important decisions 
-fighting rising prices 
-protecting freedom of speech 
The items conceming freedom of speech and political participation are understood as post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1977:29). 
A more detaUed measure was used in later European sttidies and comparisons of die United States and Japan (Inglehart, 1977:40-
41) and in AustraUan surveys (Graetz & McAlUster, 1988:250). 
There is a lot of talk about what aims of diis country should be for die next ten years. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD A.) On 
diis card are Usted some of die goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of tiiese 
you, yourself, consider most important 
CARD A 
A. Maintaining a high rate of economic growth. 
B. Making sure tiiat diis country has strong defence forces. 
C. Seeing diat die people have more say in how tiling get decided at work and in dieir communities. 
D. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful. 
And which would be die next most important? 
(HAND RESPONDENT CARD B.). If you had to choose, which one of die tilings on diis card would you say is most desirable? 
CARDB 
E. Maintaining order in the nation. 
F. Giving people more say in government decisions. 
G. Fighting rising prices. 
H. Protecting freedom of speech. 
Here is anotiier list (HAND RESPONDENT CARD C) . In your opinion, which one of these is die most important. 
CARDC 
I. Maintain a stable economy 
J. Progress towards a less impersonal, a more humane society. 
K. The fight against crime. 
L. Progress to a society where ideas count more than money. 
What comes next? 
Now would you look again at aU the goals on these three cards together and teU me which one do you consider die most desirable 
of aU? Just read off die one you choose. 
And which is die next most desirable. 
And which one of aU these aims on these cards is least important from your point of view? 
The most post-materialist goals are; J. a less impersonal society, C. more say on job, F. more say in government, L. ideas count 
and H. freedom of speech. 
In Australia post-materiaUst items have included in 1984 National social science survey and the 1987 Australian Election study. 
From die National Social Survey the foUowing questions relating to post-materialism were asked (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 
1987:V383-V398:161-166). 
What do you think should be the aims of this country over the next ten years. Here is a list of some of the aims to which different 
people would give top priority. Remember, it is not possible to have everything - doing more for one usuaUy means less for 
odiers. 
Using diis scale at die top of die card how important do you diink item (a) is. 
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(a) Maintain a High Rate of Econonuc Growth. 
(b) Make sure dus Country has Strong Defence Forces. 
(c) See diat People have More Say about how Things are done at tiieir Jobs and in tiieir Communities. 
(d) Try to make our Cities and Countryside more Beautiful. 
(e) Maintain Order in the Nation. 
(f) Give People More Say in Important Government Decisions. 
(g) Fight Rising Prices. 
(h) Protect Freedom of Speech. 
(i) Maintain a Stable Economy. 
(j) Progress toward a less Impersonal and more Human Society. 
(k) Progress toward a Society where Ideas Count more dian Money. 
(1) Fight against Crime. 
For Each question part tiie foUowing Response set was Offered. 
1. Most Important Thing 
2. Extremely Important 
3. Very Important 
4. Fairly Important 
5. Not Important 
6. Undesirable, Bad 
7. Very Bad Idea 
From die 1987 AustraUan Election study (McAlUster & Mughan, 1987a;V142,53) a shortened version was used. 
There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of AustraUa should be for the next ten years. Listed Below are some of the 
goals different people would give top priority. Would you say which one of these you yourself consider die most important? And 
which would be die next most important? 
Maintaining Order in die Nation 
Giving People More Say in Government Decisions 
Fighting Rising Prices 
Protecting Freedom of Speech 
49. The questions employed in the British and Australian election studies. 
The United Kingdom (Butier & Stokes, 1974:468); 
Do you ever think of yourself as being to the left, the centre or to the right in politics or don't you think of yourself in that way? 
(IF YES) 
Where would you say you are? 
In die Australian surveys, the word ever was dropped (Aiddn, 1977:278). 
Do you think of yourself as being to the left, centre or the right in politics, or don't you think of yourself in diat way? 
(IF YES) 
Where would you say you are? 
50. The measures of ideology used in 1987 Australian election sttidy (McAUister & Mughan, 1987a; 14). 
hi poUtical matters, people talk about tiie 'left' and die 'right'. GeneraUy speaking, where would you place yourself on die scale? 
51. The diree categories were materiaUsts, post-materiaUsts and a mixed group. These categories were constructed from a selection 
of questions from Inglehart's measure of post-materialism. 
52. In Britain, the correlation between party identification and ideology was observed to be 0.68, compared with 0.33 in the 
United States (Inglehart & KUngemann, 1976). 
53. In die context of econonuc voting, whether a reward punishment model or issue priority model is found, is quite dependent 
on what measure of political support is employed as the dependent variable. Measuring the support of the incumbent government 
unpues a reward punishment model, while measuring support for a particular party indicates, an issue domain or issue priority 
model. 
54. The questions used for candidate likes and disUkes (Aitidn, Kahan & Stokes, 1975;V59, V60); 
Is diere anytiiing in particular you Uke about Mr Holt? (What is tiiat?)(Anydung else?). 
Is diere anytiung in particular you don't Uke about Mr Holt? (What is tiiat?)(Anydiing else?). Similar questions were used for 
odier party leaders and in die 1969 and 1979 ANPA surveys. 
55. FeeUng diermometers were employed in die 1984 NSSS (KeUey, Gushing & Headey. 1987:V302, pp. 129-130). 
I'd now like to get your feelings towards some of the poUtical leaders and other people who are in the news these days. I'U read 
die name of die person and I'd Uke you to rate diat person using dus 'feeling tiiermometer'. 
You may use any number from 0 to 100. 100 is die highest rating for people you feel very warm or favourable about, 0 is die 
lowest rating for people you feel very strongly against If you do recognise the name, but don't feel particularly warm or cold 
toward die person, you would rate die person at the 50 mark. 
Fint some Australian politicians: 
Bob Hawke (How do you feel about him)? 
1 Very Cold 
100 Very Warm 
998 Don't Recognise 
999 Don't Know, Refused 
56. A 10 point rating scale was used in 1987 Australian election study (McAUister & Mughan, 1987a:V40,18). 
We would like to know your feelings towards some of the political leaders and other people who are in die news today. We 
would like you to show your feeUngs by rating diem from 0 to 10. You may use any number between 0 and 10. 10 is die highest 
rating for people you feel very favourable about and 0 is the lowest rating, for people you feel very strongly against If you are 
neutral about a particular person, you should give them a rating of 5. 
How do you feel about; 
Bob Hawke? 
1 Very Unfavourable 
5 Neutral 
10 Very Favourable 
999 Missing 
CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework employed in the study. A theoretical framework 
is important, since it guides and disciplines the subsequent investigations. The chapter begins with a 
discussion of electoral change in Australia. Four general propositions are presented to account for the 
changes observed. A major point developed from this discussion is that the study of electoral change 
is subsequent to the study of electoral choice. Electoral choice is therefore considered and it is argued 
that in order to investigate electoral choice and (by extension) electoral change, a model of the 
electoral process needs to be formulated. The next section of the chapter details the model of electoral 
choice proposed. The model specifies the concepts involved in the process of electoral choice, their 
proximity to vote and the interrelationships between them. The final section of the chapter gives a 
brief accoimt of how the model is employed in the investigations reported in later chapters. 
3.1 THE PROBLEM OF ELECTORAL CHANGE 
Questions surrounding electoral change in Australia result from observations of election outcomes 
during the post-war period. The most striking observation is that during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Labor party was in opposition federally and in most states, while during the 1980s, the situation was 
reversed. 
At the federal level, the Liberal and Country parties governed for a record 23 years, between 
1949 and 1972. The re-election of the coalition parties to government in 1975, was followed by a 
further 8 years of coalition government In contrast, the 1980s has witnessed the unparalleled electoral 
success by the federal Labor party, wirming four consecuUve elections. 
A similar picture emerges from a review of the state parliaments in Victoria, South Australia, 
Westem Australia and possibly Queensland. In Victoria, the Liberal party was in government between 
1955 and 1982. But the Labor government elected in 1982, has been re-elected on two successive 
occasions. In Queensland, conservative parties were in power, from 1957 to 1989. But the Labor 
party won comfortably in 1989. In South Australia, the Liberal Country League was in power 
continuously from 1933 to 1965, with the Labor Party having a brief term in government, between 
1965 and 1968. Since 1970, the Labor party has governed in South Australia almost continuously, 
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apart ft-om the period between 1979 and 1982. In Westem Australia, the Liberal party governed from 
1949 to 1983, except for the period between 1965 and 1969. A Labor government was elected in 
1983 and has the won subsequent elections, held in 1986 and 1989 (for years until 1989, Jaensch, 
1985a: 135) 
The two exceptions to this general observation from conservative governments to Labor 
governments are the states of New South Wales and Tasmania. New South Wales was govemed by 
the Labor party for twenty years between 1945 and 1965, by the Liberal and country parties for 11 
years, followed by a further 12 years of Labor rule between 1976 and 1988. In Tasmania, except for 
the period between 1969 and 1972, the Labor party was in government almost continuously between 
1945 and 1982 (Jaensch, 1989a: 135). The Labor party regained government, with the support of 
Green independents, in early 1989. 
With the exception of the states of New South Wales and Tasmania, the pattem that emerges is 
that conservative governments dominated Australian state parliaments during the 1950s and 1960s, but 
more often than not, the Labor party was elected to government during the 1980s. Comparison of the 
1960s with the 1980s reveals a change from a nation characterised by non-Labor governments, to one 
almost exclusively govemed by Labor parties. After the defeat of the Tasmanian Labor government in 
1969, the Labor party was not in government in any Australia parliament (Jaensch, 1989a: 135). In 
contrast at the end of 1989, the Labor party was in government in all Australian parliaments, except 
for New South Wales. 
These observations pose an important question. Has a fundamental change occurred in the 
Australian electorate, so that the Liberal party has been replaced by the Labor party, as the 'natural 
party of government*. 
Two types of explanations can be proposed to account for Australian politics, during the post-war 
period. The first focuses on individual elections and attributes each election result, to transient factors, 
such as the issues and personalities of the time. 
An altemative type of explanation focuses on more stable elements of the Australian electorate. 
These stable elements give one party an electoral advantage over the other party. These explanations 
assume that one party (or a coalition of parties)' holds a substantial and enduring electoral advantage. 
The enduring advantage a political party holds in an electorate is independent of the transient 
influences of election campaigns. 
These two types of explanations allow distinctions to be made in terms of the electoral balance 
between the major parties. The first group of explanations assumes that the major parties are evenly 
balanced, that neither party holds an enduring electoral advantage. Therefore, the results of elections 
must be due to transient factors. The second group of explanations assumes that one party enters each 
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election campaign with a distinct electoral advantage. The party that holds an enduring electoral 
advantage is defined as the dominant party. The dominant party is in a superior electoral position and 
is more likely to win any given election. The concepts of 'dominant party' in a 'superior electoral 
position' are more precisely defined later in the chapter. Being the dominant party does not mean that 
it wins each and every election, but it is likely to win most elections held during the period, when it is 
dominant in the electorate. Transient factors may occasionally overcome the advantage the dominant 
party holds, causing the dominant party to lose one or more elections. 
3.1.1 Electoral Periods 
A period may be characterised by the fact that one party or no party is in a superior electoral 
position. Such a period is designated an 'electoral period'. Employing the concept of 'electoral 
periods', four basic propositions may account for the results of Australian elections, during the post-
war period. These propositions employ the two types of explanations introduced in the last section: 
election results can be explained in terms of transient factors, or durable electoral advantages political 
parties enjoy. These propositions are summarised in table 3.1. 
The first and most obvious proposition has already been alluded to. This proposition argues that 
post-war Australian electoral politics has two distinct periods, a period of electoral dominance by the 
coalition parties followed by a period of electoral dominance by the Labor party. This proposition 
argues that during the 1950s and 1960s the coalition parties held a distinct and enduring electoral 
advantage over the Labor party. In contrast, the 1980s were characterised by the Labor party enjoying 
an enduring advantage over the coalition parties. The 1970s was either a transition period, or 
belonged to one of the adjacent periods of electoral dominance. The implication of this proposition is 
that at some point the Labor party replaced the coalition as the dominant party. This proposition 
would appear plausible, given the electoral success of the coalition parties during the 1950s and 1960s, 
and the remaricable electoral success of the Labor party during the 1980s. This proposition is similar 
to the 'zero-sum' explanation for the results of Australian post-war elections, proposed by Bean & 
Mughan (1988). 
The second proposition proposes that there has been no substantial change in the Australian 
electorate since the 1950s and 1960s, when the coalition enjoyed a superior position. The recent 
success of the Labor party in the federal arena can be explained in terms of transient factors rather 
than more durable factors. This proposition corresponds to one of Jaensch's (1989a:76-77) altemative 
classifications of Australian elections and is similar to the 'status-quo' explanation of Bean & Mughan 
(1988). There are some indications that no substantial changes have occurred in the Australian 
electorate. The proportion of the electorate voting for the Labor party during the 1980s is not 
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appreciably higher than during previous decades (table 3.2). The average vote for the Labor and 
coalition parties differed by less than 2 percentage points between 1949 and 1972, and by only 0.1 of 
a percentage point between 1972 and 1987 (Bean & Mughan, 1988:199). The Hawke government was 
re-elected in 1987 with fewer primary votes than the coalition parties (Mackerras, 1988:251) and in 
1990, a minority of the two-party preferred vote (table 3.2). Furthermore, throughout most of the 
1980s, the Labor party has continued to perform pooriy in Queensland and in 1988 lost government in 
the most populous state. New South Wales. 
TABLE 3.1: PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING THE AUSTRAUAN POST-WAR ELECTORATE 
PROPOSITION 1; 
A period of electoral dominance by the Coalition parties foUowed by a period of dominance by die Labor party. 
PROPOSITION 2; 
The coalition parties in a superior electoral position throughout the post-war period (including die present). 
PROPOSITION 3: 
Electoral dominance by the coaUtion parties foUowed by a period where no party or party group enjoys an superior electoral 
position. 
PROPOSmON 4: 
Neither the coaUtion parties, nor the Labor party is or has been in an dominant electoral position. 
The third proposition holds that a period of coalition dominance was followed by a period, when 
no party could be considered as being in a dominant electoral position. According to this proposition, 
during the 1950s and 1960s, the coalition parties were in a superior position and had lost this 
advantage by the 1980s. During the latter period, election outcomes were determined by the transient 
factors of each election campaign. This proposition is supported by the observation that the election 
victories by the Labor party during the 1980s have not been nearly as impressive as the coalition 
victories at the 1955, 1966, 1975 or 1977 elections. The Labor party has never gained more than 53% 
of the two party preferred vote, whereas the coalition parties have done so on several occasions (table 
3.2). This proposition has similarities to the 'convergence' explanation of Bean & Mughan (1988), 
which contends that the coalition has lost its advantage and elections have become more competitive. 
The fourth and final proposition contends that the parties were more or less evenly balanced, 
throughout the entire post-war period. Neither the Labor party nor the coalition has been in a 
dominant electoral position. Therefore, the election victories of the coalition during the 1950s and 
1960s are attributed to transient factors, as are the Labor victories of the 1980s. Evidence for this 
proposal are near-victories by the Labor party at the 1954 and 1961 federal elections and the high 
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level of support Labor received, at the 1951 and 1969 elections (table 3.2). Similarly, the coalition 
parties went close to winning the 1984, 1987 and 1990 federal elections. 
TABLE 3.2: RRST PREFERENCE LABOR VOTE, TWO PARTY PREFERRED LABOR AND COALITION VOTE AND 
COALmON MAJORITY IN LOWER HOUSE, 1949-1987 
Election 
Year 
1949 
1951 
1954 
1955 
1958 
1961 
1963 
1966 
1969 
1972 
1974 
1975 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1984 
1987 
1990 
Labor 
Primary 
Vote^ 
46.0 
47.6 
50.0 
44.6 
42.8 
47.9 
45.5 
40.0 
47.0 
49.6 
49.3 
42.8 
39.6 
45.1 
49.5 
47.5 
45.8 
39.4 
Labor 
2 Party 
Preferred' 
48.8 
49.2 
50.9 
45.8 
45.9 
50.6 
477 
43.7 
50.0 
52.5 
51.4 
44.2 
45.4 
49.5 
53.3 
52.0 
51.0 
49.9 
CoaUtion 
2 Party 
Preferred' 
51.2 
50.8 
49.1 
54.2 
54.1 
49.4 
52.3 
56.3 
50.0 
47.5 
48.6 
55.8 
54.6 
50.5 
46.7 
48.0 
49.0 
50.1 
CoaUtion Majority 
in House of 
Representatives^ 
27 
17 
7 
28 
n 2 
22 
40 
7 
-9 
-5 
55 
48 
23 
-25 
-16 
-24 
-8 
These propositions are by no means exhaustive and other less plausible propositions could be 
proposed. These propositions include, the Labor party being the dominant party throughout the entire 
post-war period, or post-war politics comprising two periods, a period of Labor dominance during the 
1950s and 1960s, followed by a period of coalition dominance during the 1980s. Although possible, 
these propositions do not appear likely. 
The four basic propositions argue for only one or two electoral periods. Other propositions may 
be posited derived from these four basic propositions, which contend that post-war Australian politics 
consists of three or more electoral periods. For example, Jaensch (1989a:76) notes the possibility that 
the Labor party was in a superior electoral position between 1972 and 1975 and again from 1980. 
Four periods, including a period where no party enjoyed a distinct electoral advantage, were identified 
by Jaensch (1989b:32). The possibility of three or more electoral periods is not excluded by the 
account of electoral change presented here. 
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3.1.2 Implications of Electoral Periods 
There are quite different implications for the future of Australian politics, if the present time is 
found to be a period of Labor dominance, coalition dominance, or a period when the parties are evenly 
matched. 
If the Labor party is in a superior electoral position, then the results of the elections held during 
the 1980s can be explained in terms of underiying changes, that have occurred in the electorate 
favouring the Labor party. Transient factors are, therefore, not major factors in the elections held 
during the 1980s. If there are no signs of Labor's superior electoral position weakening, then it is 
more likely that Labor governments will be elected and re-elected in the future, both federally and in 
the states. The twenty or more years of electoral success by the conservative parties during the 1950s 
and 1960s, may be parallelled by a sustained period of electoral success by the Labor party during the 
1990s and beyond. 
There are quite different implications if the coalition parties were found to enjoy a superior 
electoral position. The electoral success of the Labor party during the 1980s would then be attributed 
to transient factors, overcoming the distinct electoral advantage the coalition has in the electorate. 
Since these factors are, by defirution, not enduring, then the Labor party cannot be expected to be as 
successful in the future. In the 1990s, Labor govemments may be as imusual, as they were in the 
1960s. 
The third possibihty, that the present period of Australian politics is characterised by neither party 
being dominant in the Australian electorate, has also quite different implications. Smaller parties, such 
as the Australian Democrats, can be expected to continue to receive a substantial degree of electoral 
support, to continue holding the balance of power*, and to affect the political agenda. Other minority 
parties, such as Green and Grey parties, and independents can also be expected to gain a considerable 
amount of electoral support. Single-issue movements are also likely to be more successful. 
The investigation of these propositions conceming the Australian electorate during the post-war 
period can only be investigated by examining the factors involved in the process of electoral choice. 
Comparisons of seats in parliament and either the primary or the two party preferred vote ignore the 
underlying processes responsible for electoral change. Seats in parliaments are a function of the 
electoral system and the spatial distribution of the vote, as well as the levels of party support. The 
levels of support parties receive at elections is determined by the factors that influence electoral 
choice. 
In order to distinguish between the propositions accoimting for electoral change, it is necessary to 
consider what are the factors involved in the process of electoral choice. Furthermore, these factors 
need to be distinguished in terms of durable and transient factors. Electoral change can be 
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investigated by comparing the influence of durable and transient factors on electoral choice, at 
different time points. Therefore, the following section focuses on the factors involved in the process 
of electoral choice. 
3.2 THE PROBLEM OF ELECTORAL CHOICE 
This section begins with a discussion of more simple explanations of electoral outcomes and then 
proceeds to discuss the need for a model of electoral choice. 
A variety of 'popular' explanations has been presented to account for the results of Australian 
elections. These explanations most often focus on a single factor as the key to explain why parties 
won or lost particular elections. The explanations given for the outcome of a particular election 
generally focus on a factor associated with one of the five sets of factors discussed in the literature 
review - social-structural factors, partisanship, ideology, issues and candidates. 
Explanations of election results may focus on social factors, attributing the levels of party support 
to changes in the poUtical behaviour of class or ethnic groups, young people or women. Political 
commentators may speak of the 'ethnic vote' or the Labor party losing its core (that is working class) 
support, or the conservative parties being unattractive to the young. When focusing on individual 
seats, political commentators imply a class-based explanation, as certain areas are viewed as more 
Labor (or more coalition) than other areas. 
When explanations centre on the loyalty or disloyalty of party supporters, the concept of 
partisanship is implied. The theme of Labor's 1972 election campaign 'Time for a change' could be 
understood as appealing to coalition supporters, since a Labor government would revitalise the 
coalition parties. The 1990 Queensland state election could be understood as an election in which 
loyal conservatives switched their vote to Labor. Similarly, by-elections and Senate elections have 
often been considered occasions when voters can suspend their party loyalties and vote for an 
altemative party. 
Ideological explanations have also been offered. Losing parties have become 'too radical' for the 
Australian electorate while wirming parties have 'captured the middle ground'. The gains in support 
that the Whitiam-led Labor party enjoyed at the 1969 and 1972 elections could be attributed to 
movement of the Labor party to the ideological position of the Liberal party. The electoral success of 
the Hawke Labor government could be understood in ideological terms as it captured the centre and 
forced the Liberal party to adopt a more radical (and unattractive) electoral position. 
Issue-based explanations consider elections as being won or lost on the basis of the issues of the 
election campaign. For example, the landslide victory of the coalition parties at the 1966 elections has 
been attributed to support for Australia's involvement in the Viemam war. Economic issues and 
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government scandals, rather than the dismissal of tiie Whitiam government, would appear to be 
important at tiie 1975 election. The Franklin dam and environmental issues have been considered as 
contiibuting to Labor's victories during tiie 1980s. 
The leaders of winning parties are often viewed (with hindsight) as popular, charismatic or strong, 
whereas leaders of losing parties are seen as possessing less desirable characteristics. Menzies may 
have been an important component of tiie coalition successes during the 1950s and 1960s. Whitiam 
was viewed as an electoral plus for tiie Labor party during tiie late 1960s and eariy 1970s. Similarly, 
Mr Hawke has been seen as an electoral asset to tiie Labor party. 
There are several problems with such explanations. First, these explanations tend to focus on one 
factor, ignoring other equally plausible explanations involving other factors. The victory of the Labor 
party at tiie 1972 election could be explained in terms of tiie Labor party attracting tiie support of 
middle-class voters. Liberal partisans voting Labor, conscription and welfare issues, or the 
unpopularity of Liberal Prime Minister, Mr McMahon. Similarly, tiie 1983 election result could be 
explained in terms of tiie issue of tiie Franklin Dam, an ailing economy or the popularity of Mr 
Hawke. 
Second, explanations which cite particular factors as being important are dependent on electoral 
outcomes. The Viemam war would have appeared a very important issue in 1969 if tiie Labor party 
had won that election - which it almost did. The leadership styles of Evatt, Calwell, McMahon, 
Snedden, Hayden, Peacock and Howard would not have appeared as electoral liabilities - if tiiey had 
won their respective elections. Conversely, the leadership of Menzies and Hawke would not be 
viewed so positively had they lost an election. Focusing on issues, the issues deemed important are 
usually those issues that are understood as beneficial to the winning party. During the 1980s, 
environmental issues appeared important and economic issues less important, mainly because Labor 
won tiiese elections .^ If Labor had lost eitiier tiie 1987 or 1990 elections, high interest rates would 
have appeared as a very important issue and explanations focusing on the 'mortgage belt' would have 
emerged. An issue can be important in an election, even if the issue may not have helped tiie 
victorious party. 
Finally, these explanations give littie attention to causal processes: support for parties among 
social groups, party loyalties, issues and leaders are each seen as immediate influences on vote. More 
complex explanations, such as a particular issue led to a degree of party disloyalty, among certain 
social groups, are not usually offered. 
Therefore, investigations of electoral choice must be sensitive to the following considerations: 
first, it is unlikely that only one factor is responsible for election outcomes. Second, the influences on 
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electoral choice can be quite independent of electoral outcomes and finaUy, tiiere is a causal ordering 
of tiie factors tiiat influence electoral choice. 
The first two of tiiese points have been to a large extent satisfied by the multivariate studies of 
electoral choice reviewed in tiie last chapter. A summary of tiie factors included in multivariate 
studies of poUtical preference is presented in figure 3.1. 
Hanual/Hon-Hanual Occupation, Occupational Group. Level of Skill 
SoclQ-Economlc status 
Self-Employaent, Capitalist, Petty Bourgeois, Supervisor 
Social Hoblllty. Class Background 
Spouse's Occupation, Class Identification, Trade Union Hembershlp 
Family Income, Personal Income, Spouse's Income, Vealth 
Religion. No Beligion, Religiosity 
Urban/Rural Residence, State of Residence 
Place of Birth. Father/Mother's Place of Birth. Ethnicity 
Own. Paying off or own home. Consumption patterns 
Hinimal Education, Tertiary Education, Age, Gender 
Father's, Mother's. Other family member's Political Preferences 
Attachment's to. Identification's with. Attitudes to Political Parties 
Vote at last Election. Past experiences with Political Parties 
Left. Right Ideological Position 
Economic Liberalism/Conservatism, Kon-Economlc Liberalism/Conservatism 
Post-Materialist Ideology 
Policy Preferences on Political or Economic Issues 
Retrospective personal/soclotrophlc Economic Evaluations 
Prospective personal/soclotrophlc Economic Evaluations 
Popularity/Charisma/etc of Party Leaders 
Evaluations of other Political Figures 
VOTE 
Figure 3.1: Factors considered to influence electoral choice. 
Inspection of figure 3.1 reveals a number of points. First, there is a multitude of factors that have 
been considered as influencing electoral choice. Second, many of the factors are associated with each 
other and possible causal links could be made between them. Third, no distinction is made between 
durable and transient factors. FinaUy, tiie factors included range from quite vague terms such as 
political and economic issues, to quite weU-defined variables, such as vote at the last election. 
A model of electoral choice allows these factors to be organised in a manner, suitable for 
investigations to proceed. A model of electoral choice has several important benefits. First, the 
number of direct influences on electoral choice is reduced by distinguishing between factors that have 
a direct effect on vote and otiiers that have indirect effects. The indirect effects are mediated by some 
other factor or factors. Second, a further reduction is made possible by grouping similar factors as 
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general concepts. For example, such issues as tiie FrankUn dam, inflation, unemployment and tiie 
national debt, comprise tiie general concept 'issues'. Third, a model aUows tiie possible influences on 
electoral choice to be organised in a temporaUy plausible manner. For example, social factors can be 
specified as more distant from vote choice tiian either issues or tiie electorate's evaluation of tiie Prime 
Minister. FinaUy, a model aUows general concepts, specific concepts and measures of concepts to be 
distinguished. 
A model of electoral choice is also important to the investigation of electoral change. First, 
investigation of tiie model at different time points wiU indicate if changes have occurred between tiiose 
time points. Second, assuming that durable and transient influences on electoral choice can be 
distinguished, analysis of the model at different time points wiU reveal if one party enjoys a sustained 
electoral advantage. 
In addition to these benefits for the study of electoral choice and by extension electoral change, 
there are several important advantages to both the researcher and tiie audience when models are 
detailed. First, the concepts and their interrelationships are specified and rationales are provided, 
forcing researchers to be more discipUned in their work. Second, the explicit presentation of a model 
aUows the audience to have a better understanding of the model and the conclusions drawn from 
analysis of tiie model. Third, criticisms of a model which has been presented in detail are likely to be 
more precise, contesting specific aspects of the model, ratiier than an outright rejection of tiie model. 
FinaUy, the interaction between the development of models, empirical investigations and criticism, is 
likely to lead to the development of theory and therefore, a greater tmderstanding of the process 
modeUed. 
3.3 A MODEL OF ELECTORAL CHOICE 
The previous section concluded tiiat investigations of electoral choice and electoral change, 
require the formulation of a model of electoral choice. The model of electoral choice presented here is 
based on the model proposed by CampbeU et al. (1960), the Michigan model. Like the Michigan 
model, tiie model represents a 'funnel of causality' which includes aU the factors relevant to vote 
choice. The widest part of the fuimel - most distal to vote - comprises social-stmctural and social-
backgroimd factors. Moving towards vote, the factors become more political (Campbell, 1960:26-31). 
Partisanship, issues and candidates are specified as having direct effects on vote (Asher, 1984). The 
model presented here differs from the Michigan model in two respects, because it includes ideology 
and incorporates the revisionist conceptualisation of partisanship. Similar models have also been 
developed by other researchers in Austialia (Bean, 1984:475; Jackman, 1988:55-57). 
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Behind tiie model of electoral choice tiiere is an implicit tiieory. Specifically, tiie tiieory states 
tiiat social-stmcmral factors, partisanship, ideology, issues and tiie evaluations of candidates are aU 
involved, in the process of electoral choice. This theory is not a formal tiieory in tiie strict sense of 
the term, but a post-hoc tiieory. That is, tiie model is not derived from a smaU set of axiomatic 
statements, but relationships are asserted on the basis of previous tiieoretical and empirical work. 
Examples of formal theories of electoral choice are the rational choice models of Downs (1957) 
and other investigators (for example, Enelow & Hinich, 1982 & 1984). Down's theory of economic 
voting makes only two basic assumptions: parties are interested in gaining votes, and voters are 
interested in maximising benefits. These basic assumptions imply tiiat parties present poUcies to 
attract votes, and voters vote for parties on tiie basis of the perceived benefits arising from such 
policies. The theory of party support discussed here does not comprise logicaUy derived implications 
of a few assumptions. The basic assumption of tiiis theory of electoral choice is tiiat the elector's 
political preference is influenced by the most visible objects of the political landscape. What tiiese 
objects are does not logicaUy foUow from prior assimiptions, but has been developed from eartier 
empirical work. 
Although lacking tiie logical elegance of rational choice models, the model is argued as a more 
comprehensive account of the process of electoral support. As the rational choice model contends, 
voters may vote on the basis of perceived benefits from policies, but many voters may be simply 
unaware of issues (Aitkin, 1982b:216-217; CampbeU et al., 1960:172). If they are aware of issues, 
tiiey may be unable to perceive tangible benefits accming from the specific poUcies of a party. Voters 
could also be influenced by the voter's affective partisan attachments, their ideological orientations or 
their evaluations of the candidates standing for election. 
The model of electoral choice presented here is hierarchical in stmcture. The highest level relates 
electoral choice to abstract and undefined general constmcts. The second level provides more detail, it 
identifies the general concepts of the model and specifies their interrelationships. The tiiird level of 
tiie model detaUs the specific concepts, associated with each of the general concepts. The final level 
of the model comprises tiie measures of the specific concepts. Figure 3.2 siunmarises the four levels 
of tiie model and shows two examples, party identification and the issue of the Viemam war. 
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MODEL 
General Constructs 
General Concepts 
Specific Concepts 
Measures 
Examples 
Long-Term Electoral Forces Short-Term Electoral Forces 
Partisanship Ideology Issues Candidates 
Party Identification The Vietnam war 
Identification 
with a Party 
Preferred Policy Position 
Figure 3.2: Hierarchical Structure of the Model of Electoral Choice. 
In tills chapter only tiie first three levels wUl be discussed. The measures pertaining to tiie 
specific concepts in the model are presented in appendix 1. 
3.3.1 The Highest Level of die Model 
At the highest level, model relates the general constmcts of the model, 'vote', 'long-term electoral 
forces', 'short-term electoral forces' and 'social factors'. The inter-relationships between tiiese general 
constmcts are presented in figure 3.3. 
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Long-Term Electoral 
Forces 
Social 
Factors Vote 
Short-Term 
Electoral Forces 
Figure 3.3: Model of Electoral Choice showing the links between the general constructs of 
social factors, long-term and short-term electoral forces and vote. 
This model relates electoral choice to electoral forces. The model states that the levels of party 
support observed in the electorate are directiy the resitit of electoral forces and indirectiy influenced by 
social and background factors. To dispute this assumption is to argue that the levels of party support 
observed in an electorate are random, or the product of some non-societal force or forces. Given tiie 
patterning of party support over time, and the observation of persistent relationships between measures 
of electoral choice and social and political variables, such an argument would be difficult to sustain. 
This model of general constmcts also asserts that two types of electoral forces can be 
distinguished, long- and short-term electoral forces. Long-term electoral forces can account for the 
general stability in both the levels of party support observed in the electorate and tiie stabiUty of vote 
choice among many electors. Short-term forces can account for the fluctuations observed in the levels 
of party support and individual changes in vote choice. The terms long and short refer to the duration 
these forces have on electoral choice. The long-term electoral forces, partisanship and ideology, 
generaUy outUve electors, while the short-term forces, issues and leaders, appear and disappear witiiin 
a short period of time. The distinction between long and short-term factors has also been made by 
otiier researchers (Converse, 1966; Jaensch, 1989a:79; Rabinowitz, Gurian & MacDonald, 1984). 
The first piece of evidence for long and short-term forces is the variation of the levels of party 
support within fairly wide Umits. The long-term forces are responsible for the range of the limits and 
short-term forces (together with the balance of long-term forces at a particular time) are responsible for 
tiie variations within these limits. The level of Labor support, between 1949 and 1987 has ranged 
between 39% and 50% (table 3.2) and averages around 46% (Bean & Mughan, 1988). 
Further evidence for long- and short-term forces is from the stability of vote among individuals. 
The proportion of the electorate that has always voted for the same party was 65% in 1967 (Aiticin, 
Kahan & Stokes, 1975:V160), 52% in 1979 (Aitidn, 1982a:V121) and 63% in 1987 (McAUister & 
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Mughan, 1987a:V17). These results suggest tiiat tiiose voters who have always voted for tiie same 
party, are influenced by stable long-term forces and tiiose who have voted for different parties have at 
sometime, been influenced by short-term forces. These findings do not imply tiiat two models of vote 
should be investigated, one for voters who always vote for the same party and one for voters who 
have changed tiieir vote. At any time point it is likely that there are some voters who change tiieir 
vote for the first time*. 
The time at which voters decide which party they wiU vote for is also indicative of long- and 
short-term electoral forces. For instance, if the entire electorate had decided iui vote long before an 
election, tiien only long-term forces would appear to be involved. Similarly, if the entire electorate 
decided its vote during the election campaign, tiien only short-term electoral forces would appear 
important. In 1972, 13% of men and 22% of women decided how they would vote less tiian a month 
before tiie election (Saulwick & Aitchison, 1973:296). A more recent estimate is tiiat 27% of tiie 
electorate decided during the 1987 election campaign which party they would vote for (McAUister & 
Mughan, 1987a:V10). These findings are suggestive of tiie effects of short-term electoral forces. 
This model of electoral choice aUows investigations of electoral change to proceed. The four 
propositions discussed earlier can be related to long- and short-term electoral forces. Periods during 
which one party enjoys a superior electoral position are tiie result of electoral advantages attributed to 
long-term electoral forces. When no party is in a superior electoral position, long-term forces are 
balanced so neither party has an electoral advantage. During such periods, election outcomes are 
determined by short-term electoral forces. 
This accoimt of electoral change attributing electoral change to long- and short-term electoral 
forces is an extension of theories of electoral change focusing on changes in party identification. The 
terms electoral realignment and deaUgnment relate to changes in the distribution of party identification. 
An electoral reaUgnment is tiie result of a redistribution of party identification, from one party having 
a plurality of identifiers, to a second party having a pluraUty of identifiers. An electoral dealignment 
is tiie result of an overaU decUne in the level or strength of party identification in the electorate. In 
tiiis account of electoral change, partisan realignment and dealignment are two of several processes 
that may account for electoral change. 
This account of electoral change differs in one important respect from those theories that focus on 
partisan reaUgnment and dealignment. The account focuses on the impact of long- and short-term 
forces on party support, rather than on tiie distribution of partisanship in tiie electorate. Changes in 
the distribution of party identification do not necessarily imply a change in the competitive balance 
between the parties. Assuming tiiat the strength of party identification and vote are linearly related, 
the party with a plurality of identifiers may have a much larger proportion of weak identifiers, while 
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tiie party tiiat does not have a pluraUty of identifiers may enjoy an electoral advantage, since it has 
proportionaUy more strong identifiers. 
Furthermore, this tiieory investigates tiie effects of electoral forces on party support, net of tiie 
other factors involved, rather than tiie simple association between partisanship and vote. A simple 
bivariate analysis of vote and party identification may not be evidence of electoral change or electoral 
stability, because the measure of party identification wiU also be a surrogate measure for those short-
term forces correlated with party identification. 
3.3.2 The Second Level of tiie Model 
At the second (and more specific) level, the model of electoral choice can be re-drawn to specify 
the general concepts, relating to long- and short-term electoral forces. This model is presented in 
figure 3.4. 
Candidates 
Partisan 
Background 
Social 
Factors 
Partisan 
Ideology. 
Vote 
Issues 
Figure 3.4: Model of Electoral Choice at the second level, specifying the interrelationships 
between the general concepts of the model. 
The two long-term electoral forces, partisanship and ideology have been separated as have tiie two 
short-term electoral forces, 'issues' and 'candidates'. The direct influences on vote are limited to the 
general concepts of partisanship, ideology, issues and candidates. Furtiiermore, the concept 'partisan 
background' has been distinguished from other social factors. The revisionist account of partisanship 
is made explicit in the model, since non-recursive relationships are proposed between partisanship and 
both issues and candidates. 
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This model aUows a furtiier understanding of electoral change. Parties in a dominant electoral 
position enjoy that position because of a persistent net electoral advantage from the long-term electoral 
forces, partisanship and ideology. Changes in tiie same direction of tiie effect of partisanship, ideology 
or both on vote wiU, if substantial enough, result in a change in the electoral balance between the 
parties and usher in a new electoral period. For example, if the net effect of long-term electoral forces 
has changed to the advantage of a second party, then that party becomes tiie dominant party. If tiie 
net effect of long-term electoral forces changes, so that no party enjoys an electoral advantage, a new 
electoral period begins where no party is the dominant party. In this latter simation, short-term forces 
wiU determine which parties win and lose elections. 
General concepts can now be Unked to the two types of explanations of past electoral outcomes 
introduced earlier. Those explanations focusing on transient factors would argue that the electoral 
success of the coalition parties during the 1950s and 1960s was due to tiie popularity of conservative 
leaders, tiie impopularity of Labor leaders and the issues of the period. Similarly, such explanations 
would attribute the success of tiie Labor party during the 1980s to the popularity of the Labor leaders, 
the unpopularity of the Liberal leaders, and elements of the contemporary issue agenda, such as 
environmental issues. In contrast, explanations focusing on durable influences would explain 
successive election victories in terms of enduring advantages the parties hold in the electorate, through 
partisanship, ideology or both. 
Furthermore, analysis of this model of electoral choice aUows conclusions to be made regarding 
tiie accounts presented in the flrst chapter. These accounts focused on changes in the impact 
partisanship, ideology, issues and candidates, on vote. Analysis of this model at different time points 
aUows answers to such questions as; 'Has Australian poUtics become presidential?', 'Is tiie electorate 
more ideological?' and 'Are Australians more responsive to issues?'. A summary of the 16 possible 
scenarios and plausible reasons for changes (in parentheses) is presented in table 3.3. 
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TABLE 3.3: QUESTIONS CONCERNING CHANGES OVER-TIME IN THE INFLUENCE OF PARTISANSHIP, 
IDEOLOGY, ISSUES AND CANDIDATES HAVE ON ELECTORAL CHOICE 
PARTISANSHIP 
Has Partisanship become more important (as electors find issues too complex and are unimpressed by leaders)? 
Has partisanship become less important (because e' ctors are have become cynical about political parties)? 
No Change 
No Effect on electoral choice 
IDEOLOGY 
Has the electorate become more ideological (because of the divisive politics of the 1970s or because of the rise of post-
materialism)? 
Has the electorate become less ideological (as the Labor party adopts policies of privatisation and less goverrunent 
intervention in the economy)? 
No Change 
No Effect on electoral choice 
ISSUES 
Have issues become less important (because the parties no longer present clear and distinct alternatives)? 
Have issues become more important (since the electorate has become more educated and politically sophisticated)? 
No Change 
No Effect on electoral choice 
CANDIDATES 
Have Candidates become more important as Austrahan poUtics (becomes more presidential in style or because Australians 
have become more concerned about the competence and abiUties of their representatives)? 
Have Candidates become less important (as Australians become more cynical about politicians)? 
No Change 
No Effect on electoral choice 
Similarly changes in the effect of social factors on political preference, can be redefined as 
changes in the effects of these factors on ihe long-term electoral forces, partisanship and ideology. 
Social factors have only indirect effects on electoral choice. FoUowing from table 3.3, each social 
factor can be hypothesised as having greater, smaUer, simUar or inconsequential effects on partisanship 
and ideology. 
3.3.3 Extended Time-Period Model 
The model presented in figure 3.4 is in fact an abridged version of a more general model. The 
fuU model of electoral choice over an extended time period, is presented in figure 3.5. This model has 
two parts, the first part indicates that both first partisanship and ideology are influenced by social and 
backgroimd factors and at every time point, sensitive to 'contemporary short-term electoral forces''. 
These 'contemporary short-term forces' include issues and the evaluations of candidates as weU 
poUtical influences associated witii social factors. The second part of tiie fuU model refers to the 
present time (t) where partisanship, ideology, issues and candidates aU have direct influences on vote 
and partisanship is sensitive, to both tiie issues and the candidates of the present time. This fuU model 
97 
shows tiiat long-term electoral forces are sensitive to short-term factors, over an extended period of 
time. 
P a r t i s a n 
Background 
S o c i a l 
F a c t o r s 
P a r t i s a n s h i p - • P a r t i s a n s h 
( f i r s t ) I (at t ) 
I 
I 
Candidates 
> V ^ \ (at t ) 
i 
Contemporary 
Short-term Forces 
I 
I 
t 
Ideology ^ Ideology 
( f i r s t ) ^at t ) 
Figure 3.5: FuU model of Electoral Choice over an extended time period. 
Vote 
I s s u e s 
( a t t ) 
3.3.4 Rationale for the Model 
The foUowing section discusses each of the general concepts of the model in mm, noting the 
specific concepts relating to each general concept and the influences on each general concept. 
Vote 
The most central concept in the model of electoral choice is, of course, vote. The concept of vote 
encompasses a number of specific concepts. Vote may relate to vote in federal or state elections, vote 
at House of Representatives or Senate elections. In addition, the Australian electoral system aUows 
two distinct concepts of vote, primary vote and two-party-preferred vote (figure 3.6). The specific 
concepts of vote employed in this smdy are primary and two party preferred vote at House of 
Representatives elections. 
The specific concepts of vote employed in tiie investigations reported here, are restricted to voting 
for tiie federal parliament. Vote at state or territory elections are not included, since tiiis study is 
investigating electoral choice and change in tiie Austialian electorate, not in a particular state or 
region. Vote at Senate elections is not employed in these analyses for the foUowing 
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reasons: first, tiie govemments are formed in tiie House of Representatives, second, tiie lower 
proportion of votes for tiie major parties at Senate elections (Mackerras, 1988:273-274), suggests tiiat 
there are differences in the way in which voters, vote at Senate and House of Representative elections. 
It is reasonable to suggest, tiiat voters at Senate elections are less likely to vote in accordance witii 
tiieir partisanship. FinaUy, differences between voting behaviour in Senate and House of 
Representatives elections is a smdy in its own right and cannot be readUy subsumed under this smdy. 
Similar points pertain to voting at by-elections. 
Primary vote at House of Representatives Elections 
Tvo party Preferred vote at House of Reps, Elections 
Primary vote at Senate Elections 
VOTE < Two Party Preferred vote at Senate Elections 
^ Prima'ry vote at State Elections 
Two Party Preferred vote at State Elections 
Primary vote at by-elections 
Two Party vote at by-elections 
Figure 3.6: The specific concepts relating to the general concept 'Vote'. 
A mrther issue is the AustraUan preferential voting system. In House of Representatives 
elections, voters indicate a preference for each candidate standing in the electorate. The number 1 is 
written in the box opposite the candidate most preferred, the number 2 opposite tiie next preferred 
candidate and so on until the voter has indicated a sequential preference to aU candidates. A vote 
which does not indicate a sequential preference for each and every candidate standing in the electorate 
is not counted as a vaUd vote. 
This method of voting has major implications for tiie investigation of electoral change in 
Australia. Voters may give their primary vote to a minor party, but stiU vote in accordance witii their 
partisanship, by using their second preference (Aitidn, 1985). Given the translation of votes into seats 
by the electoral system, tiie two-party preferred vote, rather than first preference vote, is more closely 
related to which party forms a government in tiie House of Representatives. Where possible, measures 
of two-party-preferred are also employed in these investigations (see appendix 1 for details of tiieir 
constmction). 
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Influences on Vote 
The essence of the model is tiiat vote is determined by partisanship, ideology, issues and 
candidates. In effect, it states tiiat tiie levels of party support observed in tiie electorate are tiie result 
of tiie most visible influences of tiie political world on electors. The first causal patiiway contends 
that vote is a direct function of partisanship, ideology, issues and the evaluations of candidates. This 
causal pathway is found in other models of vote choice. The 'Michigan' model of vote choice 
considers party identification, issues and candidates to directiy influence vote choice (Asher, 1984:341-
342). A similar model was investigated by Goldberg (1966), who limited the direct influences on vote 
choice to two concepts, partisan attimdes (towards poUcies and candidates) and party identification. In 
models of American presidential elections, candidates are sometimes considered as tiie major direct 
influences on vote, since voters acmaUy vote for the president (Page & Jones, 1979; Jackson, 1975). 
In Austialia, voters cannot vote directiy for prime ministerial candidates, so candidates are just one of 
several factors that may directiy influence vote. In Canada, voters also carmot vote directiy for the 
prime minister. For that electorate. Archer (1987) investigated a similar model to that presented in 
figure 3.4, where party identification, issues and candidate evaluations are hypothesised to directiy 
influence vote. In AustraUa, a similar model specifying direct effects of party identification, issues 
and candidates on vote was investigated by Jackman (1988:55-56). 
There is a large body of empirical evidence which supports the hypotheses that partisanship, 
issues and candidates influence electoral choice. In Australia, party identification is found to be 
closely associated witii vote (Aitidn, 1982b:228; Bean & KeUey, 1988; Graetz & McAllister, 
1988:259, 291; Jackman, 1988; KeUey & McAUister, 1985). Botii poUtical issues (Aitidn, 1982b:227; 
Budge & Fariie, 1983:69; McAUister, 1990) and economic issues (Gow, 1990) have been found to be 
associated witii vote. Candidates have also been found important, including the leaders (Bean, 1990; 
Bean & KeUey, 1988; Graetz & McAUister, 1988), past leaders (Bean & KeUey, 1988; Graetz & 
McAUister, 1988:259), tiie premier of Queensland (Bean & Kelley, 1988) and local members (Bean, 
1990). 
The most notable modification to many previous models of vote, is the addition of tiie concept of 
ideology, as a direct influence on vote. This modification is included to account for those voters, who 
vote on tiie basis of ideological orientations. Voters may vote for the coalition parties because Labor 
governments are perceived as 'socialist', 'intent on nationalisation' or 'encouraging immorality'. 
Conversely, voters may support the Labor party because it 'supports equaUty of oppormnity', 'helps 
tiie underprivUeged', 'is sensitive to tiie environment' or 'is more sympatiietic to feminist issues'. 
Furthermore, several empirical smdies have found direct effects of measures relating to 'ideology' 
on vote in tiie United States and Britain (Knight, 1985; Levitin & MiUer, 1979; MUler, MerriU & 
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Shanks, 1982:352; Scarborough, 1984:177-192) and in Australia (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:258-
261)*. 
An important feamre of this model is the assertion that social factors do not directiy influence 
electoral choice. In this model, social factors are specified as only indirectiy influencing vote. 
Explanations of the relationship between class and vote that cite class norms (Gold, 1980) or party 
loyalties (Alford, 1967:68-70) implicitiy include tiie concept of party identification. Otiier 
explanations have focused on ideological appeals (Przeworski & Sprague, 1986:45-52) and self-interest 
(Lipset, 1960:229). Ideological explanations obviously require tiie addition of the concept 'ideology', 
whereas explanations citing self-interest require the addition, of concepts such as 'partisanship' and 
'issues'. Self-interest explanations imply that voters perceive greater benefits, either tangible or 
symbolic, accming to themselves from the specific policies of a particular party, or by it simply being 
in government. Furthermore, this specification of only indirect effects of social factors on electoral 
choice, has generaUy been employed by otiier investigators (Archer, 1987; Goldberg, 1966; Markus & 
Converse, 1979; Page & Jones, 1979). 
This model implies that other factors are not relevant influences on electoral choice. There may 
be rare instances of an individual's vote choice being influenced by such non-poUtical factors as the 
weather or a bout of sickness. But such influences are considered to be random in namre, with no 
systematic effect on tiie levels of party support A more plausible influence not expUcitiy included in 
the model is the mass media (Jaensch, 1989a:79, 92-94). However, the mass media are considered to 
play a role in bringing issues onto tiie agenda, and colouring voters' evaluations of issues and 
candidates, rather than directiy influencing vote choice. 
Partisanship 
The concept of partisanship has a high degree of face validity. When discussing poUtics, people 
frequentiy refer to themselves and others in terms of parties. Comments such "I grew up to Labor", 
"we were aU brought up Liberal", "I believe she was a Liberal", "He's always been Labor and "He 
was very strong Labor" are indicative of partisanship (quotes from Aitidn, 1982b:60, 91). 
The importance of 'partisanship' to the investigation of Australian poUtics is summarised by 
Aitkin's (1982b:142) comment that "Australian politics is the politics of parties rather than of classes 
and it is on parties that Australians focus". Partisanship is a low-cost way in which voters can 
orientate tiiemselves in tiie worid of politics (MiUer, 1976; Shively, 1980). 
In this model of electoral choice, partisanship is associated with two specific concepts, 'party 
identification' and 'attimde to tiie parties' (figure 3.7). 
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P a r t y I ( i e n t i f i c a t i o n 
PARTISANSHIP < 
V 
Attitudes to Parties 
Figure 3.7: The specific concepts associated with the general concept 'Partisanship'. 
Empirical smdies indicate that an overwhelming majority of tiie Australian electorate readily 
identify witii poUtical parties (Aitidn, 1982b:38; Bean & KeUey, 1988) and tiiat 'party identification' 
has a major influence on electoral choice in Australia (Aitkin, 1982b:228). These findings support tiie 
contention that identifications with parties is an important factor in the process by which parties gain 
and maintain electoral support. 
'Attimdes to tiie parties' is included because it encapsulates aspects of partisanship that party 
identification does not. The concept 'attimdes to the parties' is concerned with the respondent's 
response to parties as objective elements of the poUtical landscape, rather than the respondent's 
identification witii a party. HypotheticaUy, an elector who identifiers with a party, but does not have 
negative attimdes to other parties, wiU have a greater tendency to vote for anotiier party than an 
elector who has strong negative feelings towards other parties. SimUar arguments have been put forth 
by other researchers. Bean (1984:370) argues that party identification gives no indication of what 
voters' feel about otiier parties and these feeUngs must have a bearing on political behaviour. In a 
similar vein, Crewe (1976:51) notes that the concept of partisanship would be more useful if it were a 
relative rather than an absolute orientation, and incorporated negative attimdes as weU as positive 
attimdes towards parties. Furthermore, the respondent's attimdes to parties also encapsulates the 
eleaor's attimdes to the values and ideas which tiie parties espouse and their performance in 
government (Aitidn, 1982b:292-293). 
The respondent's feeUngs towards parties were employed by Converse & Pierce (1985), in the 
investigation of partisanship. Furthermore, the autiiors note that over a third of tiie variance of party 
identification and relative feeUngs towards the parties is held in common. Attimdes to the party that 
electors do not identify with have been found in the American electorate to have an independent and 
long-term effect on electoral choice (Maggiotto & Piereson, 1977). 
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Influences on Partisanship 
In the fuU model of electoral choice (figure 3.5), the most immediate influence on partisanship is 
previous partisanship. Since partisanship is a relatively stable poUtical disposition, the major influence 
on partisanship is likely to be previous partisanship. EmpiricaUy, stiong associations have been 
observed between previous and present party identification (Bean & KeUey, 1988; Converse & 
Markus, 1979b; HoweU, 1981). 
In tiie model of electoral choice in figure 3.4, tiie influences on partisanship specified are partisan 
background, social factors, issues and candidates. 
The major influence on partisanship is considered to be parental partisanship. Since parents are 
the major socialising influence on their children, it expected that some poUtical sociaUsation is also 
carried out by parents. A close association between parental and present partisanship has been 
demonstrated in the United States (CampbeU et al., 1960:147; Jennings & Langton, 1968; Jennings & 
Niemi, 1968; Jennings & Niemi, 1974:38-39; Jennings & Niemi, 1981:89-91), in Britain (Butier & 
Stokes, 1974:52; Himmelweit, Humpheries & Jaeger, 1985:181) and in Austi-alia (Aitidn, 1982b:92-93, 
297; Irvine & Gold, 1980). 
Social factors are usuaUy specified as exogenous to partisanship in both bivariate and multivariate 
models of partisanship. In the bivariate models of electoral choice investigated by Aitidn (1982b), 
partisanship is observed to vary across a range of social factors. Social factors are commonly included 
in multivariate models of partisanship, both in the United States (Cassel, 1982; Knoke, 1976:102; Page 
& Jones, 1979) and in Austi^ia (Aitidn, 1982b: 111,303; KeUey & McAUister, 1985). 
Social factors are considered to be surrogate measures for poUtical socialisation tiiat occurs out-
side the family. For instance, if occupational class has a substantial effect on partisanship, net of 
partisan background, tiien it can be concluded that political socialisation occurs among occupational 
class groupings. PoUtical orientations may be influenced by other members of that class, or the voter 
has entered a political sub-culmre, which views as 'namral' support for a particular political party. 
Similarly, if trade-union membership is found to have substantial effects on partisanship, net of 
partisan background, tiien it can concluded that political socialisation occurs among trade-union 
members. It is possible tiiiat contact with key actors in the trade-union movement, association witii 
other union members, or simply identification as a trade-union member, effect the political orientations 
of tiade-union members. 
The extra-famiUal poUtical socialisation represented by social factors may be eitiier transient or 
durable. Transient political sociaUsation may be the result of issues that are particularly relevant to 
certain social groups. For example, the abolition of the super-phosphate bounty by the Whitiam 
government may have prompted mral residents to become stronger coalition partisans and undermine 
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Labor partisanship in tiiose areas. However, once tiie issue had died down, tiiis transient effect on 
partisanship would disappear. In contrast, durable extra-famUial political socialisation occurs as certain 
social groups have a long-standing preference for one poUtical party ratiier than anotiier. For example, 
east European ethnic groups may prefer tiie Liberal party, since it has a stronger anti-communist 
stance. SimUarly, manual workers prefer tiie Labor party, since it is seen as representing tiieir 
interests. The transient and durable forms of political socialisation can be distinguished, witii reference 
to the extended model of electoral choice (figure 3.5). Transient effects wUl be suggested if 
substantial effects of social factors are found on partisanship, net of previous partisanship. In contrast, 
durable effects are assumed to have already conulbuted to partisanship, and wiU not be indicated in 
models including previous partisanship. 
The model presented in this chapter expUcitiy posits tiiat issues and candidates can influence 
partisanship, foUowing the revisionist concepmalisation of partisanship. Partisanship has a degree of 
endogeneity and can change in response to contemporary political events (Shively, 1980). Similarly, 
partisanship can be understood as a running taUy of the performance of parties (Fiorina, 1981:65-83). 
Although, it may be argued that tiie classical model of partisanship is more appropriate in tiie 
Australian context, the model of electoral choice should aUow for the possibility of reciprocal 
causation. 
Empirical investigations have found that party identification is sensitive to short-term electoral 
forces (Archer, 1987; Brody & Rotiienberg, 1988; Fiorina, 1981; Franklin, 1984; Franklin & Jackson, 
1983; HoweU, 1981; Jackson, 1975; Maricus & Converse, 1979; Page & Jones, 1979; Weatiierford, 
1983b). In AustraUa, both issues (Jackman, 1989:67-70) and the evaluations of leaders (Graetz & 
McAUister, 1986) have been found to have reciprocal relationships with party identification. Recursive 
(or non-reciprocal) models tend to over-estimate the effects of partisanship and underestimate the 
effects of short-term factors (Page & Jones, 1979; Weatiierford, 1983b). 
There are two important considerations in respect to the non-recursive namre of tiie relationships 
between short-term electoral forces and partisanship. These are the namre of the short-term factors 
which influence partisanship and the question of model specification. 
On the question of which short-term factors influence partisanship, not each and every issue and 
candidate may influence partisanship. It is more likely that at a single time point only a selection of 
the potential short-term factors do influence partisanship. There is Uttie guidance from the literamre 
on this point. Most smdies on the endogeneity of partisanship employ summary measures of issues, 
mainly because there are statistical difficulties in the analysis of multiple non-recursive relationships. 
This procedure tends to combine those issues that do influence partisanship witii tiiose tiiat do not and 
tiierefore attenuate tiie observed effects. In this smdy, the investigations are guided by general 
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principle, tiiat only tiiose short-term factors tiiat have an impact on vote may also influence 
partisanship. Therefore, only poUticaUy relevant short-term influences are included in tiie non-
recursive models. 
The second consideration concems model specification, specificaUy tiie high association between 
partisanship and vote. Short-term factors wiU be found to have greater effects on partisanship, if vote 
is not included in the model. Since vote and partisanship are highly associated, tiiose issues which 
influence vote choice wiU have augmented effects on partisanship, if vote is not analysed in the same 
model. Therefore, in the investigation of the influences of short-term forces on partisanship, tiie whole 
model is analysed rather than individual relationships. 
The revisionist concepmalisation of partisanship is also implied by the earlier discussion on 
transient and durable forms of political socialisation represented by social factors. However, tiiere are 
substantial differences. First, the durable forms are unrelated to the short-term political factors that 
effect vote and partisanship. For example, the enduring political socialisation relating to occupational 
class or trade-union membership that may occur over generations is qualitatively different from tiie 
effects of contemporary issues or candidates. Second, tiie transient forms are associated witii particular 
social factors, whereas the non-reciprocal links between issues and partisanship apply to relevant issues 
not limited to specific social groups. Third, the effect of issues on partisanship at a given time relates 
to the endogenous namre of partisanship at that time. In contrast, tiie transient political sociaUsation 
occurs over a longer time-period, between previous and present partisanship. 
Ideology 
In this model of electoral choice, ideology is considered as a long-term electoral force, 
complementary to partisanship. Voters may orientate themselves in tiie political worid by their 
ideological orientation, as weU as or instead of, through their partisanship (Rabinowitz, Gurian & 
MacDonald, 1984). Furthermore, ideology may mediate the relationship between social-stmcmral 
factors and vote (Himmelweit, Humphries & Jaeger, 1985:45-52; Przeworski & Sprague, 1986:45-52; 
Roberston, 1984:17). Like partisanship, ideology is a cost saving device (Downs, 1957:100) and is a 
relatively stable orientation (Levitin & Miller, 1979). 
The model of electoral choice presented here asserts that there are four specific ideological 
concepts relating to the general concept ideology. These are 'general ideological orientation' 
'economic liberalism/conservatism', 'non-economic Uberalism/conservatism' and 'post-materialism' 
(figure 3.8). General ideological orientation is simply whetiier respondents see tiiemselves as to 'the 
left', 'tiie right' or 'the centre'. Economic liberaUsm/conservatism refers to a general orientation about 
tiie desirabiUty of government intervention in the economy. Along this continuum, ideological 
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orientations range from minimal government intervention, to complete ownership by tiie state. The 
second ideological concept, non-economic liberalism/conservatism, relates to a general orientation to 
moral and social attimdes. It is understood as a broad orientation, which guides the formation of 
attimdes towards matters such as censorship and immigration. Post-materialism is considered as a 
concept distinct from economic and non-economic ideological orientations. 
General Ideological Position 
y- Economic Liberalism/Conservatism 
IDEOLOGY < 
L Non-Economic Liberalism/Conservatism 
Post-Materialism 
Figure 3.8: The four specific concepts relating to the general concept 'Ideology'. 
The distinction between economic and non-economic liberalism conservatism is derived from 
smdies conducted in the United States and Great Britain that have distinguished between economic and 
non-economic ideological dimensions (Knoke, 1979; Himmelweit, Humphries & Jaeger, 1985:138-139; 
Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985:883; Roberston, 1984:17). In Austt-alia, Graetz & McAUister (1988:240) 
identified a belief system concemed with economic power, distinct from non-economic concems. In 
tiie analysis of ideology in AustraUa, KeUey (1988:60) considered economic attimdes separately from 
non-economic attimdes. A measure of economic conservatism was employed in the analyses of Bean 
& KeUey (1988) and Jackman (1988:67-70). 
The concept of 'post-materialism' was introduced by Inglehart (1971, 1977 & 1984). Post-
materiaUsm is defined by priorities given to 'quaUty of Ufe' concems, ratiier than furtiier economic 
development. Post-materiaUsm is associated with attimdes to a variety of 'quality of life' concems. 
Attimdes relating to equality for women, nuclear issues and the environment are related to post-
materiaUsm (Inglehart, 1984:28). In Australia, attimdes to the protection of the environment were 
found to be strongly associated witii post-materialism (Graetz & McAlUster, 1988:253). 
Irfluences on Ideology 
Given the general stabUity of ideological orientation, tiie major influence on ideology is previous 
ideology as indicated in figure 3.5. Empirical work has showed high correlations between measures of 
ideology taken at different time points (Levitin & Miller, 1979) and Uttie change has been observed 
over an election campaign (Maricus, 1982). 
106 
Ideology is correlated witii social-sttuctural factors. Self-placement on tiie right is associated witii 
income, self-employment, age and gender (Zagorski, 1988). A measure relating to economic 
conservatism has been found to be associated witii class, religion, education and trade-union 
membership (Smdlar & Welch, 1981). Similarly, non-economic liberalism/conservatism appears to be 
associated witii education (Knoke & Hout, 1974). Furthermore, post-materialism is lUcely to be more 
prevalent in younger age groups (higlehart, 1977:30-33, 9-10). 
In addition to such social-stmcmral factors, partisanship may stmcture ideological orientations. 
Preferred positions on ideological matters may be simply a reflection of partisanship. 
Issues, are not considered to have substantial influences on ideology. Issues and ideology are 
correlated but the causal relationships between them is considered to be in the opposite direction. 
Candidates are also not considered to directiy influence ideological orientations. GeneraUy, 
empirical investigations have not found a direct influence of candidates on ideology. The popularity 
of Reagan as a candidate for president was found not associated with an ideological shift in the 
American electorate towards Reagan's ideological positions (Fleishman, 1986; Markus, 1982). 
Issues 
The model of electoral choice specifies tiiat issues have an influence on electoral choice. Issues 
introduced during election campaigns are considered as influencing vote (Achen, 1975; Aitkin, 
1982b:216). The general concept 'issues' includes a large number of specific issues. A selection of 
specific issues in Australian poUtics is presented in figure 3.9. These issues range from issues which 
have only a smaU economic component to those which are almost entirely economic. The issue 
measures included in this smdy are detaUed in appendix 1. 
Irrfluences on Issues 
The model of electoral choice proposed by the authors of The American Voter understood 
partisanship, as a percepmal screen through which objects of the poUtical landscape are evaluated 
(CampbeU et al., 1960:170). In other words, electors' positions on issues are coloured by their 
partisanship. In some instances, voters simply adopt the policy stands of the party they identify with. 
This relationship between issues and partisanship has been specified in later models of electoral choice 
(Archer, 1987; Asher, 1984; Jackman, ;988:55-56; Markus & Converse, 1979; Page & Jones, 1979). 
Therefore, this specification is also included in the model investigated here. 
Social factors are not included as direct influences on issues. In contrast, a number of studies 
have specified direct effects of social factors on issues (Archer, 1987; Jacoby, 1988). Positing direct 
effects of social-stmcmral factors on issues is also a product of difficulties in statistical estimation, as 
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Communism 
State Aid to Non-Government Schools 
The Vietnam ¥ar 
Conscription 
Parties Split 
Rainforests 
ISSUES < '^^^ Franklin Dam 
L Local Issues 
Evaluations of the State Government 
Privatisation 
StriXes 
Taxation 
Unemployment 
Economic Growth 
Prospective Economic Issues 
Retrospective Economic Evaluations 
Figure 3.9: A selection of specific issues in Australian Politics. 
weU as substantive theory (Asher, 1984:345-346). However, in the AustraUan context, there is no 
substantive reason to specify particular social factors as invariably having direct effects on issues. 
Therefore, direct effects of social factors on issues are not specified. 
Although social factors are not understood as directiy influencing issues, the relevance of issues to 
electoral choice may differ between social groups. For example, issues may be more important to 
younger age groups, for men ratiier than women. There is some empirical evidence for this 
contention, the issues of inflation and unemployment are evaluated differentiy between social classes 
(Hibbs, 1982; Kemp, 1978:320; Weatiierford, 1978). The partisanship of younger voters could be 
more responsive to issues (Franklin, 1984; Maricus, 1979). Therefore, tiie model can be extended to 
include the possibiUty that the model of electoral choice differs between social groups (figure 3.10). 
Ideology is considered to directiy influence issues. An elector's preferred policy position on 
issues, are to some extent derived from beUef systems (CampbeU, et al. 1960:191). A relationship 
between policy positions and ideology was found by Page & Jones (1979). However, this relationship 
is not a major focus in this smdy of electoral choice. 
SOCIAL GROUP 1 
'ot 
"fU, 
'^J. 
Partisanship 
Ideology 
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Candidates 
Vote 
Issues 
SOCIAL GROUP 2 
Partisanship 
Ideology 
Candidates 
Vote 
Issues 
Figure 3.10: Model of Electoral Choice may differ between Social Groups. 
Candidates 
In this model of vote, the general concept candidates encompasses the personalities involved in 
politics. SpecificaUy, the general concept 'candidates' includes the party leaders at botii the federal 
and state levels, government ministers, backbenchers, local members and otiier political figures (figure 
3.11). 
Although tiiere are many specific concepts that are encompassed by the general concept 
'candidates', in tiiis smdy the concept is limited to tiie evaluations of tiie leaders of the two major 
political parties. This is because there is littie data coUected on evaluations of other political figures. 
Irrfluences on Candidates 
Like issues, tiie evaluations of candidates is understood as largely influenced by partisanship. The 
American literamre has generaUy considered the evaluation of candidates as endogenous to 
partisanship (Asher, 1984; CampbeU et al., 1960; Markus, 1982). Ideology and issues are specified as 
not directiy influencing the evaluations of candidates. 
CANDIDATES 
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Prime Min i s te r 
Leader of the Opposi t ion 
Leaders of Minor P a r t i e s 
Min i s t e r s 
Local Members and Local Candidates 
S t a t e Leaders 
Par ty Admin i s t r a to r s 
Figure 3.11: The specific concepts associated with the general concept 'CancUdates'. 
Social-structural Factors 
A total of 13 concepts constimte the general concept 'social-stmcmral factors'. Included are tiie 
specific concepts, class, reUgion, region and ethnicity which correspond to tiie four basic political 
cleavages of Lipset & Rokkan (1967). The class-related factors of class identification, income, trade-
union membership and employment sector are also included. Religiosity is included as it relates to 
religion in a similar manner as class-related factors relate to class. The demographic variables, age 
and gender are also included as social-stmctural factors. The final group of factors which constitute 
the social factor constmct are those concepts associated witii social background, education and class 
background. 
Occupational class is included in the model for both tiieoretical and empirical reasons. The major 
Australian poUtical parties have been viewed as based on class (Aitidn, 1982b:l 18-120; Kemp, 
1978:38-39). Measures of occupational class have been often employed in the investigation of 
electoral behaviour in Australia and associations have been found (Alford, 1963:172-178; Bean, 
1984:290-305; Kemp, 1978:45-91; McAUister & KeUey, 1982). 
Trade-union membership, class identification, education, and income are included in tiie model, as 
they are Ukely to reinforce the political effects of objective class location. Earlier research has termed 
these concepts as dimensions of class (Rose, 1982). Members of the trade-unions are exposed to 
political actors such as shop stewards and other members who may make political appeals. The 
political preference of those who identify witii a social class are likely to correspond with tiieir 
perception of that class's poUtical orientation. Focusing on employment sector: employers, and 
employees woricing in the private sector, may be more sympathetic to the more entrepreneurial policies 
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Occupational Class 
Religion 
Region - Rural 
Region - State 
Ethnicity 
Class Identification 
SOCIAL FACTORS < Income 
\- Trade Union Membership 
Self-Employment, Public/Private Sector 
Religiosity 
Education 
Class Bacltground 
Gender 
Age Group 
Figure 3.12: The specific concepts relating to the general concepts 'Social-structural Factors'. 
of the coaUtion parties. Conversely, those working to the public sector may be more likely to support 
the Labor party, since it has historicaUy been more sympathetic to the public sector. Qass background 
is included in the model since poUtical socialisation may be influenced by the social milieu of an 
elector's famUy of origin. 
There is much empirical woric that suggests social factors are involved in tiie process of electoral 
choice. A measure of 'class identification' has been included in several models of party identification 
(Bean & KeUey, 1988; KeUey, 1988:71; KeUey & McAUister, 1985). Measures of income have also 
been employed in the analysis of political preference (Aitidn, 1982b:303; KeUey & McAUister, 1985). 
Membership of a trade-union, has been shown to be associated with increased levels of Labor party 
identification (Aitkin, 1982b:140,301). A relationship between employment 'sector' on party 
identification has also been observed (KeUey & McAUister, 1985). Differences in the levels of party 
support, have been noted between groups with different levels of educational attainment (Bean, 
1984:262; Graetz & McAlUster, 1988:285). Class background appears to influence partisanship 
(Aitidn, 1982b: 111). 
Religion is included in this theory of party support, since religion may be associated witii political 
preference through group norms, historic loyalties, ideological appeals or past experience witii issues 
pertaining to religion. The political dispositions of members of religious groups is reinforced by botii 
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group identification and group integration (Penning, 1988). It can be hypotiiesised tiiat individuals 
who identify with a religious group and who perceive tiiat group as preferring a particular political 
party, wiU be more incUned to support that party. Similarly, it can be hypotiiesised tiiat members of 
reUgious groups, who are weU integrated into a religious community are more exposed to tiie political 
preferences of key actors such as priests and to the group norms of the community. On a more 
empirical level, the Australian Labor party has historicaUy had close links with the CathoUc church 
(Aitkin, 1982b: 162-166). In Australia, differences have been observed in the levels of party support 
between religious groups (Alford, 1963:191-194; Aitidn, 1982b:166; Bean, 1984:274-277; Kemp, 
1978:198-202,352). 
The group integration argument can also be applied to religiosity. Individuals witii high levels of 
religiosity are expected to more closely adhere to group norms. 'Religiosity' is associated with lower 
levels of Labor party identification (Aitidn, 1982b:303; Gold, 1979; Kemp, 1978:207). 
There are two aspects of 'region' relevant to voting behaviour. In AustraUa, the major regional 
divisions are between the states and between urban and mral areas. The vote parties receive and the 
swings between parties at Australian elections, generaUy differ between the states (Bean, 1991). 
Higher levels of Labor support have been noted among urban residents, compared witii non-urban 
residents (Bean, 1991; Kemp, 1978:274; McAUister & Ascui, 1988). 
'Etimicity' is included in tiie model on the assumption that ethnic groups wiU be poUtically 
distinct from each other, or from the Australian bom. There are a number of hypotheses conceming 
the political preferences of immigrants. First, they may be influenced by the political situation of tiie 
their country of origin. For example, immigrants from eastem Europe may appreciate the harder 
stance the coalition parties have towards communism (McAlUster & KeUey, 1982). Second, they may 
simply translate their political preferences in their country of origin to AustraUa poUtics (Aitkin, 
1982b: 158). Third, immigrants may be influenced by their relatively inferior social and economic 
simation. As a group they would support the party which is perceived as more supportive, of less 
privileged groups, tiiat is tiie Labor party (Aitidn, 1982b:155; McAUister & Kelley, 1984:59). 
Immigrants may support the conservative parties, since tiiey are concemed with economic success 
(Aitidn, 1982b: 159; McAUister & KeUey, 1983a; McAUister & Kelley, 1984:59). Altematively, etimic 
groups may have responded positively, to tiie multiculmral policies of the Labor party (McAUister, 
1988b). FinaUy, etiinic groups may be disengaged from Australian politics and have no reason to 
prefer any political party (Aitidn, 1985; McAllister, 1988a). EmpiricaUy, variations in tiie poUtical 
support for poUtical parties among etiinic groups in Austialia, have been observed (Kemp, 1978:191; 
McAUister, 1988b; McAUister & KeUey, 1982). 
112 
'Age' is included in the model since different age cohorts may have had different political 
experiences (Ryder, 1965). Getting older may or may not be related to increasing conservatism 
(Crittenden, 1962; Glenn & Heftier, 1972). Similarly, 'gender' is included in tiie model, under tiie 
hypothesis that attachments to the political system, issue concems and political socialisation may differ 
between men and women. Age and gender differences in the distribution of vote and party 
identification, have been noted (Aitidn, 1982b:326-329,332; Bean, 1984:233-234; Goot, 1980; Graetz 
& McAUister, 1988:282; Saulwick & Aitchison, 1973:296). Aitidn (1982b:306-307) found gender 
differences, in the relation between social-stmcmral factors and party identification. 
Social-structural Concepts not included 
In addition to these concepts relating to the "social factor" constmct, there are other social factors 
that have been employed in the analysis of political behaviour, but have not been included in this 
model of electoral choice. These social factors include, 'tenancy', 'social context' and 'consumption'. 
Housing tenancy has littie or no influence on vote in Australia (McAUister, 1984). The influence of 
social context on party support in Austialia appears to be quite smaU (McAUister & KeUey, 1983b) 
and its exclusion is unlUcely to generate incorrect conclusions as to the process of electoral choice 
(Jones, 1981). Consumption refers to tiie distribution of consumption items in the electorate, such as 
cars, telephones and the use of private sector services (Dunleavy, 1979, 1980a & 1980b). There is 
Uttie evidence that the possession of consumable items, or the use of government rather than private 
services, has political effects in Austialia. Furthermore, tiiere are theoretical and concepmal difficulties 
in this approach to electoral behaviour (FrankUn & Page, 1984). 
Partisan Backgrourui 
The model would be incorrectiy specified if tiie concept of partisan background was not included. 
A number of specific concepts are associated with 'partisan background' (figure 3.13). 
PARTISAN 
BACKGROUND 
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F a t h e r ' s Par ty Preference 
r Mother 's Par ty Preference 
^ P o l i t i c a l Preferences of Other Family Members 
P o l i t i c a l Preferences of Other S ign i f i can t Others 
Figure 3.13: The specific concepts associated with the general concept 'Partisan Background'. 
The poUtical socialisation of most electors is carried out by their parents (Aitkin, 1982b:87-88). 
Parents are the first source of tiie political information tiiat individuals leam. It is possible that voters 
may also by socialised by otiier family members and by other people important to the voter while he 
or she was growing up. However, this smdy limits the concept 'partisan background' to tiie influences 
of tiie voter's parents. The poUtical preferences of voter's parents have been found to be strongly 
associated witii present partisanship (Aitidn, 1982b:92-94,297; Bean, 1984:347-352). 
3.4 THE MODEL AND EMPflllCAL INVESTIGATIONS 
This chapter has set out the tiieoretical framework which aUows the investigation of electoral 
choice and electoral change in Australia. This smdy employs the model of electoral choice to 
investigate the process of electoral choice, at different time points. The time points span a twenty-one 
year period from 1967. Details on the measures relating to the specific concepts discussed here are 
presented in appendix 1. In tiie foUowing chapter (chapter 4) one part of the model is examined to 
investigate the relations between social factors, partisan background and present partisanship. A 
complementary analysis of the influences on ideology is undertaken in chapter 5. Chapter 6 focuses 
on the right hand section of the model (in figure 3.4), the effects of partisanship, ideology, issues and 
candidates on electoral choice. These results obtained from tiie investigations reported in these 
chapters are employed to constmct a confirmatory reciprocal model of the whole process of electoral 
choice, which is analysed in chapter 7. Conclusions drawn from the empirical investigations are 
summarised and discussed in the final chapter (chapter 8) of tiie tiiesis. 
1 From this point 'one party' can include a coalition of parties, specifically the Liberal Naional (Country) party coalition. 
2. From Mackerras (1988:273). The 1990 figure is from Mackerras (1990:201). 
3. From Bean & Mughan (1988). The 1990 figure is from Mackerras (1990:182). 
4. The Australian Federal Parliament consists of two Houses, the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Senate is elected 
by proportional (quota) representation, treating each state as an electorate. This method of electing representatives allows minor 
parties to more easily secure seats. Legislation must pass through both houses. 
5. During the 1980s, Australia continued to endure economic difficulties. Inflation remained high, unemployment has not 
decreased to the levels of the 1960s, interest rates approached 20% and the national debt increased substantially. 
6. There is Uttie empirical evidence to support this assertion. However, it would be very unlikely, that a given election, not one 
voter is changing his or her vote for the first time. This assertion is based on letters to editors of newspapers, in which voters 
claim they are changing their vote, after always voting for the same party. Whether such letters are honest accounts or written 
on behalf of a party's election campaign is open to question. Some indirect evidence for this assertion comes from the analysis 
of vote turnover. While the swing against the Labor party at the 1987 election was only 1.7%, 20% of Labor and Liberal party 
voters at the 1984 election voted for another party at the 1987 election (McAllister & Ascui, 1988). This 20% is likely to include 
some voters, who have always voted for the same party. Furthermore, in 1967, 16% of very strong party identifiers admitted to 
having voted for a party, other than the party they identify with (Aitkin, 1982b:44). 
7. The model in figure 3.5 may be queried since a direct link between social factors and first partisanship is not specified. This 
link is not included because it assimied that the effects of social factors on first partisanship are mediated by 'contemporary short-
term forces' at the time of first partisanship. These forces include the transient and durable forms of poUtical sociaUsation 
associated with social factors discussed in this chapter and investigated in the next chapter. 
8. In many of these studies party identification was not included in the analyses. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that ideology 
has an effect on electoral choice, net of party identification. 
CHAPTER 4 
PARTISANSHIP 
In this chapter the relationship between partisan background, a range of social-stmcmral factors 
and botii party identification and attimde to tiie parties is examined. The analyses focus on one part of 
tiie model of electoral choice (figure 4.1) presented in chapter 3. 
Partisan 
BacXground 
Social 
Factors 
Partisanshi 
Candidates 
Ideology. 
Vote 
Issues 
Figure 4.1: The part of the model investigated in this chapter on partisanship. 
This model hypothesises that there are two major sources of poUtical socialisation, partisan 
backgroimd and social factors. The relationship between partisan background and partisanship 
represents the political socialisation that takes place within the family. The relationships between 
social factors and partisanship represent poUtical socialisation tiiat occurs outside the family (extra-
famUial). 
Investigation of this model at several time points aUows conclusions to be made on several 
aspects of electoral behaviour. First, the social factors that are and are not associated with partisanship 
can be identified. Therefore, tiiose sections of society where extra-familial political sociaUsation is 
occurring can be identified. Second, increases or decUnes in the effect of a particular social-stmcmral 
factor on partisanship over time will indicate whetiier that form of political socialisation is becoming 
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more or less important Third, changes in the relationship between partisan background and present 
partisanship can be closely examined. A decUne in tiiis relationship would indicate that voters are 
becoming less socialised by tiie family and it may imply tiiat political socialisation is increasingly 
being carried out by otiier more 'poUtical' factors. Fourth, tiiese investigations wUl mrther elucidate 
the relationship between class and class-related factors on partisanship during tiie time period under 
investigation. 
As discussed in chapter 3, extra-familial poUtical socialisation may be durable or transient 
Focusing on durable forms, extra-familial poUtical socialisation may occur via, for instance, tiie 
workplace, friendship networics and neighbourhoods. For example, poUtical sociaUsation may be 
occurring among manual and non-manual class groups or among trade-union members. Residents of 
mral areas may be exposed to a distinct mral political sub-culmre. Political socialisation may also 
occur among members of reUgious and etiinic groups, where one political party is understood as 
generaUy preferable. Less direct Unks can be made with other social-stmcmral factors. Differences 
between age cohorts would support the view that durable political socialisation occurs among age 
cohorts when they enter the electorate. Religiosity may be understood as a surrogate measure of 
integration into religious based community groups, where some form of political socialisation occurs. 
Altematively, relationships between social-stmcmral factors and partisanship may represent quite 
transient political influences. A political issue or a general change in party's policies could influence 
individuals belonging to a particular social group to re-evaluate their general poUtical orientation. For 
example, rural dweUers may change their partisan leanings in response to the mral poUcies of a 
government or its response to mral problems. Changes in taxation may provoke different responses 
between high and low income earners. Increases in unemployment may prompt different responses 
from manual and non-manual occupational groups. However, after the reaction to tiiese changes has 
subsided, these (transient) effects on partisanship tend to disappear. 
To reiterate a point made in chapter 3, the extra-famUial forms of political socialisation are not 
identical to the reciprocal relationships between partisanship and issues. The tiansient forms of 
political socialisation may be brought about through issues, but such issues are specific, associated 
with particular social factors. In contrast, those issues that effect partisanship are general issues, not 
usuaUy associated with particular social groups. Furthermore, issues are only one means in which tiie 
extra-familial forms of political socialisation can take place. It may come about by frequent contact 
with members of that group, identification witii key political actors with similar social characteristics, 
general perceptions within the group that one party is preferable or the political sub-culmre of tiiat 
group. 
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One way of distinguishing between the durable and transient forms of political sociaUsation 
relating to social-stmcmral factors is to observe whetiier tiie relationship between a given social factor 
and partisanship changes over time. The relationship could be generaUy constant, foUow a long-term 
trend or flucmate widely. If the relationship is constant or foUows a unmistakable trend, then tiie 
durable form is indicated. Flucmations in tiiis relationship may indicate tiie transient form. However, 
it is often difficult to distinguish between long-term tiends and flucmations, especiaUy when only a 
Umited number of time points are compared. 
A more satisfactory metiiod to distinguish between transient and durable effects, is to compare 
the results from analysis of the model presented in figure 4.1, witii a model tiiat includes past 
partisanship. The durable form of poUtical socialisation wUl have already been absorbed by tiie 
voter's partisanship, and so wUl not be apparent if past partisanship is included in tiie analysis. In 
contrast, the transient form of political socialisation wiU not be absorbed by past partisanship, since by 
definition it does not have durable effects on partisanship. Therefore, the transient form wiU be 
observed when past partisanship has controUed for the durable forms of political sociaUsation. 
In order to investigate the durable and transient forms of political socialisation associated with 
social factors, reference is made to fuU (extended time period) model of electoral choice (figure 4.2). 
Partisan 
Background 
Social 
Factors 
Partisanship 
(first) i 
Partisanship 
(at t) 
Contemporary 
Short-term Forces 
Ideology 
(first) 
T 
Candidates 
t t) 
Ideology 
(at t) 
Vote 
Issues 
(at t) 
Figure 4.2: The part of the extended model investigated in this chapter on partisanship. 
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The concept 'contemporary short-term forces' represents two groups of factors, those general 
short-term factors (issues and candidates) that influence partisanship between any two time points and 
the poUtical sociaUsation (botii durable and transient) associated with social-stmcmral factors. In the 
investigation of partisanship at time (t) controUing for partisanship at t-1, 'contemporary short-tenn 
factors' wiU not include the durable form of poUtical socialisation associated witii social factors, since 
this form has been incorporated in partisanship at t-1. Therefore, tiiose 'contemporary short-term 
forces' associated with social factors wiU compromise only tiie transient form of political socialisation. 
Figure 4.3 presents this argument in a diagrammatic fashion. 
Contemporary 
Short-term Forceps 
(at last election)'^\ 
14 
I I 
t l 
Partisanship 
^ (at last election^"-^-
Partisan 
Background 
Partisanship 
(at t) 
^^ Transient 
Social ^r^^^ Political Socialisation 
Factors Associated with 
Social Factors 
(since last election) 
Figure 4.3: Detail on the extended model showing how the transient forms of political 
socialisation associated with social structural factors, can be identified. 
In tills figure the solid Unes indicate relationships that can be estimated in cross-sectional data 
sets, and tiie dashed lines represent relationships which are assumed to exist, although they carmot be 
readily estimated. Relationships between social factors and partisanship found from the investigation 
of tills model, can be interpreted as representing the effects of transient factors (or short-term forces) 
on partisanship. Furthermore, investigation of this model together witii tiie model in figure 4.1, wiU 
show the extent to which, the extra-famiUal sources of political socialisation (relating to social factors), 
are durable or transient 
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In tiiese investigations, vote at tiie last election togetiier witii partisan background are employed 
as a surrogate measure for previous partisanship (at time t-1, tiiat is at tiie last election). Vote at tiie 
last election wiU be highly correlated witii partisanship at tiiat time, since most voters vote in 
accordance with their partisanship. In addition, vote at the last election wiU measure the short-term 
forces extant at the time point, since short-term forces induced some partisans to vote conu-ary to tiieir 
partisanship. Therefore, parental partisanship is also included as a control, to cover these respondents 
who deviated from tiieir partisanship at tiie last election^ 
There is empirical evidence that tiiese two measures are highly associated with previous 
partisanship. Using tiie Austialia 1967-1969 panel data (discussed in appendix 1), tiie multiple 
correlation of vote at tiie last election and partisan background (measured in 1969) witii party 
identification in 1967 was 0.71^. In addition, vote at the last election and parental partisanship have a 
simUar relationship with present partisanship as previous partisanship. Regression of present 
partisanship (in 1969) on vote at the last election and parental partisanship explained 58% of the 
variance. An almost identical the amount of variance of party identification in 1969 was explained 
(59%) by party identification in 1967^ These results confirm the contention that these two measures 
can be used as a surrogate measure of previous partisanship". 
4.1 CONCEPTS, DATA, MEASURES AND STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE 
As discussed in chapter 3, the two concepts which comprise partisanship are party identification 
and attimde to the parties. The social-stmcmral concepts in the model include the four basic social 
cleavages of occupational class, reUgion, region and ethnicity. Both regional divisions between the 
states and the urban-mral division are included in tiie analysis. In addition other social-stmcmral 
factors included in the model are: class identification, trade-union membership, sector of employment, 
gender, age cohort, education, class background, income and religiosity. Partisan background is 
included as the measure of intra-famiUal political socialisation. 
The data employed in these analyses comes from surveys conducted in 1967, 1969, 1979, 1984, 
1986, 1987 and 1988. These smdies fonn tiiree groups. The 1967, 1969 and 1979 studies are tiie 
Australian National PoUtical Attitudes (ANPA) surveys in which the field work was carried out by 
trained interviewers. The 1969 ANPA was for tiie most part a panel of tiie 1967 smdy, altiiough 
additional respondents were interviewed to improve its representativeness. The second group are the 
National Social Science Smdy (NSSS) smdies of 1984, 1986 and 1988. The data for tiie urban sample 
of tiie 1984 survey was soUcited by personal interview. For the mral sample of tiie 1984 NSSS smdy 
and tiie two later NSSS smdies the data was coUected by mailed questionnaires. The tiiird group are 
tiie AustraUan Electoral Smdies of which only tiie data derived from tiie 1987 study is employed^ 
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Like tiie NSSS surveys, tiie 1987 AES data was coUected by mail. These smdies, tiie data derived 
from tiie surveys and tiie sampUng procedures employed are detailed in appendix 1. 
GeneraUy, tiie same measures were constmcted from each data set. DetaUs of tiieir constmction 
are presented in appendix 1 where a few inevitable differences are noted. These differences are made 
more explicit here, since they are important to the analyses presented in tiiis chapter. 
Measures of both dependent variables are scored about zero with a positive value indicting a 
more conservative orientation*. The party identification measure ranges from -3 to 3. A seven level 
measure of party identification has not generaUy been employed in multivariate analyses on party 
identification, carried out in Australia. A two or tiiree category measure has usuaUy been employed 
(Aitidn, 1982b:305-306; Bean & KeUey, 1988; KeUey & McAlUster, 1985). The main reason why 
measures with only a limited number of levels have been employed is probably because strength of 
identification is not Unearly related to vote. The seven level measure has been extensively used, in the 
bivariate analyses undertaken by Aitidn (1982b) and the investigations of Jackman (1988). 
There are a number of reasons for employing tiie seven category measure. First, since party 
identification is conceived as a uni-dimensional concept ranging from strong coalition to strong Labor 
identifiers, then the seven level measure is a 'better' indicator of partisanship than a two or three point 
ordinal level index .^ Second, as a general principle it is preferable to use more information than less 
information. Third, the variable of interest is party identification, not preference for one ratiier than 
another of the major parties. 
The measures of relative attimde to the parties constmcted from the three ANPA data sets were 
based on tiie numbers of Ukes and dislikes to tiie Liberal and Labor parties. In the 1984 NSSS data, 
this concept was measured from questions on how much confidence respondents had in the Liberal and 
Labor parties. From tiie 1986 'Role of government' and tiie 1988 'Inequality' data tills measure, was 
based on feeling thermometer scores. A measure of attimde to the parties, could not be constmcted 
from tiie 1987 AES data. 
The independent variables in tiiese investigations are occupational class, religion, urban or mral 
region, state of residence, ethnicity, class identification, trade-union membership, employment sector, 
gender, age cohort, education, class background, income, reUgiosity and partisan background. Details 
on tiie constmction of these measures can be found in appendix 1. Of tiiese independent variables, 
measures of self-employment/employment sector could not be constmcted from tiie 1967 and 1969 
data, and a measure of income could not be included in tiie model for tiie 1987 AES sample. The 
otiier independent variables were measured in an almost identical manner for each time point The 
important exception is the measure of mral or urban residency which was based on whetiier tiie 
respondent Uved in a mral electorate in tiie 1967, 1969, 1979 and 1987 samples, but by tiie size of tiie 
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place of residence (above or below 100,000 persons) in tiie otiier (1984, 1986 and 1988) samples. 
Again, details are presented in appendix 1. 
Partisan background was measured as a five level index with tiie foUowing scores: botii parents 
preferring tiie Labor party (scored -2), one parent Labor (-1), neitiier parent Labor or coalition (0), one 
parent a coalition supporter (1) and botii parents coalition supporters (2). Income was measured by an 
index ranging from 0 to 100, with the modal income groups assigned a score of 50. The constmction 
of this measure was quite complex and is detailed in appendix 1. Religiosity was measured as a eight 
point scale ranging from respondents who never went to church (scored 1) to those who attended 
religious services more than once a week (8). DetaUs on the constmction of these measures is also 
presented in appendix 1. 
With the exception of the measures of income, religiosity and partisan background, the 
independent variables were included in tiiese analyses as dummy variables (Lewis-Beck, 1980:66-71; 
Schroeder, Sjoquist & Stephan, 1986:56-58). The foUowing groups are tiie reference categories: 
manual occupation, CathoUc religion, non-mral residence, resident of New Soutii Wales, 'Australian'^ 
middle class identification, not a member of a trade-union, employee of a private company, female, the 
oldest age cohort, completed secondary school and manual class background. As far as possible, tiie 
same age cohorts have been included in each analysis'. For some variables residual categories have 
been created rather than declaring such cases as missing. These residual groups have littie substantial 
interest and are not discussed in tiiis chapter. The frequencies (and percentages) of tiie categorical 
variables and the means and standard deviations of tiie continuous variables are included in each table 
of results under the column headed 'Freq(%)'. 
The analysis in this chapter were performed using ordinary least squares regression. There are 
several reasons why OLS regression was employed in these analyses. First, OLS regression is 
commonly employed in the analysis of party identification (Cassel, 1982; Knoke, 1976:90-108; Knoke, 
1979; Miller, 1986; Page & Jones, 1979). Second, ordinal level measures can be satisfactorily 
analysed using OLS regression (Labovitz, 1970 & 1972:24; Kim, 1975). 
One criticism of analysing the seven level measure of party identification witii OLS regression 
concems the supposedly cardinal namre of the measure. Ordinary least squares regression assumes tiie 
dependent variable is an interval measure and a one unit change has tiie same meaning tiiroughout the 
range of the measure. This assumption is debatable in the case of party identification, since a change 
from no identification to a not very strong identification is qualitatively distinct from a change from a 
not very strong identification to a fairly strong identification. One solution to this problem is to 
employ an ordered probit analysis (McKelvey & Zavoina, 1975) which also estimates tiie limits of tiie 
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levels of the dependent variable. However, in preliminary analyses Uttie difference was found between 
in the results obtained from OLS regression and ordered probit'". 
Missing values were handled using the pair-wise procedure which is often used in analyses of 
poUtical behaviour in Australia (Bean & KeUey, 1988; McAlUster, 1988a; McAllister & KeUey, 1985). 
This procedure is recommended by Hertel (1976). Therefore, the complete samples were employed in 
these analyses. 
In this chapter the results that foUow from the first model presented in figure 4.1 (witiiout 
controls for past partisanship) are presented in detail and referred to as the first model. The results for 
the analyses of the second model based on figure 4.3 (which include measures for previous 
partisanship) are not detaUed and a summary table is presented. In the discussion section, the results 
obtained for the first and second models are compared and discussed. 
4.2 RESULTS 
In tiie presentation of the results, reference is made to a commonly employed measure of tiie 
overaU fit of the model, the (adjusted) R square value. Although, there are several problems with 
using the R square value as a measure of fit (Achen, 1982:58-61), it is included in tiie discussions 
because it gives a rough guide to the suitabiUty of the model. However, assessments of the fit of tiie 
models are not the main focus of these investigations. The major focus is the acmal parameter 
estimates or coefficients. 
The results presented are of unstandardised or raw coefficients. These coefficients or parameter 
estimates denote the impact of the independent variable on tiie dependent variable, net of tiie other 
factors included in the model. In the case of dummy variables, the coefficient is an estimate of the 
difference of the group associated witii that coefficient and the reference group (Schroeder, Sjoquist & 
Stephan, 1986:58). In the case of continuous variables the coefficient indicates, tiie average change on 
the dependent variable associated, with a one unit increase in tiie value of the independent variable 
(Lewis-Beck, 1980:17). Because of the way in which tiie dependent variables are scored, a positive 
coefficient indicates a tendency towards to the coalition parties and a negative coefficient, a tendency 
towards tiie Labor party. Coefficients or (estimates) which are significant at the P<0.05 level are 
marked by an asterisk, indicating which factors can be confidentiy concluded as having effects in the 
population from which the sample was drawn''. Therefore, the conclusions generated from these 
analyses apply to the Australian electorate, over the time period during which data was coUected. 
Standardised coefficients are not presented. Comparisons of standardised coefficients between 
different samples is hazardous, since they are very sensitive to tiie variance of both the dependent and 
independent variables (Kim & MueUer, 1976; King, 1986). The assumption of constant variance in 
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each measure over a twenty year period is difficult to justify. In cases where tiie independent and 
dependent variables are measured in tiie same manner, tiien tiie unstandardised coefficients can be 
compared across populations (Kim & MueUer, 1976). The question of tiie importance of a variable 
can be assessed by the magnimde of tiie (unstandardised) coefficient witii respect to tiie way in which 
tiie independent variable was measured (Achen, 1982:69-71). 
4.2.1 The 1967 ANPA 
The results of tiie OLS regression analyses on the 1967 sample are presented in table 4.1. This 
table presents the R square values, the parameter estimates and their standard errors for separate 
regression analyses of party identification and relative attimde to tiie parties. 
Party Identification in 1967 
The amount of variation in party identification, explained by tiie model was found to be 
approximately 33%. 
The measures tiiat were found to have significant effects on party identification in 1967 were 
occupational class, reUgion, ethnicity, class identification, trade-union membership, gender, education, 
income, reUgiosity and partisan background. AU non-manual occupational groups had significantiy 
higher levels of identification with tiie coaUtion parties than tiie manual group. Managers and farmers 
were on average 0.6 of a unit closer to the coalition end of the measure than manual workers, upper 
professionals about half a unit, otiier professionals and other non-manual workers about 0.4 units. In 
the investigation of social-stmcmral influences on vote (rather than party identification), McAUister 
(1988a) found that manual workers were 25% more likely to vote Labor than tiie non-manual group, a 
finding not dissimilar to the results presented here'^. 
Anglicans, the uniting group (including botii Presbyterians and Methodists), were significantiy 
closer to the coaUtion end of tiie measure, than Catholics. Those inunigrants classified as nortii 
westem, southem or eastem European were significantiy more 'coalition' than the Austialian bom. 
Comparable results were obtained by McAUister (1988a), who found that those bom in eastem or 
soutiiem Europe were less likely to vote Labor. Men in 1967 were found to be, significantiy more 
pro-Labor than women. Tertiary education engenders significantiy higher levels of Labor party 
identification. Higher incomes were found to be associated with increased tendency to more strongly 
identify with the coaUtion parties, as was increasing church attendance. 
Identification with the working class and trade-union membership had strong effects on party 
identification. Working class identifiers were on average nearly 0.7 units closer to the 'Labor end' of 
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tiie measure, tiian middle class identifiers. Trade-union members were on average 0.45 units 'more 
Labor' than non-members. 
The variable witii largest impact on party identification was partisan background'^ 
Respondents whose parents were botii coalition supporters were approximately 2'/4 units furtiier 
towards tiie coalition end of tiie seven unit index, tiian respondents whose parents were botii Labor 
supporters. 
Attitudes to the Parties in 1967 
The analysis of tiie measure of relative attitude to the parties revealed tiiat only 11 % of tiie 
variation in tills measure could be accounted for by the model. This low value of R square is most 
likely due to the low variance of the measure - approximately 30% of the 1967 sample, did not 
express lUces or disUkes to the parties, or were neutial overaU. Its variance was approximately 4 units 
altiiough tiie measure had a tiieoretical range of 20 units. 
The measures that were found to have significant effects on relative attitude towards the parties 
were occupational class, reUgion, class identification, age, education, religiosity (church attendance) 
and partisan background. As was found in the investigation of party identification, class identification 
and partisan background had the largest significant effects on the relative evaluation of the parties. 
The 'other non-manual' group had significantiy more positive evaluations of tiie Liberal party tiian 
manual workers. Those indicating that tiiey had no religion tended to be more positive towards tiie 
Labor party than the reference group, CathoUcs. A simUar result was not found in relation to party 
identification. SimUarly, woridng class identifiers were on average about half a unit closer to tiie pro-
Labor/anti-Liberal end of tiie measure. The second oldest age group were significantiy more positive 
to tiie Liberal party (or more negative to tiie Labor party) tiian tiie oldest age cohort. Both tiie tertiary 
educated and those who had not completed secondary school tended to have a more positive 
evaluation of the Labor party than those who had completed secondary school. Higher levels of 
reUgiosity, were associated witii a more pro-Liberal or anti-Labor evaluation of the parties. 
4.2.2 The 1969 ANPA 
The model for the 1969 sample included the same measures as were used in the analysis of tiie 
1967 data. The results of the OLS regression analyses on the 1969 sample are presented in table 4.2. 
Party Identification in 1969 
The amount of variation in party identification explained by tiie model for tiie 1969 data was tiie 
almost identical to tiiat found in the analysis of the 1967 data, around 32%. 
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The measures tiiat were found to be significantiy associated witii party identification in 1969 
were occupational class, religion, mral/non-mral residency, state of residence, class identification, 
trade-union membership, age, education, income, reUgiosity and partisan background. 
With tiie exception of upper professionals all non-manual occupational groups, had significantiy 
high levels of identification witii tiie coalition parties. Managers and farmers were on average 0.6 of a 
unit closer to the coalition end of the measure, than manual workers. Other professionals 0.4 of a unit 
and otiier non-manual workers 0.3 units 'more coalition'. The sign of tiie coefficient associated with 
the upper professional group was in the expected (positive) direction and its magnitude was only 
sUghtiy lower than that found in the 1967 analysis. However, tiie larger standard error confirmed tiie 
nuU hypothesis that this group (upper professionals) were not significantiy different from manual 
workers. 
Different results from those obtained in the 1967 analysis were found for the measures of 
religion, ethnicity and gender. Only the uniting group (Presbyterians and Methodists) were 
significantiy closer to the coalition end of the measure than Catholics. AngUcans were not found to 
'more coaUtion' than CathoUcs. Similarly, no differences could be found between the ethnic groups 
and 'Australians'. Males were found not to be significantiy more pro-Labor tiian females, as they 
were in 1967. Non-rural residents were more likely to identify with tiie Labor party than mral 
residents, a result also not obtained in 1967. Residents from the state of South Australia had a 
significantiy greater tendency to more strongly identify with the Labor party''*. The second oldest 
age cohort were found to be significantiy more pro-Liberal/anti-Labor than tiie oldest group, a result 
obtained in relation to relative attimde to the parties in 1967 but not in relation to party identification. 
In contrast to the findings summarised in the last paragraph, the results obtained for the 
measures of class identification, trade-union membership, education, income, religiosity and partisan 
background were generaUy the same as those obtained from the analysis of the 1967 data. Working 
class identification and trade-union membership were found to be significantiy related to higher levels 
of Labor identification, with effects similar to those found from the analysis of the 1967 data. Tertiary 
education had a substantiaUy larger impact on party identification tiian it did in 1967. Higher incomes 
and higher levels of religiosity were again found to be associated witii increased tendencies to more 
strongly identify witii the coalition parties. 
As was found in the analysis of the 1967 data, the largest impact on party identification was 
partisan background. The parameter estimate was almost identical to that found in the analysis of the 
1967 sample. 
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Attitudes to the Parties in 1969 
The analysis of tiie measure of relative attimde to the parties revealed that 9% of tiie variation in 
tius measure could be accounted for by the model. This figure is slightiy lower tiian tiie 11 % 
observed from analysis of tiie 1967 sample. This decline was despite tiie increased variance of tiie 
measure from 4.4 in 1967 to 5.8 in 1969 and a decline in tiie proportion who had notiiing to say about 
eitiier party (or were neuti^ overaU), from 32.5% in 1967 to 23.7% in 1969. 
The measures that were found to have significant effects on relative attitude towards tiie parties 
were religion, state of residence, class identification, trade-union membership, religiosity (church 
attendance) and partisan background. Those with 'no religion' tended to be more positive towards the 
Labor party than tiie reference group, CathoUcs. As was found in the analyses of party identification. 
South AustraUan residents tended to be more positive towards the Labor party. Working class 
identification, trade-union membership and tertiary education were aU found, to significantiy increase 
tiie tendency to have a more pro-Labor evaluation of the parties. Those who had a tertiary education 
were on average 0.85 units 'more Labor', than those who had completed secondary school. As was 
found in tiie analysis of the 1967 measure, higher levels of reUgiosity was associated witii a more pro-
Liberal or anti-Labor evaluation of the parties. Partisan background had a large significant effect on 
relative evaluation of the parties with the magnimde of the effect was almost identical to that found in 
the analysis of the 1967 sample. 
TABLE 4.1: SOaAL-STRUCTURAL CORRELATES OF PARTISANSHIP (1967 ANPA - N=:2054) 
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Party Identificauon 
0.15 ± 2.0 
Attitude to Parties 
0.10 ±2.1 
Measure Freq(%) Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Intercept -0.34 -0.22 -0.31 0.25 
Occupational (Tlass (Manual) 
Managers/Farmers 
Upper Professionals 
Other Professionals 
Other Non-Manual 
Unclassified 
Religion (Catholic) 
Anglican 
Uniting 
No Religion 
Other ReUgion 
Region 1 (Rural) 
Non-Rural 
Region 2 (N.S.W.) 
Victoria , 
Queensland 
South Australia 
West Australia 
Tasmania 
Ethnicity (Australian) 
British Isles 
Northwest Europe 
Southem Europe 
Eastem Europe 
Other 
Gass Identification (Middle) 
Woridng (Hass Identiflcation 
None 
Trade-Union Membership (Non-Member) 
Member 
Gender (Female) 
Male 
Age (1) (59-93) 
Age (2) 51-58 
Age (3) 42-50 
Age (4) 34-41 
Age (5) 26-33 
Age (6) 19-25 
Education (Completed Secondary) 
Not Completed Secondary 
Tertiary 
Qass Background (Not Manual) 
Manual Qass 
Income 
Religiosity 
Partisan Background 
R Square 
Number of Cases 
948(46.2) 
361(17.6) 
110(5.4) 
125(6.1) 
443(21.6) 
67(3.3) 
506(24.6) 
749(36.5) 
448(21.8) 
64(3.1) 
287(14.0) 
749(36.5) 
1305(63.5) 
714(34.8) 
590(28.7) 
280(13.6) 
219(10.7) 
170(8.3) 
81(3.9) 
1487(72.4) 
306(14.9) 
55(18) 
85(4.1) 
57(Z8) 
64(3.1) 
1026(50.0) 
874(42.6) 
154(7.5) 
1451(74.0) 
511(26.0) 
1042(50.7) 
1012(49.3) 
431(21.0) 
299(14.6) 
389(18.9) 
374(18.2) 
310(15.1) 
234(11.4) 
613(29.8) 
1324(64.5) 
116(5.7) 
1026(50.0) 
1028(50.0) 
45 ±31 
4 ± 2 
-0.13 ± 1.4 
-
0.63' 
0.52' 
0.40' 
0.48* 
0.44' 
-
0.41' 
0.49' 
-0.25 
0.23 
-
-0.09 
-
0.04 
0.08 
-0.11 
0.06 
-0.30 
-
0.00 
0.51' 
0.41' 
0.46" 
-0.06 
-
-o.6r 
-0.08 
-
-0.45" 
-
-0.26* 
-
-0.05 
-0.03 
0.04 
0.12 
0.13 
-
-0.14 
-0.39' 
-
-0.08 
0.006* 
o.or 
o.4r 
0.33 
2054 
-
0.11 
0.20 
0.17 
0.10 
0.22 
-
0.11 
0.12 
0.24 
0.13 
-
0.08 
-
0.09 
0.12 
0.13 
0.14 
0.20 
-
0.11 
0.21 
0.20 
0.24 
0.21 
-
0.09 
0.15 
-
0.10 
-
0.08 
-
0.13 
0.12 
0.13 
0.13 
0.14 
-
0.09 
0.18 
-
0.08 
0.001 
0.02 
0.03 
-
0.26 
0.39 
0.29 
0.34' 
0.24 
-
0.13 
0.18 
-1.30' 
-0.10 
-
-0.10 
-
0.11 
0.03 
0.27 
0.22 
-0.27 
-
0.14 
0.32 
0.39 
0.44 
0.05 
-
-0.4/ 
-0.06 
-
-0.07 
-
-0.02 
-
0.31" 
-0.02 
0.26 
0.24 
0.19 
-
-0.21' 
-0.51' 
-
0.11 
0.002 
O.or 
0.26' 
0.11 
2054 
-
0.14 
0.23 
0.20 
0.12 
0.27 
-
0.13 
0.14 
0.29 
0.15 
-
0.09 
-
0.11 
0.14 
0.16 
0.17 
0.23 
-
0.13 
0.28 
0.23 
0.28 
0.25 
-
0.10 
0.17 
-
0.12 
-
0.10 
-
0.16 
0.15 
0.15 
0.16 
0.17 
-
0.10 
0.22 
-
0.10 
0.001 
0.02 
0.04 
TABLE 4.2: SOaAL-STRUCTURAL CORRELATES OF PARTISANSHIP (1969 ANPA - N=1873) 
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Party Identificauon 
0.07 ± 2.1 
Attitude to Parties 
-0.21 ± 2.4 
Measure Freq(%) Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Intercept -0.19 0.23 0.00 0.30 
Occupational Class (Manual) 
Managers/Farmers 
Upper Professionals 
Other Professionals 
Other Non-Manual 
Unclassified 
Religion (Catholic) 
Anghcan 
Uniting 
No ReUgion 
Other ReUgion 
Region 1 (Rural) 
Non-Rural 
Region 2 (N.S.W.) 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South AustraUa 
West Australia 
Tasmania 
Ethnicity (Australian) 
British Isles 
Northwest Europe 
Southem Eutiope 
Eastern Europe 
Other 
Gass Identificadon (Middle) 
Working CTlass Identification 
No (Tlass Identification 
Trade-Union Membership (Non-Member) 
Member 
Gender (Female) 
Male 
Age (1) (61-) 
Age (2) 53-60 
Age (3) 44-52 
Age (4) 36-43 
Age (5) 28-35 
Age (6) -27 
Education ((Completed Secondary) 
Not C:ompleted Secondary 
Tertiary 
Gass Background (Not Manual) 
Manual Qass 
Income 
ReUgiosity 
Partisan Background 
R Square 
Number of Cases 
788(42.1) 
384(20.5) 
117(6.2) 
149(8.0) 
346(18.5) 
37(2.0) 
455(24.3) 
651(34.8) 
437(23.3) 
75(4.0) 
234(12.5) 
603(32.2) 
1270(67.8) 
628(33.5) 
522(27.9) 
275(14.7) 
215(11.5) 
159(8.5) 
74(4.0) 
1390(74.2) 
278(14.8) 
46(2.5) 
64(3.4) 
45(2.4) 
50(2.7) 
952(50.8) 
855(45.6) 
66(3.5) 
1389(74.3) 
480(25.7) 
898(47.9) 
975(52.1) 
311(16.6) 
243(13.0) 
311(16.6) 
324(17.3) 
271(14.5) 
322(17.2) 
630(33.6) 
1120(59.8) 
123(6.6) 
945(50.5) 
928(49.5) 
52 ±31 
4 ± 2 
-0.13 ± 1.5 
-
o.sr 
0.34 
0.41' 
0.30' 
o.7r 
-
0.19 
0.33' 
-0.02 
0.03 
-
-0.18" 
-
-0.05 
0.05 
-0.43' 
0.01 
0.02 
-
0.14 
0.35 
0.38 
0.06 
0.17 
-
-0.66* 
-0.04 
-
-0.60' 
-
-0.09 
-
0.28' 
-0.02 
0.06 
0.05 
0.09 
-
-0.21' 
-0.67 
-
-0.09 
0.006' 
0.10' 
0.48' 
0.32 
1873 
-
0.13 
0.19 
0.16 
0.11 
0.29 
-
0.12 
0.12 
0.24 
0.14 
-
0.09 
-
0.10 
0.13 
0.14 
0.16 
0.22 
-
0.11 
0.27 
0.23 
0.27 
0.25 
-
0.09 
0.22 
-
0.10 
-
0.09 
-
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
-
0.09 
0.18 
-
0.09 
0.002 
0.02 
0.03 
-
0.25 
-0.29 
-0.14 
0.20 
0.57 
-
0.09 
0.26 
-0.71' 
0.24 
-
-0.20 
-
0.10 
0.08 
-0.43' 
0.16 
-0.06 
-
0.00 
-0.39 
-0.04 
-0.31 
-0.05 
-
-0.53' 
-0.72* 
-
-0.42* 
-
-0.17 
-
0.21 
0.01 
0.10 
-0.05 
-0.15 
-
-0.14 
-0.85* 
-
0.06 
0.001 
O.or 
0.25* 
0.09 
1873 
-
0.16 
0.25 
0.21 
0.15 
0.38 
-
0.15 
0.16 
0.31 
0.18 
-
0.12 
-
0.14 
0.17 
0.18 
0.20 
0.28 
-
0.15 
0.35 
0.31 
0.36 
0.33 
-
0.12 
0.29 
-
0.14 
-
0.12 
-
0.19 
0.18 
0.18 
0.19 
0.18 
-
0.12 
0.23 
-
0.12 
0.002 
0.03 
0.04 
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4.2.3 The 1979 ANPA 
The model for the 1979 sample included tiie same measures as used in tiie previous analyses 
with tiie addition of a measure of self-employment/employment sector. The reference category was 
working for a private company. The results of tiie OLS regression analyses on the 1979 sample are 
presented in table 4.3. 
Party Identification in 1979 
The amount of variance of party identification explained by tiie model was 27%, a littie lower 
tiian tiiat obtained (33%) in tiie analyses of tiie 1967 and 1969 data. 
The measures tiiat were found to have significant effects on party identification in 1979 were 
occupational class, religion, mral residency, ethnicity, class identification, tiade-union membership, 
employment sector, age, income, religiosity and partisan background. 
As was found from the analysis of the 1967 and 1969 data sets, several non-manual occupational 
groups had significantiy high levels of identification with the coaUtion parties. Managers and farmers 
were on average about 0.7 of a unit mrther towards the coalition end of the index, relative to manual 
workers. Other non-manual workers were about 0.4 units. However, the two 'professional' 
occupational class groups were found not to be significantiy different from manual workers. 
Anglicans and the uniting church group were significantiy closer to the coaUtion end of the 
measure, tiian Catholics. The 'otiier religion' group were also significantiy more 'coaUtion' tiian 
CathoUcs. Immigrants classified as southem European were not significantiy different from the 
Australian bom. This result contrasts with those obtained from tiie analysis of the 1967 sample, where 
this group were significantiy more 'coalition'. A simUar result was obtained by Bean (1984:309). As 
was found in previous analyses, identification with the working class and trade-union membership had 
strong effects on party identification, these effects were comparable with the effects found in the 
investigation of the 1967 and 1969 samples. Relative to employees in private enterprise, the self-
employed tended to more strongly identify with the coalition parties; whereas government employees 
tended to more strongly identify with the Labor party. This result confirms the findings obtained by 
KeUey & McAUister (1985). The oldest age group (the reference group) were significantiy more 
'coalition' than tiie three youngest age cohorts. Tertiary education was found not be associated witii a 
more pro-Labor party identification, as it was in tiie analysis of tiie 1967 and 1969 data. Botii higher 
income and increased church attendance were found to be associated with a significant tendency to 
more stiongly identify with tiie coaUtion parties. 
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Again partisan background was found to have tiie greatest impact on party identification. The 
parameter estimate of 0.43 is sUghtiy lower tiian tiie estimates of 0.47 and 0.48 found in tiie 
investigations of tiie 1967 and 1969 samples. 
Attitudes to the Parties in 1979 
Approximately 14% of the measure of relative attimde to the parties was explained by the 
model. This is a higher level that obtained in similar analyses performed on the 1967 and 1969 data 
sets. This result is not due to a greater variance in tiie measure, since variance in 1979 was similar to 
tiiat obtained in 1969. 
The measures that were found to have significant effects on relative attimde towards tiie parties 
were occupational class, religion, mral or non-mral residency, state of residence, class identification, 
employment sector, age, education, and partisan background. Witii the exception of ethnicity, income 
and religiosity, the findings are generaUy similar to those obtained in the analysis of party 
identification. Each non-manual occupational group was found to be significantiy more positive to the 
Liberal party, tiian the Labor party, compared witii manual workers. This finding differs somewhat 
from tiie analysis of party identification where the two professional occupational groups, were found 
not to be significantiy different from the manual group. Residents of Victoria were significantiy more 
pro-Labor than residents of New South Wales. This result may be attributed to dissension witiiin the 
state Liberal government at that time. The self-employed were found to be significantiy more positive 
to the Liberal party, while government employees were more positive to tiie Labor party. The oldest 
age cohort were significantiy more positive to the Liberal party (or more negative to the Labor party), 
tiian aU other age cohorts. Both working class identification and trade-union membership, were found 
to be significantiy associated witii a more pro-Labor evaluatioa Tertiary education was found to 
engender a significantiy more positive evaluation of the Labor party, although a similar result was not 
found in relation to party identification. Higher levels of religiosity were found not be significantiy 
associated with a more pro-Liberal evaluation of the parties, in contrast to the results obtained from 
the analyses of the 1967 and 1969 data sets. Partisan background had a large significant effect on 
relative evaluation of tiie parties, tiie effect (0.31) being slightiy larger tiian tiiat obtained in tiie 
analyses of tiie 1967 and 1969 data sets (parameter estimates of 0.26 and 0.25, respectively). 
4.2.4 The 1984 NSSS 
The model for the 1984 sample included tiie same measures as used in tiie analysis of tiie 1979 
ANPA data. The results of the OLS regression analyses on the 1984 sample are presented in table 
4.4. 
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Party Identification in 1984 
The amount of variance of party identification explained by tiie model was at 29%, slightiy 
higher tiian tiie 27% found from the analyses of tiie 1979 data. 
The measures tiiat were found to have significant effects on party identification in 1984 were 
occupational class, religion, mral non-mral residency, ethnicity, class identification, trade-union 
membership, employment sector, age, tertiary education, class background, income, reUgiosity and 
partisan background. In the analysis of vote on this data set, Graetz & McAUister (1988:292) 
found that urban residency, church attendance, occupational class, self-employment/employment sector, 
trade-union membership and class identification had significant impacts on vote. Therefore, the results 
obtained here are not unexpected. 
As was found in the analysis of the earlier data sets, most non-manual occupational groups had 
significantiy higher levels of identification with the coalition parties. Managers and farmers were on 
average 0.71 of a unit closer to tiie coaUtion than manual workers, a result very close to the value 0.67 
of obtained from the 1979 data. Otiier non-manual workers were also significantiy closer to tiie 
coalition end of the measure. 
Anglicans and the uniting church group were significantiy closer to the coaUtion end of tiie 
measure, than Catholics. Rural residents were on average 0.4 units closer to the coalition end of the 
index. Eastem Europeans were significantiy more 'coaUtion' than 'Australians', as they were in 1979 
and 1967. Working class identification and trade-union membership were again found to be strongly 
associated with party identification. The self-employed tended to be on average significantiy 'more 
coalition', whereas government employees tended to be 'more Labor'. The two youngest and tiie 
second oldest age cohorts were also found to be significantiy 'more Labor'. Tertiary education was 
found to be associated with a more pro-Labor party identification, as was found in the analyses of the 
1967 and 1969 models. One result unique to the analysis of this sample was the finding that class 
background was significantiy related to party identification. Both higher incomes and increased church 
attendance were found to be associated with an increased tendency to more strongly identify with the 
coalition parties. 
Corresponding to the analyses reported in earlier sections, partisan background had tiie greatest 
impact on party identification. The parameter estimate of 0.49 is comparable to tiiat obtained from tiie 
analysis of tiie 1967 and 1969 ANPA data sets. 
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Attitudes to the Parties in 1984 
Approximately 20% of tiie measure of relative attimde to tiie parties was explained by tiie 
model. This is a greater level of explained variance tiian obtained in earlier analyses. This difference 
is likely to be, in part, attiibutable to tiie different variable employed. The measure was based on 
questions on 'confidence' in tiie parties, ratiier than questions on likes and dislikes to the major parties. 
The measures tiiat were found to have significant effects on relative attimde to the parties were 
class, reUgion, mral/non-mral residency, ethnicity, class identification, trade-union membership, tertiary 
education, class background, income, religiosity and partisan background. The non-manual 
occupational groups, 'managers and farmers' and 'other non-manual workers' were found to be 
significantiy more positive to the Liberal party, than manual workers. Botii Anglicans and the uniting 
church group had significantiy higher levels of confidence (relatively) witii the Liberal party. As was 
found in relation to party identification. East Europeans were found to have significantiy higher levels 
of (relative) confidence with tiie Liberal party. The tertiary educated had significantiy greater levels of 
confidence with the Labor party. The finding tiiat tiiose with a manual class background had higher 
levels of Labor identification was also found in relation to relative confidence in the parties. As was 
found in relation to party identification, higher incomes and higher levels of religiosity were found to 
be associated with a more pro-Liberal evaluation of the parties. Partisan background had a large 
significant effect on relative evaluation of the parties, the effect (0.45) being higher than tiiat obtained 
in similar analyses of the ANPA samples. The interpretation of tiiis coefficient is that voters from 
famUies where both parents preferred the coalition were on average 2.5 units 'more coalition' on tiie 
11 point index than those from equivalent Labor backgrounds. 
TABLE 4.3: SOaAL-STRUCTURAL CORRELATES OF PARTISANSHIP (1979 ANPA - N=2016) 
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Party Identification 
-0.07 ± 2.0 
Attitude to Parties 
-0.39 ± 2.4 
Measure Freq(%) Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Intercept 0.31 0.26 0.15 0.33 
Occupational Qass (Manual) 
Managers/Farmers 
Upper Professionals 
Other Professionals 
Other Non-Manual 
Unclassified 
ReUgion (CathoUc) 
AngUcan 
Uniting 
No ReUgion 
Other ReUgion 
Region 1 (Rural) 
Non-Rural 
Region 2 (N.S.W.) 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South AustraUa 
West Australia 
Tasmania 
Ethnicity (Australian) 
British Isles 
Northwest Europe 
Southem Europe 
Eastem Europe 
Other 
Gass Identification (Middle) 
Working Qass Identification 
No Class Identification 
Trade-Union Membership (Non-Member) 
Member 
Sector (Private Company) 
Government 
Self Employed 
Other 
Gender (Female) 
Male 
Age(l) (71-) 
Age (2) 63-70 
Age (3) 54-62 
Age (4) 46-53 
Age (5) 38-45 
Age (6) 30-37 
Age (7) -29 
Education (C:ompleted Secondary) 
Not Completed Secondary 
Tertiary 
Qass Background (Not Manual) 
Manual Qass 
Income 
ReUgiosity 
Partisan Background 
R Square 
Number of Cases 
766(38.0) 
238(11.8) 
138(6.8) 
218(10.8) 
513(25.4) 
143(7.1) 
451(22.4) 
492(24.4) 
236(11.7) 
512(25.4) 
325(16.1) 
597(29.6) 
1419(70.4) 
731(36.3) 
536(26.6) 
309(15.3) 
207(10.3) 
164(8.1) 
69(3.4) 
15%(79.2) 
200(9.9) 
42(11) 
49(2.4) 
46(13) 
83(4.1) 
1225(60.8) 
712(35.3) 
79(3.9) 
1450(711) 
561(27.9) 
857(42.5) 
483(24.0) 
264(13.1) 
412(20.4) 
1055(513) 
961(47.7) 
158(7.8) 
190(9.4) 
270(13.4) 
280(13.9) 
223(11.1) 
319(15.8) 
561(27.8) 
901(44.7) 
820(40.7) 
295(14.6) 
999(49.6) 
1017(50.4) 
43 ±26 
3 ± 2 
-0.16 ± 1.5 
-
o.6r 
0.34 
0.21 
0.40' 
0.36" 
-
0.39' 
0.41' 
-0.04 
0.55' 
-
-0.50' 
-
-0.15 
0.03 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.32 
-
-0.06 
0.22 
-0.48 
0.64' 
-0.02 
-
-0.71' 
-0.48' 
-
-0.39' 
-
-0.25* 
0.34' 
-0.10 
-
-0.17 
-
-0.23 
-0.29 
-0.23 
-o.4r 
-0.46' 
-0.44' 
-
0.02 
-0.11 
-
-0.04 
o.oor 
0.05* 
0.43' 
0.27 
2016 
-
0.14 
0.18 
0.15 
0.11 
0.18 
-
0.12 
0.15 
0.14 
0.13 
-
0.09 
-
0.10 
0.12 
0.14 
0.15 
0.23 
-
0.14 
0.27 
0.27 
0.27 
0.20 
-
0.09 
0.20 
-
0.10 
-
0.13 
0.11 
0.12 
-
0.09 
-
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
0.19 
0.18 
0.17 
-
0.09 
0.13 
-
0.08 
0.002 
0.02 
0.03 
-
0.68* 
0.74' 
0.40' 
0.47" 
0.53' 
-
0.21 
0.27 
0.02 
0.42' 
-
-0.32' 
-
-0.4^ 
0.05 
0.04 
-0.02 
0.03 
-
-0.04 
0.25 
-0.23 
0.59 
-0.36 
-
-0.63' 
-0.56* 
-
-0.23 
-
-0.31' 
0.46' 
-0.13 
-
0.11 
-
-0.66' 
-0.46' 
-o.4r 
-0.49* 
-0.82" 
-0.93' 
-
0.05 
-0.42* 
-
0.07 
0.004 
0.04 
0.31' 
0.14 
2016 
-
0.18 
0.23 
0.18 
0.13 
0.23 
-
0.16 
0.19 
0.18 
0.17 
-
0.12 
-
0.13 
0.16 
0.18 
0.19 
0.29 
-
0.17 
0.35 
0.33 
0.35 
0,26 
-
0.12 
0.26 
-
0.13 
-
0.14 
0.17 
0.16 
-
0.11 
-
0.23 
0.23 
0.23 
0.24 
0.23 
0.21 
-
0.12 
0.16 
-
0.11 
0.003 
0.03 
0.04 
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TABLE 4.4: SOaAL-STRUCTURAL CORRELATES OF PARTISANSHIP (1984 NSSS - N=3012 & 2965") 
Party Identification 
-0.15 ± 2.0 
Attitude to Parties 
-0.42 ± 2.3 
Measure Freq(%) Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Intercept -0.02 0.19 -0.38 0.23 
Occupational Qass (Manual) 
Managers/Farmers 
Upper Professionals 
Other Professionals 
Other Non-Manual 
UnclassiHed 
ReUgion (CathoUc) 
AngUcan 
Uniting 
No ReUgion 
Other ReUgion 
Region 1 (Rural) 
Non-Rural 
Region 2 (N.S.W.) 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Austialia 
West AustraUa 
Tasmatua 
Ethnicity (Australian) 
British Isles 
Northwest Europe 
Southem Europe 
Eastem Europe 
Other 
Qass Identification (Middle) 
Working Class Identification 
No Class Identification 
Trade-Union Membership (Non-Member) 
Member 
Sector (Private Company) 
Govemmoit 
Self Employed 
Other 
Gender (Female) 
Male 
Age (3) (59-67) 
Age (2) 68-98 
Age (4) 51-58 
Age (5) 43-50 
Age (6) 35-42 
Age (7) 27-34 
Age (8) 18-26 
Education (CZompleted Secondary) 
Not Completed Secondary 
Tertiary 
Gass Background (Not Manual) 
Manual Qass 
Income 
ReUgiosity 
Partisan Background 
R Square 
Number of Cases 
886(29.4) 
321(10.7) 
178(5.9) 
301(10.0) 
745(24.7) 
581(19.3) 
781(25.9) 
929(30.7) 
559(18.6) 
307(10.2) 
439(14.6) 
791(26.5) 
2195(73.5) 
926(30.7) 
718(23.8) 
422(14.0) 
300(10.0) 
273(9.1) 
373(12.4) 
2166(71.9) 
367(12.2) 
179(5.9) 
151(5.0) 
85(18) 
64(11) 
1583(516) 
1356(45.0) 
73(14) 
1706(56.6) 
635(21.1) 
1546(51.3) 
761(25.3) 
321(10.7) 
384(12.7) 
1551(51.5) 
1458(48.5) 
336(11.2) 
311(10.3) 
314(10.4) 
305(10.1) 
506(16.8) 
630(20.9) 
587(19.5) 
1038(34.8) 
1439(48.2) 
508(17.0) 
1682(55.8) 
1330(44.2) 
45 ±29 
3 ± 2 
-0.08 ± 1.5 
-
0.71* 
0.24 
0.23 
0.41' 
0.21' 
-
0.22* 
0.35' 
-0.04 
0.03 
-
-0.40* 
-
-0.06 
0.16 
0.07 
-0.08 
0.10 
-
0.02 
0.01 
-0.15 
0.53" 
-0.02 
-
-0.44* 
-0.08 
-
-0.55* 
-
-0.18" 
0.28* 
-0.06 
-
-0.02 
-
-0.28* 
-0.14 
0.02 
-0.11 
-0.29* 
-0.20* 
-
-0.08 
-0.52* 
-
-0.23* 
0.004* 
0.11* 
0.49* 
0.29 
3012 
-
0.12 
0.15 
0.12 
0.09 
0.10 
-
0.09 
0.10 
0.12 
0.10 
-
0.08 
-
0.08 
0.10 
0.11 
0.12 
0.10 
-
0.10 
0.13 
0.15 
0.19 
0.21 
-
0.07 
0.20 
-
0.08 
-
0.08 
0.11 
0.11 
-
0.07 
-
0.13 
0.13 
0.14 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
-
0.07 
0.10 
-
0.06 
0.001 
0.02 
0.02 
-
0.39* 
0.07 
0.06 
0.36* 
0.23 
-
0.33* 
0.41* 
-0.06 
0.16 
-
-0.63* 
-
0.12 
0.20 
0.27 
-0.09 
0.24 
-
0.02 
-0.12 
-0.11 
0.53* 
-0.24 
. 
-o.3r 
0.03 
-
-0.65* 
-
-0.06 
0.21 
-0.06 
-
0.02 
-
-0.26 
-0.05 
-0.07 
-0.11 
-0.21 
-0.14 
-
-0.05 
-0.58' 
_ 
-0.25' 
0.006' 
0.12* 
0.45" 
0.20 
2965 
-
0.15 
0.19 
0.15 
0.11 
0.13 
-
0.11 
0.12 
0.15 
0.12 
. 
0.09 
-
0.10 
0.12 
0.14 
0.14 
0.13 
. 
0.12 
0.16 
0.18 
0.23 
0.26 
-
0.08 
0.25 
-
0.10 
-
0.10 
0.13 
0.14 
-
0.08 
-
0.16 
0.16 
0.17 
0.15 
0.14 
0.14 
_ 
0.09 
0.12 
_ 
0.08 
0.002 
0.02 
0.03 
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4.2.5 The 1986 'Role of Govemment' NSSS 
The model for tiie 1986 'Role of Government' sample included tiie same measures as used in 
tiie analyses of the 1984 NSSS sample. The results of tiie OLS regression analyses on tiie 1986 
sample are presented in table 4.5. 
Party Identification in 1986 
The amount of variance of party identification explained by tiie model was at 26%, slightiy 
lower tiian tiiat found (29%) in tiie analysis of tiie 1984 NSSS data. 
The measures that were found to have significant effects on party identification in 1986 were 
occupational class, ethnicity, class identification, trade-union membership, tertiary education, religiosity 
and partisan background. 
In contrast to the results from analyses performed on data coUected at earlier time points, none 
of tiie non-manual occupational class groups was significantiy different from manual workers in 
relation to party identification. No significant differences in relation to party identification were 
observed among reUgious, ethnic, regional, employment or age groups, with the exception that 
southem Europeans were found to have significantiy higher levels of Labor identification than 
'AustraUans'. 
Qass identification and trade-union membership continued to have substantial influences on 
party identification. As was found in previous smdies, tertiary education was found to be associated 
with a more pro-Labor party identification. Also, higher levels of church attendance were found to be 
associated witii an increased tendency to more strongly identify with tiie coalition parties. 
Again, partisan background has the greatest impact on party identification. The parameter 
estimate is very close to tiiat obtained (0.45) from tiie analysis of tiie 1979 ANPA data. 
Attitudes to the Parties in 1986 
As was found in the analysis of tiie 1984 NSSS 'confidence' measure, approximately 20% of tiie 
measure of relative attimde to the parties was explained by the model. 
The measures that were found to have significant effects on relative attitude to the parties were 
religion, class identification, trade-union membership, education, religiosity and partisan background. 
Respondents professing 'no religion' were significantiy more pro-Labor. As was found previously, 
working class identification and tiade-union membership, were significantiy associated witii a 
relatively higher pro-Labor evaluation of the two major parties. Once again, tiie experience of tertiary 
education, was found to be associated witii a more pro-Labor evaluation of tiie parties. Higher levels 
of religiosity were again found to be significantiy associated witii a more pro-Liberal evaluation of tiie 
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parties. Partisan background had a large significant effect on relative evaluation of tiie parties, tiie 
effect (0.78) being substantiaUy larger than that obtained in the analyses of the earUer data sets. If tiiis 
value is expressed as a percentage of the range of tiie dependent variable, tiiis result is tiien 
comparable with tiie result obtained witii tiie 1984 'confidence' measure. (As a percentage, tiie values 
are 3.9% in 1986, compared witii 4.5% in 1984). 
4.2.6 The 1987 AES 
The model for the 1987 sample included the same measures employed in tiie analyses of the 
1979 ANPA and NSSS data sets with tiie exception of income. Analysis of a measure of attitude to 
tiie parties could not be perfonned on tiiis data set. The results of the OLS regression analyses on tiie 
1987 sample are presented in table 4.6. 
Party Identification in 1987 
The amount of variance of party identification explained by tiie model was at 30%, similar to the 
values obtained from the analysis of data coUected at earlier times. 
The measures tiiat were found to have significant effects on party identification in 1987 were 
occupational class, religion, mral residency, ethnicity, class identification, trade-union membership, 
employment sector, gender, education, reUgiosity and partisan background. 
Only one non-manual occupational group had significantiy higher levels of identification witii 
tiie coalition parties. Managers and farmers were on average 0.56 units more 'coalition'. Anglicans 
and tiie uniting church group were sigruficantiy closer to the coalition end of the measure, than 
CathoUcs. North west European and east European immigrants were found to be significantiy more 
'coalition' than the Australian bom. Working class identifiers and trade-union members were 
significantiy more pro-Labor, although the estimates are slightiy lower than those found in the other 
analyses. As found in the analyses reported earlier, the self-employed tended to more stiongly identify 
with the coalition parties and govemment employees with the Labor party. Males tended to be 
significantiy further to the Labor end of the index, a result obtained only once before in tiie analysis of 
the 1967 sample. Tertiary education was once again found to be associated witii a more pro-Labor 
party identification, although the parameter estimate is smaUer than that obtained in the analysis of the 
1984 and 1986 NSSS smdies. Higher levels of church attendance were found to be associated, witii a 
significant tendency to more strongly identify with the coalition parties. 
Again, partisan background had the greatest impact on party identification. The parameter 
estimate of 0.48 is comparable with the estimates obtained from tiie analysis of the otiier data sets. 
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TABLE 4.5: SOaAL-STRUCTURAL CORRELATES OF PARTISANSHIP (1986 NSSS, Role of Govemment, - N=1528) 
Party Identification Attitude to Parties 
-0.02 ±2.0 -0.17 ± 4.3 
Measure Freq(%) Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Intercept 0.66* 0.2S 1.74* 0.60 
Occupational Class (Manual) 
Managers/Farmers 
Upper Professionals 
Other Professionals 
Other Non-Manual 
Unclassified 
ReUgion (CathoUc) 
AngUcan 
Uniting 
No ReUgion 
Other ReUgion 
Region 1 (Rural) 
Non-Rural 
Region 2 (N.S.W.) 
Victoria ' 
Queensland 
South AustraUa 
West Australia 
Tasmatua 
Ethnicity (Australian) 
British Isles 
Northwest Europe 
Southem Europe 
Eastem Europe 
Other 
Qass Identification (Middle) 
Working Qass Identification 
No Class Identification 
Trade-Union Membership (Non-Member) 
Member 
Seaor (Private Company) 
Govemment 
Self Employed 
Other 
Gender (Female) 
Male 
Age (3) (61-69) 
Age (2) 70-96 
Age (4) 53-60 
Age (5) 45-52 
Age (6) 37-44 
Age (7) 29-36 
Age (8) 18-28 
Education (Completed Secondary) 
Not Completed Secondary 
Tertiary 
Gass Background (Not Manual) 
Manual Qass 
Income 
ReUgiosity 
Partisan Background 
R Square 
Number of Ceases 
449(29.4) 
204(13.4) 
121(7.9) 
146(9.6) 
347(22.7) 
261(17.1) 
409(26.8) 
461(30.2) 
295(19.3) 
133(8.7) 
230(15.1) 
402(30.5) 
917(69.5) 
547(35.8) 
401(26.2) 
197(12.9) 
180(11.8) 
149(9.8) 
52(3.4) 
1067(69.8) 
185(111) 
47(3.1) 
85(5.6) 
45(11) 
99(6.5) 
647(42.3) 
789(51.6) 
92(6.0) 
997(65.2) 
463(30.3) 
589(38.5) 
385(25.2) 
139(9.1) 
415(27.2) 
735(48.1) 
793(51.9) 
154(10.1) 
99(6.5) 
170(11.1) 
187(12.2) 
277(18.1) 
269(17.6) 
278(18.2) 
543(36.5) 
691(46.5) 
252(17.0) 
816(53.4) 
712(46.6) 
37 ±25 
3 ± 2 
-0.31 ± 1.6 
-
0.18 
-0.15 
-0.19 
0.25 
-0.28 
-
-0.09 
0.11 
-0.19 
0.01 
-
-0.19 
-
-0.20 
0.11 
-0.15 
-0.08 
-0.46 
-
-0.15 
-0.14 
-0.60' 
-0.20 
0.09 
-
-0.60' 
-0.36 
-
-o.6r 
-
-0.04 
0.30 
-0.11 
-
0.01 
-
-0.05 
-0.03 
0.08 
-0.00 
-0.14 
-0.18 
-
-0.07 
-0.30' 
-
-0.03 
0.003 
0.10' 
0.45* 
0.26 
1S28 
-
0.16 
0.21 
0.18 
0.13 
0.17 
-
0.13 
0.15 
0.19 
0.15 
-
0.10 
-
0.12 
0.15 
0.15 
0.16 
0.26 
-
0.15 
0.27 
0.21 
0.28 
0.19 
-
0.11 
0.20 
-
0.11 
-
0.13 
0.18 
0.15 
-
0.09 
-
0.21 
0.18 
0.18 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
-
0.11 
0.15 
-
0.10 
0.002 
0.02 
0.03 
-
0.20 
-0.21 
-0.26 
0.32 
-0.49 
-
-0.18 
0.11 
-1.19* 
-0.18 
-
-0.19 
-
-0.28 
-0.01 
-0.13 
0.07 
0.00 
-
-0.13 
-0.65 
-0.78 
0.40 
0.49 
-
-1.16* 
-0.78 
-
-1.31* 
-
-0.30 
0.56 
-0.59 
-
-0.11 
-
-0.24 
-0.25 
0.27 
-0.12 
-0.38 
-0.90* 
-
-0.16 
-o.ir 
-
-0.20 
0.003 
0.15* 
0.78* 
0.20 
1528 
-
0.36 
0.46 
0.40 
0.29 
0.38 
-
0.29 
0.32 
0.43 
0.32 
-
0.23 
-
0.26 
0.32 
0.34 
0.36 
0.57 
-
0.32 
0.58 
0.46 
0.61 
0.42 
-
0.24 
0.45 
-
0.25 
-
0.28 
0.38 
0.34 
-
0.22 
-
0.46 
0.40 
0.39 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
-
0.24 
0.32 
-
0.21 
0.004 
0.05 
0.07 
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TABLE 4.6: SOaAL-STRUCTURAL CORRELATES OF PARTISANSHIP (1987 AES - N=1825) 
Party Identification 
-0.19 ± 1.6 
Measure Freq(%) Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Intercept 
Occupational Qass (Manual) 
Managers/Farmers 
Upper Professionals 
Other Professionals 
Other Non-Manual 
Unclassified 
ReUgion (CathoUc) 
AngUcan 
Uniting 
No ReUgion 
Other ReUgion 
Region 1 (Rural) 
Non-Rural 
Region 2 (N.S.W.) 
Viaoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
West Australia 
Tasmania 
Ethnicity (Australian) 
British Isles 
Northwest Europe 
Southem Europe 
Eastem Europe 
Other 
Gass Identification (Middle) 
Working Qass Identification 
No Class Identification 
Trade-Union Membership (Non-Member) 
Member 
Sector (Private (Tompany) 
Govemment 
Self Employed 
Other 
Gender (Female) 
Male 
Age (3) (62-70) 
Age (2)71-
Age (4) 54-61 
Age (5) 46-53 
Age (6) 38-45 
Age (7) 30-37 
Age (8) 18-29 
Education (Completed Secondary) 
Not Completed Secondary 
Tertiary 
Gass Background (Not Manual) 
Manual Qass 
ReUgiosity 
Partisan Background 
R Square 
Number of Cases 
656(35.9) 
289(15.8) 
132(7.2) 
168(9.2) 
371(20.3) 
209(11.5) 
522(28.6) 
506(27.7) 
339(18.6) 
226(12.4) 
200(11.0) 
608(33.3) 
1217(66.7) 
632(34.6) 
471(25.8) 
291(15.9) 
205(11.2) 
153(8.4) 
60(3.3) 
1223(67.0) 
222(12.2) 
59(3.2) 
107(5.9) 
59(3.2) 
155(8.5) 
719(39.3) 
752(41.2) 
354(19.4) 
1110(65.0) 
599(35.0) 
783(42.9) 
444(24.3) 
181(9.9) 
417(218) 
942(51.8) 
878(48.2) 
203(11.1) 
126(6.9) 
214(11.7) 
225(12.3) 
300(16.4) 
313(17.2) 
418(219) 
539(30.7) 
887(50.6) 
327(18.7) 
1050(57.5) 
775(42.5) 
3 ± 2 
-0.19 ± 1.9 
-0.24 
0.56* 
0.29 
0.04 
0.19 
0.22 
0.46* 
0.28* 
-0.09 
0.06 
-Q.rr 
0.03 
-0.18 
0.20 
0.04 
0.13 
-0.02 
0.32 
-0.10 
0.56* 
0.21 
-0.38* 
-0.29* 
-0.48* 
-0.23* 
0.21 
-0.42* 
-0.18* 
-0.04 
-0.15 
0.04 
0.08 
-0.22 
-0.20 
-0.20" 
-0.24" 
-0.00 
0.08" 
0.48" 
0.30 
1825 
0.23 
0.12 
0.17 
0.15 
0.11 
0.15 
0.11 
0.12 
0.14 
0.13 
0.08 
0.10 
0.11 
0.13 
0.14 
0.22 
0.12 
0.21 
0.17 
0.22 
0.14 
0.09 
0.12 
0.09 
0.10 
0.13 
0.13 
0.08 
0.18 
0.15 
0.15 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
0.09 
0.12 
0.08 
0.02 
0.02 
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TABLE 4.7: SOaAL-STRUCTURAL CORRELATES OF PARTISANSHIP (1988 NSSS. InequaUty. - N=1663) 
Party Identification Attitude to Parties 
-0.06 ± 2.0 -0.43 ± 4.0 
Measure Freq(%) Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Intercept -0.06 0.28 -0.52 0.59 
Occupational Class (Manual) 
Managers/Farmers 
Upper Professionals 
Other Professionals 
Other Non-Manual 
Unclassified 
ReUgion (CathoUc) 
AngUcan 
Uniting 
No ReUgion 
Other ReUgion 
Region 1 (Rural) 
Non-Rural 
Region 2 (N.S.W.) 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
West AustraUa 
Tasmania 
Ethnicity (AustraUan) 
British Isles 
Northwest Europe 
Southem Europe 
Eastem Europe 
Other 
Gass Identification (Middle) 
Working Qass Identification 
No Qass Identification 
Trade-Union Membership (Non-Member) 
Member 
Sector (Private Company) 
Govemment 
Self Employed 
Other 
Gender (Female) 
Male 
Age (3) (63-71) 
Age (2) 72-
Age (4) 55-62 
Age (5) 47-54 
Age (6) 39-46 
Age (7) 31-38 
Age (8) 18-30 
Education (Clompleted Secondary) 
Not Completed Secondary 
Tertiary 
Gass Background (Not Manual) 
Manual Qass 
Income 
ReUgiosity 
Partisan Background 
R Square 
Number of Cases 
487(29.3) 
216(13.0) 
144(8.7) 
180(10.8) 
420(25.3) 
212(12.7) 
438(26.3) 
516(31.0) 
334(20.1) 
171(10.3) 
204(113) 
456(28.4) 
1151(71.6) 
584(35.1) 
448(26.9) 
248(14.9) 
150(9.0) 
153(9.2) 
57(3.4) 
1140(68.6) 
215(119) 
51(3.1) 
81(4.9) 
61(3.7) 
115(6.9) 
856(51.5) 
735(44.2) 
72(4.3) 
1206(74.0) 
423(26.0) 
701(42.2) 
457(27.5) 
143(8.6) 
362(21.8) 
839(50.5) 
824(49.5) 
149(9.0) 
101(6.1) 
170(10.2) 
205(12.3) 
299(18.0) 
318(19.1) 
419(25.2) 
399(24.1) 
836(50.4) 
423(25.5) 
944(56.8) 
719(43.2) 
42 ±29 
3 ± 2 
-0.03 ± 1.6 
-
0.74" 
o.4r 
-0.12 
0.20 
0.34" 
-
0.07 
0.13 
-0.30 
0.20 
-
-0.21* 
-
0.08 
0.15 
-0.02 
0.01 
0.09 
-
0.01 
-0.06 
-0.62* 
-0.02 
-0.10 
-
-0.30* 
-0.22 
-
-0.23* 
-
-0.17 
0.43* 
-0.18 
-
-0.11 
-
-0.11 
0.07 
0.02 
0.06 
-0.32 
-0.26 
-
-0.03 
-0.07 
-
0.04 
0.002 
O.or 
0.50* 
0.27 
1663 
-
0.15 
0.18 
0.16 
0.12 
0.17 
-
0.12 
0.13 
0.17 
0.15 
-
0.10 
-
0.11 
0.13 
0.15 
0.15 
0.24 
-
0.13 
0.25 
0.21 
0.23 
0.17 
-
0.10 
0.22 
-
0.11 
-
0.11 
0.16 
0.14 
-
0.09 
-
0.22 
0.19 
0.19 
0.18 
0.18 
0.17 
-
0.11 
0.13 
-
0.09 
0.002 
0.02 
0.03 
-
1.28* 
0.56 
-0.45 
0.24 
0.89* 
-
0.10 
0.23 
-0.34 
0.40 
-
-0.20 
-
-0.08 
0.30 
-0.06 
-0.20 
-0.25 
-
0.25 
-0.61 
-0.64 
0.89 
-0.55 
-
-0.41* 
-0.15 
-
-0.56* 
-
-0.31 
o.7r 
-0.24 
-
-0.29 
-
0.10 
0.01 
0.27 
0.40 
-0.55 
-0.38 
-
-0.29 
-0.58* 
. 
0.10 
0.003 
0.19* 
0.91* 
0.21 
1663 
-
0.32 
0.38 
0.34 
0.25 
0.36 
-
0.26 
0.28 
0.36 
0.31 
-
0.20 
-
0.22 
0.27 
0.33 
0.33 
0.50 
-
0.27 
0.36 
0.43 
0.49 
0.36 
-
0.20 
0.46 
-
0.23 
-
0.34 
0.23 
0.30 
-
0.19 
. 
0.46 
0.40 
0.39 
0.38 
0.37 
0.36 
-
0.23 
0.28 
-
0.19 
0.004 
0.05 
0.06 
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4.2.7 The 1988 'InequaUty' NSSS 
The variables included in tiie analysis of the 1988 'Inequality' data were the same as tiiose 
included in tiie analysis of the 1986 NSSS. The results of tiie OLS regression analyses on tiie 1988 
data are presented in table 4.7. 
Party Identification in 1988 
The amount of variance of party identification explained by tiie model was 27%, a figure 
comparable with tiiat obtained from tiie analysis of tiie 1986 NSSS data. 
The measures tiiat were found to have significant effects on party identification in 1988 were 
occupational class, mral or non-mral residence, etimicity, class identification, trade-union membership, 
employment sector, religiosity and partisan background. 
The non-manual occupational groups, managers and farmers and upper professionals, were found 
to have significantiy higher levels of Labor identification, than manual woricers. Non-mral residency, 
soutiiem Europe ethnicity, working class identification and tiade-union membership were aU found to 
significantiy increase the level of identification with the Labor party. As was found in previous 
analyses, the self-employed were on average significantiy closer to the coalition end of the measure. 
In contrast to most of the other analyses, tertiary education and income were found not to be 
significantiy associated with party identification. Higher levels of church attendance were again found 
to be associated with a tendency to more strongly identify with the coaUtion parties. 
Partisan background has the greatest impact on party identification. The parameter estimate of 
0.50 is slightiy higher than the value obtained in aU previous analyses. 
Attitudes to the Parties in 1988 
In the regression analysis of attimde to the parties, tiie R square value obtained was 0.21, a 
figure almost identical to that obtained from the analysis of the 1986 sample. 
The measures that were found to have significant effects on relative attitude towards the parties 
were occupational class, class identification, trade-union membership, employment sector, education, 
religiosity and partisan background. As was found previously, working class identification and trade-
union membership were significantiy associated with a more pro-Labor evaluation of tiie parties. In 
contrast to tiie result obtained for party identification, tertiary education tended to engender a more 
positive evaluation of the Labor party. Higher levels of reUgiosity were again found to be 
significantiy associated with a more pro-Liberal evaluation of the parties. Partisan background had a 
large and significant effect on relative evaluation of the parties, the parameter estimate of 0.91 being 
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tiie highest obtained in tiie any of tiie analyses. As a percentage of tiie range of tiie measure (4.6%) 
tiie result is comparable to tiiat obtained from tiie analyses of tiie two eartier NSSS samples. 
4.2.8 Results of tiie Second Model for aU Samples 
This section reports the results of the analyses of the second model, which include surrogate 
measures (vote at tiie last election and partisan background) for previous partisanship. As discussed 
earlier, tiie purpose of tiie second model is to distinguish between durable and transient effects on 
partisanship, associated witii social-stmcmral factors. The results for the analyses of botii party 
identification and relative attimde to tiie parties for tiiis second model are presented in tables 4.8 and 
4.9. Only significant coefficients (at the P<0.05 level) are presented. 
The effects of vote at the last election are relatively constant, the estimates ranging from -2.30 
and -2.9 for vote for the Labor party at the previous election and between -0.9 and -1.5 for vote for a 
minor party (or did not vote). These results suggest a degree of consistency witiiin the AustraUan 
electorate between elections. The effects of partisan background are remarkably constant, especiaUy in 
relation to party identification. 
Of tiie occupational class groups, the manager and farmer group was significantiy more likely 
to have higher levels of identification with the coalition parties in aU samples but the 1986 sample. 
This finding indicates tiiat this group moved towards a more coaUtion identification since tiie last 
election. Similarly, transient effects towards identification with the coalition parties were observed 
among tiie other non-manual group in the 1967, 1969 and 1984 samples. In 1988, other professionals 
moved towards the Labor party. 
In relation to relative attimde to the parties similar results were not found as those found in 
relation to party identification. The exception was movement by the 'other non-manual' group to the 
Liberals in 1967 and movement among other professionals to the Labor party in 1988. Short-term 
movements were also observed among the two professional groups to the Liberals in 1979. 
There is a tendency for differences to emerge in party identification between religious groups 
between elections, especiaUy between Anglicans and CathoUcs, and in the 1967 and 1979 samples 
between the uniting group and CathoUcs. In relation to the relative attimde to tiie parties, tiie 'no 
religion' group displayed strong short-term movements towards the Labor party in 1967, 1969 and 
1986. 
Transient influences on party identification appear to have moved mral residents to a relatively 
stronger coalition party identification (or non-mral residents to a relatively stronger Labor 
identification) in 1979, 1984 and 1987. Transient factors are also indicated as engendering a relatively 
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more positive evaluation of tiie Liberal party (or a more negative evaluation of the Labor party) in 
1984"*. 
A slightiy greater number of significant differences were observed between the states in tiie 
second (extended time period) model compared witii tiie first model. If we focus first on party 
identification, we can observe two state differences (Soutii Australia in 1969 and Victoria in 1988) 
compared with only one in tiie first model (South Austialia in 1969). In relation to relative attimde to 
tiie parties, there were four instances where significant differences between tiie states were observed in 
the second model compared with two, in the first model. 
OveraU, there appears to be littie short-term movement in partisanship between the different 
etiinic groups. In terms of party identification, east European immigrants appear to be relaxed their 
anti-Labor orientation during the early years of the Hawke government, indicated by tiie result 
obtained for the 1984 NSSS. However, this group shifted towards a more pro-Liberal evaluation of 
the parties, in 1988. Southem Europeans became 'more Labor' between tiie 1987 election and the 
time the 1988 survey was conducted. 
Transient effects of working-class identification on partisanship were found, tiiroughout the time 
period investigated. This result was found in relation to botii party identification and relative attitude 
to the parties. These results suggest that the part of the relationship between class identification and 
partisanship can be attributed transient short-term factors associated with working class identification. 
Similarly, trade-union membership was found to have a significant and sustained influence on 
party identification, controUing for previous partisanship. However, significant relationships witii 
relative attimde to the parties were observed only in 1984 and 1986. Again, part of tiie relationship 
between trade-union membership and partisanship can be attributed to transient short-term factors. 
Transient influences associated with employment sector were not observed. 
One additional gender difference was observed in the second model. In 1979 males, were 
significantiy more Ukely than females, to have a higher level of identification with the Labor party. 
The second model also picked up tiie gender differences, observed with the first model in the 1967 
and 1987 samples. 
A greater number of significant differences between age cohorts were observed from the 
analyses of the second model compared witii tiie first model. In the analysis of party identification, 
five significant differences were observed in the first model compared with seven in tiie second model. 
In relation to the relative attimde to the parties, seven significant differences were observed in the first 
model compared with nine in the second model. 
Short-term movements of the tertiary-educated towards a more Labor identification were 
observed only in 1969 and 1984. However, tertiary education appears to be consistentiy associated 
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witii transient influences in relation to attimdes to tiie parties, engendering a more pro-Labor/anti-
Liberal evaluation of the parties. 
Effects of income on party identification, contioUing for vote at the last election, were observed 
in 1967, 1979 and 1984. In relation to the relative attimde to tiie parties, income was found to be 
significant only in 1984. Significant effects of religiosity on party identification, contioUing for 
previous partisanship, were only observed in 1969 and 1984. In relation to attitude to tiie parties 
transient effects were only observed in 1984 and 1988. 
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TABLE 4.8: SUMMARY OF SIGNIHCANT MEASURES ON PARTY IDENTIHCATION CONTROLLING FOR PREVIOUS 
PARTISANSHIP (P<0.05) 
Measure 
Intercept 
Vote for Labor Party 
Vote for Minor Part & not voted 
Occupational Class (Manual) 
Managers/Farmers 
Upper Professionals 
Other Professionals 
Other Non-Manual 
Unclassified 
ReUgion (CathoUc) 
AngUcan 
Uniting 
No ReUgion 
Other ReUgion 
Region 1 (Rural) 
Non-Rural 
Region 2 (N.S.W.) 
Victoria 
C^eensland 
South Australia 
West AustraUa 
Tasmania 
Ethnicity (Australian) 
British Isles 
Northwest Europe 
Southem Europe 
Eastem Europe 
Other 
Qass Identification (Middle) 
W. Gass Identification 
No Qass Identification 
Trade-U. M'ship (Non-Member) 
Member 
Sector (Private Company) 
Govemment 
Self Employed 
Other 
Gender (Female) 
Male 
Age 1 (bom 1908 or eariier) 
Age 2 (bom 1909-1916) 
Age 3 (bom 1917-1925) 
Age 4 (Bom 1926-1933) 
Age 5 (Bom 1934-1941) 
Age 6 (Bom 1942-1949) 
Age 7 (Bom 1950-1957) 
Age 8 (Bom 1958 or later) 
Education (Comp Secondary) 
Not Completed Secondary 
Tertiary 
Gass Background (Not Manual) 
Manual Qass 
Income 
ReUgiosity 
Partisan Background 
R Square 
Number of Cases 
1967 
ANPA 
0.97 
-2.75 
-1.04 
R 
0.26 
0 
0 
0.29 
0.43 
R 
0.27 
0.31 
0 
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-0.32 
-0.25 
R 
-0.17 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
R 
-0.14 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
NA 
NA 
R 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0.003 
0 
0.22 
0.64 
2054 
1969 
ANPA 
0.85 
-2.65 
-0.97 
R 
0.37 
0 
0 
0.22 
0.71 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
-0.37 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-0.37 
0 
R 
-0.31 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
R 
0 
R 
0.32 
0 
0 
a 
-0.27 
NA 
NA 
R 
0 
-0.50 
R 
0 
0 
0.06 
0.27 
0.58 
1873 
1979 
ANPA 
1.36 
-2.73 
-1.26 
R 
0.21 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0.29 
0.30 
0 
0.24 
R 
-0.25 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-0.33 
0 
R 
-0.14 
R 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-0.15 
R 
0 
0 
0 
-0.37 
-0.45 
-0.59 
NA 
R 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0.006 
0 
0.19 
0.64 
2016 
1984 
NSSS 
1.15 
-2.44 
-1.38 
R 
0.31 
0 
0 
0.15 
0 
R 
0.16 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-0.29 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
-0.32 
0 
R 
-0.29 
-0.40 
R 
-0.24 
R 
0 
0 
Q 
R 
0 
/) 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
-0.17 
-0.23 
R 
0 
-0.26 
R 
0 
0.004 
0.07 
0.28 
0.60 
3012 
1986 
NSSS 
1.80 
-2.96 
-1.58 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
-0.22 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-0.20 
-0.29 
R 
-0.31 
R 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
/) 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0.17 
0.65 
1528 
1987 
AES 
1.52 
-2.36 
-0.98 
R 
0.22 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0.26 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-0.16 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-0.22 
-0.30 
R 
-0.25 
R 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-0.13 
/} 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0.40 
R 
-0.15 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.24 
0.60 
1825 
1988 
NSSS 
1.40 
-2.86 
-1.46 
R 
0.27 
0 
-0.24 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0.20 
R 
0 
R 
0.15 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
-0.32 
0 
0 
R 
-0.19 
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
/} 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0.21 
0.67 
1663 
Key: 
R = Reference Group 
0 = no significant effect 
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TABLE 4.9: SUMMARY OF SIGNIHCANT MEASURES ON RELATIVE ATTITUDES TO THE PARTIES CONTROLLING FOR 
PREVIOUS PARTISANSHIP (P<0.05) 
Measure 
Intercept 
Vote for Labor Party 
Vote for Minor Part & not voted 
Occupational Qass (Manual) 
Managers/Farmers 
Upper Professionals 
Other Prtrfessionals 
Other Non-Manual 
Unclassified 
ReUgion (CathoUc) 
AngUcan 
Uniting 
No ReUgion 
Other ReUgion 
Region 1 (Rural) 
Non-Rural 
Region 2 (N.S.W.) 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
West Australia 
Tasmania 
Ethnicity (Australian) 
British Isles 
Northwest Europe 
Southem Europe 
Eastem Europe 
Other 
Gass Identification (Middle) 
W. Gass Identificatian 
No Class Identification 
Trade-U. M'ship (Non-Member) 
Member 
Sector (Private (Company) 
Govemment 
Self Employed 
Other 
Gender (Female) 
Male 
Age 1 (bom 1908 or eariier) 
Age 2 (bom 1909-1916) 
Age 3 (bom 1917-1925) 
Age 4 (Bom 1926-1933) 
Age 5 (Bom 1934-1941) 
Age 6 (Bom 1942-1949) 
Age 7 (Bom 1950-1957) 
Age 8 (Bom 1958 or later) 
Education (Comp Secondary) 
Not Completed Secondary 
Tertiary 
Gass Background (Not Manual) 
Manual Qass 
Income 
ReUgiosity 
Partisan Background 
R Square 
Number of Cases 
Key: 
R = Reference Group 
0 = no significant effect 
1967 
ANPA 
0.53 
-1.83 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0.22 
0 
R 
0 
0 
-1.27 
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0.34 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-0.24 
0 
R 
0 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
R 
0 
R 
0.32 
0 
0 
0 
0 
NA 
NA 
R 
-0.19 
-0.41 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0.09 
0.24 
2054 
1969 
ANPA 
0.82 
-110 
-0.66 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
-0.65 
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
-0.37 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-0.31 
-0.84 
R 
0 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0.44 
NA 
NA 
R 
0 
-0.72 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0.08 
0.22 
1873 
1979 
ANPA 
1.01 
-2.36 
-0.86 
R 
0 
0.56 
0.34 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
R 
-0.37 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0.56 
R 
-0.30 
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
R 
-0.57 
-0.42 
-0.46 
-0.43 
-0.82 
-1.07 
NA 
R 
0 
-0.42 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0.11 
0.32 
2016 
1984 
NSSS 
0.80 
-2.47 
-1.19 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0.26 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-0.52 
R 
0 
0 
0.30 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-0.21 
0 
R 
-0.34 
R 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
/) 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
-0.32 
R 
Q 
0.005 
0.08 
0.24 
0.44 
2965 
1986 1987 1988 
NSSS AES NSSS 
3.77 not L98 
-5.30 appl. -4.91 
-2.87 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
-1.05 
-0.59 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-0.46 
0 
R 
-0.67 
R 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
/) 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
-0.51 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0.28 
0.48 
1528 
-2.30 
R 
0 
0 
-0.66 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0.78 
0 
R 
-0.19 
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
/) 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0.59 
0 
0 
R 
0 
-0.65 
R 
0 
0 
0.07 
0.41 
0.50 
1663 
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4.3 DISCUSSION 
In tiie this section tiie results presented in tiiis chapter are summarised and discussed. The 
comparabiUty of the dependent variables is discussed first foUowed by discussions on changes in 
partisanship over time, the overaU fit of the models and the results obtained for each independent 
variable. 
4.3.1 Comparison of Measures 
GeneraUy, the two partisanship concepts, party identification and attitude to the parties revealed 
simUar results. Variables that had larger impacts on party identification, such as working-class 
identification, trade-union membership and partisan background, usuaUy had significant effects on the 
measure of relative attimde to the parties. Moreover, there are instances where measures that had no 
significant effect on party identification were found to have sigruficant effects on the measures of 
relative attimde to tiie parties. Examples are tertiary education in 1988, the youngest age cohort in 
1967 and tertiary education and several occupational class groups in 1979. 
Variables that had only smaU or moderate impacts on party identification did not usuaUy have a 
significant impact on the relative attimde to the parties. This is especiaUy tme in tiie case of the two 
earlier ANPA smdies. 
Pemsal of the correlations between the measures of the two concepts (table 4.10) indicate that 
ANPA measures of attimde to the parties have lower correlations witii party identification tiian tiie 
measures employed in the NSSS data sets. These lower correlations are the most likely explanation as 
to why the independent variables that had smaU or moderate effects on party identification were more 
often tiian not found not to have effects on relative attimde to the parties in the ANPA samples. 
TABLE 4.10: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE MEASURES OF PARTY IDENTmCATION AND ATTITUDE TO THE 
PARTIES 
Year Basis for measure of Relative Attitude to Parties Correlation 
1967 Relative number of likes and dislikes to the Liberal and Labor parties 0.56 
1969 Relative number of likes and dislikes to the Liberal and Labor parties 0.56 
1979 Relative number of likes and dislikes to the Liberal and Labor parties 0.65 
1984 Relative confidence in the Liberal and Labor parties 0.78 
1986 Relative feelings to the Liberal and Labor parties 0.77 
1988 Relative feelings to the Liberal and Labor parties 0.78 
These correlations confirm the proposition that the concepts 'party identification' and 'relative 
attimde to parties' relate to the same underlying general concept, considered to be partisanship. Since 
the two models do not produce identical results, it can be concluded that the two concepts relate to 
slightiy different aspects of the general concept 'partisanship'. 
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The question of tiie comparabUity of tiie measures of relative attimde to tiie parties requires 
consideration. The NSSS measures wiU be discussed first and foUowed by a discussion on comparing 
tiie ANPA and NSSS measures. 
The 1984 NSSS 'confidence' measure has a range of 10 whereas the 'feeling thermometer' 
measures in the 1986 and 1988 NSSS smdies have a range of 20. Since tiie correlations of tiiese 
measures with partisanship are almost identical and the 'confidence' measure has a standard deviation 
of approximately half that of tiie 'tiiermometer' measures, a cmde way to make tiie 1984 estimates 
comparable to tiie 1986 and 1988 estimates is to multiple tiie 1984 estimates by 20/10 (or 2). In tiie 
figures presented below the parameter estimates for tiie 1984 NSSS sample, are adjusted in this 
manner. 
The relative likes and dislikes measures in the three ANPA smdies are comparable witii each 
other, but are not comparable with eitiier of the two NSSS measures. Much fewer respondents are 
found at either extreme in the ANPA measures, compared with the NSSS measures. This difference is 
indicated by the larger standard deviations of the NSSS measures. Assuming that the ANPA variables 
are measuring the same concept but have more measurement error, tiien tiie coefficients obtained for 
tiie ANPA measures are 'unbiased''^ but are less lUcely to be significant (Berry & Feldman, 
1985:28). Measurement error probably accounts for the lower correlations found between the ANPA 
measures and party identification. In tiie figures presented below, a short vertical line indicates the 
distinction between the ANPA and NSSS measures. 
4.3.2 Changes in Partisanship 
Changes have occurred in the Australian electorate in the central tendencies of botii party 
identification and relative attimde to the parties over the time period smdied. The mean values of tiie 
two measures are presented in figure 4.4. 
Several points are apparent from figure 4.4. Both concepts display a similar over time pattem, 
lending further support to the contention tiiat they both relate to tiie same general concept of 
partisanship. The graphs in figure 4.4 support tiie observation noted in the literature review that a 
partisan reaUgnment took place between tiie late 1960s and late 1970s. In 1967 tiie mean level of 
party identification was positive, indicating the electorate was more 'coalition' than 'Labor'. Since 
1979, the mean value has always been negative, indicating the electorate is more 'Labor' than 
'coalition'. However, it is probably more correct to note how evenly balanced the parties are, rather 
than the sUght differences between the parties. The mean values are very close to zero on a measure 
ranging from -3 to 3, indicating that electorate has been only marginaUy 'more coalition' or 'more 
Labor'. Assuming that vote is linearly related to strength of partisanship and this relationship applies 
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CHANGES IN PARTISANSHIP 
Mean Value 
a. 4 
0 .2 
- 0 . 2 
- 0 . 4 
Party Identification 
0 
Attitude to Parties 
X 
~ x - k 
j _ 
_L 
1970 1975 1980 
Year of Survey 
1985 1990 
Figure 4.4: Chart showing changes in the mean levels of party identification and relative 
attitude to the parties. 
equaUy to both Labor and coalition identifiers then, these results suggest tiiat the parties are more 
likely to be evenly balanced, rather than one group enjoying a distinct electoral advantage. However, 
the relationship between partisanship and vote has not yet been explored'*. 
4.3.3 OveraU fit of tiie Models 
The results indicate that the value of R square for tiie party identification model had remained 
constant, around 30% in aU samples examined. There are only sUght differences in tiie fit of the 
model (measured by R^  values) between the samples. It is therefore concluded that the relation 
between party identification with social-stmcmral factors and partisan background has remained more 
or less constant 
Comparison of the R square estimates of the fit of the first group of models to comparable 
analyses in the United States show very simUar findings. An R square value of around 30 % was also 
observed by Cassel (1982) and Knoke & Hout (1974) in the analysis of party identification for the 
years 1952-1980". Therefore, it can be concluded that the process by which voters form a party 
identification in Australia is not too dissimilar to tiie process in the United States. 
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Before making comparisons witii otiier smdies conducted in Australia, it should be noted tiiat as 
measures of model fit comparisons of R square values between samples are at best hazardous (Achen, 
1982:58-61) and tiie models analysed in otiier smdies are generaUy quite different in terms of tiie 
namre of the dependent variable, the analytical technique employed and tiie independent variables 
included in the model. 
Comparison of the R square values obtained from the analysis of tiie first model between 1967 
and 1979 shows only a sUght decrease, declining from 33% in 1967 to 27% in 1979. In contrast, 
other researchers have found precipitous decUnes between 1967 and 1979. Focusing only on a group 
of social-stmcmral variables, McAUister (1988a) could account for 13.6% of the variation in vote in 
1967, and 8% in 1979. In the models analysed by Bean (1984:309), the value of R square declined 
from 16% in 1967 to 10% in 1979. Using tiie AID technique, Aitidn (1982b:303) also found a 
reduction in variation of Labor partisanship explained by social-stmcmral factors, from 16.6% in 1967 
to 10.9% in 1979. 
The discrepancies between the results presented and those obtained by the smdies cited above is 
Ukely to be due to the inclusion of a measure of partisan background in these investigations. Partisan 
background has the greatest impact on party identification and its impact decreased only slightiy 
between 1967 and 1979. It has been argued in chapter 3 that partisan background is a necessary 
component of causal models of partisanship. 
In an analysis of the effects of social-stmcmral factors and partisan background, on vote in the 
1984 NSSS data, tiie R square value was 0.22 (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:292). This figure is lower 
than that obtained in the analysis presented here (0.29), the differences most Ukely due to tiie more 
extensive model analysed here. SpecificaUy, tiiat analysis did not include measures of tertiary 
education and income, variables which were found to have significant effects on partisanship in the 
analyses presented here. Furthermore, the dependent variable in this analysis has a greater variance. 
The R square values obtained from the analysis of the NSSS measures of attimde to the parties 
were higher than those obtained from ANPA measures. For the first model the figures were 0.11 in 
1967, 0.09 in 1969, 0.14 in 1979, rising to 0.20 in 1984 and 1986 and 0.21 in 1988. For tiie second 
model a similar increase is evident (table 4.9). This result is probably due to the higher correlations of 
the NSSS measures with the party identification measure, than the correlations witii tiie ANPA 
measures (table 4.10). 
Focusing on the second model, it can be concluded that between 60% and 70% of the variation 
of party identification at one time point can be explained by previous partisanship and transient short-
term forces (correlated with social-stmcmral factors), operating since the previous election. Therefore, 
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only 30 to 40% of tiie variation in party identification can be attiibuted to measurement error and 
general short-term influences such as issues and candidates. 
4.3.4 Social-Stmctural and Background Factors 
Summaries of the significant social-stmcmral influences on party identification and attimde to 
tiie parties for tiie first model are presented in tables 4.11 and 4.12. The corresponding summary 
tables for the second model have already been presented (tables 4.8 & 4.9). 
Before reviewing tiie findings of individual social factors, it should pointed tiiat high 
multicoUinearity was not a problem in these analyses^". Inspection of the tables of the regression 
analyses indicates that high multicoUinearity does not appear to be a problem, since the standard errors 
are not particularly high and many variables have significant effects '^. Furthermore, generaUy 
consistent results were obtained across the samples. A more suitable way to evaluate the extent of 
multicoUinearity is to obtain tiie tolerance values for each independent variable. The tolerance values 
measure the degree of interrelationships between tiie predictor (independent) variables^. The 
tolerance values were found to be high (generaUy weU over 0.7) for the independent variables, further 
indicating that high multicoUinearity was not a problem in tiiese analyses". 
Occupational Class 
There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from these results, in relation to 
occupational class. First, the manual group remained generaUy more 'Labor', tiian the non-manual 
group. Where significant differences were found between the manual group and one or more non-
manual groups, the coefficient was always positive, indicating that throughout the period smdied, 
manual workers had generaUy higher levels of Labor identification. Second, there are indications of a 
continuing decline in the influence of occupational class in the process of electoral choice. In 1967, 
each of the four non-manual groups had significantiy higher levels of identification with the coalition 
parties, in 1969, 1979 and 1984, only two or three groups, and in later samples only one or two non-
manual groups. In the 1986 sample tiiere were no significant differences attributable to occupational 
class. These results suggest tiiat poUtical socialisation is decreasingly being carried out, tiirough 
membership of broad occupational class groups. This finding may conflict with the conclusions 
reached by Bean & KeUey (1988), who concluded tiiat no further decline was occurring in tiie 
relationship between class and vote, during the 1980s. However, their analysis included fewer conttols 
than the analyses presented here and was based on vote recaU, rather than separate analyses at different 
time points. 
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In respect to changes in tiie relationship between social class and political orientation between 
1967 and 1979, tiie results obtained here confirm tiie weU-documented decUne. In contrast to tiie 
simation in 1967, when aU non-manual groups had significantiy higher levels of identification witii tiie 
coalition parties, in 1979 both higher professionals and other professionals were found not found to be, 
significantiy different from manual workers. Since tiiese groups make up approximately 17% of tiie 
sample, tiiis decline corresponds to tiie documented decUne witii tiie manual/non-manual measure. 
Therefore, the decUne in the effects of the manual non-manual measure on political preference between 
1967 and 1979 can be atixibuted to changes among professionals. 
Focusing on the second (extended time period model), some form of transient political 
socialisation appears to be occurring among the group of managers and farmers. The coefficient for 
this group was found to be significant in aU but one of tiie samples investigated. It is suggested that 
this finding relates to new entrants to this occupational class group. One possible explanation is that 
they are exposed to a general consensus, regarding the virtues of a free-market and contemporary 
politics is inteipreted in this context Such interpretations are Ukely to engender, a more conservative 
political orientation. 
The finding that the 'other non-manual' group have significantiy higher levels of identification 
with the coalition parties, net of the proxy measure of previous partisanship in 1967, 1969 and 1984, 
could be evidence of partisan change brought about through social mobility. Changes in partisanship 
away from partisan background, brought about by upward mobility from tiie manual group and to tiiis 
non-manual group, would accoimt for these findings^. This explanation has simUarities with the 
classical view of partisanship, where a new job is cited as an example of a source of partisan change 
(CampbeU et al., 1960:149). 
Religion 
OveraU, the influence of reUgious denomination on party identification was found to be weak. 
On several occasions (in 1967, 1979, 1984 and 1987), botii AngUcans and the uniting church group 
were found to have significantiy higher levels of identification witii the coalition parties tiian 
CatiioUcs. However, there is evidence that these effects were mainly tiansient First significant 
differences were not observed at the other time points, suggesting a flucmating relationship. Second, 
the analyses from the second model largely match those of the first model, the parameter estimates 
being only slightiy attenuated. These findings suggest that whatever political socialisation occurs 
associated with reUgious denominations it is transient rather than enduring. 
It is possible that the significant differences between the reUgious denominations in relation to 
party identification, reflect changes in marital stams. Changes in religion tend to be associated witii 
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marriage since tiie CatiioUc church often insists tiiat botii partners be CatiioUc. The possibility of 
changes in partisanship brought about by marriage are also noted in the classical account of 
partisanship (CampbeU et al., 1960:149). Furthermore, since about two tiiirds of couples (witii 
chUdren) have tiie same party identifications (McAUister, 1990) and given tiie almost equal partisan 
division in the electorate, tiiis figure could not be reached if some form of political socialisation 
between marriage partoers was not occurring". However, this explanation remains quite speculative. 
An altemative explanation based on issues is not as plausible since there are few reUgious issues that 
could account for these findings. 
Although tiie group professing 'no religion' was not distinctive in its party identifications, in 
relation to relative attimde to tiie parties they were significantiy 'more Labor' in 1967, 1969 and 1986. 
This finding can be explained by tiie 'no religion' group seeing themselves as generaUy having no 
strong attachments to parties, but have more positive evaluations of tiie Labor party. Comparisons of 
tiie magnimdes of tiie estimates obtained in relation to attimde to the parties, between tiie first and 
second models for tiie years 1967, 1969 and 1986, suggest that tiie tendency for the no-religion group 
to be more pro-Labor is almost entirely due to transient factors. 
Rural/non-rural residency 
From the analysis of the first model, residents of mral areas were found to have significantiy 
higher levels of identification witii tiie coaUtion parties, in tiie years 1969 to 1984 and again in 1987 
and 1988. (The 1986 estimate just failed to be significant). This finding supports tiie view that a 
distinctive mral culmre does exist in Austialia. Therefore, it can be concluded that some pro-coalition 
poUtical socialisation occurs in mral areas, independent of partisan background. 
In addition to suggesting a mral sub-culmre, there is evidence that the partisanship of mral 
dweUers was also sensitive to transient factors. The policies of the Whitiam Labor govemment may 
have been responsible for the increase in the levels of identification witii tiie coalition parties between 
1969 to 1979^ *. The magnimde of tiie effect (in the first model) increased from -0.18 in 1969, to -
0.50 in 1979 '^. This antipathy to tiie Labor party among mral dweUers was somewhat aUeviated by 
the third term of the Hawke Labor govemment. The coefficient in 1987 (when a comparable 
measured was used) declined to -0.27. Focusing on the NSSS measures (based on size of place lived 
rather than residence in a mral electorate), a decUne is also apparent from tiie early years of the 
Hawke government the estimate declined from -0.40 in 1984 to -0.20 in 1988. These transient factors 
are also indicated by the analyses of the second model, where transient effects were observed in 1984 
but not in 1986 or 1988. 
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In relation to relative attimde to tiie parties, tiie mral/non-mral measure had significant impacts 
only in 1979 and 1984. Transient effects are indicated for tiie 1984 NSSS sample. The parameter 
estimate estimated by tiie second model was aUnost as great in tiie second model (-0.52) as estimated 
by tiie first model (-0.63). Transient effects are also Ukely to account for tiie 1979 result. However, 
tiie second model (of tiie 1979 sample) did not indicate a significant transient effect since tiie last 
election. It is possible that the transient effects originated at the time of the Whitiam govemment 
before tiie last election held in 1977. 
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TABLE 4.11: SUMMARY OF SIGNIHCANT MEASURES FOR PARTY IDENTinCATION (P<0.05) - FIRST MODEL 
Measure 
Intercept 
Occupational Qass (Manual) 
Managers/Farmers 
Upper Professionals 
Other Professionals 
Other Non-Manual 
Unclassified 
Religion (CathoUc) 
Anghcan 
Uniting 
No ReUgion 
Other Religion 
Region 1 (Rural) 
Non-Rural 
Region 2 (N.S.W.) 
Viaoria 
Queensland 
South AustraUa 
West Australia 
Tasmania 
Ethnicity (AustraUan) 
British Isles 
Northwest Europe 
Southern Europe 
Eastem Europe 
Other 
Qass Identification (Middle) 
W. Qass Identification 
No Qass Identification 
Trade-U. M'ship (Non-Member) 
Member 
Sector (Private Company) 
Govemment 
Self Employed 
Other 
Gender (Female) 
Male 
Age 1 (bom 1908 or eariier) 
Age 2 (bom 1909-1916) 
Age 3 (bom 1917-1925) 
Age 4 (Bom 1926-1933) 
Age 5 (Bom 1934-1941) 
Age 6 (Bom 1942-1949) 
Age 7 (Bom 1950-1957) 
Age 8 (Bom 1958 or later) 
Education (Comp Secondary) 
Not Completed Secondary 
Tertiary 
Qass Background (Not Manual) 
Manual Qass 
Income 
ReUgiosity 
Partisan Background 
1967 
ANPA 
0 
R 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
R 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
R 
-
0 
R 
-
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
R 
-
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
NA 
NA 
R 
0 
-
R 
Q 
-1-
+ 
+ 
1969 
ANPA 
0 
R 
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
R 
0 
+ 
0 
0 
R 
-
R 
0 
Q 
-
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
Q 
Q 
R 
-
0 
R 
-
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
R 
0 
R 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
NA 
NA 
R 
-
-= 
R 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
1979 
ANPA 
0 
R 
+ 
0 
Q 
+ 
+ 
R 
-^  
+ 
0 
-h 
R 
-
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
Q 
0 
-t-
0 
R 
_ 
-
R 
. 
R 
-
+ 
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
-
. 
-
NA 
R 
0 
0 
R 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
1984 
NSSS 
0 
R 
-t-
Q 
0 
+ 
+ 
R 
+ 
-t-
0 
0 
R 
-
R 
0 
Q 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
R 
_ 
0 
R 
_ 
R 
-
+ 
0 
R 
0 
n 
R 
0 
0 
0 
_ 
_ 
R 
0 
„ 
R 
_ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
1986 
NSSS 
-t-
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
R 
._ 
0 
R 
_ 
R 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
/} 
0 
R 
0 
Q 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
_ 
R 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
1987 
AES 
0 
R 
4-
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-f 
+ 
0 
0 
R 
_ 
R 
0 
0 
0 
Q 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
R 
. 
_ 
R 
^ 
R 
_ 
0 
_-
R 
/] 
Q 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
. 
R 
0 
NA 
+ 
+ 
1988 
NSSS 
0 
R 
• ^ 
+ 
0 
Q 
+ 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
_ 
0 
0 
R 
0 
R 
R 
0 
+ 
0 
R 
0 
/) 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
Key: 
R = Reference Group 
/)= Group combined with next adjacent age cohort 
NA= Not Available 
•^  = Significantly more pro-coaUtion 
- = Significantly more pro-Labor 
0 = Not Significant (at P<0.05) 
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TABLE 4.12: SUMMARY OF SIGNIHCANT MEASURES FOR RELATIVE EVALUATION OF THE PARTIES (P<0.05). FIRST MODEL 
Measure 
Intercept 
Occupational Qass (Manual) 
Managers/Farmers 
Upper Professionals 
Other Professionals 
Other Non-Manual 
Unclassified 
ReUgion (CathoUc) 
AngUcan 
Uniting 
No ReUgion 
Other ReUgion 
Region 1 (Rural) 
Non-Rural 
Region 2 (N.S.W.) 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
West AustraUa 
Tasmania 
Ethnicity (AustraUan) 
British Isles 
Northwest Europe 
Southem Europe 
Eastem Europe 
Other 
Qass Identification (Middle) 
W. Qass Identification 
No Class Identification 
Trade-U. M'ship (Non-Member) 
Member 
Sector (Private Company) 
Govemment 
Self Employed 
Other 
Gender (Female) 
Male 
Age 1 (bom 1908 or eariier) 
Age 2 (bom 1909-1916) 
Age 3 (bom 1917-1925) 
Age 4 (Bora 1926-1933) 
Age 5 (Bora 1934-1941) 
Age 6 (Bom 1942-1949) 
Age 7 (Bom 1950-1957) 
Age 8 (Bom 1958 or later) 
Education (Comp Secondary) 
Not Completed Secondary 
Tertiary 
Qass Background (Not Manual) 
Manual Qass 
Income 
ReUgiosity 
Partisan Background 
1967 
ANPA 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
R 
0 
0 
-
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-
0 
R 
0 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
R 
0 
R 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
NA 
NA 
R 
-
-
R 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
1969 
ANPA 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
-
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
•• 
-
R 
-
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
NA 
NA 
R 
0 
-
R 
0 
0 
-1-
+ 
1979 
ANPA 
0 
R 
• ^ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
R 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
R 
-
R 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
. 
-
R 
0 
R 
-
+ 
0 
R 
0 
R 
-
-
-
-
-
-
NA 
R 
0 
-
R 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
1984 
NSSS 
0 
R 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
R 
+ 
-1-
0 
0 
R 
-
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
Q 
R 
-
0 
R 
-
R 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
/} 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
-
R 
. 
-1-
+ 
+ 
1986 
NSSS 
+ 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
-
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-
0 
R 
-
R 
0 
0 
0 
R 
0 
/) 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
R 
0 
-
R 
0 
0 
+ 
•H 
1987 
AES 
Not 
Appl. 
1988 
NSSS 
0 
R 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
R 
0 
Q 
0 
0 
R 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Q 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
-
0 
R 
-
R 
0 
+ 
0 
R 
0 
/} 
0 
R 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Q 
R 
Q 
. 
R 
0 
0 
-t-
-i-
Key: 
R = Reference Group 
/)= Group combined with next adjacent age cohort 
NA= Not Available 
+ = Significantly more pro-coalition 
- = Significantly more pro-Labor 
0 = Not Significant (at P<0.05) 
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State of Residence 
The investigations presented in this chapter indicate tiiat tiiere are not enduring differences 
between the states in terms of party identification or attitude to the parties. Only in 1969 were state 
differences observed in relation to party identification, with the residents of only one state having 
significantiy higher levels of Labor identification. In reference to attitude to the parties only two 
significant differences were observed. These results confirm tiie conclusions reached by McAUister & 
KeUey (1983) after tiie analysis of the 1967 and 1979 ANPA data sets, tiiat tiiere are no poUtical 
differences between the states that cannot be accounted for by social-stmctural factors. 
Investigations of tiie second (extended time period) model, provide mrtiier evidence tiiat tiie 
differences between tiie states are due to transient factors. For tiie two measures of partisanship, a 
greater number of significant coefficients were observed witii this second model (6 compared witii 3). 
Furthermore, tiie significant effects observed in the first model, are generaUy found in tiie second 
model. These findings indicate tiiat issues specific to a particular state (or otiier short-term factors) 
have influences on partisanship. Possibly the performance of the state govemment or the state party 
leaders can have effects on partisanship. This finding may lead to a greater understanding of the lack 
of uniformity, in the proportion of the vote parties receive at federal elections and tiie swings to and 
from parties between elections. 
Ethnicity 
The results obtained from the measures of ethnicity generaUy confirm tiie conclusions found in 
tiie Uteramre (McAUister, 1988c; McAlUster & KeUey, 1982). Eastem Europeans tend to have 
significantiy higher levels of identification with the coalition and have maintained this stance during 
the 1980s. In contrast southem Europeans have changed from having higher levels of identification 
with the coalition parties in 1967, to displaying higher levels of Labor identification. Excepting the 
year 1967, no differences were observed between 'Austialians' and those classified as 'British Isles' or 
'north west Europeans'. 
Differences in partisanship between ethnic groups appear to be based mainly on enduring 
differences in political sociaUsation. This proposition is supported by the analysis of the extended 
time period model where fewer differences between ethnic groups (since the last election) were 
observed. Focusing on party identification. East Europeans become more Labor in 1984 and southem 
Europeans in 1988. 
A general explanation for poUtical differences between ethnic groups is based on both durable 
and tiansient forms of political socialisation. The initial change is brought about by tiansient factors 
such as, the issue of communism influences in the Labor party, a high profile soutiiem European 
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immigration minister or the policies of multiculmraUsm. However, these tiansient influences permeate 
tiux)ughout tiie etiinic community and become part of tiie poUtical sub-culmre of tiiat group. In this 
case, transient factors become durable factors. 
Class Identification 
The analyses of tiie first model indicate tiiat, identification witii tiie working class is one of tiie 
major influences on partisanship. In aU samples investigated, working class identifiers were found to 
be significantiy higher levels of identification witii tiie Labor party and have more positive evaluations 
of tiie Labor party. Working class identification is lUcely to incorporate forms of extra-familial 
socialisation to Labor partisanship, not made explicit in tiie model. Examples are tiie poUtical 
influences of marriage, neighbourhood, friendship networks and housing. 
Over time comparison of the coefficients reveals a decline in the impact working class 
identification on party identification (figure 4.5 - solid Une). Witii respect to party identification tiie 
estimates for the four later samples were lower than tiiose obtained in the tiiree ANPA samples. 
WORKING CLASS I D E N T I F I C A T I O N 
Parameter Estimate 
- 1 . 2 
-0. 8 
- 0 . 6 
-0. 4 
-0. 2 
<>- 0-
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Figure 4.5: Chart showing changes in the impact of identification working class on 
partisanship (Note: 1984 attitude to parties coefficient adjusted). 
In relation to attimde to the parties a decline is not clearly evident (figure 4.5 - dashed line). 
The pattem is confused by the very large coefficient obtained in the 1986 sample. However, the 
157 
estimate for tiie 1988 sample is lower tiian tiiose obtained from tiie ANPA samples, not adjusting for 
changes in the way the concept was measured. Furtiiermore, tiie estimate for the 1984 NSSS is only 
sUghtiy higher tiian tiiose obtained in the analyses of the ANPA samples, altiiough it is likely to have 
less measurement ertor tiian tiie ANPA measures. Therefore, tiiese results do not necessarily 
contradict the finding found for party identification, that the effects of class identification on 
partisanship have declined. 
Investigations of the second (extended time-period) model indicate that tiiere are botii transient 
and durable political socialisation occur with working class identification. However, it appears that the 
transient component has become relatively more important during tiie 1980s, since tiie coefficients 
obtained in relation to party identification in the second model became closer to those obtained from 
analyses of the first model (figure 4.5 - smaU dashed Une). 
Voters who indicated they did not identify with a social class tended to have significantiy higher 
levels of identification with the Labor party and/or a more positive evaluation of tiie Labor party tiian 
middle-class identifiers. This result indicates that a reluctance to see oneself as belonging to a social 
class is associated with a more pro-Labor orientatiorL 
Trade-Union Membership 
As was the case with woridng-class identification, membership of trade unions has large impact 
and sustained impact on party identificatioa The impact of trade-union membership on party 
identification showed no clear pattem (figure 4.6 - solid Une). It is concluded that its effect is more or 
less constant. In relation to attimde to the parties, the impact of trade-union membership is greater on 
the 'better' NSSS measures (figure 4.6 - dashed line), a further indication of a consistent relationship. 
Approximately half the influence of trade-union membership on party identification appears to 
be attributed to transient factors. This finding is indicated by comparing the coefficients obtained from 
tiie first model with those obtained from tiie second model (figure 4.6 - smaU dashed line). The line 
representing transient factors, foUows a very similar pattem to tiie overaU effects of trade-union 
membership (figure 4.6 - compare smaU dashed line to solid Une). It is plausible tiiat new members to 
trade unions become re-socialised towards a greater sympatiiy with Labor poUtics. The durable 
component may represent tiiis transient component becoming permanent 
Self-Employment/Employment Sector 
The self-employed were found to have sigruficantiy higher levels of identification witii tiie 
coalition parties in tiie years 1979, 1984 and 1988. The result for tiie 1979 sample is similar to tiiat 
found by KeUey & McAUister (1985). These findings are not conclusive as to whetiier tiie self-
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Figure 4.6: Chart showing changes in the impact of trade union membership on partisanship 
(Note: 1984 attitude to parties coefficient adjusted). 
employed, are generaUy significantiy 'more coalition' due to durable, possibly ideological factors, or 
they became 'more coalition' for brief periods of time in response to tiie poUcies of the major parties. 
Pemsal of the coefficients can be interpreted as supporting either explanation. The estimates (from tiie 
first model) were generaUy stable (0.34 in 1979, 0.28 in 1984, 0.30 in 1986, 0.21 in 1987 and 0.43 
1988) supporting tiie 'consistency' explanation. However, these estimates were not significant in 1986 
and 1987, pointing to a 'transient factor' based explanation. Investigation of the second model points 
to an explanation focusing on durable differences, since no coefficient associated with tiiis group was 
found to be significant in relation to tiie party identification or tiie relative attitude measures. It is 
suggested that the effects of self-employment on partisanship are transient in the sense that they are 
engendered by media attention to the plight of the self-employed but become incorporated into 
partisanship so transient effects are not observed. For example, the transient effects may have be 
brought about by views that the Fraser govemment was more sympathetic tiian tiie Labor party to the 
self-employed and the Hawke govemment being more interested in big business and unions than smaU 
businesses. 
Govemment employees were found to be consistentiy more Labor than employees of private 
companies. The exceptions are tiie years 1986 and 1988. These findings indicate tiiat some fomi of 
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political socialisation occurs in govemment and private enterprises. This form of political socialisation 
appears to be enduring, since no significant coefficients were observed from the analysis of the second 
model. The explanation for the non-significant effects in the 1986 and 1988 samples may be 
movement toward a less anti-Labor partisanship among employees of private companies, since the 
Labor party shed its image as being an enemy of private enterprise. A counter explanation, that 
govemment employment attracts Labor partisans (or private companies attract coalition partisans), is 
less likely to explain these results, since these analyses control for partisan background. 
Gender 
From the analyses of the first model, men were found to have significantiy higher levels of 
identification witii tiie Labor party only in tiie years 1967 and 1987. From tiiese findings it can be 
inferred that between 1969 and 1986, that any observed differences in political orientations between 
men and women could not be atiributed to gender per se, but to differences between the sexes on 
factors included in these models. When differences occur tiiey are appear to be due to transient 
factors, because analyses of the second model, also found males to have significantiy higher levels of 
Labor identification in 1967 and 1987. Transient factors also appear to be involved in 1979, altiiough 
in the first model, the coefficient associated witii being male just failed to reach statistical significance. 
Therefore, these findings indicate that there are no enduring differences, in the poUtical orientations of 
men and women. 
Age Cohorts 
These analyses showed very few significant differences between the different age cohorts. 
Furthermore, when differences were observed, they were not sustained in later samples. The second 
oldest age cohort had more positive evaluations of the Liberal party in 1967 and higher levels of 
identification with the coaUtion in 1969. However, this group did not appear to have maintained a 
more conservative orientation in later samples. In 1979, the tiiree youngest cohorts had significantiy 
higher levels of Labor identification and more positive evaluations of the Labor party tiian did the 
oldest age cohort. However, these groups were not remarkable in later years. During the 1980s, only 
one cohort in 1988 sample was a significantiy different from the reference group. This findings 
suggests that tiieories of political generations are not appropriate to tiie Australian electorate, during 
the time period smdied. Furthermore, these results suggest that extrapolation of the poUtical 
preferences of the young to fumre electorates is unwise, since they are unlikely to maintain tiieir 
political orientations. 
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The results ftom the second (extended time-period) model suggest tiiat, whenever differences 
between age cohorts appear, tiiey can be attributed to transient factors. A greater number of 
significant differences were found in tills model tiian in tiie first model. (This is apparent if tables 4.8 
and 4.9 are compared witii tables 4.11 and 4.12). In 1969, tiiese transient factors may be related to 
Viemam war issue or tiie more attractive Whitiam-led Labor party^*. In 1979 and 1984 tiiere was no 
obvious issue effecting only young people, altiiough the high levels of youtii unemployment may have 
contributed to young age cohorts adopting a stronger Labor partisanship. However, whatever the 
factors involved, they did not have an enduring effect on partisanship. 
These findings point to an aging theory or lifestyle account of party identification, in which 
younger voters do not retain their Labor preferences as they get older. 
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Education 
Tertiary education was found to be significantiy associated witii partisanship. Tertiary education 
was found to be associated witii botii party identification and relative attitude to tiie parties. Tertiary 
education appears to consistentiy engender a more pro-Labor orientation. Its impact on attimde to tiie 
parties was generaUy higher tiian tiiat on party identification (figure 4.7), a finding contrasting witii 
otiier independent variables (with tiie notable exception of tiie no-religion group). This result could 
attributed to, a reluctance of tiie tertiary-educated to identify with a party, witii a wiUingness to more 
positively evaluate tiie Labor party, relative to tiie Liberal party. 
TERTIARY EDUCATION 
Parameter Estimate 
- 1 . 2 
Attitude to Parties 
-0. a 
-0. 6 
-0. 4 
-0. 2 _ Party Identification 
0 
1970 1975 1980 
Year of Survey 
1985 1990 
Figure 4.7: Chart showing changes in the impact of tertiary education on partisanship (Note: 
1984 attitude to parties coefficients adjusted). 
The relationship between tertiary education and a more 'pro-Labor' orientation suggests that the 
experience of a tertiary education involves some degree of political socialisation. This form of extra-
famUial political socialisation appears to involve transient factors for the following reasons. First, the 
change in the coefficients between 1967 and 1969 is Ukely to be a reflection of tiie mobilisation of 
tertiary smdents to protest against Australia's involvement in Viemam and related issues '^. Second, 
tiie pattems in graphs in figure 4.7, show quite large flucmations, rather tiian a general tendency. 
Third, from the analysis tiie second model, nearly aU of tiie effect of tertiary education on relative 
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attimde to tiie parties (in aU but tiie 1984 sample), appears to be due to tiansient factors. (Compare 
dashed line to smaU dashed line in figure 4.7). 
These findings also confirm tiie non-linear relationship between education and partisanship. In 
several instances tiie 'not completed secondary school' group was significantiy different from tiie 
'completed secondary' group, but resembled tiie tertiary educated group. 
Class Backgrourui 
These findings consistentiy show that class background is irrelevant to the process in which 
voters acquire partisan orientations. Only in the 1984 sample was a significant effect observed. It is 
likely tiiat effects of class background on poUtical orientation wiU be observed only if tiie analysis 
does not control for partisan background. 
Income 
Income was found to have a significant association witii partisanship. Higher incomes were 
related to increasing levels of identification with the coaUtion parties or a relatively more positive 
evaluation of the Liberal party. A quite steady decline of the impact of income on party identification 
from 1979 is observed (figure 4.8). 
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Figure 4.8: Chart showing changes in the impact of income on party identification. 
There are two explanations for this association between income and partisanship. First, the 
relationship could be durable: higher incomes simply engender a more conservative political 
orientation. Conservative govemments are less likely to increase taxes or otherwise penalise high-
income eamers. Altematively, the effect of income on poUtical orientation could be due to transient 
factors, such as response to specific taxation policies or changes in economic circumstances. 
Comparison of the two models suggests that both explanations are plausible, but at different time 
points. In the 1967 and 1969 ANPA samples the influence of income appears to be attributable to 
durable factors, whereas during tiie late 1970s and early 1980s transient factors account for most of the 
influence of income (figure 4.8 - dashed line). Towards tiie late 1980s neitiier was found to have a 
substantial effect. 
Religiosity 
Religiosity as measured by church attendance, was found to be significantiy related to party 
identification in aU samples examined (figure 4.9 - solid Une) and to tiie relative evaluation of tiie 
parties in aU but tiie 1979 sample. Higher levels of religiosity is related to botii increasing levels of 
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Figure 4.9: Chart showing changes in the impact of religiosity on partisanship. 
identification with the coaUtion parties and a more positive evaluation of tiie Liberal party. A similar 
finding has been indicated by other researchers (Aitidn, 1982b:170-173; Gold, 1979). The influence of 
reUgiosity on partisanship seems to be attributable to mainly durable factors. Apart from the 1969 and 
1986 samples, estimates of the transient effects are considerably lower than the total influence of 
religiosity on partisanship. (Compare solid line with dashed line in figure 4.8). One explanation for 
tiiese findings is that church attendance is associated with membership of church and community 
groups, and within these groups a enduring conservative poUtical disposition is engendered. It can be 
speculated that the additional transient effects found in the 1969 and 1984 samples may be attributed 
to particular issues relating to reUgiosity at those times such as censorship in 1969 and abortion during 
the early years of the Hawke govemment. 
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Partisan Background 
In aU samples investigated partisan background had a steady influence on partisanship. In 
relation to party identification the effect is quite constant, altiiough a very slight increase is discemible 
from tiie middle 1980s. In relation to relative attitude to the parties, quite constant effects are 
observed with the ANPA measures and the NSSS measures (figure 4.10). 
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Figure 4.10: Chart showing changes in the impact of partisan background on partisanship 
(Note: 1984 attitude to parties coefficient adjusted). 
A further analysis with separate measures for Labor and coalition backgrounds is presented in 
figure 4.11^. From this figure it appears that the effects on party identification for a coaUtion 
background are more constant than the effects of a Labor background. This result suggests tiiat voters 
from a Labor background are more sensitive to tiie extra-familial forms of political socialisation, than 
those from a coalition background. Like figure 4.10, figure 4.11 shows tiiat overaU, tiie effects of 
partisan background on partisanship have remained remarkably constant A sUght increase over time 
is discemible in the effects of having a coaUtion background. 
It can be concluded that the Australian family has a more or less constant influence on 
partisanship. The role of the famUy as the primary vehicle for poUtical socialisation has not changed 
during tiie time period smdied. Since this relationship is the major source of tiie stability of AustraUan 
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Figure 4.11: Chart showing changes in the impact of partisan background on partisanship. 
party system, then radical departures from present form of Austialian politics appears unlikely. 
1. One problem with this argument is that partisan background does not 'cover' aU those respondents who deviated from their 
partisanship at the last election in response to short term forces. Some respondents may have changed their partisanship at earlier 
time points. However, the focus is on the effects of social structural factors so that only those short term forces (at the last 
election) in figure 4.3, associated wUh social factors will contribute to the estimates. It can be assumed that the estimates 
associated with social factors will represent the effects of transient political socialisation rather than the effects of general short 
term factors (such as issues and candidates) since the associations between social factors and issues (Page & Jones, 1979) and 
candidates (Graetz & McAllister, 1988:257) is generally weak. 
2. This figure may appear low, since it is equivalent to an R square of 0.50. However, it should be noted that vote at the last 
election also includes a component attributable to short term forces at that time, which prompted some party identifiers to vote 
contrary to their identification. In contrast, such short term forces are not a component of the 1967 party identification measure. 
3. It Ukely that the two analyses are explaining a slightly different part of the variance of party identification in 1969, although 
similar R square values were obtained. 
4. Unfortunately, a similar test could not performed on the 1984-1987 NSSS panel study. The second (1987) wave of this panel 
study did not include information on vote at the last election or the political preferences of the respondent's parents. 
5. At the time of analysis, data from the 1990 AES survey was not available. 
6. Party identification was scored as a seven category measure, from very strong Labor identifiers (scored -3) through no major 
party identifiers (0) to very strong coalition identifiers (3). The measures of relative attitude to the parties were also scored so 
that, a non-partisan position received a score of zero. The AhfPA and 1986 and 1988 NSSS measures ranged from -10 to 10 and 
the 1984 NSSS measure ranged from -5 to 5. 
7. 'Better' in the sense that it has a greater variance and more accurately reflects partisanship as having both direction and 
intensity. Furthermore, since OLS regression assumes that the dependent variable is an interval variable, this property is more 
closely approximated by a seven level ordinal index than a two or three level ordinal index. 
8. 'Australian' is defined in terms of either the respxmdent, or at least one of his or her parents was bom in Australia. Details 
are presented in appendix 1. 
9. TTte exceptions are cases where a particular age cohort has too few respondents to be analysed separately. These cohorts are 
either the youngest or oldest age cohort and are grouped with the next yoimgest or oldest age cohort, respectively. 
10. These analyses were also investigated using the a statistical procedm-e for ordered dependent variable developed by McKelvey 
& Zavoina (1975). Although the program has a limit on the number of independent variables that can be included in the analysis, 
almost identical results were obtained from this procedure, compared with the results obtained from OLS regression. 
11. The standard criteria is that the probability of the null hypothesis is less than 0.05, or we are 95% confident that the null 
hypothesis is not true. 
12. McAlUster's (1988a) results are not strictly comparable, since there are differences between that study and this study in terms 
of model specification and the measures of both the independent and dependent variables. 
13. This impact is considered the largest (or greatest), since it reflects a one tmit change in a five level variable. The coefficients 
associated with some of the dummy variables may be larger but they simply contrast that group with the reference group. 
14. The result could be attributed to the popularity of the Dimstan led Labor party. However, this is only speculation. 
15. Fourty-seven cases were declared missing since they did not indicate a level of confidence for either of the major parties. 
16. In the 1984 NSSS, most of the data from rural residents was collected in 1985 and 1986. See appendix 1 for details. 
17. The estimates are only 'unbiased' if the measurement error contained in the dependent variable is uncorrelated with any of 
the independent variables (Berry & Feldman, 1985:28). Education would appear the independent variable most likely to be 
correlated with the error component of the relative attitude to the parties measure, since expressing likes and dislikes would appear 
to be related to articulateness, and articulateness would in turn relate to education. However, the overall correlations between 
education and the measure of relative attitude to the parties are low : 0.03 (not significant) for 'not than completed secondary 
school' and 0.06 for 'tertiary education', suggesting that error component is not highly correlated with education. Therefore, the 
estimates are likely to be unbiased. 
18. Investigations on the propensity of the different groups of identifiers to vote for the party they identify with, will aUow 
conclusions on party dominance. These investigations are carried out in chapters 6 and 7. 
19 These results are obtained when the analysis does not adjust for measurement error. When the model was adjusted for 
measurement error the R square values rise to between 40% and 50% (Cassel, 1982; Knoke 1976:103). 
20. There are distinctions between muldcollinemty, perfect muldcoUinearity and high multicoUinearity. MulticoUinearity is a 
constant feature of data collected through social surveys, since most variables are to some extent correlated with other variables, 
they are seldom statistically independent (Schroeder, Sjoquist & Stephan, 1986:71-72). Perfect multicoUinearity occurs when one 
independent variable is linearly dependent on the other independent variables in the model. In this case, estimates cannot be 
calculated (Lewis-Beck, 1980:57) and the regression analysis carmot be performed. High multicoUinearity is a major concern with 
any multivariate analysis. It occurs when one independent variable is largely (or almost entirely) explained by the other 
independent variables. High multicoUinearity is the major concern, since umreliable estimates are generated (Lewis-Beck, 1980:57-
58). 
21. This simple test is discussed by Schroeder, Sjoquist & Stephan (1986:72). 
22. The tolerance value for a single independent variable is defined as l-R^(Xi), where R^(Xi) is the R square value obtained from 
regression analysis of that variable on all other independent variables. If a variable is very highly correlated with the other 
variables the tolerance value approaches zero. 
23. The exceptions were some of the age cohorts and religious groups, that had tolerance values below 0.7. However, low 
tolerance values are not unexpected in variables with a large number of dummy variable categories and are not indicative of 
serious multicoUinearity problems (Advice from statistical consultant). 
24. The 'other non-manual' group is equivalent to the Social class III (Routine non-manual. Clerical and Sales) of the 
investigations by Jones & Davis (1986). Of sons in this class (Social class group HI), 36% came from manual backgrounds, that 
is the father had a skiUed, semi-skiUed or imskiUed manual job (Jones & Davis, 1986:24). 
25. There are two altemative explanations. The possibUity that Labor and coalition partisans seek parmers with sirmlar poUtical 
orientation is unlikely to be a major influence, since poUtics is not usuaUy seen as a criterion for a suitable marriage parmer. A 
second altemative explanation that people tend to marry people with similar social structural characteristics and thus similar 
political orientations, is undermined by the generally low association between social stnictural factors and party identification 
(R square less 0.20 - Bean, 1984:309; McAllister, 1988a). There is some evidence that political socialisation occurs during 
marriage. From the analysis of correlations between the party identification of husbands, wives and their parents, Weiner (1978) 
concluded that poUtical sociaUsation occurs during marriage. It is likely that all three processes are operating, with sociaUsation 
during marriage the major influence. 
26. The non-significant result for the 1967 sample is probably due to the lower levels of party identification for the Labor party 
in non-rural areas, compared to the later samples. Therefore, in this sample differences between rtiral and non-rural residents 
would not be very great. 
27. Electoral redistributions between these two time points may have been responsible for these changes, if the rural/non-rural 
measure was a better indicator of rurality in 1979 than in 1969. However, there no reason to suggest that there are substantial 
differences in the reliabUities of these two measures, since rural electorates were defined in a similar manner. 
28. The most likely short-term factor, the Vietnam war issue, was fotmd not to alter this effect. 
29. Addition of a measure of the Viemam issue to the second model, substantially decreased the effect for tertiary education from 
-0.50 to -0.34. 
30. Two dummy variables were employed for this additional analysis, one for a Labor background (one or more parents preferring 
Labor) and the other for a coalition background (one or more parents preferring either of the coaUtion parties). The reference 
group includes those respondents who (i) were missing for this data for both parents (ii) both parents preferred another party or 
no party and (ui) one parent was Labor and the other was coalition. 
CHAPTER 5 
IDEOLOGY 
In tills chapter tiie results of investigations on 'ideology' are reported. The main purpose of tiiis 
chapter is to investigate the relationships of ideology witii social factors and partisan background. The 
investigations reported in tiiis chapter, focus on one part of the model of electoral choice (figure 5.1), 
first presented in chapter 3. 
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Figure 5.1: The part of the model investigated in this chapter, focusing on the relationships 
of Ideology with social factors and partisan background. 
The model specifies that ideological orientations relate to partisan background and social factors. 
It is hypothesised tiiat one source of attimdes to ideological matters is the voter's family of origin, 
measured by partisan background\ As in the case of partisanship, social factors represent mrther 
political socialisation during adulthood. It is hypothesised that certain social groups wiU have different 
ideological positions. For example, the university educated are expected to be generaUy more Uberal 
and mral residents more conservative. 
The resiUts from these investigations wiU inform on the foUowing questions. First, the extent to 
which ideological orientations relate to the partisan preferences of tiie family of origin. Second, tiiese 
167 
168 
investigations wiU indicate which social-stmcmral factors are associated witii ideology and which are 
not. When a particular social factor is found to have a substantial and consistent relation witii 
ideology, then it can be inferred that some form of socialisation on ideological matters is occurring 
relating to that social factor. Conversely, if a particidar social factor is found to have no relationship 
witii ideology, tiien it can be concluded tiiat littie or no socialisation occurs associated witii tills factor. 
Third, the extent of tiie overaU relationship between social factors and ideology can be evaluated. If 
there is littie or no association between social factors and ideology, then the above model should be 
revised. Furthermore, the claim that ideology is a mediator between social-stmcmral factors and vote 
would be questioned. FinaUy and importantiy, these investigations wiU indicate what changes have 
occurred over time in the relation between social factors and partisan background on the one hand and 
ideology on the other. 
Further analyses are reported, which investigate tiie possibility that ideological orientations are to 
a large extent stmcmred by present partisanship. Instead of ideology and partisanship being specified 
as independent variables with no causal links specified between them, a casual influence is 
hypotiiesised from partisanship to ideology. A model iUustrating this causal Unk, is presented in figure 
5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Revision to model showing 'Ideology' being structured by 'Partisanship'. 
There are two preliminary steps, in the investigation of the relations of ideology, with partisan 
background and social factors. The first step is to establish whetiier, ideology can be considered in 
terms of the three underlying dimensions proposed in chapter 3 (figure 5.3). The second preliminary 
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step, is to examine whetiier or not ideology has one property of a long-term electoral force, tiiat is it is 
a generaUy stable orientatioa 
Economic Liberalism/Conservatism 
Non-Economic Liberalism/Conservatism 
Post-Materialism 
Attitude to (big) business 
Attitude to social services/reduce taxes 
Attitude to the death penalty 
Attitude to Innigration 
Attitude to censorship/pornography 
Attitude to royalty 
Attitude to uranlux nlnlng 
Attitude to legalisation of narljuana 
Attitude to special benefits for Aborigines 
Figure 5.3: A model of the indicators of three dimensions of 'Ideology'. 
The chapter then comprises three parts. The first examines the hypothesis tiiat ideology can be 
understood as consisting of three distinct dimensions. The second considers tiie stability of ideology 
over time, and the third dicusses the relations of ideology to partisan background and social factors. 
5.1 DATA, MEASURES AND METHODS 
The data employed in these analyses are from the seven smdies on electoral behaviour employed 
in the previous chapter, detailed in appendix 1. AU seven data sets were employed in the 
investigations referred to in the first and third parts of tills chapter. However, the investigations of the 
stability of ideological orientations, tiie second part of the chapter, were restricted to one data set. 
Panel data which includes measures obtained over time is necessary for the investigation of the 
StabUity of ideological orientations. The 1967-1969 ANPA panel data are suitable for tiiis purpose .^ 
These indicators of the 3 dimensions of ideology hypotiiesised were presented in figure 5.3. In 
addition 'general ideological orientation' is included in this investigations, since it relates directiy to 
ideological orientation. The otiier indicators are chosen for two reasons, they can be distinguished as 
indicators of economic liberal/conservatism, non-economic Uberalism/conservatism and post-
materiahsm and they are generaUy common across the data sets. Appendix 1 provides rationales for 
their inclusion and detaUs the constmction of these measures. 
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In order to have these indicators as comparable as possible, tiiese indicators of tiie hypotiiesised 
ideological dimensions were measured at a nominal ratiier tiian at an interval (or ordinal) level. In tiie 
ANPA surveys many of these indicators were measured witii dichotomous response categories so in 
order to control for different measurement strategies, tiie measures from tiie later surveys were also 
measured by broad categories. These issue is mrtiier discussed in appendix 1. 
In tiie investigation of the effects of partisan background and social-stmcmral factors on ideology, 
tiie independent variables employed in the previous chapter were used: occupational class, religion, 
mral/non-mral residence, etimicity, class identification, income, trade- union membership, religiosity, 
age cohort, gender, education and class background. 
In contrast to the analyses reported in tiie last chapter, the measures of income and religiosity 
were specified as categorical rather than continuous variables since in preliminary analyses differences 
between categories of these variables were obscured when the measures were considered as continuous 
variables. 
In the tests of ideology being stmcmred by present partisanship (figure 5.2), tiie measure of 
partisan background is substimted with the two measures of partisanship, a seven-category measure of 
party identification and a continuous measure of relative attitude to the parties. 
With the exception of partisan background, tiie independent variables were cast as dummy 
variables. The reference groups were manual occupation, Anglican religion, resident of a mral area, 
residing in New Soutii Wales, working class identification, the group earning the lowest incomes, 
trade-union membership, never attending church, the oldest age cohort(s) (except in tiie 1986 and 1988 
samples where a middle aged cohort was the reference group^), males, a less than completed 
secondary school education and a non-manual class background'*. Some of these reference groups 
differ from those employed in tiie investigations reported in last chapter. The rationale for tiiese 
reference groups, was to specify the most leftist or liberal group as the reference group or if no group 
could be seen as the most Uberal group, tiie largest group^ 
In parts 1 and 2 of this chapter, missing values were handled by pair-wise deletion. In tiie 
investigation of tiie causal model (part 3), the analyses were restricted to respondents in the 1969 and 
1987 samples who indicated that tiiey had voted at tiie last federal election, and in the other samples to 
those respondents who intended to vote for political party, if an election was to be held in tiie near 
fumre. The rational for this procedure, was to exclude the more politicaUy apathetic from the 
analyses, in order to sharpen the relationships of ideology with partisan background and social factors. 
In the investigation of hypothetical underlying ideological dimensions the statistical technique 
often employed in such analyses - factor analysis - coiUd not be employed in these analyses. The 
main reason is that nominal measures carmot be included in factor analysis (Kim & MueUer, 
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1978b:73). Therefore, tiie test of tiie tiiree underiying ideological dimensions was performed by 
simply focusing on tiie associations between tiie indicators. Ideological dimensions would be indicated 
by the indicators of each dimensions having higher associations witii each otiier, tiian witii otiier items. 
The pattems of association between the indicators of ideology was assessed by tiie Cramer's V 
statistic. This measure of association is based on chi-square, adjusting for tiie sample size and tiie 
number of categories of the two variables tested^ Cramer's V is an appropriate statistic, since it 
attains the value zero when no relationship exists between the two variables and approaches one witii 
very strong associations. Unlike some bivariate measures of association, it can attain unity when tiie 
number of categories in the two variables are not equal (Blalock, 1979:303, 305). Furthermore, the 
statistic is not sensitive to extreme distributions of tiie two variables (Blalock, 1979:315). This statistic 
was also employed in the investigations of the stability of ideological orientations, since these 
considerations are again relevant. 
The results reported fix)m the analysis of tiie causal model, were obtained by logistic regression 
on dichotomous variables constmcted from the response categories. This choice of logistic regression 
was based on two considerations, the necessity of employing a multivariate technique and the 
suitabUity of logistic regression, given tiie dichotomous namre of the dependent variables. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is generaUy considered as inappropriate when the 
dependent variable is dichotomous. The normality of the error terms and the homoscedastic 
assumptions are violated (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984:53). The estimates of tiie population parameters 
tend to be unbiased, but are not 'best', that is the estimates do not have the smaUest possible error 
variance (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984:13-14,27). Estimated standard errors are therefore incorrect and 
statistical tests on the coefficients cannot be performed. Furthermore, nonsensical results can be 
produced since the predicted values of the dependent variable faU outside the range of the observed 
values (Aitidn et al., 1989:168-169). 
StatisticaUy, the estimates ftx)m logistic regression in large samples are unbiased (the parameter 
estimates are as close as possible to the tme population values), efficient (the estimates have a minimal 
sampling variance) and normal (that is statistical tests of tiie nuU hypothesis can be performed) 
(Aldrich & Nelson, 1984:53-54). 
The technique of logistic regression aUows assessments of the goodness of fit of the model and 
the significance of tiie independent variables in relation to the dependent (or response) variables to be 
made. 
The goodness of fit of the models indicates if the model is appropriate in the investigation of tiie 
dependent variable. The fit of the models was assessed by the Ukelihood ratio statistic (or scaled 
deviance) which compares the fit of the nuU model, to tiiat of the fuU modef. hi tiie nuU model, all 
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tiie coefficients except tiie intercept are zero* (Aitidn, et al. 1989:171; Aldrich & Nelson 1984:55-56). 
The comparison is based on the scaled deviance for each model which is minus twice the Ukelihood 
function (Aitidn et al., 1989:170). The difference between the two values is distributed in large 
samples as a chi-square distribution, so the overaU goodness of fit can be assessed (Aitidn et al., 
1989:171; Aldrich & Nelson, 1984:55). Furthenmore, this difference in scaled deviance can be 
expressed as a percentage of the scaled deviance of the baseUne or nuU model (Jones & McAUister, 
1989). A higher percentage is suggestive of a more satisfactory model. A summary of tiie goodness 
of fits of the models is presented in table A5.1 (in tiie appendix to this chapter). 
The significance of each individual parameter in tiie model on vote is assessed by the usual test 
of the nuU hypothesis: that tiie parameter is zero in the population from which the sample was drawn. 
The significance of each parameter in tiie model is readily obtained, since the standard errors of the 
estimate are computed and using the t-ratio, the probabiUty of this estimate being due to a chance 
association, when in fact it is zero, can be inferred (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984:55). In this analysis (or 
any analysis of a sample witii over 120 cases), if tiie t-ratio is greater than 1.96 then tiie probability of 
the nuU hypotiiesis being accepted for that parameter estimate is less than 0.05. In the tables of tiie 
results presented in this chapter, parameters with t ratios greater tiian 1.96 are mariced by an asterisk'. 
In respect to the causal model, the analyses of the dichotomous response variables are not 
discussed individuaUy, but the resiUts are discussed in general terms for aU samples. Discussing the 
results of each individual analysis woiUd be tedious. In addition, the purpose of these investigations is 
to identify general trends, rather than specific relationships at single time points. The results obtained 
from tiie investigation of the causal models are presented in the tables that comprise the appendix to 
tills chapter (tables A5.2-A5.8). 
5.2 PART 1: DISTINCT IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 
The results of the bivariate associations between the indicators of ideology over the seven data 
sets are presented in tables 5.1 to 5.7. 
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TABLE 5.1: CORRELATIONS (CRAMER'S V) BETWEEN VARIABLES (1967 ANPA) 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1 General Ideological Position 
ECONOMIC LIBERAUSMyCONSERVATISM 
2 Big Business Too much Power 
3 Spend on Welfare/Reduce Taxes 
NON-ECONOMIC LIBERAUSM/CONSERVATISM 
4 Death Penalty 
5 Migration 
6 Censorship 
7 Royalty 
0.10 
0.06 
0.07 
0.09 
0.05 
0.06 
0.13 
0.13 
0.14 
0.11 
0.10 
0.10 
0.13 
0.15 
0.09 
0.13 
0.13 
0.06 
0.19 
0.10 0.14 
TABLE 5.2: CORRELATIONS (CRAMER'S V) BETWEEN VARL^LBLES (1969 ANPA) 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1 General Ideological Position 
ECONOMIC LIBERAUSM/CONSERVATISM 
2 Big Business Too much Power 
3 Spend on Welfare/Reduce Taxes 
NON-ECONOMIC LIBERAUSM/CONSERVATISM 
4 Death Penalty 
5 Migration 
6 Censorship 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.16 
7 Royalty . . . . . 
TABLE 5.3: CORRELATIONS (CRAMER'S V) BETWEEN VARL\BLES (1979 ANPA) 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
0.10 
0.05 
0.06 
0.09 
0.09 
0.11 
0.10 
0.12 
0.13 0.12 
1 General Ideological Position 
ECONOMIC LIBERAUSM/CONSERVATISM 
2 Big Business Too much Power 
3 Spend on Welfare/Reduce Taxes 
NON-ECONOMIC LIBERAUSM/CONSERVATISM 
4 Death Penalty 
5 Migration 
6 Censorship 
7 Royalty 
POST-MATERIAUSM 
8 Uranium Mining 
9 Marijuana 
10 Special Benefits for Aborigines 
0.14 
0.13 
0.11 
0.13 
0.07 
0.10 
0.15 
0.13 
0.12 
0.13 
0.08 
0.10 
0.06 
0.10 
0.18 
0.07 
0.09 
0.16 
0.12 
0.06 
0.07 
0.14 
0.07 
0.13 
0.15 
0.08 
0.08 
0.18 
0.12 
0.13 
0.08 
0.10 
0.13 
0.12 
0.12 
0.09 
0.08 
0.17 
0.07 
0.12 
0.14 
0.07 
0.11 
0.08 0.07 
TABLE 5.4: CORRELATIONS (CRAMER'S V) BETWEEN VARIABLES (1984 NSSS) 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1 General Ideological Position 
ECONOMIC LIBERAUSM/CONSERVATISM 
2 Big Business Too much Power 
3 Sf)end on Welfare/Reduce Taxes 
NON-ECONOMIC LIBERAUSM/CONSERVATISM 
4 Death Penalty 
5 Migration 
6 Censorship 
7 Royalty 
POST-MATERL\USM 
8 Uraniiun Mining 
9 Marijuana 
10 Special Benefits for Aborigines 
0.11 
0.09 0.09 
0.08 0.08 0.13 
0.06 
0.10 
0.11 
0.12 
0.09 
0.04 
0.08 
0.14 
0.07 
0.06 
0.04 
0.07 
0.10 
0.12 
0.14 
0.06 
0.07 
0.16 
0.11 
0.16 
0.12 
0.03 
0.22 
0.04 
0.13 
0.17 
0.09 
0.09 
0.12 0.12 
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TABLE 5.5: CORRELATIONS (CRAMER'S V) BETWEEN VARIABLES (1986 NSSS) 
Meastire 1 2 3 4 5 
1 General Ideological Position 
ECONOMIC LIBERAUSM/CONSERVATISM 
2 Big Business Too much Power 
3 Spend on Welfare/Reduce Taxes 
NON-ECONOMIC LIBERAUSM/CONSERVATISM 
4 Death Penalty 
5 Migration 
6 Censorship 
7 Royalty 
POST-MATERL^LISM 
8 Uranium Mining 
9 Marijuana 
10 Special Benefits for Aborigines 
0.10 
0.09 0.13 
0.05 0.08 0.15 
0.05 
0.10 
0.07 
0.11 
0.09 
0.04 
0.13 
0.06 
0.09 
0.12 
0.03 
0.08 
0.14 
0.07 
0.16 
0.08 
0.08 
0.15 
0.14 
0.17 
0.13 
0.05 
0.23 
0.06 
0.08 
0.16 
0.06 
0.12 
0.15 0.10 
TABLE 5.6: CORRELATIONS (CRAMER'S V) BETWEEN VARIABLES (1987 AES) 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1 General Ideological Position 
ECONOMIC LIBERAUSM/CONSERVATISM 
2 Big Business Too much Power 
3 Spend on Welfare/Reduce Taxes 
NON-ECONOMIC LIBERAUSM/CONSERVATISM 
4 Death Penalty 
5 Migration 
6 Censorship 
7 Royalty 
POST-MATERIAUSM 
8 Uranium Mining 
9 Marijuana 
10 Special Benefits for Aborigines 
0.06 
0.13 
0.07 
0.11 
0.08 
0.13 
0.14 
0.09 
0.08 
0.12 
0.06 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
0.10 
0.06 
0.10 
0.13 
0.09 
0.04 
0.08 
0.09 
0.07 
0.12 
0.22 
0.03 
0.11 
0.18 
0.09 
0.19 
0.08 
0.13 
0.22 
0.07 
0.17 
0.11 
0.12 
0.19 
0.06 
0.17 
0.15 
0.06 
0.09 
0.11 0.07 
TABLE 5.7: CORRELATIONS (CRAMER'S V) BETWEEN VARL^iBLES (1988 NSSS) 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1 General Ideological Position 
ECONOMIC LIBERAUSM/CONSERVATISM 
2 Big Business Too much Power 
3 Spend on Welfare/Reduce Taxes 
NON-ECONOMIC LIBERAUSM/CONSERVATISM 
4 Death Penalty 
5 Migration 
6 Censorship 
7 Royalty 
POST-MATERIAUSM 
8 Uranium Mining 
9 Marijuana 
10 Special Benefits for Aborigines 
0.09 
0.10 
0.09 
0.03 
0.09 
0.09 
0.10 
0.10 
0.06 
0.10 
0.04 
0.07 
0.09 
0.08 
0.05 
0.10 
0.05 
0.07 
0.11 
0.07 
0.16 
0.08 
0.07 
0.10 
0.10 
0.16 
0.11 
0.05 
0.19 
0.07 
0.13 
0.12 
0.07 
0.07 
0.14 0.10 
These tables suggest three general findings. First, the associations between the different indicators 
are aU quite low. Therefore, tiiere is no evidence of single overarching ideology from which 
Australians base their views on these social and political matters. Secondly, there is no evidence tiiat 
the three ideological dimensions hypothesised exist, since the intra-correlations between the indicators 
of each group are no higher, than the inter-correlations between indicators of different groups. Third, 
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tiiere is Uttie consistency of correlations between pairs of indicators in different data sets. The same 
conclusions are reached, if different measures of association are employed or Pearson r correlations are 
performed on dichotomous variables developed from each category'". 
In addition to these tiiree general findings, these results also indicate that no change has taken 
place in the ideological consistency of the Australian electorate. The average correlations have 
remained low, tiiroughout iie time period investigated. An average correlation of 0.11 was calculated 
for tiie 1967 ANPA data, 0.09 for tiie 1969 ANPA, 0.11 for tiie 1979 ANPA, 0.10 for tiie 1984 NSSS, 
0.10 for tiie 1986 NSSS, 0.11 for tiie 1987 AES and 0.11 for tiie 1988 NSSS. This stabiUty of tiie 
average correlation between the indicators suggests tiiat tiiere is no evidence tiiat attitudes to these 
matters have become increasingly or decreasingly tiie product of a general ideological orientation. 
5.3 PART 2: THE STABILITY OF IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS 
The results of the associations between the six ideological indicators in the two years between 
1967 and 1969 are presented in table 5.8. This table also includes comparable statistics on the seven 
category measure of party identification, the Viemam war issue and the number of likes towards the 
leader of the opposition at the time, Mr Whitiam". 
TABLE 5.8: CORRELATIONS (CRAMER'S V) BETWEEN VARL^kBLES (1967-1969 ANPA Panel) 
Measure 
1 General Ideological Position 
ECONOMIC LIBERAUSM/CONSERVATISM 
2 Big Business Too much Power 
3 Spend on Welfare/Reduce Taxes 
NON-ECONOMIC LIBERALISM/CONSERVATISM 
4 Death Penalty 
5 Migration 
6 Censorship 
7 Royalty 
Party Identification 
Vietnam Issue 
Likes to Whitiam 
0.40 
0.28 
0.27 
0.43 
0.32 
0.31 
-
0.41 
0.25 
0.19 
These results are evidence that 'ideology' can be considered as a relatively stable orientation . 
The StabUity of general ideological orientation is comparable with tiiat of party identification'^ , 
although much of the stabUity of general ideological position can be attributed to the large proportion 
of both samples who eitiier place themselves in the centre or do not see themselves in ideological 
terms. Attimdes to the death penalty were quite stable between 1967 and 1979. The association of 
the other indicators of ideology between the two time points, was greater than tiiat for eitiier tiie 
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Viemam war issue or the numbers of likes towards Whitiam. The correlations are in general over 
0.25, suggesting tiiat tiie electorates' attimdes to tiiese matters had a moderate degree of stabiUty. 
5.4 PART 3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL FACTORS AND IDEOLOGY 
The lack of empirical support for tiie proposition for tiie existence of tiiree ideological dimensions 
complicates the investigation of the relationships between social factors and ideology. If evidence was 
found that general ideological orientations existed, then the indicators of ideology could be combined 
into summary measures. However, the empirical investigations of attimdinal consistency, do not aUow 
the constmction of summary measures. 
Since the indicators do not cluster, the causal model was investigated for the dichotomous 
variables constmcted from the response categories of each indicator. These investigations may 
resurrect the notion of distinct ideological dimensions, if the same social factors were found to be 
important for the different indicators of a single hypotiiesised ideological dimension. For example, if 
class related factors were found to be important in relation to the two indicators of economic ideology 
and not for the indicators of the other ideological dimensions, then such a result is some evidence for 
a distinct economic Uberalism/conservatism dimension. The smaU associations between the indicators 
found in the first part of the results section could then be attributed to high measurement error. 
OveraU, the relationships between social-stmcmral factors and these indicators of ideology are 
quite weak. GeneraUy, social-stmcmral factors can account for less than 15% of the scaled deviance 
of the dichotomous variables (table A5.1 in the appendix to this chapter). The exceptions are the 
models of left and right ideological self-placement in which a greater proportion of the scaled deviance 
is accounted for. In most instances, the substimtion of partisan background by the two measures of 
partisanship, only marginaUy increased the percentage of scaled deviance accounted for by tiie models 
(table A5.1). 
5.4.1 General Ideological Alignment 
In general, left and right ideological self-placement have moderate association with social-
stmcmral factors. The exception is the much smaUer percentage explained in tiie 1987 AES data, in 
which the measure used was quite different from the measures used in the other smdies'^ . A 
consistent finding was that the causal model could account for a greater proportion of tiie scaled 
deviance for ideological self-placement on the left, compared with self-placement on the right. 
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(A) Left Position 
In tiie analysis of left ideological position tiie most consistent finding was tiiat tiie 'no religion' 
group were significantiy more Ukely to place themselves on tiie left. This result was found in all data 
sets with tiie exception of the 1986 'Role of government' data. This finding reflects tiie non-religious 
namre of leftist self-identification. 
In general, the non-manual occupational groups were not more lUcely to place themselves on the 
left compared with those in a manual occupation. There are a few exceptions, lower (or other) 
professionals were in 1967 and 1979 more likely to place themselves on the left. Lower non-manual 
groups in 1986 and 1988 and upper professionals in 1987, were less likely to place tiiemselves on tiie 
left. 
There were Uttie differences between mral and non-mral residents and between the residents of 
the different states in relation ideological placement on the left. The only exception was in 1984 when 
residents of Victoria were found to be significantiy more likely to place themselves on the left, 
compared with residents of New Soutii Wales. Although, the coefficients associated witii Victoria 
residency in the other analyses, tended to be positive, the 1984 result is the orUy reflection of the more 
leftist namre of Labor party and trade-union politics in Victoria. 
In terms of 'left' self-placement, few differences were observed among the ethnic groups. The 
exceptions being north west Europeans in 1984, soutiiem Europeans in 1987 and eastem Europeans in 
1986, these groups were found to be significantiy more lUcely to place themselves on the left. The 
results for north west and southem Europeans, may be a reflection of the more frequent use of 
ideological terms in European politics. The result for east Europeans (in 1986) is somewhat puzzling, 
since this group is generaUy understood as being 'anti-communist'. The smaU numbers of both eastem 
Europeans and leftists in the 1986 sample is lUcely to be responsible this anomalous result. 
Tertiary education was found to be significantiy associated witii leftist position in 1967, 1969 and 
1979, but not in the later years. Zagorski (1988) found a similar result in data coUected in 1983. This 
result may reflect the inteUecmal credibUity the 'left' had until the late 1980s. 
In 1967, females were sigruficantiy less Ukely than males to place themselves on the left. This 
result was not found in the investigations of data coUected at later time points. A similar result was 
obtained in relation to party identification, when women were found to be significantiy less likely to 
identify with the Labor party in 1967 but not at most otiier time points. 
Trade-union membership was found to be associated with a more leftist position in 1979, 1986 
and 1987. Non-members of trade-unions were less lUcely tiian trade-union members to place 
themselves on the left. OiUy infrequentiy were significant differences observed between the income 
groups and orUy in 1984, was religiosity associated with self-placement on the left. In 1969, 
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significant differences were found between the age cohorts, witii 28 to 43 year olds (cohorts 4 and 5) 
being less inclined to place tiiemselves on tiie left, compared witii tiie oldest age cohort. 
Partisan background was negatively associated witii a left position in 1979, 1984 and 1988, 
showing that 'leftists' have a tendency to come from Labor backgrounds. 
(B) Right position 
In general, the measures that were found to be significantiy associated with self-placement on tiie 
right were middle class identification, tertiary education, the younger age cohorts and partisan 
background. Identification with the middle class was found to be significantiy associated with a 
rightist position in 1967, 1969, 1979, 1984 and 1987. The tertiary educated were found to be 
significantiy more likely to place tiiemselves on tiie right in 1967 and 1979, but significantiy less 
likely to place themselves on the right in 1988. The result for tiie ANPA samples in which the tertiary 
educated were significantiy more Ukely to place themselves either on tiie left or tiie right, suggest tiiat 
tertiary education had the effect of influencing people to think of themselves in ideological terms. 
During the 1980s, the tertiary educated have become less incUned to place themselves on the left or 
the right. 
Younger age cohorts were found to be significantiy less likely to place themselves on the right, in 
1967, 1969, 1979, 1984, 1986 and 1987. However, as these cohorts aged they generaUy were not 
significantiy different from the reference group. This resiUt indicates that age cohorts do not maintain 
their poUtical orientations tiiroughout their life-time. Zagorski (1988) found that a continuous measure 
of age was significantiy associated with a rightist ideological position, in data coUected in 1983. 
Partisan backgroimd was found to be positively associated with a rightist position in aU samples 
examined. This resiUt with that obtained for partisan background and leftist orientation leads to the 
conclusion that ideological position is influenced by partisan background. 
No consistent differences were found in respect to occupational class, religion, region, etimicity, 
trade-union membership, reUgiosity and class background. One notable exception is the finding that 
eastem Europeans were more Ukely to place themselves on the right, in 1979 and 1984. 
5.4.2 Economic Liberalism/Conservatism 
(A) Attimde to (Big) Business 
Social-stmcmral factors were only weakly associated witii attitudes towards big business. In the 
analyses of both positive and negative attimdes towards business, the social-stmcmral model could 
only account for approximately 10% of the scaled deviance of the measures. At most time points. 
179 
little was gained by tiie substimtion of partisan background by tiie two measures of partisanship. The 
amount of scaled deviance accounted for by the model rose by only a few percentage points. The 
exception was tiie 1979 sample in which tiie percentage increased quite steeply from 5% to 12%. This 
finding is Ukely to be due to the ideological division between notions of free enterprise and 
govemment intervention, during tiie Whitiam and Fraser govemments. 
Negative Attitudes to (Big) Business 
In respect to negative attimdes to (big) business, orUy a limited number of consistent results 
appear. The social-stmcmral factors that had consistent effects on attimde to business were tiie 'no 
religion' and partisan background. The 'no religion' group were significantiy more likely to view 
business having too much power in 1967, 1969, 1984, 1986 and 1988. Residents of tiie state of 
Victoria tended to agree to the proposition that big business had too much power in 1967 and 1979. 
This result may reflect tiie higher public profile of disputes between employers and employees in 
Victoria than in other states. Queenslands were found to be negative towards big business in 1987. 
The result for Queensland may indicate some pubUc disapproval with the close relations between 
business and the National party government during the late 1980s. Partisan background was found to 
be significantiy (and negatively) related to this view in 1969, 1979, 1984, 1986 and 1987. 
Younger age groups tended to be less Ukely to view big business as being too powerful in 1967 
and 1969. These results are a further indication of the general conservatism of tiiese young cohorts, 
found in bivariate analyses of party identification (Aitidn, 1982b:98-99). In the 1967 sample, the age 
cohort bom between 1934 and 1941, was significantiy less likely to indicate that big business had too 
much power, but by 1979 tills group had reversed its position. The higher income groups were found 
to be less Ukely to have negative attimdes to business in 1984, 1986 and 1988. Middle class 
identifiers were significantiy less likely to say business had too much power in the 1979, 1984, 1986 
and 1987 samples, reflecting some class basis in responses to this matter. Non-membership of a trade-
union was negatively associated with tiiis position in the 1979, 1984, 1986 and 1987 samples, a 
reflection that attimdes to tiiis matter relate to conflicts between employers and employees. Females 
were found to be significantiy less Ukely to express a negative view towards business in 1967 and 
1969. This finding may indicate that women during the late 1960s tended to be less critical of 
political groups than men. However in the 1984 sample, women were significantiy more likely tiian 
men to have a negative attimde to big business. 
Positive Attitudes to (Big) Business 
In relation to positive attitudes towards big business, the only consistent predictor was partisan 
background. Not surprisingly, a more coalition background is associated witii more positive views of 
business. This resuU was found in aU the samples examined, except the 1988 NSSS. The 'no 
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religion' group were significantiy less likely to be sympatiietic to business in 1967, 1984, and 1988. 
This result is a mrther indication of more 'leftist' stance, of those who profess to no religious 
denomination. Higher income groups were found to be significantiy more lUcely to have positive 
evaluations of business in 1984 and 1988. As was found in relation to negative views about business, 
younger age cohort groups in 1967, 1969, and 1979 were significantiy more likely to take tiie view 
that big busmess does not have too much power. However, these age groups were not substantially 
different from older cohorts in later years. In 1984, the youngest cohort was less likely to be positive 
towards business. Middle class identifiers were significantiy more likely to say business does not have 
too much power, at aU time points since 1979. 
(B) Spending on Welfare or cutting taxation 
Models of social-stmcmral factors can only account for a small proportion of the scaled deviance, 
of tiie dichotomous measures created from the question, on preference for more spent on welfare or 
cuts in taxation. Substimtion with the two partisanship concepts did not substantiaUy improve the fit 
of tiie model, especiaUy in tiie two data sets coUected in tiie 1960s. However, in the 1979 and later 
samples, the addition of the measures of partisanship did improve the fit of tiie models by a modest 
two to four percentage points. Therefore, it can be concluded this matter became only slightiy 
politicised during the 1970s. 
Comparison of the responses to this question between tiie 1967 sample and the 1979 or later 
samples, show a quite dramatic change from a majority of the 1967 sample supporting more spending 
on social services to a majority choosing lower taxes in the 1979 and later samples. Despite this 
change, a high degree of consistency was foimd, in the relationship between social factors and attitudes 
to this matter. 
Increase Spending 
In the analysis of the 'increase spending on welfare' option, the most consistent predictors were 
income, education, mral/non-mral residence and partisan background. As was found in the analysis of 
general ideological position, the no reUgion group were noticeable, they were found to be significantiy 
more Ukely to advocate increased spending on welfare in all data sets coUected during the 1980s. 
GeneraUy, tiie lowest income group (the reference group in aU analyses) were significantiy more 
likely to take this option than several of the other higher income groups. This result was found in the 
analysis of tiie 1967, 1969, 1979, 1984, 1986 and 1988 data sets. The simple explanation for tiiis 
result is self-interest. Respondents with lower incomes prefer a stronger 'safety net' while those on 
higher incomes prefer to have lower taxes. 
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Education was found to be significantiy associated witii this option in 1967, 1969, 1979, 1984, 
1986 and 1988. The group tiiat had not completed secondary school (tiie reference category), was 
significantiy less Ukely to approve of increased spending on welfare, than those who completed 
secondary school (in 1967), or those who had had at least some tertiary education (in 1979, 1986 and 
1988), or both groups (in 1969 and 1984). These findings are an indication of tiie 'liberalising' 
influence of education. 
Residents from mral areas were significantiy less lUcely to advocate increased spending on welfare 
in aU years examined except for 1988. This result is additional evidence that a distinctive political 
sub-culmres exists among those living in mral areas, a conclusion indicated from the investigations of 
partisanship reported in the previous chapter. 
Partisan background was found to be negatively associated with support for increased spending on 
weU^ are in 1967, 1969, 1984, 1986 and 1988. In 1979 and 1987, tiie coefficients were in tiie expected 
direction but failed to be significant at the 0.05 level. This result indicates that partisan background is 
an important influence, on whether individuals support increased welfare. 
Reducing Taxes 
In relation to advocacy of cutting taxes ratiier tiian spending more on welfare, the results were 
similar but of course, opposite to tiiose obtained in relation to the 'increased spending option'. The 
most consistent predictors were income, education, mral/non-mral residence, and partisan background. 
5.4.3 Non-Economic Liberalism/Conservatism 
(A) The Deatii Penalty 
The causal model could only account for approximately 10% of the scaled deviance, of tiie 
categorical measures on the attimde to the death penalty. The addition of partisanship to the model 
did not substantiaUy increase the explanatory power of the model. This finding suggests that attimdes 
to the death penalty were basicaUy, non-partisan which is understandable given the reluctance of 
poUtical parties to adopt strong policy positions on this matter. A similar finding was observed by 
KeUey & Braithwaite (1990) who found that party identification was not significantiy associated with 
attimdes to tiie deatii penalty, in the analysis of tiie 1984 NSSS. 
The measures that were generaUy found to have consistent relationships with tiie attimde to tiie 
death penalty were no religion, tertiary education and gender. 
The 'no reUgion' group were found to be, significantiy less likely to support the death penalty in 
1979, 1984, 1986, 1987 and 1988. Similarly, tiiis group were significantiy more Ukely to oppose tiie 
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deatii penalty in tiiese years. This result is a furtiier indication of tiie generaUy liberal or leftist 
orientation of tiiis group. 
Residents of mral areas were found to be significantiy more likely to support tiie death penalty in 
1979, 1984 and 1987. This finding is again, a reflection of tiie general conservatism of mral residents. 
There were differences between the states in relation to the death penalty. Despite the commonly 
held view, tiiat Queenslanders are generaUy conservative, Queenslanders were significantiy less likely, 
tiian residents of New Soutii Wales, to support tiie deatii penalty in 1967, 1979, 1984 and 1987. 
Conversely, South Australians were found to be, more lUcely to support tiie deatii penalty, in 1967, 
1969 and 1984. 
Tertiary education was also found to be associated with opposition to the deatii penalty in tiie 
years from 1969. Again, tiie 'liberalising' influence of education is demonstrated. Using a measure of 
years in formal education, KeUey & Braitiiwaite (1990) found that increasing education was associated 
with less support for the death penalty. 
Women were significantiy less likely than men to support tiie death penalty, in aU the data sets 
investigated, excepting the two most recent samples (the 1987 AES and 1988 NSSS). The tendency 
for women not to support the death penalty was also noted by KeUey & Braitiiwaite (1990), in tiie 
analysis of tiie 1984 NSSS data. 
Higher levels of church attendance were generaUy found to be associated with opposition to the 
death penalty or support for its reintroduction, from 1979. This finding is probably due to tiie greater 
regard more reUgious people have for such Christian principles as tiie sanctity of life and forgiveness. 
Partisan background was found to be significantiy associated with support for tiie death penalty 
only in the years 1969 and 1984. This measure was found to be significantiy associated witii 
opposition to the death penalty in 1967, 1969 and 1987. The estunates are in tiie expected direction, 
respondents from more 'coalition' backgrounds are more conservative on this matter, and those from 
'Labor' backgrounds, more liberal. 
(B) Immigration 
The same question on attimde to migration was asked in the three ANPA surveys and the 1987 
AES. The NSSS smdies did not include tills question, altiiough from tiie 1986 NSSS a scale of 
attimde to migrants was constmcted from feeling thermometer scores. (The detaUs of tiiis measure can 
be found in appendix 1). This discussion wiU begin witii the questions common to the ANPA and 
AES smdies. 
This discussion is confined to the two most distinguishable positions 'Asians should be allowed to 
enter Australia like anyone else' and tiie 'No more migrants option'. These positions are respectively , 
183 
tiie most and least supportive of furtiier migration. The results from tiie analysis of the otiier tiiree 
options 'quota on Asian immigration', 'No Asian immigrants' and 'Only British & Northem European 
immigrants' are included in tiie tables in tiie appendix to tiiis chapter (for completeness), but are 
discussed only briefly here. 
The 'Asians like Anyone Else' Option 
The amount of scaled deviance explained by the social-stmcmral model of the 'Asians like 
anyone else ' option increased between 1967 and 1987. Only 5% of tiie scaled deviance could be 
explained by tiie model in 1967, 9% in 1969, 14% in 1979 and 16% in 1987. Substimtion witii tiie 
two measures relating to the general concept 'partisanship', had Uttie effect on the explanatory power 
of tiie causal model. This result indicates that despite the occasional appearance of immigration onto 
the poUtical agenda, the matter of immigration has not become politicised. 
The measures with consistent relationships with the 'Asians Uke everyone else' option were 
religion, ethnicity and age. Less consistent findings were found with education, gender and mral 
residency. 
Both CatiioUcs and those professing no religion were significantiy more lUcely to take this option 
in 1967, 1979 and 1987. At several time points (in 1967, 1969 and 1979), groups witii very high 
levels of religiosity were significantiy more likely to take this option, than those who never went to 
Church. Again these findings show that, those who go to church more often have a stronger 
adherence to Christian principles. 
There is a tendency for ethnic groups to be supportive of further immigration. Soutiiem 
Europeans were found to be significantiy more Ukely (than 'Australians') to choose this option in 
1967, 1969 and 1987, eastem Europeans more Ukely in 1969 and 1987, the British Isles and northem 
European groups in 1979 and 1987. hi 1987, aU etiinic groups were significantiy more likely to take 
this option relative to the Australian bom. In general, these findings suggest that immigrant groups 
have a tendency to support further immigration of quite different ethnic groups. 
Younger age groups were also significantiy more lUcely to choose this option, in the years the 
question was asked. As the age cohort aged tiieir position appears to have been maintained. If tiiis 
tendency among younger age groups is maintained, AustraUan society is Ukely to be less antagonistic 
to Asian immigration in the fumre. 
The tertiary educated were significantiy more Ukely to take this option in 1979 and 1987, while 
females were significantiy more likely to choose this option in 1969. These infrequent differences do 
not indicate trends. However, these variables figure more prominentiy in tiie analyses of the 'no more 
migrants' option. 
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A change was observed in relation to mral and non-mral residency. In 1969, mral residents were 
significantiy more likely (tiian non-mral residents), to hold tiie opinion tiiat 'Asians should be aUowed 
to enter Australia like anyone else', but significantiy less likely in 1979 and 1987. It is more likely 
that non-rural residents have become more liberal, ratiier than mral residents becoming more 
conservative, since Asians have tended to migrate to urban areas without serious problem, reducing 
anti-Asia feelings among urban residents. This explanation is only speculation but there is no apparent 
reason, why the attimde of mral residents to this matter should have changed. 
The 'No more migrants' Option 
In contrast to the 'Asians like anyone else' option, the amount of scaled deviance explained by 
tiie model in the analysis of the 'no more migrants' was more or less constant, at 11% in 1967, 13 % 
in 1969, 7% in 1979 and 12% in 1984. 
In tiie analysis of tills option, the most consistent results were obtained in relation to etimicity and 
tertiary education. 
The ethnic groups tended to be less supportive of this position tiian the Australian bom. Southem 
Europeans were significantiy less Ukely tiian AustraUans to choose tiiis option in 1967, 1969 and 1987, 
Eastem Europeans in 1979, those from the British Isles in 1979 and 1987 and nortii (west) Europeans 
in 1987. These results lend further support to the conclusion, that immigrant groups are supportive of 
further immigration. 
The tertiary educated were significantiy less inclined to take tiiis option in each sample analysed, 
again indicating the 'liberalising' influence of education. 
There are indications that manual woricers are more conservative towards immigration than non-
manual workers. In most analyses of the 'no more migrants' option, tiie estimates for the non-manual 
groups were negative. In 1967, those in the 'other non-manual' group were significantiy less lUcely to 
take this option and in 1987 aU non-manual groups were significantiy less lUcely to advocate 'no more 
migrants'. One plausible explanation is that manual workers are more concemed about job losses 
tiirough immigration, than non-manual workers. 
Rural residents were significantiy more Ukely to choose this option in 1967, 1969 and 1987, a 
further indication of the conservative orientation of mral residents. 
Women were significantiy more likely than men, to choose tills option m 1967, 1969 and 1987. 
One possible explanation for this result centres on contacts with immigrants through work force 
participation. Possibly, women are less likely to come into contact with immigrants since their 
participation in labor force is lower. Therefore, there is less need for them to reassess their views on 
this matter. In the analysis of the 1986 NSSS, those not in the work force were significantiy colder to 
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immigrants. In the 1979 sample, the parameters associated with both being female and not being in 
tiie work force, were in a positive direction, altiiough neitiier was significant. 
Younger voters were significantiy more likely (than the oldest cohort) to take tiie 'no more 
migrants' option in 1969. However, this resuU appears an atypical result since no age differences were 
observed in tiie 1967, 1979 and 1987 samples. 
There was surprisingly littie difference between the religious groups. However, higher levels of 
reUgiosity was often found to be associated with a tendency not to take tills option - in the 1967, 
1969, 1979 and 1987 samples. It appears that it is religiosity, ratiier tiian religious denomination 
which is important in regard to attimdes to immigration. 
In 1969 the lowest income group (the reference) group were significantiy more likely to advocate 
'no more immigrants', than several of the other (higher) income groups. In 1967 and 1979, the 
coefficients associated with most income groups were in the same (negative) direction but only the 
highest income group in 1979 was found to be significantiy different from the lowest income group. 
One explanation for tiiese results is that lower income groups are more negative towards immigration 
because of perceived lost job opportunities. 
Only in 1969 was partisan background found to be, negatively associated with the 'no more 
migrants' option. (Those from more 'Labor' backgrounds were more likely to take this option). This 
result is a furtiier indication of the generaUy non-partisan namre of attimdes to immigration. 
Other Options on Migration 
There was littie consistency between the data sets in relation to the three otiier options. In 
relation to the 'quota on Asian immigrants' option, the ethnic groups were in general, opposed to a 
quota on Asian immigration. Significant differences were observed for southem Europeans in 1967 
and 1969 and for north west Europeans in 1987. Differences between residents of tiie different states 
were observed in the late sixties. Victorians and Queenslanders were significantiy more likely to opt 
for a quota in 1967 and West AustraUans and Tasmanians, sigruficantiy less lUcely in 1969. CathoUcs 
and those with 'no religion' and younger age groups were less lUcely to support a quota in 1979. 
In relation to the 'No Asian, European OK' option, north west Europeans were more likely (than 
'AustraUans') to choose this option in 1967 and the British Isles group in 1969. The 'no religion' 
group, were significantiy less Ukely to take this option in 1987 and tiie more restrictive 'only from 
Britain and Northem Europe' option. In relation to tiiis latter option, the British Isles group were 
significantiy more Ukely to take this option in 1987. 
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The 1986 hidex of Attimde to hnmigrants 
Ordmary least squares regression analysis of the index of attitudes towards immigrants in tiie 
1986 NSSS 'Role of Government' data indicated similar but not identical conclusions to tiiose drawn 
from tiie analyses of tiie ANPA and AES samples. The tertiary educated were significantiy warmer 
towards immigrants, as were Catholics, those with no religion, those who attended church quite 
frequentiy and immigrants from botii southem Europe and tiie British Isles. Two of tiie higher income 
groups were also significantiy warmer towards immigrants. 
In contrast to the analyses of the 'no more migrants' option ui the ANPA and AES samples, 
women were found to significantiy warmer than men in this OLS analysis. One possible explanation 
is that women are more lUcely to prefer no more migrants, while being warmer to migrants tiiat have 
aUeady settied here. 
(Q Censorship/Pomography 
The measure of attimdes to censorship or pomography were measured differentiy between the 
smdies. In the ANPA and the 1987 AES smdies, tiie question concemed whether tiiere should be 
some censorship, or should people be aUowed to 'read and see whatever they like'. In tiie NSSS 
surveys, the question focused on supporting or opposing the view, that tiiere should be stiicter controls 
on pomography. 
Social-stmcmral factors could account for about 10% of scaled deviance of the censorship item 
and between 15 and 20% of the scaled deviance of the stricter controls on pomography item. This 
change probably reflects the changing namre of the censorship debate. In the late 1960s the debate 
centred on materials tiiat were considered to have artistic merit, such as foreign films and novels. By 
the 1980s the debate had tended to focus on a possible association between pomographic material and 
sex crimes, and on the exploitation of women. The most notable change in the relationship between 
social factors and attimdes to censorship or pomography was tiie relationship with gender. 
Substimtion of partisan background witii the two measures of partisanship had littie effect on tiie 
explanatory power of the model. This finding indicates that attitudes to censorship or pomography 
were not 'politicised'. 
In the analysis of the 'pomography' items, quite simUar findings were found to those obtained 
from analyses of tiie 'censorship' item, despite differences in the key words of the items. The social-
stmcmral factor with the most consistent relationship with this question was religiosity. Higher levels 
church attendance is associated witii greater support for censorship or stricter controls on pomography 
in each of the samples examined. There was a general tendency for younger age groups to be more 
liberal in this regard. 
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Women were significantiy less likely to support censorship in 1969, but in 1979 tiieir position 
(relative to men) had changed, as they were significantiy less supportive of censorship tiian men. By 
1987, tiieir position had strengtiiened, tiie estimate had increased from 0.25 in 1979 to 0.71 in 1987. 
In tiiese three smdies, the same question was employed. The proposition that tiiere should be stricter 
controls on pomographic material was stiongly (and significantiy) supported by women in aU tiiree 
NSSS samples. 
There were consistent differences between the religious denominations. The uniting church group 
were significantiy more conservative tiian AngUcans in 1967, 1969 and 1984. Those with 'no 
religion' were found to be significantiy more liberal, in 1979 and 1986. On this item, mral residents 
were significantiy less supportive of censorship in 1969 and significantiy less supportive of stricter 
controls on pomography in 1984. This finding confrasts with the general conservative orientation of 
rural residents found in relation to the other measures. 
Farmers and managers were significantiy more supportive of censorship in 1967, 1969 and 1979. 
Some differences among etiinic groups were apparent, the most consistent finding was that eastem 
Europeans were less restrictive on censorship or pomography in 1967, 1969, 1987 and 1988. It is 
possible that tiie notion of censorship has political implications for tills group. 
(D) Attimdes to Royalty 
A three-level ordinal index of attimde to the importance of royalty was analysed (by OLS 
regression) in aU samples, with the exception of the 1969 ANPA"*. The amount of variation in tills 
measure that could be explained by the model ranged from 14% in 1987, to 23% in 1984. 
One consistent and not unexpected result was that immigrants from the British Isles were 
significantiy more supportive of royalty tiian the Australian bom. In contrast, immigrants from other 
regions tended to be significantiy less supportive of royalty, especiaUy in 1979, 1986 and 1988. The 
tertiary educated were found to be less supportive in aU samples examined, except in the 1967 ANPA. 
CathoUcs and the 'no reUgion group' were also less supportive of royalty, than Anglicans in aU 
samples. The result obtained for Catholics is Ukely to reflect the republican and anti-royalist traditions 
of CathoUcs in Australia. Women were found to be significantiy more supportive of royalty, but only 
in tiie years 1967 and 1984. 
The most consistent finding was that the older or the oldest age groups were significantiy more 
supportive of royalty in tiie years, 1967, 1979, 1984, 1986, 1987 and 1988. This finding suggests tiiat 
support for royalty is Ukely to wane in the fumre. 
Higher levels of church attendance is generaUy associated with increased support for royalty. 
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5.4.4 Post-materialism 
(A) Attimde to Uranium Mining 
The measure of attimde to uranium mining, employed in tiie 1979 ANPA and tiie 1987 AES 
smdies were similar. Respondents were asked to choose one of four positions: 'Mine and seU 
uranium', 'Mine and seU but with strong safeguards', 'Mine - but oiUy for Australian use' and 'Keep 
in tiie ground'. From the three NSSS data sets a three category measure was constmcted comprising 
responses supportive, opposed or neutial towards uranium mining. The foUowing discussion wiU deal 
with the ANPA/AES measure first, then the NSSS measure. 
The ANPA/AES measure 
In the 1979 ANPA, the social factor model could account for approximately 10% of the scaled 
deviance of dichotomous variables constmcted from each response. The model could account for 
progressively higher proportions of scaled deviance, as tiie positions became more opposed to uranium 
mining, ranging from 6% to 11%. Substimtion of the measures relating to partisanship for partisan 
background substantiaUy improved the fit of the model for orUy tiie most opposed 'Keep in ground' 
position. The amount of scaled deviance accounted for rose from 11% to 18%. Pemsal of tiie 
estimates revealed tiiat fairly strong and very coaUtion identifiers were significantiy less Ukely to take 
this position relative to those without a major party identification. 
In 1987, the model could account for less of the scaled deviance (between 5% and 8%), again 
with those positions more opposed, being sUghtiy better explained by tiie model. Substimtion with the 
partisanship measures did not substantiaUy improve the fit of the model. These results taken togetiier, 
suggest that opposition to uranium mining was slightiy politicised in 1979, but not in 1987. 
1. Mine and seU uranium 
In both samples, women were significantiy less Ukely tiian men to choose this option. In 1979, 
higher levels of religiosity were negatively associated with this option and high income groups more 
likely to support this option. However, similar results were not found in the analysis of tiie 1987 
sample. In 1987, lower non-manual woricers were less inclmed to support this option, than manual 
workers. 
2. Mine but safeguards 
In 1979, the 'mine, but safeguards' option was positively associated witii a coalition background, 
the 'otiier non-manual' group and those who attended church more than once a year. This position 
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was negatively associated with residence in the state of Victoria and southem European etimicity. In 
tiie 1987 sample, this option was also found to be negatively associated witii soutiiem European 
etimicity. It was positively associated witii the highest level of religiosity. However, in contrast to 
1979, partisan background was not associated witii this position. 
3. Mine orUy in AustraUa 
In the 1979 sample, the third position 'mine but only for Australian use' was found to be 
negatively associated with the 'British Isles' group, income groups earning over $10,500 per armum 
and partisan background. In the 1987 sample, similar results were not obtained, this option was found 
to be positively associated with 'southem European' ethnicity and the group who attended church once 
a year (relative to those who never went to church). This option was negatively associated witii tiie 
'other reUgion' group and middle class identification. 
4. Keep in Ground 
The position least supportive of uranium mining -'keep in ground' - was found to be significantiy 
associated witii gender in both 1979 and 1987. Females were more lUcely to take this option in botii 
samples. In 1979, residents of Victoria and South AustraUan were more likely to choose tiiis option 
than residents of New South Wales. The age cohort between 30 and 37 years old were significantiy 
more Ukely to choose this position in 1979, but the same cohort was not significantiy different from 
the reference (oldest) cohort in 1987. Those with a tertiary education and tiiose not in the work force 
were also significantiy more likely to take this option in 1979. Respondents from a Labor background 
were significantiy more likely to choose this option in 1979. However, no significant relationship with 
partisan background was found in 1987. In 1987, the 'no reUgion' group and the two youngest 
cohorts were significantiy more Ukely to choose the 'keep in ground' option. Some consistency 
regarding the age cohorts was noted. The cohort bom between 1942 and 1949, was found to be 
significantiy more likely to take this option in botii 1979 and 1987. 
The uranium question in the NSSS smdies 
As pointed out earlier, the responses to the questions on uranium mining in the NSSS smdies 
were coUapsed into three groups. These groups were supportive, opposed or neutial towards uranium 
mining. The foUowing discussion wiU be confined to the supportive and opposed groups. 
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1. Support uranium Mining 
Support for uranium mining was found to be negatively associated witii being female in tiie tiiree 
samples examined. This position of support for uranium mming, was found to be positively associated 
with partisan background in aU tiiree NSSS samples. Some of the younger age cohorts were 
significantiy less Ukely to be supportive of uranium mining, especially in 1984 and 1986. In 1984, 
higher income groups were significantiy more lUcely to choose tiiis option. Also in 1984, residents of 
Soutii AustraUa were significantiy more lUcely to be opposed to uranium mining than residents of New 
Soutii Wales. 
2. Opposed to uranium mining 
Women were found to be consistentiy more likely to be opposed to uranium mining than men. 
Significant differences between age cohorts were observed m aU three samples, witii tiie younger age 
groups being more lUcely to be opposed to uranium mining. The 'other professionals' and tiie 'no 
religion' groups, were significantiy more lUcely to be opposed to uranium mining in 1984 and 1986. 
In 1984 and 1988, some of the higher income groups were found to be significantiy less likely express 
opposition to uranium mining. This position was negatively associated with partisan background in 
1984 and 1988. 
Summarising from both groups of smdies, a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, women 
tend to be opposed to uranium mining (or support no mining). This result was found in the five 
samples investigated. This finding may reflect the prominence of women in anti-uranium groups. 
Second, higher income groups were more supportive of uranium mining m 1979, 1984 and 1988 but in 
tiie other two samples, were no different from other income groups. Third, opposition to uranium 
mining is concentrated among the young. However, there is some indication tiiat as the cohorts aged, 
they became less opposed and more supportive of uranium mining. For example, the cohort bom 
between 1942 and 1949 (cohort 6), were opposed to uranium mining in 1979 and 1984 but not in later 
years. 
(B) Attimde to LegaUsation of Marijuana 
The causal model could account for approximately 13% of tiie scaled deviance in 1979 and 1984 
samples, but declined slightiy to around 10% in tiie 1987 and 1988 samples. There was Utile evidence 
that attimdes to the legalisation of marijuana was stmcmred by partisanship, since substimtion with the 
partisanship measures, did not substantively improve the fit of the models. 
191 
Ban should stay/disagree legalisation 
The measures tiiat had tiie most consistent relationship to conservative positions on tiie question 
on tiie legalisation of marijuana were religiosity, age and 'no religion'. High levels of church 
attendance were found to be, significantiy and positively related to this conservative position in aU 
samples examined. Conversely, younger age groups and tiie 'no religion' group were found to less 
likely to adopt this position in each year analysed. Tertiary education was found to be negatively 
associated witii tills conservative position in 1979, 1984 and 1988. 
There were Uttie differences among the occupational class groups although, upper professionals 
were more lUcely to adopt tiiis conservative position (than the manual group) in 1988 and 'otiier 
professionals', less likely in 1979. 
Similarly, tiiere were littie differences between religious denominations although the uniting 
church group were found to be significantiy more likely to adopt this position in 1984, tiian AngUcans, 
and CatiioUcs were found to be less lUcely to adopt tills position in 1988. 
Some state differences were observed, Victorians were more likely to take tiiis fX)sition in 1979 as 
were South Australians in 1986. The result for Soutii Austialia may reflect a reaction to the more 
liberal laws regarding marijuana in tiiat state. Only in 1984 were mral residents more Ukely than non-
rural residents to opt for a conservative position on the marijuana question. 
Legalise Marijuana 
Similar results were obtained in tiie analyses of the lil^ eral position on the legalisation of 
marijuana. This position was found to be negatively associated witii higher levels of religiosity, and 
positively associated with younger age cohorts. The 'no religion' group showed significant levels of 
support for this position. The tertiary educated were significantiy more likely to adopt this position in 
1979 and 1984, but not in later years. 
(Q Special Benefits for Aborigines 
Approximately 10% of the scaled deviance of two dichotomous measures of attimde to special 
benefits for Aborigines could be accounted for by the model. No over time trends were observed. 
Substimtion with the partisanship measures only slightiy increased the fit of the models by 2 or 3 
percentage points. 
Special Benefits, It dependslSpend more 
Support for special assistance or more money spent on Aborigines was found to be consistentiy 
and positively related to having no religion (in aU years since 1984), residence in a non-mral area (in 
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1979, 1984, 1987 and 1988), tertiary education (in 1979, 1984, 1986 and 1987) and witii partisan 
background, in tiie data sets coUected since 1986. 
Differences between occupation class groups were observed. Managers and farmers, upper 
professionals and 'other professionals' were found to be significantiy more Ukely to adopt this position 
in 1987, in 1988, tiie 'other professional' group, in 1984, 'upper professionals' and in 1979 the 'otiier 
non-manual' group. These results together with the observation that the parameter estimates associated 
with each non-manual group were generaUy positive, suggests that the manual group tends to be, tiie 
occupational group least supportive of special assistance to Aborigines. 
Some consistent differences were found between the states. Queenslanders were found to less 
likely to be associated with this 'liberal' position in 1979 and Tasmaruans more liberal in 1979, 1986 
and 1988. The result for Queensland may reflect the less supportive stance the National party had 
towards Aborigines compared with other states. Furthermore, Queensland has a higher Aboriginal 
population and increased contact is considered to be explanation for antipathy to native groups. The 
contact argument is also suggested by the result for residents of mral areas, where Aborigines also 
tend to be more visible. It is possible tiiat 'guilt' associated with the near extermination of Tasmanian 
Aborigines may accoimt for the result obtained for Tasmanians. 
Differences between age cohorts were observed from the analysis of the 1979 and 1984 samples, 
with the youngest cohort being more lUcely to choose this more liberal option. 
Partisan background was found to be negatively associated witii this measure position in 1986, 
1987 and 1988, indicating that those from 'coalition' backgrounds tended to be less sympathetic to 
special assistance to Aborigines during the late 1980s. 
1. No special benefits/Do not spend more 
Consistent results were obtained in relation to attimdes opposed to special benefits for, or more 
spending on Aborigines. The tertiary educated were significantiy less Ukely to adopt this position in 
tiie 1979, 1984 and 1987 samples. Rural residents were significantiy more likely to support tiiis 
position in 1979, 1984 and 1987 as were Queenslanders in 1979 and 1984. The coefficients for 
Queenslanders in the later samples tended to be negative (but not significant) suggesting increasing 
Uberal attimdes. As was found in the analyses of special assistance for Aborigines, Tasmanians were 
found to be more Uberal - significantiy less Ukely to take tills option in 1979, 1986 and 1988. In 
keeping with their more 'Uberal' attimdes to other matters, the 'no reUgion' group were found to be 
significantiy less Ukely to take tiiis position in 1984 and 1987. Partisan background was found to be 
positively associated with this option in 1986 and 1987, this result corresponding to tiie findings found 
from the analyses of the more sympathetic position. 
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5.5 DISCUSSION 
5.5.1 Distinct Ideological Dimensions 
The conclusion suggested by tiie analyses of ideological consistency and constraint, is tiiat a 
conception of ideology, as eitiier comprising a single overarching ideology or several distinct 
ideological dimensions is not tenable for the AustraUan electorate, at least between the late 1960s and 
late 1980s. 
To the above conclusion, two counter-arguments may be put. The first argument focuses on 
measurement error. It could be argued tiiat these indicators have a high degree of measurement error, 
therefore attenuating the associations between tiie measures. The implication is that, if tiie indicators 
had less measurement error, then ideological dimensions or a single ideological dimension would be 
more evident. There are indications that contt-oUing for measurement error would not reveal distinct 
ideological dimensions. First, the associations between the indicators are very low, and controUing for 
measurement error is imlUcely to increase these associations by a factor of three or four. Second, since 
the associations within groups of indicators were no higher than the associations between indicators 
from different groups, controUing for measurement error is imlUcely to show distinct dimensions. 
Correcting for measurement error is lUcely to similarly attenuate aU associations, ratiier than selectively 
attenuate some associations and not others. 
A second argument could focus on the number and variety of ideological indicators included in 
these analyses. It could be strongly argued that there are too few indicators and tiie indicators relate to 
more than one of the hypothesised ideological dimensions. This argument has a degree of validity, 
since the variance of each indicator is Ukely to be attributable to more tiian one underlying dimension. 
Furthermore, the number of ideological indicators belonging to each group was small. The response to 
this argument is to cite the Uteramre. Although, Graetz & McAUister (1988:261,note 3) found tiiat 
factor analysis of 14 attimde scales (in the 1984 NSSS data), yielded a clear economic attimdes 
dimension, the pattem among the other scales was 'confused'. KeUey (1988:74-75) concluded that 
although Australians do have consistent attimdes towards such matters as business, the Queen and 
uranium mining, their attimdes are not organised into a single overarching ideology. The results of 
parts 1 and 2 of these analyses tend to confirm KeUey's conclusion. Australians have consistent 
attimdes to specific matters, but such attimdes are not organised in an ideological manner. KeUey's 
conclusion is also indicated by the analyses of the causal models, where often the same variables were 
important predictors of an ideological indicator at several time points. 
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5.5.2 The Models of tiie Ideological hidicators 
At the outset, it should be noted tiiat multicoUinearity was not a problem in tiiese analyses. The 
standard errors were not particularly large, the fit of tiie models was low and tiie results make 
substantive sense. Furtiiermore, deletion of single variables from tiie model did not substantiaUy alter 
the parameter estimates. 
The first conclusion drawn from the analyses of this model is that the model comprising social 
factors and partisan background is not adequate to explain attitudes to these matters. The models are 
nearly always significant, but the percentage of scaled deviance explained by tiie models is generaUy 
quite smaU. 
One implication of the low model fits is that the ideological explanation for the relationship 
between social factors and electoral choice is under questioa Since social factors have closer 
relationships witii partisanship than the ideological indicators (chapter 4), it can be concluded tiiat tiie 
path through partisanship is stronger than the path through ideology - at least during the time period 
smdied. This result may have a more general implication, that ideological appeals are not an 
important means by which political parties gain support from particular social groups. 
The poor performance of the models may be in part atixibutable to measurement error, although 
correcting for measurement error is unUkely to dramaticaUy increase the fit of tiie models. A more 
likely explanation is that the model has not included important variables. One important group of 
variables lUcely to be important are measures of the attimdes of the respondents' parents to these 
specific matters. There is evidence that attimdes are passed from parent to chUd (Dalton, 1980). 
Since attimdes to these matters is oiUy weakly related to partisanship and electors do not generaUy 
have consistent attimdes, it can be implied that partisan background is a poor indicator of parental 
attimdes. It appears that the model should be modified to include parental attimdes and this 
modification is Ukely to be a step forward from these investigations. GeneraUy, information was not 
be coUected in these smdies on the attimdes of parents and their children'^ . 
The analyses performed on the influences on ideology could not resurrect tiie notion of distinct 
ideological dimensions. There was no patterning as to which social factors were important to the three 
groups of indicators. For example, in relation to attimdes to preference for increased welfare spending 
or cuts in taxation, relevant predictors were income, mral residency and education. These predictors 
did not figure prominentiy in relation to attimdes to big business, while income figured in relation to 
mining uranium. The significant predictors of each ideological indicator showed a degree of 
consistency between time points, but tiie group of predictors was usuaUy unique to that indicator. In 
an analysis of American data, this variability in the predictors of ideological indicators was also 
observed (Himmelstein & McRae, 1986). 
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Furthemiore, particularist rather than ideological explanations appear more suitable to explain 
particular associations. For example, tiie finding that Queenslanders were less lUcely to be sympatiietic 
to business, can be explained by the political situation in Queensland during the late 1980s. The 
finding that women were less inclined to support uranium mining, may be attributed to the prominence 
of women in the anti-nuclear movement. The opposition of mral residents to special assistance to 
Aborigines is probably due to their greater contact witii Aborigines, ratiier than an anti-post-materialist 
ideology'*. 
From tiiese analyses there are some indications that the some social groups are more 'ideological' 
or show greater consistency than others'^ A more 'ideological' social group displays consistent 
relationships in a liberal or conservative maimer, to a large number of indicators. The most 
ideological group appears to be those respondents professing no religion. This group were generaUy 
more Ukely to place themselves on the left and often took liberal positions, in a consistent maimer, 
across a range of indicators, at most time points. Similarly, tertiary education appears to engender a 
degree of ideological consistency, since tills group were generaUy quite Uberal. The only group that 
appears to often adopt conservative positions are mral residents. However, there are instances when 
rural residents were found not to take distinctive conservative positions. 
It is noteworthy that the variables with consistent and large effects on party identification - trade-
union membership and class identification - were not important predictors in these analyses. 
Conversely, measures that were often significant predictors of the ideological indicators such as 'no 
religion', tertiary education, gender and age were not important predictors of party identification. 
These results lead to tiie conclusion that, party identification and tiiese indicators of ideology are quite 
distinct. This conclusion is supported by the generaUy weak effects of partisan background, on the 
ideological indicators and the smaU or negligible improvement of fit observed when partisan 
background is substimted by the two measures of partisanship. 
Although U appears that the Australian electorate carmot be regarded as ideological and these 
ideological indicators are orUy weakly associated with social factors, it cannot be concluded tiiat 
ideology has no role to play in relation to electoral choice. It is possible that a minority of the 
electorate are ideological, and to tiiis minority, ideology is important m tiie process of electoral choice. 
From the analyses of tiie models of ideology the 'no religion' and the tertiary educated groups stand 
out as social groups, that may employ ideology when casting their vote. Therefore, the indicators of 
ideology wiU be included m the next chapter when electoral choice is the focus of attention. 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 (For explanation to tables see note'*). 
TABLE A5.1(i): SUMMARY OF MODELS ON INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY (1967-1988) 
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VARIABLE 
1967 
Null Model 
With Model 
Change (d of 0 
Percent 
With Model + Partis. 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
1969 
Null Model 
With Model 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
With Model + Partis. 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
1979 
Null Model 
With Model 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
With Model + Partis. 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
1984 
Null Model 
With Model 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
With Model + Partis. 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
1986 
NuU Model 
With Model 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
With Model + Partis. 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
1987 
NuU Model 
With Model 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
With Model + Partis. 
Change (d of 0 
Percent 
1988 
NuU Model 
With Model 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
With Model + Partis. 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
Ideology-
Left 
476 
334 
142(50)' 
30% 
270 
196(56)* 
41% 
581 
460 
121(50)' 
21% 
406 
174(56)' 
30% 
914 
758 
156(54)' 
17% 
665 
249(60)' 
27% 
598 
497 
101(53)' 
17% 
442 
156(59)' 
26% 
353 
284 
69(55)' 
20% 
246 
106(61)' 
30% 
944 
863 
81(45)' 
9% 
826 
117(50)' 
12% 
247 
156 
91(54)' 
37% 
131 
116(60)' 
47% 
Ideology-
Right 
1164 
1000 
164(50)' 
14% 
930 
234(56)' 
20% 
1074 
936 
138(50)' 
13% 
874 
200(56)' 
19% 
1290 
1092 
198(54)' 
15% 
968 
323(60)' 
25% 
1597 
1429 
168(53)' 
11% 
1239 
358(59)' 
22% 
969 
867 
102(55)' 
11% 
718 
251(61)' 
26% 
1826 
1686 
141(45)' 
7% 
1597 
230(50)' 
13% 
668 
551 
117(54)' 
18% 
486 
182(60)' 
27% 
Business-
Too much 
Power 
2450 
2291 
159(50)' 
7% 
2232 
218(56)' 
9% 
2401 
2289 
113(50)' 
5% 
2230 
171(56)' 
7% 
2318 
2211 
107(54)' 
5% 
2049 
268(60)' 
12% 
3601 
3410 
191(53)' 
5% 
3269 
332(59)' 
9% 
1882 
1752 
130(55)' 
7% 
1683 
199(61)' 
11% 
2325 
2211 
114(45)' 
5% 
2175 
149(50)' 
7% 
Business-
Negative 
1692 
1613 
78(54)' 
5% 
1597 
95(60)' 
6% 
Business-
Not too much 
Power 
2312 
2180 
132(50)' 
6% 
2124 
188(56)' 
8% 
2219 
2109 
110(50)' 
5% 
2066 
153(56) 
7% 
2146 
2029 
117(54)' 
5% 
1911 
236(60)' 
11% 
2725 
2522 
202(53)' 
7% 
2389 
336(59)' 
12% 
1315 
1209 
106(55)' 
8% 
1148 
167(61)' 
13% 
1554 
1447 
107(45)' 
7% 
1406 
147(50)' 
9% 
Business-
Positive 
2101 
2018 
82(54)' 
4% 
1987 
114(60)' 
5% 
Spend on 
Welfare 
2214 
2082 
132(50)' 
6% 
2071 
143(56)' 
6% 
2091 
1964 
127(50)' 
6% 
1960 
130(56)' 
6% 
2347 
2184 
162(54)' 
7% 
2111 
236(60)' 
10% 
3390 
3100 
290(53)' 
9% 
3027 
383(59)' 
11% 
1579 
1432 
146(55)' 
9% 
1380 
198(61)' 
13% 
1352 
1234 
117(45)' 
9% 
1199 
153(50)' 
11% 
1732 
1585 
147(54)' 
8% 
1555 
177(60)' 
10% 
Reduce Taxes 
2045 
1920 
125(50)' 
6% 
1909 
136(56)' 
7% 
1964 
1843 
121(50)' 
6% 
1840 
124(56)' 
6% 
2408 
2246 
163(54)" 
7% 
2148 
224(60)' 
9% 
3511 
3207 
304<53)' 
9% 
3136 
374(59)' 
11% 
1664 
1508 
156(55)' 
9% 
1452 
217(61)' 
13% 
2214 
2081 
133(45)" 
6% 
2028 
186(50)' 
8% 
1804 
1644 
160(54)" 
9% 
1471 
194(60)' 
11% 
Keep Death 
Penalty 
2435 
2311 
124(50)" 
5% 
2278 
158(56)' 
6% 
2405 
2265 
140(50)" 
6% 
2234 
172(56)' 
7% 
2343 
2195 
148(54)' 
6% 
2142 
201(60)" 
9% 
Favour 
Death Penalty 
3683 
3429 
254(53)" 
7% 
3340 
290(59)" 
8% 
1878 
1702 
176(55)" 
9% 
1670 
207(61)' 
11% 
Bring Back 
Death Penalty 
2275 
2129 
146(45)' 
6% 
2110 
164(50)" 
7% 
Death Penalty 
In Favour 
1987 
1806 
181(54)' 
9% 
1770 
218(60)" 
11% 
Abolish 
Death 
Penalty 
2333 
2227 
106(50)' 
5% 
2196 
137(56)" 
6% 
2407 
2292 
116(50)" 
5% 
2259 
148(56)" 
6% 
2209 
2071 
138(54)' 
6% 
2019 
190(60)' 
9% 
Oppose 
Death Penalty 
3122 
2890 
232(53)" 
7% 
2846 
277(59)" 
9% 
1504 
1343 
162(55)' 
11% 
1308 
196(61)" 
13% 
Disagree Bring 
Back Death 
Penalty 
1812 
1638 
174(45)' 
10% 
1600 
212(50)" 
12% 
Death Penalty 
Not in Favour 
1612 
1421 
191(54)" 
12% 
1378 
234(60)' 
15% 
TABLE A5.1(ii): SUMMARY OF MODELS ON INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY (1967-1988) 
VARIABLE Migration-
Asians like 
anyone else 
Migration- Migration- Migration- Migration-
Quou on No Asian Only from No More 
Asian British & Britain & Migrants 
Immigrants Europe OK North Europe 
Censorship- Censorship- Royalty 
Read & see Some OLS 
what like Censorship R square 
1967 
NuU Model 1755 2333 846 1799 1375 2376 2395 R'=0.15 
With Model 1665 2212 791 1748 1217 2194 2207 
Change (doff) 90(50)' 120(50)' 55(50) 51(50) 158(50)' 183(50)' 188(50)" 
Percent 5% 5% 7% 3% 11% 8% 8% 
With Model + Partis. 1662 2205 781 1723 1203 2172 2190 R'=ai7 
Change (d of 0 92(56)' 128(56)' 65(56) 76(56)' 172(56)" 205(56)" 205(56)' 
Percent 5% 5% 8% 4% 13% 9% 9% 
1969 
NuU Model 1864 2372 668 1595 1193 2374 2385 
With Model 1703 2239 595 1499 1033 2207 2214 NA 
Change (doff) 161(50)* 133(50)' 73(50)' 96(50)' 160(50)' 167(50)' 170(50)' 
Percent 9% 6% 11% 6% 13% 7% 7% 
With Model + Partis. 1694 2212 590 1473 1018 2173 2183 NA 
Change (d of 0 170(56)' 159(56)' 78(56)' 123(56)' 174(56)' 200(56)' 202(56)' 
Percent 9% 7% 12% 8% 15% 8% 8% 
i9l9 
NuU Model 2055 
With Model 1763 
Change (d of f) 292(54)' 
Percent 14% 
With Model + Partis. 1757 
Change (d of f) 298(60)' 
Percent 15% 
1984 
NuU Model 
With Model 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
With Model + Partis. 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
1986 Attitudes to 
NuU Model Migrants 
With Model R^=0.17 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
With Model + Partis. 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
2 1 « 
2050 
96(54)' 
4% 
2038 
108(60)' 
5% 
1987 
NuU Model 
With Model 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
1770 
1486 
284(45)' 
16% 
With Model + Partis. 1470 
Change (d of f) 300(50)' 
Percent 17% 
1988 
NuU Model 
With Model 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
With Model + Partis. 
Change (d of 0 
Percent 
1819 
1660 
159(45)' 
9% 
1646 
173(50)' 
10% 
420 
344 
76(54)' 
18% 
342 
77(60) 
18% 
407 
353 
53(45)' 
13% 
350 
57(50)' 
14% 
741 
671 
70(54)' 
9% 
662 
79(60)' 
11% 
817 
706 
111(45)' 
14% 
680 
137(50)' 
17% 
2285 
2124 
161(54)' 
7% 
2116 
169(60)' 
7% 
2290 
2062 
264(45)' 
12% 
2020 
270(45)' 
1 2 * 
2424 
2217 
207(54)' 
9% 
2198 
226(60)' 
9% 
Disagree 
Pomography 
Controls 
1597 
1332 
265(53)' 
17% 
1315 
282(59)' 
18% 
1344 
1120 
224(55)' 
17% 
1104 
240(61)' 
18% 
No Censorship 
2010 
1809 
201(45)' 
10% 
1803 
207(50)' 
10% 
Disagree 
Pomography 
Controls 
379 
1176 
203(54)' 
15% 
1170 
209(60)" 
1S% 
2436 
2231 R^=0.19 
206(54)" 
8% 
2436 R'=0.25 
224(60)" 
9% 
Agree 
Pomography 
Controls R^=0.23 
2746 
2280 
466(53)" 
17% R^=0.29 
2265 
481(59)' 
21% 
1845 R^=0.21 
1544 
301(55)' 
16% R'=0.29 
1532 
313(55)' 
17% 
Some 
Censorship 
2288 
1631 
207(45)' 
9% 
2067 
221(50)' 
10% 
Agree 
Pomography 
Controls 
1981 
1688 
293(54)' 
15% 
1683 
298(60)' 
15% 
R'=0.14 
R^=0.17 
R'=0.20 
R^=0.25 
196.1 
TABLE A5.1(iii): SUMMARY OF MODELS ON INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY (1967-1988) 
VARIABLE Uranium-
Mine & SeU 
Uranium-
Mine but 
safeguards 
Uranium-
Mine only 
Austrahan 
use 
Uranium- Marijuana-
Stay in ground Ban should 
stay 
Marijuana 
Legahse 
Aboriginal 
Benefits-
Special 
benefits, 
it depends 
Aboriginal 
Benefits-
No different, 
get loo many 
1979 
NuU Model 1337 2448 1052 1825 2356 2280 2247 2265 
With Model 1252 2283 972 1623 2062 1971 2052 2067 
Change (doff) 85(54)' 164(54)' 80(54)' 201(54)' 294(54)' 310(54)' 195(54)' 197(54)" 
Percent 6% 7% 8% 11% 12% 14% 9% 9% 
With Model + Partis. 1225 2217 960 1497 2018 1927 2034 2049 
Change (d of 0 113(60)' -31(60)' 92(60)' 327(60)' 338(60)' 352(60)" 213(60)' 215(60)" 
Percent 8% 9% 9% 18% 14% 15% Wa 9% 
tm 
Middle 
Position 
Against 
Uranium 
Mining 
Support 
Uranium 
Mining 
Marijuana-
Disagree 
LegaUsation 
Marijuana-
Agree 
LegaUsation 
NuU Model 3011 3357 3708 
With Model 2923 3133 3348 
Change (doff) 88(53)" 224(53)* 360(53)' 
Percent 3% 7% 10% 
With Model + Partis. 2907 3084 3265 
Change (doff) 104(59)' 272(59)" 443(59)' 
Percent 3% 8% 12% 
3598 
3091 
507(53)' 
14% 
3083 
516(59)' 
14% 
2995 
2620 
375(53)' 
13% 
2995 
385(59)' 
13% 
2939 
2646 
293(53)' 
10% 
2597 
342(59)" 
12% 
3006 
2724 
283(53)" 
9% 
2682 
324(59)' 
11% 
19*6 
NuU Model 
With Model 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
With Model + Partis. 
Change (d of 0 
Percent 
1533 
1434 
99(55)' 
6% 
1427 
106(61)' 
7% 
1781 
1634 
147(55)' 
8% 
1608 
173(61)' 
10% 
2039 
1835 
203(55)' 
10% 
1799 
239(61)" 
12% 
1IS4 
1665 
219(55)' 
12% 
1631 
253(61)' 
13% 
1546 
1430 
116(55)' 
8% 
1420 
127(61)' 
8% 
Benefits for 
Aborigines -
Spend more 
1912 
1772 
140(55)' 
7% 
1702 
211(61)" 
11% 
Benefits for 
Aborigines 
Do not spend 
more 
2007 
1860 
147(55)* 
7% 
1805 
202(61)" 
10% 
1987 Mine & SeU Uranium - but Uranium - Uranium Marijuana 
NuU Model 
With Model 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
With Model + Partis. 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
Uranium 
1315 
1260 
55(45)' 
4% 
1246 
69(50)' 
5% 
Safeguards AusL use only Stay in ground Ban Should 
2309 
2197 
112(45)* 
5% 
2185 
124(50)* 
5% 
1052 
984 
68(45)* 
6% 
965 
86(50)* 
8% 
1603 
1493 
110(45)* 
7% 
1469 
133(50)* 
8% 
Stay 
2119 
1929 
190(45)* 
9% 
1910 
209(50)* 
10% 
Marijuana -
LegaUse 
1672 
1525 
147(45)* 
9% 
1515 
156(50)* 
9% 
Special 
Benefits for 
Aborigines 
1924 
1781 
144(45)* 
7% 
1751 
173(50)* 
9% 
Aboriginal 
Benefits 
different 
1941 
1795 
145(45)" 
7% 
1764 
176(50)" 
9% 
NuU Model 
With Model 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
With Model + Partis. 
Change (d of f) 
Percent 
Middle 
Position 
1627 
1548 
78(54)' 
5% 
1534 
93(60)' 
6% 
Against 
Uranium 
mining 
1960 
1846 
115(54)' 
6% 
1828 
132(60)' 
7% 
Support 
Uranium 
Mining 
2101 
1964 
137(54)' 
7% 
1937 
164(60)' 
8% 
Marijuana-
Disagree 
LegaUsation 
1979 
1799 
180(54)' 
9% 
1779 
200(60) 
10% 
Marijuana-
Agree 
LegaUsation 
1551 
1410 
141(54)" 
10% 
1383 
168(60)' 
11% 
Aborigines -
Spend more 
1707 
1560 
148(54)" 
9% 
1503 
204(60)' 
12% 
Aborigines -
Do not spend 
more 
2030 
1881 
149(54)' 
7% 
1843 
187(60) 
9% 
1963 
TABLE A5.2(i): IWLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCmiRAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1967 ANPA. N=1770) 
Category 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Class - Upper Professionals 
Class - Other Professionals 
Class - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Qassified 
ReUgion - CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
State - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
State - SA 
State - WA 
State - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass Ident - None 
Income 2 ($751-51250) 
Income 3 ($1251-52250) 
Income 4 ($2251-53250) 
Income 5 ($3251-54250) 
hicome 6 ($4251-55250) 
hicome7 (55251-56250) 
Income 8 (over $6251) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
ReUgiosity (2) less than 1 x yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 51-58 (Ref: >58) 
Age (3) 42-50 
Age (4) 34-41 
Age (5) 26-33 
Age (6) 19-25 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Ideology-
Left 
53(3%) 
Ideology-
Right 
180(10%) 
Business-too Business-Not Spend on 
much Power too much Welfare 
Freq(%) PE SE PE SE 
314(18) 
93(5) 
114(6) 
383(22) 
54(3) 
433(25) 
402(23) 
53(3) 
226(13) 
653(37) 
525(30) 
243(14) 
187(11) 
150(8) 
68(4) 
263(15) 
61(3) 
40(2) 
42(2) 
53(3) 
907(51) 
108(6) 
79(4) 
260(15) 
456(26) 
288(16) 
139(8) 
67(4) 
127(7) 
236(13) 
1248(71) 
193(11) 
176(10) 
417(24) 
104(6) 
107(6) 
351(20) 
68(4) 
265(15) 
336(19) 
314(18) 
274(15) 
201(11) 
9(.5) 
887(50) 
527(30) 
99(6) 
890(50) 
-1.72' 
0.33 
1.30 
i.2r 
-0.18 
-0.71 
-0.08 
-0.19 
1.70' 
0.75 
-0.66 
0.00 
0.12 
0.40 
-8.40 
OlO 
1.03 
-7.60 
-0.45 
-1.63 
-0.89 
-0.52 
0.01 
-0.30 
-0.16 
-1.03 
-0.48 
-1.84 
-0.64 
-0.90 
-1.24 
-0.65 
-0.78 
0.55 
0.09 
-1.11 
-7.21 
0.09 
-0.30 
-0.83 
-0.73 
-0.03 
-0.33 
-1.31 
2.22 
-2.41' 
0.08 
1.33' 
-0.02 
-0.18 
0.74 
0.54 
0.75 
0.59 
0.49 
1.72 
0.51 
0.46 
0.59 
0.54 
0.38 
0.40 
0.48 
0.49 
13.21 
0.88 
037 
21.43 
1.16 
1.10 
1.14 
0.41 
072 
084 
0.63 
0.68 
0.69 
1.05 
1.00 
0.90 
0.83 
0.38 
0.64 
0.54 
0.49 
1.10 
16.56 
0.57 
0.97 
0.58 
0.56 
053 
0.55 
0.74 
1.76 
0.57 
0.40 
0.61 
0.36 
0.13 
-2.49' 
0.31 
0.49 
0.28 
0.31 
-0.20 
0.41 
0.00 
-0.55 
013 
-0.06 
0.04 
-0.16 
-0.14 
-0.93" 
0.26 
0.14 
-0.07 
0.93 
0.03 
0.51 
0.27 
037 
0.34 
0.24 
0.59 
0.27 
0.23 
0.60 
0.30 
0.19 
0.21 
0.29 
0.31 
039 
0.42 
0.24 
0.52 
0.48 
0.53 
0.92" 0.40 
0.68' 0.23 
0.83' 0.37 
0.39 
-0.23 
-0.05 
019 
0.25 
0.56 
0.70 
-0.27 
-0.42 
0.30 
-0.19 
0.01 
0.27 
0.03 
0.37 
0.61 
-0.47 
-0.37 
-1.08' 
-0.62' 
-0.62 
-4.68 
0.51 
0.47 
0.44 
046 
0.50 
0.56 
0.50 
0.47 
0.23 
0.34 
0.40 
0.29 
0.41 
0.40 
0.31 
0.45 
0.30 
0.28 
033 
0.31 
033 
4.63 
925(52%) 
PE SE 
0.39 
0.25 
-0.10 
-0.12 
0.06 
-0.19 
0.12 
0.07 
1.00' 
0.42' 
-0.14 
0.36' 
0.04 
-0.43* 
-0.17 
-0.19 
014 
0.06 
0.16 
0.25 
0.42 
015 
0.02 
-0.32 
0.38 
0.26 
0.16 
0.05 
0.22 
-0.40 
-0.14 
-0.26 
-0.20 
0.28 
0.16 
0.27 
0.23 
014 
0.32 
0.15 
0.14 
0.35 
0.18 
0.11 
0.13 
0.16 
0.18 
019 
0.27 
0.15 
0.29 
0.36 
0.35 
0.30 
0.12 
0.22 
0.31 
0.25 
0.24 
0.26 
0.29 
0.36 
0.31 
0.25 
0.14 
0.19 
0.36* 0.20 
-0.12 016 
0.10 
-0.47 
-0.04 
0.10 
-0.09 
-0.30 
-0.42* 
-0.68* 
-0.75* 
0.95 
0.24 
0.25 
0.18 
0.29 
0.19 
0.18 
0.19 
019 
0.21 
0.84 
-0.5r 0.19 
0.50' 0.19 
0.66' 0.33 
Oi l 0.19 
0.35* 0.07 
-0.48" Oi l 
0.08 012 
-0.17 0.26 
0.19 0.11 
-0.06 0.04 
636(36%) 
PE SE 
-0.84' 0.30 
-0.25 0.16 
0.14 0.27 
0.13 0.23 
-0.05 0.14 
-0.31 0.35 
-0.16 0.16 
-0.18 0.14 
-0.75' 0.36 
-0.29 0.19 
Oi l 0.11 
-0.33' 0.13 
0.04 0.17 
033 0.18 
018 0.20 
-0.28 0.29 
-0.17 0.15 
-0.36 0.31 
-0.48 0.40 
-0.44 0.38 
-0.31 0.31 
0.02 0.12 
-0.13 0.23 
0.36 0.32 
-0.15 0.27 
-0.04 0.26 
0.02 0.28 
0.25 031 
-0.09 0.37 
0.59 0.32 
0.08 0.27 
0.33' 0.14 
0.09 0.20 
-0.30 0.21 
0.07 0.17 
-0.14 0.25 
0.49' 0.25 
-0.06 0.19 
-0.28 0.31 
Oi l 0.20 
0.27 0.19 
0.29 0.19 
0.68' 0.20 
0.56' 0.21 
-4.44 3.13 
-0.01 0.12 
0.08 0.12 
0.42 0.26 
-0.21 0.11 
0.08' 0.04 
1207(68%) 
PE SE 
1.36' 
-0.07 
-0.02 
0.26 
0.16 
-0.07 
-0.25 
0.05 
0.45 
-0.04 
-0.36* 
0.32* 
-0.02 
0.13 
0.29 
-0.02 
0.17 
-0.83* 
-0.01 
0.32 
0.17 
0.29 
0.26 
015 
0.33 
016 
015 
0.40 
019 
012 
0.14 
0.17 
0.19 
0.21 
0.28 
0.16 
0.29 
0.36 
0.40 0.40 
017 0.32 
-0.04 013 
-0.19 023 
-0.7r 0.34 
-0.88" 0.28 
-O.sr 0.28 
-0.31 0.30 
0.10 
-0.57 
-0.59 
-0.83" 
0.05 
-0.02 
0.23 
-0.10 
0.08 
-0.16 
0.09 
0.49 
-0.06 
-0.14 
Oi l 
0.02 
-0.02 
-0.41 
0.35 
0.39 
0.34 
0.28 
0.15 
0.21 
0.22 
0.17 
0.26 
0.25 
0.19 
0.33 
0.19 
0.19 
0.20 
0.20 
0.22 
0.70 
Reduce 
Taxes 
468(26%) 
PE SE 
-2.08" 0.37 
0.04 017 
0.04 
-0.33 
-0.18 
0.20 
0.23 
0.00 
-0.45 
-0.11 
0.31 
0.28 
0.16 
0.35 
0.17 
0.15 
0.44 
0.20 
0.42* 012 
-0.41* 014 
-0.09 
-0.24 
-0.42 
0.11 
-0.19 
0.52 
-0.55 
-0.34 
-0.30 
Oi l 
-0.09 
1.10* 
1.28" 
0.18 
0.20 
0.23 
0.29 
0.17 
0.30 
0.43 
0.45 
0.35 
0.13 
0.25 
0.38 
0.33 
0.98" 0.33 
0.76* 0.35 
031 O40 
0.86* 0.44 
0.91* 0.39 
0.99' 0.33 
-0.26' 012 
0.29' 0.13 
0.41 0.29 
0.01 012 
-0.12* 0.04 
-0.06 
0.24 
-0.25 
0.02 
-0.03 
0.17 
-0.06 
-0.21 
017 
0.20 
0.03 
0.08 
017 
0.39 
0.35* 
-0.25 
0.15 
0.22 
0.24 
018 
0.27 
0.26 
0.20 
0.34 
0.21 
0.20 
0.21 
0.21 
0.23 
0.74 
0.13 
014 
-0.6r 0.33 
0.01 012 
0.11* 0.05 
196.4 
TABLE A5.2(ii): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1967 ANPA, N=1770) 
VARIABLE Keep Death AboUsh Immigration- Immigraiicn- Immigration- Immigration- No more 
Penalty Death Asians like Quota Asian No Asian- Only Britain .Migrants 
PenaUy anyone else migration Europe OK & N.Europe 
975(55%) 655(37%) 348(20%) 655(37%) 114(6%) 364(21%) 232(13) 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Classified 
ReUgion - CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
State - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
State - SA 
State - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass Ident. - None 
hicome 2 ($751-$1250) 
hicome 3 ($1251-$2250) 
hicome 4 (52251-53250) 
hicome 5 (53251-54250) 
hicome 6 (54251-55250) 
hicome 7 ($5251-$6250) 
Income 8 (over $6251) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 51-58 (Ref:>58) 
Age (3) 42-50 
Age (4) 34-51 
Age (5) 26-33 
Age (6) 19-25 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
314(18) 
93(5) 
114(6) 
383(22) 
54(3) 
433(25) 
402(23) 
53(3) 
226(13) 
653(37) 
525(30) 
243(14) 
187(11) 
150(8) 
68(4) 
263(15) 
61(3) 
40(2) 
42(2) 
53(3) 
907(51) 
108(6) 
79(4) 
260(15) 
456(26) 
288(16) 
139(8) 
67(4) 
127(7) 
236(13) 
1248(71) 
193(11) 
176(10) 
417(24) 
104(6) 
107(6) 
351(20) 
68(4) 
265(15) 
336(19) 
314(18) 
274(15) 
201(11) 
9(.5) 
887(50) 
527(30) 
99(6) 
890(50) 
-
PE 
0.24 
-0.07 
0.07 
-0.26 
-0.20 
-0.31 
-0.26 
-0.04 
-0.47 
-0.46* 
0.18 
O02 
-0.33* 
0.51* 
0.02 
0.07 
0.30* 
0.13 
0.53 
0.46 
0.06 
021 
0.21 
0.38 
0.02 
Oi l 
0.01 
0.15 
0.23 
0.09 
0.16 
0.04 
0.00 
0.39 
0.21 
0.01 
0.24 
-0.29 
-0.05 
-0.31 
-0.03 
0.09 
-0.10 
0.04 
-0.65 
-0.51* 
0.18 
-0.33 
0.09 
0.07 
SE 
0.28 
0.16 
0.27 
0.23 
014 
0.31 
0.15 
0.14 
0.32 
0.18 
Oi l 
013 
0.16 
0.18 
0.20 
0.27 
0.15 
0.29 
0.36 
034 
0.29 
0.12 
0.22 
0.31 
0.25 
0.24 
026 
0.30 
0.36 
0.31 
0.25 
013 
019 
0.20 
0.16 
0.24 
025 
0.18 
0.29 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
0.19 
0.21 
0.73 
0.11 
0.12 
0.25 
Oi l 
0.04 
PE 
-0.72* 
0.02 
0.02 
0.32 
Oi l 
0.22 
0.39* 
0.01 
0.53 
0.56* 
-0.15 
0.18 
0.54' 
-0.39' 
-0.05 
0.17 
-0.10 
-0.36 
-0.55 
-0.43 
-0.16 
-0.07 
-0.28 
-0.47 
-0.14 
-0.28 
-0.12 
-0.34 
-0.48 
-0.13 
-0.42 
-0.02 
0.07 
-0.21 
-0.13 
0.06 
-0.31 
0.12 
0.14 
0.29 
0.15 
0.17 
0.29 
0.38 
0.78 
0.34' 
-0.13 
0.35 
-0.17 
-0.10' 
SE 
0.29 
0.16 
0.27 
0.23 
0.14 
0.32 
016 
014 
032 
0.18 
0.11 
0.13 
0.16 
0.19 
0.20 
0.27 
0.15 
0.30 
0.37 
0.35 
0.30 
0.12 
0.23 
0.32 
0.25 
0.25 
0.26 
0.30 
0.37 
0.31 
0.26 
0.14 
0.20 
0.21 
0.17 
0.24 
0.26 
0.18 
0.29 
0.19 
0.19 
0.19 
0.20 
0.21 
0.70 
0.12 
0.12 
0.26 
0.11 
0.04 
PE 
-2.48' 
0.05 
0.27 
0.43 
0.10 
0.23 
0.41' 
0.05 
SE 
038 
0.20 
0.32 
0.27 
0.17 
042 
0.19 
0.18 
0.8r 0.38 
0.05 
0.04 
0.05 
-0.24 
-0.04 
-0.40 
0.01 
0.15 
0.22 
0.14 
0.15 
0.21 
0.22 
0.26 
0.34 
0.18 
0.75* 0.30 
0.72 
-0.33 
0.02 
-0.18 
-0.43 
-0.37 
0.11 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.11 
0.34 
0.07 
-0.43 
0.04 
0.16 
0.23 
0.21 
0.33 
038 
0.36 
0.82* 
0.43 
0.43 
0.52* 
0.50* 
0.38 
0.47 
0.37 
0.15 
0.30 
0.44 
033 
0.32 
0.34 
0.39 
0.43 
O40 
0.35 
0.17 
0.26 
0.26 
0.21 
0.30 
0.30 
0.23 
0.34 
0.25 
0.24 
0.24 
0.25 
l . i r 0.25 
0.58 
0.26 
0.03 
-0.14 
0.12 
0.02 
0.88 
0.14 
0.15 
0.31 
0.14 
0.05 
PE 
-0.68" 
-0.03 
0.02 
0.02 
019 
-0.31 
-0.11 
-0.03 
-0.28 
0.31 
-0.32' 
0.41" 
0.61* 
-0.21 
-0.17 
013 
-0.07 
-0.73' 
-0.63 
-0.12 
-0.10 
0.24' 
0.27 
0.01 
-0.39 
-0.20 
0.03 
-0.12 
-0.14 
0.26 
-0.06 
0.15 
0.24 
-0.14 
0.14 
0.31 
-0.02 
0.11 
0.39 
-0.04 
-0.09 
-0.13 
0.07 
-0.00 
-0.27 
-0.37 
0.29" 
0.43 
-0.09 
0.04 
SE 
0.29 
016 
0.26 
0.23 
014 
0.34 
0.16 
0.14 
0.33 
0.18 
0.11 
0.13 
016 
0.19 
0.21 
0.28 
0.15 
0.33 
0.40 
0.34 
0.31 
0.12 
0.23 
0.31 
0.26 
0.25 
0.26 
0.30 
0.36 
0.31 
0.26 
0.14 
0.20 
0.21 
0.17 
0.25 
0.25 
019 
0.30 
0.19 
0.18 
0.19 
0.19 
0.21 
0.74 
012 
012 
0.26 
0.11 
0.04 
PE 
-2.85' 
0.63' 
0.80 
0.63 
0.02 
0.97 
-0.24 
0.25 
0.24 
0.04 
-0.16 
-0.36 
-0.46 
-0.22 
0.00 
-0.02 
0.46 
0.83 
0.44 
SE 
0.59 
0.31 
0.48 
041 
O30 
0.53 
0.33 
0.26 
0.56 
0.35 
0.22 
0.26 
0.35 
0.36 
0.35 
0.56 
0.26 
0.54 
0.67 
1.25' 0.49 
0.74 
0.07 
0.27 
0.47 
059 
0.49 
0.24 
0.64 
-0.16 
0.52 
0.27 
-0.44 
-0.51 
0.21 
0.11 
-0.98 
-0.75 
-0.10 
-1.04 
-0.22 
-0.42 
0,03 
-0.34 
-0.80 
-3.96 
0.02 
0.06 
0.32 
016 
-0.08 
0.47 
0.24 
0.41 
0.60 
0.52 
0.52 
0.56 
0.60 
0.81 
0.62 
0.55 
0.26 
0.42 
0.36 
0.30 
0.64 
0.58 
0.36 
0.78 
0.35 
036 
0.34 
0.37 
0.46 
5.20 
0.23 
0.24 
0.45 
0.22 
0.08 
PE SE 
-0.8r 0.33 
-0.10 
-0.19 
-0.39 
-0.01 
-0.22 
0.01 
-0.08 
-0.61 
-0.25 
0.08 
-0.19 
-0.26 
-0.19 
0.34 
-0.15 
015 
0.24 
-0.34 
0.35 
-0.01 
0.25 
-0.05 
-0.12 
0.04 
-0.04 
-0.07 
0.07 
-0.32 
-0.38 
-0.01 
0.02 
-0.22 
-0.09 
-0.16 
-0.26 
0.14 
-0.34 
-0.31 
012 
-0.09 
-0.21 
-0.22 
-0.74' 
0.15 
-0.28' 
0.00 
-0.18 
-0.04 
-0.03 
0.19 
033 
O30 
016 
0.39 
0,18 
016 
0.42 
0,22 
0.13 
0.15 
0.20 
0,22 
0.21 
0,33 
0,17 
0.34 
0.47 
0.39 
0.37 
0.14 
0,28 
037 
0,29 
0,29 
031 
034 
044 
038 
0,30 
0,16 
0,23 
0.23 
0.19 
0.30 
0.28 
0.22 
0.36 
0.21 
0.21 
0.22 
023 
0.27 
0.83 
0.14 
014 
0.34 
0.13 
0.05 
PE 
-1,50" 
0.02 
-0.94 
-0.33 
-0,60" 
-0.18 
O06 
OlO 
0,38 
-0.14 
0.45' 
-0,38 
-0,50" 
0.59" 
0.26 
-0.09 
-0,42 
-1,66* 
-1.37 
-1,08 
-0,47 
-0,50" 
-0,09 
0,17 
033 
0,03 
-0.22 
-0,15 
-0,02 
-0,77 
0,24 
-0.19 
0.02 
-0.11 
SE 
0,40 
0.23 
0,63 
0.39 
0.22 
0,43 
0.23 
0,20 
0,48 
0.28 
016 
0,20 
0,25 
024 
0,29 
0,42 
023 
0.75 
076 
076 
OiO 
0.17 
0.31 
0,43 
0,35 
0.35 
0.39 
0.46 
0 i 7 
Oi8 
0.36 
021 
021 
0.28 
-O.sr 0.24 
-0.32 
-0.40 
-0.33 
-1.23' 
-0.22 
015 
0.05 
0.00 
-0,06 
-0.49 
0,84" 
-0,43 
-1,40 
OlO 
0,02 
0.36 
0.37 
026 
0.S7 
02% 
0.26 
021 
0,28 
0,32 
1,15 
018 
0,20 
0,75 
0,17 
0,06 
196 5 
TABLE A5.2(m): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOaAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1967 ANPA, N=1770) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Qassified 
ReUgion - CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
State - Vic 
State - Qld 
Stale - SA 
State - WA 
State - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 ($751-$1250) 
hicome 3 ($1251-$2250) 
hicome 4 ($2251-$3250) 
hicome 5 ($3251-$4250) 
hicome 6 ($4251-55250) 
hicome 7 (55251-56250) 
Income 8 (over 56251) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr, 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 51-58 (Ref:>58) 
Age (3) 42-50 
Age (4) 34-41 
Age (5) 26-33 
Age (6) 19-25 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
314(18) 
93(5) 
114(6) 
383(22) 
54(3) 
433(25) 
402(23) 
53(3) 
226(13) 
653(37) 
525(30) 
243(14) 
187(11) 
150(8) 
68(4) 
263(15) 
61(3) 
40(2) 
42(2) 
53(3) 
907(51) 
108(6) 
79(4) 
260(15) 
456(26) 
288(16) 
139(8) 
67(4) 
127(7) 
236(13) 
1248(71) 
193(11) 
176(10) 
417(24) 
104(6) 
107(6) 
351(20) 
68(4) 
265(15) 
336(19) 
314(18) 
274(15) 
201(11) 
9(.5) 
887(50) 
527(30) 
99(6) 
890(50) 
-
Read & see 
what Uke 
701(40%) 
PE 
-0.08 
SE 
0.29 
-0.3r 016 
-0.12 
-0.26 
-0.30' 
-0.39 
-0.08 
-0.34' 
0.16 
-0.20 
0.05 
-0.11 
-0.09 
0.05 
0.32 
-0.45 
0.10 
0.03 
0.56 
0.41 
-0.05 
0.04 
-0.12 
-0.04 
-0.03 
0.03 
-0.21 
0.12 
-0.28 
0.27 
-0.11 
0.08 
-0.04 
-0.14 
0.27 
0.24 
0.14 
0.34 
0.16 
0.14 
0.32 
0.18 
Oi l 
0.13 
0.17 
0.19 
0.20 
0.29 
0.15 
0.30 
0.35 
0.34 
0.30 
0.12 
0.23 
0.32 
0.26 
0.25 
0.27 
0.30 
037 
0.32 
0.26 
0.14 
0.19 
0.20 
-O.sr 0.16 
-0.65' 0.24 
-0.70' 0.25 
-1.26' 0.19 
-2.13' 
0.21 
0.08 
0.17 
0.48' 
083 ' 
0.28 
0.15 
-0.07 
-0.39 
0.05 
-0.03 
0.43 
0.19 
0.19 
0.19 
0.20 
0.21 
0.75 
0.12 
0.12 
0.27 
0.11 
0.04 
Some 
Censorship 
1046(59%) 
PE SE 
-0.12 0.29 
0.41' 0.16 
0.13 0.27 
0.25 0.24 
0.35" 0.14 
0.53 0.34 
-0.04 0.16 
0.32' 0.14 
-0.22 0.32 
018 0.18 
-0.06 0.11 
0.10 0.13 
0.09 0.17 
0.02 0.19 
-0.31 0.20 
0.50 0.29 
-0.09 0.15 
-0.02 0.30 
-1.00* 0.36 
-0.32 0.34 
-0.06 0.30 
0.02 0.12 
0.14 0.23 
0.18 0.32 
0.10 0.25 
0.10 0.25 
0.34 0.27 
0.01 0.30 
0.41 0.37 
-0.16 0.32 
0.12 0.26 
-0.04 0.14 
0.04 0.19 
0.13 0.20 
0.34* 0.16 
0.65* 0.24 
0.65* 0.25 
1.25* 0.19 
2.19' 0.42 
-0.19 0.19 
-0.08 0.19 
-0.10 0.19 
-0.44' 0.19 
-0.73' 0.21 
-0.18 0.75 
-0.19 0.12 
0.06 0.12 
0.30 0.27 
-0.05 0.11 
0.03 0.04 
Attitude to 
Royahy 
(OLS) 
PE SE 
1.99' 0.11 
-0.02 0.06 
0.16 OlO 
-0.06 0.09 
OOl 0.05 
-0.19 0.12 
-0.32' 0.06 
0.01 0.05 
-0.39' 0.12 
-0.11 0.07 
0.11 0.04 
0.06 0.05 
-0.01 0.06 
-0.14' 0.07 
-0.03 0.07 
-0.05 0.10 
0.11' 0.05 
0.13 0.11 
-0.04 0.13 
-0.23' Oi l 
0.03 013 
-0.07 0.05 
-O.ir 0.08 
0.22 0.12 
0.08 0.09 
-0.01 0.09 
-0.16 0.10 
-0.21 0.11 
-0.17 0.13 
-0.17 0.12 
-0.08 0.10 
-0.05 0.05 
0.02 0.07 
0.03 0.08 
0.08 0.06 
0.19' 0.09 
0.24' 0.09 
0.26' 0.07 
0.21 0.11 
-0.09 0.07 
-O.ir 0.07 
-0.30' 0.07 
-0.33' 0.07 
-0.36' 0.08 
-0.13 0.27 
0.21' 0.04 
-0.07 0.05 
-0.18 0.10 
0.00 0.04 
0.03 0.02 
196.6 
TABLE A5.3(i): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1969 ANPA, N=1745) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Classified 
ReUgion - CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
State - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 ($751-$1250) 
hicome 3 ($1251-$2250) 
hicome 4 ($2251-$3250) 
hicome 5 ($3251-54250) 
hicome 6 ($4251-$5250) 
hicome 7 ($5251-$6250) 
Income 8 (over $6251) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 53-60 (Ref:>60) 
Age (3) 44-52 
Age (4) 36-43 
Age (5) 28-35 
Age (6) 19-27 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Frcq(%) 
205(12) 
109(6) 
137(8) 
327(19) 
81(5) 
419(24) 
414(24) 
72(4) 
231(13) 
553(32) 
484(28) 
258(15) 
207(12) 
142(8) 
71(4) 
259(15) 
54(3) 
37(2) 
43(2) 
45(2) 
898(51) 
57(3) 
93(5) 
189(11) 
387(22) 
326(19) 
193(11) 
119(7) 
194(11) 
190(11) 
1286(74) 
179(10) 
180(10) 
411(24) 
109(6) 
109(6) 
343(20) 
59(3) 
226(13) 
300(17) 
301(17) 
255(15) 
291(17) 
77(4) 
842(49) 
589(34) 
112(6) 
865(50) 
-
Ideology-
Left 
69(4%) 
PE 
-3.36* 
-0.35 
0.17 
0.42 
-0.06 
-1.33 
0.34 
-0.21 
SE 
1.16 
0.48 
0.56 
0.48 
0.38 
1.11 
0.42 
0.42 
1.4r 0.52 
044 
0.06 
0.31 
-1.17 
-0.37 
-0.78 
0.40 
0.59 
0.20 
0.56 
0.02 
-6.26 
-0.45 
-0.82 
081 
1.49 
0.12 
1.11 
0.69 
0.86 
1.59 
0.61 
-0.35 
-0.76 
-0.28 
0.03 
-6.20 
-0.39 
-0.58 
-0.58 
1.71* 
-0.99 
-1.53* 
-1.29* 
-0.40 
-1.35 
0.09 
0.56 
0.47 
0.33 
0.32 
0.64 
0.53 
0.59 
0.62 
0.34 
0.85 
0.74 
0.71 
9,84 
0.32 
0.83 
1.18 
1.09 
1.17 
1.14 
1.18 
1.20 
1.18 
1.16 
032 
1.32 
0.60 
0.53 
6.46 
0.70 
0.50 
0.86 
•0.62 
0.48 
•0.54 
•0.58 
0.45 
0.85 
0.31 
0.33 
l.er 0.48 
0.39 
-0.09 
0.31 
0.11 
Ideology-
Right 
180(9%) 
PE SE 
-2.26* 0.58 
0.36 0.29 
0.53 0.36 
0.66 0.34 
0.30 0.27 
0.55 0.43 
0.24 0.28 
017 0.24 
-0.41 0.56 
-0.24 0.32 
-0,24 0,21 
-0.13 023 
0.09 0.29 
-0.12 0.31 
-0.17 0.34 
0.25 0.43 
0.35 0.24 
0.47 0.55 
0.71 0.60 
014 0.53 
0.45 0.58 
0.46* 0.22 
-0.98 0.76 
-0.79 0.59 
-1.11*0.55 
-0.52 0.50 
-1.01 0.53 
-0.19 0.52 
-0.29 0.55 
-0.02 0.53 
-0.11 0.50 
-0.04 0.24 
0.03 0.37 
-0.93 0.52 
0.23 0.30 
018 0.43 
017 0.42 
069* 0.32 
0.65 0.49 
-0.40 0.33 
-0.51 0.32 
-0.49 0.33 
-0.21 0.33 
-0.95* 0.35 
-1.34*0.58 
-0.52* 0.20 
0.44* 0.20 
0.39 0.34 
0.16 0.20 
0.27* 0.07 
Business-
Too much 
Power 
205(12%) 
PE 
064 
0.01 
-0.05 
0.40 
-0.10 
-0.01 
012 
0.12 
0.59* 
0.03 
0.03 
0.22 
0.08 
0.11 
0.30 
0.34 
-0.01 
0.27 
-0.14 
-0.13 
-0.21 
0.09 
-0.12 
-0.67 
-0.33 
-0.10 
0.07 
-0.30 
-0.29 
-0.28 
-0.14 
-0.13 
0.05 
-0.05 
-0.12 
O30 
-0.12 
0.00 
-0.41 
-0.09 
-0.13 
-0.04 
-0.49* 
-0.82* 
SE 
0.36 
016 
0.24 
0.21 
0.14 
0.25 
0.16 
0.14 
0.30 
0.17 
Oi l 
0.13 
0.16 
017 
0.20 
0.27 
0.14 
0.32 
0.36 
0.32 
0.33 
0.12 
0.29 
0.36 
0.33 
0.33 
0.34 
0.35 
0.38 
0.36 
0.34 
0.13 
0.20 
0.20 
016 
0.24 
0.24 
0.18 
0.31 
0.20 
0.19 
0.20 
•0.20 
0.20 
-0.85* 0.28 
-0.35* 
-0.05 
-0.15 
0.16 
-0.14« 
Oi l 
0.12 
0.23 
Oi l 
•0.04 
Business -
Not too 
much power 
580(33%) 
PE 
-1.14* 
0.04 
0.12 
-0.14 
0,26 
0,01 
-0,08 
-0,04 
-0,48 
-0,11 
0,01 
-0,12 
Oi l 
-0,02 
-0.16 
-0.37 
0.06 
-0.24 
-0.05 
0.19 
-0.18 
0.16 
-0.14 
0.16 
0.12 
-0.18 
-0.33 
-0.01 
0.03 
0.15 
-0.66 
0.04 
-0.16 
0.03 
016 
-0.10 
017 
-0.05 
0.36 
0.29 
0.32 
0.22 
0.54* 
0.92* 
1.26' 
0.08 
0.21 
0.15 
-0.16 
0.11* 
SE 
0.39 
0.16 
0.25 
0.22 
0.15 
0.27 
0.16 
0.14 
0.32 
018 
0.12 
0.14 
0.17 
0.18 
0.21 
0.29 
0.15 
0.35 
0.39 
0.33 
0.37 
0.12 
0.32 
0.39 
0.36 
0.35 
0.36 
0.38 
0.40 
0.39 
038 
0.14 
0.22 
0.21 
0.17 
0.25 
0.25 
0.19 
0.32 
0.22 
0.21 
0.22 
0.22 
021 
•0.29 
0.12 
0.12 
0.24 
0.12 
0.04 
Spend on 
WeUare 
1245(71%) 
PE 
1,36* 
-0,02 
-0,02 
0,26 
0.17 
-0.15 
-0.15 
-0.11 
0,20 
0,13 
-0,28' 
0.73" 
0.16 
-0.08 
012 
0.62 
0.21 
-0.70" 
0.29 
0.19 
-0.69* 
0.01 
0.05 
-0.24 
-0.72 
-0.47 
-0.45 
-0.46 
-0.34 
-1.03" 
-0.94' 
-0.15 
-0.53" 
-0.31 
SE 
0.41 
0.17 
0.27 
0.24 
0.16 
0.27 
0.17 
0.15 
0.36 
0.20 
0.12 
015 
0.17 
0.18 
0.22 
0.32 
0.17 
0.32 
0.44 
0.37 
0.33 
0.13 
0.32 
0.41 
0.37 
0.37 
0.38 
0,40 
0,43 
0,41 
0,38 
0,15 
0.22 
0.23 
-0.3r 0.19 
-0.31 
-0.48 
-0.30 
-0.28 
016 
013 
0.32 
0.20 
0.25 
0.52 
0.08 
0.27' 
0.69* 
0.11 
-0.10" 
0.26 
0.27 
0.20 
0.35 
0.21 
0.21 
0.21 
0.22 
0.21 
0.32 
0.12 
'0.13 
0.28 
0.12 
0.04 
Reduce 
Taxes 
437(46%) 
PE SE 
-1.7r 045 
0.09 0.17 
-0.35 0.29 
-0.27 0.25 
-0,21 0.17 
0.06 0.29 
014 0.18 
0,06 015 
-0,39 039 
-0.22 0.21 
O30" 0.13 
-0,68" 016 
-0,17 0,18 
0.02 0.19 
-0.09 0.22 
-0.63 0.34 
-0.17 0.17 
0.50 0.33 
-0.42 0.48 
-0,01 0,40 
0.9r 0.33 
O09 013 
-0.41 037 
0.46 0.46 
0.95" 0,42 
0.64 0.42 
0.65 0.42 
0,58 0.45 
0.61 0.48 
1.26" 0.45 
1.10" 043 
OlO 015 
0.42 0.23 
0.36 0.23 
0.39" 0.20 
021 0.28 
0,43 0.28 
0.23 0.22 
013 0.38 
-0.15 0.23 
-0.05 0.22 
-0.13 0.22 
-0.07 0.23 
-0.10 0.22 
-0.36 0.33 
-016 0.13 
-0.28" 0.14 
-0.66" 0.29 
-0.05 0.13 
0.11* 0.04 
196.7 
TABLE A5.3(ii): INFLUENCE OF SOCUL-STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1969 ANPA. N=1745) 
VAIUABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Classified 
ReUgion - CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 ($751-$1250) 
hicome 3 ($1251-52250) 
hicome 4 (52251-53250) 
hicome 5 ($3251-$4250) 
hicome 6 ($4251-$5250) 
hicome 7 ($5251-$6250) 
Income 8 (over $6251) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 53-60 (Ref:>60) 
Age (3) 44-52 
Age (4) 36-43 
Age (5) 28-35 
Age (6) 19-27 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
205(12) 
109(6) 
137(8) 
327(19) 
81(5) 
419(24) 
414(24) 
72(4) 
231(13) 
553(32) 
484(28) 
258(15) 
207(12) 
142(8) 
71(4) 
259(15) 
54(3) 
37(2) 
43(2) 
45(2) 
898(51) 
57(3) 
93(5) 
189(11) 
387(22) 
326(19) 
193(11) 
119(7) 
194(11) 
190(11) 
1286(74) 
179(10) 
180(10) 
411(24) 
109(6) 
109(6) 
343(20) 
59(3) 
226(13) 
300(17) 
301(17) 
255(15) 
291(17) 
77(4) 
842(49) 
589(34) 
112(6) 
865(50) 
-
Keep Death 
Penalty 
795(46%) 
PE 
-0.45 
-0.03 
0.08 
-0.41 
-0.02 
0.01 
-0.26 
-0.02 
-0.46 
-0.42* 
0.07 
0.25 
0.05 
0.70* 
0.52" 
0.32 
0.38* 
0.42 
-0.03 
-0.34 
0.44 
0.38* 
-0.26 
0.06 
0.43 
0.24 
0.25 
0.48 
0.46 
0.36 
-0.19 
-0.04 
0.24 
0.25 
0.21 
-0.12 
-0.14 
0.11 
-0.23 
-0.14 
0.03 
-0.16 
-0.02 
-0.06 
-0.34 
-0.48* 
-0.05 
SE 
0.36 
0.16 
0.24 
0.21 
0.15 
0.26 
0.16 
0.14 
0.29 
0.18 
0.11 
0.13 
0.16 
018 
0.20 
0.27 
0.15 
0.31 
0.37 
0.34 
0.32 
0.12 
0.31 
0.36 
0.33 
0.33 
0.34 
0.35 
0.38 
0.36 
0.34 
0.13 
0.20 
0.20 
0.16 
0.24 
0.24 
0.18 
0.32 
0.20 
019 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.29 
0.11 
0.12 
-O.sr 0.24 
0.05 
0.08* 
0.11 
0.04 
AboUsh 
Death 
Penalty 
802(46%) 
PE SE 
-0.08 0.35 
0.11 0.16 
-0.05 0.24 
0.59" 0.21 
0.20 014 
0.30 0.25 
0.25 0.15 
0.01 0.14 
0.34 0.29 
031 0.17 
-0.19 0.11 
-0.04 0.13 
0.08 0.16 
-0.52" 018 
-0.38 0.20 
-0.23 0.26 
-0.41* 0.15 
-0.45 0.31 
0.07 0.36 
-0.04 0.32 
0.27 0.33 
-0.28 0.12 
-0.00 0.29 
-0.38 0.36 
-0.49 0.33 
-0.27 0.32 
-0.25 0.33 
-0.39 0.35 
-0.46 0.37 
-0.25 0.36 
-0.11 0.34 
0.11 0.13 
-0.44* 0.20 
-0.41* 0.20 
-0.35* 0.16 
-0.15 0.24 
0.01 0.24 
0.02 0.18 
-0.15 0.31 
0.28 0.20 
018 0.19 
0.37 0.20 
0.17 0.20 
0.34 0.20 
0.54 0.28 
032' 0.11 
0.09 0.12 
O.sr 0.23 
-0.07 Oi l 
-0.09' 0.04 
Immigration-
Asians Uke 
anyone else 
394(23%) 
PE SE 
-2.66' 0.50 
0.11 0.19 
0.23 0.29 
0.43 0.24 
0.11 0.18 
0.16 0.30 
0.13 0.18 
-0.28 018 
0.50 0.34 
0.17 0.21 
0.30" 0.14 
0.33' 0.16 
-0.31 0.21 
-0.07 0.22 
-0.17 0,25 
0,68' 0,29 
0.13 018 
0.94" 0.33 
1.01" 0.38 
-0.06 0.41 
0.09 0.38 
-0.32' 0.14 
0.26 0.32 
0.82 0.49 
0.51 0.47 
0.46 0.46 
0.50 0.47 
-0.04 0.49 
0.13 0.52 
0.43 0.50 
0.07 0.48 
0.08 0.16 
-0.08 0.27 
0.17 0.25 
0.20 0.21 
0.10 0.30 
0.33 0.29 
0.25 0.22 
1.09' 0.33 
0.19 0.26 
0.13 0.25 
0.02 0.25 
0.55' 0.25 
1.1 r 0.24 
1.16" 0.32 
0.40' 0.14 
0.01 014 
0.48 0.26 
-0.11 0.13 
-0.07 0.05 
Immij 
Quou 
Migra 
"ration-
Asian 
tion 
729(42%) 
PE 
-0.64 
0.01 
0.26 
0.32 
0.39" 
-0.09 
-0.23 
0.10 
-0,53 
-0.18 
-0.28' 
-0.03 
0.10 
-0.15 
-0.45' 
-0.49' 
-0.15 
-0.88' 
-0.28 
0.38 
0.27 
0.25 
-0.04 
-0.13 
0.05 
0.41 
0.51 
0.55 
SE 
0.37 
0.16 
0.24 
0.21 
0.15 
0.27 
0.16 
0.14 
0.29 
0.18 
0.12 
0.13 
0.16 
0.18 
0.20 
0.28 
0.15 
0.37 
0.39 
0.33 
0.32 
0.12 
0.30 
0.38 
0.35 
0.34 
0.34 
0.36 
0.76' 0.38 
0.53 
0.54 
0.11 
-0.06 
-0.23 
-0.06 
-0.19 
-0.38 
0.14 
0.11 
-0.06 
-0.10 
0.16 
-0.21 
-0.48' 
-0.47 
-0.19 
0.26' 
0.25 
-0.02 
0.08' 
0.37 
0.35 
0.13 
0.20 
0.20 
0.17 
0.24 
0.25 
0.18 
0.31 
0.20 
0.19 
0.20 
0.21 
0.20 
0.29 
0.11 
0.12 
0.23 
0.11 
0.04 
Immij jration-
No Asian 
but Europe 
83(5%) 
PE 
-2.99" 
-0.57 
-0.50 
-0.05 
-0.08 
0.22 
-0.36 
-0.34 
0.36 
-0.02 
-0.53 
-0.31 
0.96" 
0.88" 
-0.03 
0.18 
0,61' 
0,60 
-5,42 
0,07 
0,21 
0,35 
1,34' 
-0.54 
-0.25 
0.23 
-0.23 
0.23 
0.03 
-0.26 
0.45 
-0.02 
-0.29 
0.46 
-0.13 
-0.11 
-0.30 
-0.84 
-0.04 
-0.15 
0.21 
0.32 
-0.57 
-0.99 
-0.79 
-0.23 
-0.06 
0.25 
0.28 
0.14 
SE 
078 
0.40 
0.64 
0.48 
0.33 
0.55 
0.39 
0.33 
0.52 
0,39 
0,29 
0,37 
0.33 
0.36 
0.49 
0,66 
0,29 
0,62 
6,98 
0,67 
0.79 
0.27 
0.56 
0.86 
0.75 
0.71 
0.74 
0.76 
0.84 
0.83 
0.72 
0.30 
0.46 
0.40 
0.37 
0.55 
0.60 
0.48 
0.68 
0.47 
0.42 
0.43 
0.49 
0.51 
0.70 
0.27 
0.29 
0.54 
0.26 
0.09 
Immigration-
Only 
&N. 
Britain 
Europe 
298(17%) 
PE 
-0.66 
0.26 
-0.24 
-0,72' 
-0.30 
-0,62 
019 
0,25 
0.41 
0,10 
-0,25 
-0.17 
-0.01 
-0.11 
0.62" 
-0.16 
0.19 
0,46 
-0.11 
-0.26 
-0.62 
0.25 
-0.82 
-0.56 
-0,23 
-0,45 
-0,42 
-0,04 
-0,53 
-0,61 
-0,41 
-021 
0,25 
0.18 
0.13 
0.16 
0.32 
-0.03 
SE 
0,43 
0,20 
0,34 
0,33 
0.19 
039 
021 
018 
0,37 
0,24 
0.15 
018 
021 
0.23 
0.23 
0.37 
018 
036 
0.49 
0.45 
0.50 
0.15 
0.54 
0.44 
0.39 
0.39 
0.40 
0.42 
0.47 
0.44 
0.41 
0,17 
0,25 
0,25 
021 
031 
032 
0,24 
-1,25* 0,62 
-0,42 
-0,31 
0,25 
0,23 
-0.65* 0.25 
-0,69" 
-0.84" 
-0.84' 
-0.39" 
-0,02 
-0,44 
019 
0,02 
0,26 
0,26 
0,39 
0,15 
0,16 
035 
015 
0,05 
No more 
Migrants 
188(11%) 
PE SE 
-121" 0.49 
-0.36 0,26 
-1,01 0.63 
-0,66 0,43 
-0.39 024 
0.37 0,34 
012 025 
0,18 021 
-0,09 0,54 
0,01 0.30 
0,60" 0,18 
-0,06 0,22 
-0,58" 0,27 
0,26 0,27 
0,44 0.33 
-0,12 0,45 
-0,44 026 
-2,18" 1,02 
-1,90 1,04 
-1,20 0.77 
-1.10 0.76 
-0.52" 019 
-0.87 0.63 
-0,30 0,47 
-0,51 0,44 
-1,01" 0,44 
-1,19* 0,46 
-1,34" 0,53 
- l . i r 0J9 
0.77 033 
0,87 0.47 
-0,26 0,22 
0,09 0.30 
-0.17 0.31 
-0.41 0,26 
0,03 0,36 
0,27 0.37 
-0,55 0,30 
-221" 1,01 
0,51 0,32 
0.33 0.33 
0,58 0.33 
0.6r 0.33 
0.71" 0,33 
0,73" 0,48 
0,61" 019 
-0,53* 021 
-2,06* 0,94 
015 018 
-0,12" 0,06 
196.8 
TABLE A5.3(iu): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOaAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1969 ANPA. N=1745) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers <fe Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Classified 
ReUgion - CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 ($751-$1250) 
hicome 3 (51251-52250) 
hicome 4 (52251-53250) 
hicome 5 (53251-54250) 
hicome 6 (54251-55250) 
hicome 7 (55251-56250) 
Income 8 (over 56251) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 53-60 (Ref:>60) 
Age (3) 44-52 
Age (4) 36-43 
Age (5) 28-35 
Age (6) 19-27 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
205(12) 
109(6) 
137(8) 
327(19) 
81(5) 
419(24) 
414(24) 
72(4) 
231(13) 
553(32) 
484(28) 
258(15) 
207(12) 
142(8) 
71(4) 
259(15) 
54(3) 
37(2) 
43(2) 
45(2) 
898(51) 
57(3) 
93(5) 
189(11) 
387(22) 
326(19) 
193(11) 
119(7) 
194(11) 
190(11) 
1286(74) 
179(10) 
180(10) 
411(24) 
109(6) 
109(6) 
343(20) 
59(3) 
226(13) 
300(17) 
301(17) 
255(15) 
291(17) 
77(4) 
842(49) 
589(34) 
112(6) 
865(50) 
-
Read & See 
what they 
Uke 
732(42%) 
PE SE 
0.34 0.36 
-0.45* 0.16 
0.30 0.25 
-0.24 021 
-0.25 0.15 
-0.08 0.26 
-021 0.16 
-0.30' 0.14 
-0.17 0.29 
-0.50* 018 
0.29* 0.12 
-0.01 0.13 
-0.31 0.17 
0.46* 0.18 
0.33 0.20 
0.35 0.27 
0.14 0.15 
0.14 0.32 
0.71' 0.36 
0.39 0.34 
-0.07 0.33 
-0.11 012 
034 0.30 
-0.12 0.36 
-0.7r 0.34 
-0.72' 0.33 
-0.85' 0.34 
-1.00' 0.36 
-0.72 0.38 
-0.42 0.36 
-0.70' 0.34 
0.01 0.13 
0.03 0.20 
0.20 0.20 
-0.26 0.16 
-0.35 0.24 
-0.47 0.25 
-0.85* 0.19 
-1.46* 0.38 
0.41 021 
0.44* 0.20 
0.55* 0.21 
0.63* 0.21 
1.10' 0.20 
1.28' 0.29 
0.22 0.12 
-0.26* 0.12 
-0.29 0.24 
-0.07 0.11 
-0.01 0.04 
Some 
Censorship 
995(57%) 
PE SE 
-0.38 0.36 
0.45* 0.16 
0.30 0.25 
0.26 0.21 
0.26 0.15 
0.08 0.26 
0.17 0.16 
0.30' 0.14 
0.11 0.29 
0.48* 018 
-0.33* 0.12 
0.01 0.13 
021 0.16 
-0.42* 0.18 
-0.38 0.20 
-0.33 0.27 
-0.15 015 
-0.17 0.31 
-0.66 0.36 
-0.44 0.34 
0.14 0.33 
0.15 0.12 
-0.33 0.30 
0.02 0.36 
0.74* 0.33 
0.76* 0.33 
0.86* 0.33 
1.00* 0.36 
0.73 0.38 
0.45 0.36 
0.70* 0.34 
-0.01 0.13 
-0.08 0.20 
-0.20 0.20 
0.19 0.16 
0.31 0.24 
0.47 0.25 
0.81* 0.19 
1.49' 0.38 
-0.38 0.21 
-0.39' 0.20 
-0.46' 0.20 
-0.55* 0.21 
-1.10* 0.20 
-1.34* 0.29 
-0.24* 0.12 
0.28* 0.12 
0.32 0.24 
0.06 0.11 
-0.01 0.04 
196.9 
TABLE A5.4(i): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND S(XIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1979 ANPA. N=1756) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Qassified 
ReUgion - (ZathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastern Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 (53001-54500) 
hicome 3 (54501-57500) 
hicome 4 ($7501-$10500) 
hicome 5 ($10501-$13500) 
hicome 6 ($13500-$16500) 
hicome 7 ($16501-$19500) 
hicome 8 (over $19501) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 63-70 (Ref:>70) 
Age (3) 54-62 
Age (4) 46-53 
Age (5) 38-45 
Age (6) 30-37 
Age C7) 22-29 
Age (8) 18-21 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - (Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Govemment 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force + other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
207(12) 
122(7) 
192(11) 
441(25) 
109(6) 
385(22) 
216(12) 
458(26) 
268(15) 
519(29) 
479(27) 
269(15) 
183(10) 
148(8) 
63(4) 
177(10) 
43(2) 
39(2) 
33(2) 
64(4) 
1086(61) 
65(4) 
105(6) 
163(9) 
327(18) 
318(18) 
209(12) 
81(5) 
110(6) 
219(12) 
1271(72) 
178(10) 
123(7) 
302(17) 
65(4) 
54(3) 
279(16) 
49(3) 
171(10) 
243(14) 
248(14) 
190(11) 
290(16) 
317(18) 
163(9) 
11(.6) 
912(51) 
792(45) 
256(14) 
437(25) 
756(43) 
347(20) 
901(51) 
-
Ideology-
Left 
125(7%) 
PE SE 
-3.49* 0.74 
0.32 0.40 
0.40 0.44 
0.95* 0.36 
0.54 0.29 
0.18 0.57 
0.22 0.43 
0.73 0.45 
1.89' 0.46 
1.10' 0.40 
-0.23 0.25 
-0.40 0.27 
-0.33 031 
-0.27 0.34 
-0.42 0.41 
-0.48 0.60 
0.50 0.31 
-0.12 0.68 
-0.98 1.07 
-0.34 0.79 
0.70 0.43 
-0.15 0.24 
0.68 0.46 
0.01 0.50 
0.29 0.43 
-0.02 0.41 
-0.27 0.43 
-0.05 0.45 
0.36 0.53 
0.27 0.55 
-0.65 0.49 
-0.53' 0.25 
0.66 0.48 
0.34 0.56 
-0.33 0.51 
0.78 0.64 
0.16 083 
0.73 0.44 
-0.44 0.84 
034 048 
-0.94 0.56 
-0.17 0.52 
-0.82 0.59 
-0.41 0.51 
0.01 0.49 
-0.82 0.56 
-6.08 6.16 
-0.22 0.22 
0.26 0.26 
1.11' 0.33 
0.12 0.39 
0.08 0.36 
0.23 0.45 
-0.17 0.22 
-O.ir 0.08 
Ideology-
Right 
180(12%) 
PE SE 
-2.03* 0.50 
0.66' 0.27 
0.29 0.33 
-0.08 0.32 
015 0.24 
0.37 0.38 
-0.25 0.26 
-0.19 0.27 
-1.16* 0.31 
0.07 0.24 
0.01 019 
0.18 0.20 
0.12 0.26 
-0.31 0.32 
0.14 0.30 
-0.50 0.56 
0.13 0.28 
-1.54 1.03 
1.05' 0.43 
0.90* 0.46 
-0.24 0.45 
0.59' 0.22 
-0.07 0.49 
0.28 0.38 
0.06 0.38 
0.05 0.34 
0.08 0.35 
-0.11 038 
-0.58 0.54 
0.51 0.40 
0.27 0.32 
0.27 0.23 
-0.48 0.33 
-0.04 0.33 
-0.56' 0.28 
-0.73 0.48 
-0.52 0.51 
-0.13 0.28 
-0.05 0.44 
-021 0.33 
0.01 032 
-0.40 0.35 
-0.60 0.38 
-0.83' 0.36 
-0.83' 0.37 
-0.90' 0.42 
0.56 0.76 
-0.10 0.18 
0.39 0.20 
1.15' 0.27 
-0.32 0.29 
-0.07 0.24 
-0.44 0.31 
-0.39' 0.18 
021 ' 0.06 
Business-
Too much 
Power 
1136(65%) 
PE SE 
0.63 033 
-0.08 018 
-0.21 0.24 
0.04 0.20 
0.01 014 
0.11 0.25 
0.04 0.17 
-0.14 0.18 
0.26 0.19 
-0.12 0.17 
-0.11 0.12 
0.44' 0.14 
0.01 0.16 
-0.10 0.18 
0.01 0.20 
0.10 0.29 
0.02 0.18 
0.39 0.37 
-0.04 0.38 
0.07 0.40 
0.03 028 
-0.31' 0.12 
-0.39 0.28 
-0.36 0.25 
-0.22 0.23 
-0.13 021 
-0.06 0.22 
-0.17 0.24 
-0.46 0.31 
-0.25 0.29 
-0.37 021 
-0.34' 0.14 
0.17 021 
0.15 0.24 
0.05 0.18 
0.07 0.30 
-0.55 0.32 
0.19 0.19 
-0.16 0.34 
0.38 0.24 
0.49* 0.24 
0.33 0.25 
0.53* 0.26 
0.37 0.25 
0.07 0.25 
-0.08 0.26 
0.14 0.68 
0.05 0.12 
0.06 0.12 
0.34 0.19 
0.18 0.19 
0.00 0.17 
0.01 021 
-0.03 0.11 
-O.ir 0.04 
Business-
Not loo 
much 
520(30%) 
PE SE 
-1.75* 0.37 
019 0.19 
0.24 0.25 
-0.05 0.21 
-0.02 0.15 
0.14 0.27 
0.05 0.18 
021 019 
-0.25 0.20 
015 018 
0.18 0.13 
-0.35* 0.14 
0.04 0.17 
0.05 0.19 
0.05 021 
-0.18 0.32 
-0.01 0.19 
-0.75 0.43 
-0.16 0.42 
-0.06 0.41 
-0.05 0.30 
0.44* 0.13 
0.75* 0.29 
0.45 0.27 
0.34 0.25 
0.27 0.23 
0.12 0.24 
0.23 0.26 
0.20 0.33 
0.32 0.31 
0.30 0.23 
0.27 0.15 
-0.17 0.22 
-0.12 0.25 
-0.04 0.19 
0.01 0.31 
0.51 0.32 
-0.22 0.21 
-0.10 0.37 
0.18 0.27 
0.17 0.27 
0.42 0.27 
0.16 0.29 
0.31 0.27 
0.64* 0.27 
0.74* 0.29 
0.40 0.73 
-0.22 0.12 
0.11 0.13 
-0.13 0.20 
-0.34 0.20 
0.00 0.18 
-0.17 0.22 
0.07 0.12 
O.ir 0.04 
Spend on 
Welfare 
665(38%) 
PE 
-0.39 
0.08 
0.12 
-0.01 
0.34* 
-0.31 
-0.32 
-0.11 
-0.06 
OOl 
-0.64* 
SE 
0.34 
019 
0.24 
0.20 
014 
0.26 
0.17 
0.19 
0.19 
0.18 
0.13 
0.3r 0.13 
-0.06 
-0.04 
-0.15 
0.43 
0.19 
0.42 
0.19 
-0.09 
0.49 
-0.24* 
0.09 
-0.10 
-0.07 
-0.52' 
-0.39 
-0.32 
-0.36 
0.17 
0.19 
021 
0.29 
0.18 
0.34 
0.36 
028 
0.38 
0.12 
0.28 
0.25 
0.22 
021 
0.22 
0.24 
0.30 
-1.2r 0.32 
-0.68' 
-0.12 
-0.39 
-0.26 
-0.08 
Oi l 
-0.59 
0.27 
0.06 
017 
0.06 
0.20 
-0.02 
-0.13 
-0.02 
0.15 
0.18 
0.34' 
0.05 
0.58' 
0.16 
0.33 
0.33 
-0.01 
-0.02 
0.22 
0.14 
021 
0.24 
0.19 
0.30 
0.35 
0.19 
0.34 
024 
0.24 
0.25 
0.27 
0.25 
0.25 
0.27 
0.70 
0.12 
0.12 
0.19 
021 
0.18 
0.22 
0.11 
0.04 
Reduce 
Taxes 
1037(59%) 
PE SE 
0.28 0.33 
-0.07 0.19 
0.01 0,24 
0.05 0.20 
-0.33" 014 
0.24 0.25 
0,25 017 
-0,01 018 
-0,14 019 
-0,15 017 
0,54" 012 
-0,39' 013 
-0,05 0.16 
-0.05 0.18 
0.08 0.20 
-0.50 0.28 
-0.20 0.17 
-0.46 0.34 
-0.18 0.36 
-0.28 0.38 
-0.02 0.27 
031 ' 0.12 
-0.16 0.28 
Oi l 0.25 
0.07 0.22 
0.52' 0.21 
0.41 0.22 
0.35 023 
0.27 0.30 
1.29' 0.31 
0.48' 0.21 
0.05 0.14 
036 021 
0.25 0.24 
0.06 0.18 
-0.26 0.29 
0.41 0.33 
-0.32 0.19 
-0.05 0.34 
-0.11 0.24 
-0.03 0.24 
-0.17 0.25 
0.03 0.26 
0,26 0.25 
0.19 0.25 
0.02 0,26 
-0.69 0.67 
-0.25* 0.11 
-0.03 0.12 
-0.64* 0.19 
-0.08 0.20 
-0.32 018 
-0.32 021 
0.00 0.11 
0.04 0.04 
196.10 
TABLE A5.4(ii): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1979 ANPA, N=1756) 
VARIABLE Keep Death 
Penalty 
Abolish 
Death 
Penalty 
Immigration-
Asians Uke 
anyone else 
Immigration-
Quou Asian 
Migration 
Immigration-
No Asian, 
Europe OK 
Immigration- No more 
Only Britain Migrants 
& N. Europe 
1113(63%) 558(32%) 472(27%) 520(30%) 45(3%) 95(5%) 611(35%) 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Qassified 
ReUgion - CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 ($3OOl-$450O) 
hicome 3 ($4501-$7500) 
hicome 4 (57501-510500) 
hicome 5 (510501-513500) 
hicome 6 (513500-516500) 
hicome 7 (516501-519500) 
hicome 8 (over 519501) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
Religiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 63-70 (Ref:>70) 
Age (3) 54-62 
Age (4) 46-53 
Age (5) 38-45 
Age (6) 30-37 
Age (7) 22-29 
Age (8) 18-21 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Govemment 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force + other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
207(12) 
122(7) 
192(11) 
441(25) 
109(6) 
385(22) 
216(12) 
458(26) 
268(15) 
519(29) 
479(27) 
269(15) 
183(10) 
148(8) 
63(4) 
177(10) 
43(2) 
39(2) 
33(2) 
64(4) 
1086(61) 
65(4) 
105(6) 
163(9) 
327(18) 
318(18) 
209(12) 
81(5) 
110(6) 
219(12) 
1271(72) 
178(10) 
123(7) 
302(17) 
65(4) 
54(3) 
279(16) 
49(3) 
171(10) 
243(14) 
248(14) 
190(11) 
290(16) 
317(18) 
163(9) 
11(6) 
912(51) 
792(45) 
256(14) 
437(25) 
756(43) 
347(20) 
901(51) 
-
PE 
0.80* 
012 
0.50* 
0.01 
0.03 
0.05 
-0.19 
-0.05 
SE 
0.34 
0.19 
0.25 
0.20 
014 
0.25 
017 
0.19 
-0.65* 0.20 
-0.25 
0.41* 
-0.03 
-0.41* 
0.36 
0.40 
-0.20 
0.01 
0.22 
0.36 
-0.15 
-0.27 
0.10 
-0.58* 
0.08 
0.27 
0.18 
0.12 
0.13 
0.16 
019 
021 
0.29 
0.18 
0.34 
0.37 
0.38 
0.27 
0.12 
0.28 
0.25 
0.23 
0.4r 0.21 
0.25 
0.00 
-0.32 
015 
0.20 
0.18 
-0.10 
-0.24 
-0.43* 
-0.23 
0.22 
0.24 
0.30 
0.29 
0.21 
0.14 
0.22 
0.25 
0.19 
0.31 
-0.9r 0.32 
-0.71* 
-0.68* 
-0.24 
-0.06 
-0.03 
0.14 
0.23 
-0.22 
-0.07 
1.25 
-0.38* 
0.00 
-0.73* 
0.02 
0.17 
-0.04 
0.03 
0.01 
0.20 
0.34 
0.24 
0.24 
0.25 
0.27 
0.25 
0.25 
0.27 
0.84 
0.12 
0.12 
0.19 
0.20 
0.18 
021 
0.11 
0.04 
PE SE 
-1.11* 0.36 
-0.01 0.20 
-0.23 0.25 
0.14 0.20 
0.00 015 
0.24 0.26 
0.16 017 
-0.05 0.20 
0.53* 0.21 
0.17 018 
-0.42* 0.13 
0.13 0.14 
0.20 0.17 
-0.37 0.20 
-0.26 0.22 
0.10 0.31 
0.02 0.19 
-0.20 0.35 
-0.19 0.38 
016 0.38 
0.33 0.28 
-0.04 0.13 
0.30 0.29 
-0.29 0.27 
-0.45 0.24 
-0.46* 0.22 
-0.33 0.23 
-0.07 0.24 
0.35 0.31 
-0.21 0.30 
-0.34 0.22 
-0.32 0.14 
0.23 0.23 
0.38 0.26 
0.4r 0.20 
0.11 0.34 
1.19* 0.32 
0.5r 021 
0.58* 0.35 
0.52* 0.26 
0.17 0.27 
0.26 0.27 
021 0.29 
0.08 0.27 
0.53* 0.27 
0.49' 0.29 
-1.48 1.10 
0.28' 012 
0.03 0.13 
0.76' 0.19 
-0.05 0.20 
-0.27 0.18 
-0.18 0.22 
-0.03 0.12 
-0.02 0.04 
PE 
-3.35' 
0.34 
SE 
0.46 
0.22 
0.85' 0.26 
041 
0.39' 
021 
0.22 
0.16 
0.32 
0.6r 0.20 
0.35 0.23 
0.6r 0.23 
0.51" 
-0.29' 
0.36' 
-0.34 
0.06 
-0.39 
0.80' 
0.56' 
0.30 
0.75 
021 
0.14 
0.15 
0.20 
0.21 
0.25 
0.33 
0.20 
0.36 
0.39 
1.36* 0.40 
0.29 
0.03 
-0.37 
0.09 
0.51 
0.30 
0.32 
0.30 
0.14 
0.34 
0.34 
028 
0.26 
0.27 
0.6r 0.28 
0.31 
0.62 
0.26 
-0.03 
-0.25 
-0.10 
0.14 
-0.08 
-0.27 
0.35 
1.24' 
0J3 
0.46 
0.54 
0.59 
1.32' 
1.54' 
0.35 
0.34 
0.27 
0.16 
0.28 
0.29 
0.22 
0.37 
0.40 
0.23 
0.37 
0.36 
0.34 
0.34 
0.36 
0.33 
0.33 
1.2r 0.35 
0.69 
0.22 
0.22 
0.81' 
0.08 
-0.15 
-0.05 
-0.33' 
-0.05 
0.77 
0.13 
0.14 
0.20 
0.23 
0.20 
0.25 
0.13 
0.04 
PE 
-1.01' 
0.22 
-0.05 
0.14 
0.18 
016 
-0.36' 
-0.25 
-0.49' 
-0.29 
0.08 
-0.15 
021 
0.11 
0.11 
-0.53 
0.05 
-0.25 
0.27 
-0.66 
-0.27 
0.45 
1.02' 
-0.28 
0.14 
0.25 
0.24 
Oi l 
0.46 
0.24 
0.20 
0.21 
0.17 
-0.26 
0.09 
-0.14 
0.16 
0.15 
-0.15 
-0.04 
-0.20 
-0.19 
-0.37 
SE 
0.35 
0.19 
0.25 
021 
015 
0.27 
017 
0.19 
0.20 
0.18 
0.13 
0.14 
0.17 
0.19 
021 
0.34 
0.19 
0.40 
0.38 
0.48 
0.32 
0.13 
0.28 
0.28 
0.24 
0.22 
0.23 
0.26 
0.32 
0.30 
0.22 
015 
0.21 
0.25 
0.19 
0.32 
0.33 
0.20 
0.36 
0.25 
0.25 
0.26 
0.27 
-O.sr 0.26 
-0.54' 
-0.44 
0.50 
-0.26' 
-0.05 
-021 
0.12 
0.09 
-0.09 
0.17 
0.11' 
0.26 
0.28 
0.66 
0.12 
0.13 
0.20 
0.20 
0.18 
022 
0.12 
0.04 
PE 
-3.11' 
0.19 
-0.77 
-0.66 
-0.14 
0,54 
-1,91' 
-1.12 
0.21 
-0.27 
0.24 
-0.65 
-0.71 
-0.36 
0.64 
-1.15 
-0.81 
-0.36 
-6.34 
-5.93 
-0.72 
-1.03' 
0.27 
1.15 
-0.26 
0.83 
O02 
0.18 
1.26 
0.44 
0.90 
0.15 
-0.08 
0.54 
0.41 
0.15 
0.66 
1.22' 
0.57 
-0.14 
0.79 
-1.24 
-0.38 
-0.05 
-0.21 
-0.18 
-5.39 
-0.71 
0,25 
-0,82 
021 
-0,08 
0.71 
-0.59 
-0.24* 
SE 
1.06 
0.54 
1.10 
083 
0.47 
0,63 
0,66 
0,67 
0.53 
0.52 
0.35 
0.46 
0.60 
0.59 
0.47 
1.10 
0.58 
1.14 
10.44 
10.50 
1.11 
0.38 
0.70 
0.67 
0.89 
0.65 
0.80 
0.84 
0.87 
1.01 
0.61 
0.47 
0.67 
0.74 
0.61 
1.12 
1.14 
0.61 
1.25 
0.70 
0.67 
0.96 
0.87 
0.75 
0.77 
0.87 
20.26 
0.39 
036 
083 
0.62 
0.55 
0.64 
0.36 
0.12 
PE 
-3.03' 
-0.87 
-0.67 
-0,24 
•0,59 
0,40 
0.14 
016 
-0.05 
0.39 
-0,02 
0.31 
0.46 
-0.02 
-0.11 
0.23 
0.10 
-0.13 
-0.01 
0.09 
-0.53 
0.04 
0.28 
040 
-0.72 
-0.18 
0.20 
-1.43' 
-0.75 
-0.28 
0.08 
0.56 
0.05 
0.30 
0.04 
-0.80 
0.42 
-0.27 
-1.48 
0.10 
0.44 
-0.06 
-0.89 
-0.33 
-1.44* 
-0,67 
0,41 
-0,29 
OlO 
0,37 
0.32 
0.09 
-0.55 
0.31 
0.06 
SE 
0.67 
0.45 
0.55 
0.44 
032 
048 
036 
036 
0,40 
0,35 
0,26 
0,28 
0.34 
0.43 
0.45 
0.58 
036 
0.79 
0.61 
0.77 
0.76 
025 
0.57 
0.42 
0.52 
0.43 
0.42 
0.67 
0.82 
0.62 
041 
0.31 
0.40 
0.45 
0.37 
0.79 
0.60 
0.41 
1.06 
0.43 
0.43 
0.48 
O60 
0.50 
0.58 
057 
1.15 
0.25 
0.25 
0.43 
0.39 
0.35 
0.47 
0.24 
0.08 
PE 
0.49 
-0.19 
-0.48 
-0.23 
-0.20 
-0,38 
-0,03 
OlO 
0.01 
-0,09 
0,15 
-0,16 
-0,03 
-0.12 
0,05 
-0,01 
-0.43* 
-0.05 
-1,00" 
-0,66 
-0,19 
-0,32" 
-1.11" 
-0.13 
-0.27 
-044" 
-0.44" 
-0.38 
-0.53 
-0.64" 
-0.38 
-0.33 
-0,07 
017 
-0.18 
0.14 
-0.09 
-0.48" 
-1.19" 
-0.21 
-021 
019 
0.40 
-0.12 
-0.20 
-0.16 
-0.75 
0.17 
-0,08 
-0.72" 
-0.17 
0.08 
019 
013 
-0.05 
SE 
0.34 
019 
028 
021 
0,14 
026 
017 
018 
019 
018 
012 
014 
017 
019 
020 
029 
0.19 
0.35 
0.45 
0.45 
OJO 
012 
035 
0.25 
023 
021 
0.22 
024 
032 
032 
022 
014 
021 
023 
019 
030 
033 
020 
0.47 
0,25 
0,25 
026 
027 
0,26 
026 
028 
0,83 
0,12 
012 
022 
021 
018 
022 
Oil 
0.04 
196.11 
TABLE A5.4(iii): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOQAL-BACKGRGUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1979 ANPA. N=1756) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmen 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not (Classified 
ReUgion - CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 (53001-54500) 
hicome 3 (54501-57500) 
hicome 4 ($7501-$10500) 
hicome 5 ($10501-$13500) 
hicome 6 ($13500-$16S0O) 
hicome 7 ($16501-$19500) 
Income 8 (over $19501) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 63-70 (Ref:>70) 
Age (3) 54-62 
Age (4) 46-53 
Age (5) 38-45 
Age (6) 30-37 
Age (7) 22-29 
Age (8) 18-21 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - (Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Govemment 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force + other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
207(12) 
122(7) 
192(11) 
441(25) 
109(6) 
385(22) 
216(12) 
458(26) 
268(15) 
519(29) 
479(27) 
269(15) 
183(10) 
148(8) 
63(4) 
177(10) 
43(?) 
39(2) 
33(2) 
64(4) 
1086(61) 
65(4) 
105(6) 
163(9) 
327(18) 
318(18) 
209(12) 
81(5) 
110(6) 
219(12) 
1271(72) 
178(10) 
123(7) 
302(17) 
65(4) 
54(3) 
279(16) 
49(3) 
171(10) 
243(14) 
248(14) 
190(11) 
290(16) 
317(18) 
163(9) 
11(6) 
912(51) 
792(45) 
256(14) 
437(25) 
756(43) 
347(20) 
901(51) 
-
Read & see 
what they 
Uke 
762(43%) 
PE 
0.25 
-0.43* 
-0.50* 
-0.10 
-0.32* 
-0.11 
0.23 
0.04 
0.50* 
-0.26 
-0.18 
-0.27 
-0.28 
-0.41" 
OOl 
-0.11 
021 
0.09 
0.39 
0.93* 
0.36 
0.11 
0.25 
-036 
-0.26 
-0.20 
-031 
-0.12 
-0.22 
-0.42 
-0.40* 
-0.10 
0.09 
-0.06 
-0.34 
SE 
0.34 
0.19 
0.25 
0.20 
0.14 
0.26 
0.17 
018 
0.18 
0.18 
0.12 
0.13 
0.16 
019 
0.20 
0.29 
0.18 
0.34 
0.37 
0.39 
0.28 
0.12 
0.29 
0.25 
0.23 
0.21 
0.22 
0.24 
031 
0.30 
0.22 
0.14 
0.20 
0.23 
0.18 
-0.66* 0.31 
-0.35 
-0.99* 
-1.56* 
0.15 
-0.08 
0.14 
0.20 
0.39 
0.39 
0.44 
-5.86 
-0.22 
0.18 
0.03 
-0.28 
-0.05 
0.00 
0.03 
-0.06 
0.32 
0.20 
0.45 
0.25 
0.25 
0.26 
0.27 
0.26 
0.26 
0.27 
4.54 
0.12 
0.12 
0.19 
0.20 
0.17 
0.21 
0.11 
0.04 
Some 
Censo rship 
988(56%) 
PE 
-0.35 
0.40' 
0.44 
0.12 
0.33' 
0.07 
-0.12 
0.05 
-0.38' 
031 
013 
0.25 
0.26 
0.39' 
-0.01 
0.12 
-0.20 
-0.26 
-0.47 
-0.33 
-0.91' 
-0.11 
-0.26 
0.46 
0.34 
039 
0.29 
0.18 
0.28 
0.55 
0.44* 
0.09 
-0.07 
0.18 
0.35 
SE 
0.33 
0.19 
0.25 
0.20 
0.14 
0.25 
0.17 
0.18 
018 
018 
012 
0.13 
0.16 
0.19 
0.20 
0.29 
0.18 
0.34 
036 
0.39 
0.28 
0.12 
0.28 
0.25 
0.23 
021 
0.22 
0.24 
0.30 
0.30 
021 
0.14 
0.20 
0.23 
0.18 
0.7r 0.31 
0.44 
0.98* 
1.63* 
-031 
-0.02 
-0.19 
-0.29 
-0.48 
-0.52* 
-0.49 
4.57 
0.25* 
-0.15 
0.01 
0.24 
0.03 
-0.08 
-0.02 
0.07 
0.32 
0.20 
0.44 
0.25 
0.25 
0.26 
0.27 
0.26 
0.26 
0.27 
2.46 
Oi l 
0.12 
0.19 
0.20 
0.17 
021 
0.11 
0.04 
Royalty 
(OLS) 
PE 
1.91* 
SE 
0.12 
O.ir 0.07 
0.19* 
0.03 
0.10* 
0.10 
-0.30* 
-0.04 
-0.28* 
-0.06 
0.06 
0.01 
0.11 
-0.01 
0.05 
0.18 
0.08 
0.07 
0.05 
0.09 
0.06 
0.06 
0.07 
0.06 
0.04 
0.05 
0.06 
0.07 
0.07 
0.10 
0.26* 0.06 
-0.36* 0.12 
-0.26* 
-0.36* 
-0.15 
0.11* 
0.11 
0.07 
0.12 
0.09 
0.01 
-0.11 
-0.06 
-0.06 
0.00 
0.03 
0.06 
0.13 
0.13 
0.13 
0.10 
0.04 
OlO 
0.09 
0.08 
0.07 
0.08 
0.08 
0.11 
0.10 
0.08 
0.05 
0.07 
0.08 
O i r 0.07 
0.12 0.10 
0.26* 0.11 
0.19* 
0.30* 
-0.19" 
-0.22* 
-0.29* 
-0.36* 
0.07 
0.12 
0.09 
0.09 
0.09 
0.09 
-0.46* 0.09 
-0.52* 
-0.53* 
0.10 
0.04 
-0.06 
-0.16* 
O08 
0.11 
OlO 
0.05 
0.09 
0.09 
0.24 
0.04 
0.04 
0.07 
0.07 
0.06 
0.07 
0.04 
0.06* 0.01 
Uranium -
Mhie& SeU 
222(13%) 
PE SE 
-1.8r 0.48 
0.09 
-0.02 
0.25 
-0.16 
0.26 
-0.34 
-0.18 
-0.32 
-0.03 
0.01 
0.03 
0.28 
-0.26 
-0.05 
-0.04 
-0.07 
0.55 
0.34 
0.83 
0.27 
030 
0.40 
0.52 
0.19 
031 
0.51 
0.44 
-0.14 
0.88* 
0.70* 
0.24 
-0.30 
-028 
-0.47 
-0.17 
0.26 
0.25 
0.34 
0.29 
0.22 
0.36 
0.25 
0.26 
0.26 
0.24 
0.18 
0.19 
0.23 
0.29 
0.29 
0.44 
0.26 
0.46 
0.45 
0.44 
0.40 
0.18 
038 
035 
0.36 
0.32 
0.33 
0.36 
0.52 
0.40 
031 
0.21 
0.29 
0.33 
0.26 
0.42 
0.41 
-0.6r 0.30 
-0.14 
0.42 
0.12 
-0.11 
-038 
-0.36 
-0.45 
-0.79 
-5.00 
-0.51* 
-021 
-0.04 
-0.22 
0.11 
-0.17 
-0.05 
-0.02 
0.46 
0.32 
0.33 
0.35 
0.38 
035 
0.36 
0.44 
4.65 
0.17 
0.18 
0.27 
0.27 
0.23 
0.30 
0.16 
0.06 
Uranium -
Mine but 
Safeguards 
958(55%) 
PE SE 
0.43 0.33 
0.29 0.18 
0.19 0.24 
-0.12 0.19 
0.28* 014 
-0.10 025 
-0.04 016 
0.19 0.18 
-0.19 0.18 
-0.27 0.17 
-0.12 0.12 
-0.25* 0.13 
-0.20 0.16 
0.03 0.18 
-0.23 0.20 
-0.15 0.29 
0,27 0.18 
-0.6r 0.34 
-0.38 0.36 
0.30 0.38 
-0.29 0.27 
0.23 0.12 
-0.65* 0.29 
-0.12 0.25 
0.06 0.22 
0.22 0.20 
0.27 0.22 
0.39 0.23 
043 031 
-0.03 0.29 
019 021 
-0.01 0.13 
0.20 0.21 
0.27 0.23 
0.42* 0.18 
-0.05 0.29 
-0.16 0.32 
032 0.19 
0.22 0.34 
0.00 0.24 
0.09 0.24 
0.28 0.25 
0.22 0.26 
-0.30 0.25 
-0.20 0.25 
-0.06 0.26 
1.19 0.73 
-0.53* 0.11 
0.14 0.12 
-032 0.18 
-0.14 0.19 
-0.26 0.17 
-0.37 0.21 
-0.10 0.11 
0.16* 0.04 
Uranium -
Mine, 
use in 
only 
Aust. 
155(9%) 
PE 
-2.21* 
-0.69 
-0.75 
-0.18 
-0.39 
-031 
0.42 
0.04 
-0.29 
0.16 
0,22 
-0,01 
013 
-0,45 
0,08 
0,24 
-0.90* 
-0.23 
0.47 
-4.99 
0.04 
-0.10 
-0.18 
-0.37 
-0.14 
-035 
-0.82* 
-1.04* 
SE 
058 
0.39 
0.52 
0.34 
0.24 
043 
0.27 
0.32 
0.33 
0,30 
0,20 
0,23 
0,26 
0.37 
0.35 
0.45 
0.41 
0.57 
0.52 
4.43 
046 
0.20 
0.51 
0.40 
034 
0.33 
036 
0.42 
-l.Or 0.60 
-1.41* 
-0.81* 
0.08 
-0.20 
0.26 
-0.15 
-0.30 
-0.63 
-0.06 
0.34 
0.12 
0.51 
-0.07 
0.82 
0.48 
0.67 
-0.02 
0.16 
0.05 
-0.00 
0.11 
0.06 
0.35 
0.08 
-0.06 
-0.14" 
0,68 
0,37 
0.23 
0.35 
0.36 
031 
0.53 
0.65 
031 
0.52 
0.42 
0.41 
0.46 
0.44 
0.43 
0.43 
0.47 
1.14 
0.20 
0,20 
0,34 
0.37 
0.33 
038 
0.19 
0.07 
Uranium -
Keep in 
Ground 
373(21%) 
PE SE 
-2.05* 0,43 
-0,26 0,26 
0,06 030 
012 0,23 
-OlO 017 
0,09 029 
0,01 021 
-0,31 025 
0.37 0.23 
0.21 022 
0,01 015 
0,45* 016 
0,02 021 
0,44* 022 
0,34 0,24 
018 035 
0,09 021 
0,29 0.40 
-0.30 0.53 
-0.52 0J2 
-0.04 034 
-031 015 
052 032 
0.06 029 
-0.33 028 
-0.38 0.25 
-0.44 027 
-0.35 029 
Oil 036 
-0.17 038 
-0.32 025 
-0.28 017 
-0.24 027 
-0.69* 033 
-0.24 023 
-0.04 038 
0.16 038 
-0.16 024 
-0.53 0.45 
-0.19 031 
-0.45 032 
-0.19 031 
-0.58 035 
0,66" 0,30 
0.44 030 
0.61" 031 
-0.19 0.85 
084" 014 
0.06 015 
0.52* 0.22 
0.44 026 
019 0,24 
0,60* 027 
0,17 0.14 
-0.13* 0.05 
196.12 
TABLE A5.4(iv): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1979 ANPA, N=1756) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Qassified 
ReUgion - Clathohc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 ($3001-54500) 
hicome 3 (54501-57500) 
hicome 4 (57501-510500) 
hicome 5 (510501-513500) 
hicome 6 (513500-516500) 
hicome 7 (516501-519500) 
Income 8 (over 519501) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 63-70 (Ref:>70) 
Age (3) 54-62 
Age (4) 46-53 
Age (5) 38-45 
Age (6) 30-37 
Age (7) 22-29 
Age (8) 18-21 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - (Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Govemment 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force + other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
207(12) 
122(7) 
192(11) 
441(25) 
109(6) 
385(22) 
216(12) 
458(26) 
268(15) 
519(29) 
479(27) 
269(15) 
183(10) 
148(8) 
63(4) 
177(10) 
43(2) 
39(2) 
33(2) 
64(4) 
1086(61) 
65(4) 
105(6) 
163(9) 
327(18) 
318(18) 
209(12) 
81(5) 
110(6) 
219(12) 
1271(72) 
178(10) 
123(7) 
302(17) 
65(4) 
54(3) 
279(16) 
49(3) 
171(10) 
243(14) 
248(14) 
190(11) 
290(16) 
317(18) 
163(9) 
11(6) 
912(51) 
792(45) 
256(14) 
437(25) 
756(43) 
347(20) 
901(51) 
-
Marijuana-
Ban should 
Suy 
1100(62%) 
PE SE 
0.99* 0.36 
0.02 0.20 
-0.27 0.25 
-0.41* 0.20 
-0.18 0.15 
-0.6r 0.27 
-0.27 0.18 
-0.05 0.19 
-0.60* 0.19 
-0.02 0.19 
-0.01 0.13 
0.42* 0.14 
021 0.17 
0.23 019 
0.03 0.21 
0.41 0.32 
-0.06 0.19 
0.41 038 
018 041 
-0.17 0.40 
-0.09 0.29 
-0.00 0.13 
-0.24 0.29 
0.18 0.28 
-0.12 0.24 
0.18 0.22 
-0.06 0.23 
-0.04 0.25 
-0.24 0.32 
032 031 
0.13 0.23 
-0.13 0.14 
0.20 0.22 
0.02 0.24 
0.41* 0.19 
0.54 0.33 
0.81* 037 
0.8r 0.21 
0.76 0.39 
0.27 0.28 
-0.09 0.27 
-0.15 0.27 
-0.33 0.28 
-0.49* 0.27 
-0.92* 0.27 
-1.58* 0.29 
0.59 0.86 
0.23 0.12 
-0.19 0.13 
-0.76* 0.20 
0.02 0.20 
-0.04 0.18 
0.08 0.22 
0.05 0.12 
0.02 0.04 
Marijuana-
LegaUse 
607(35%) 
PE SE 
-1.26* 0.38 
0.03 0,20 
0.32 0.26 
0.49* 0.20 
0.16 0.15 
0.60* 0.29 
031 018 
OlO O20 
0.52* 0.19 
0.05 0.19 
-0.02 013 
-0.46* 0.15 
-0.26 0.17 
-031 0.20 
-0.07 021 
-0.15 033 
0.14 0.19 
-0.23 0.38 
-0.64 0.48 
0.38 0.40 
0.25 0.29 
0.01 0.13 
-0.13 031 
-0.18 029 
-0.07 0.25 
-0.29 0.23 
-0.07 0.24 
-0.15 0.26 
0.07 0.32 
-0.52 0.32 
-0.34 0.24 
0.07 015 
-0.43 0.23 
-0.03 0.24 
-0.64* 0.20 
-0.51 0.34 
-0.83* 038 
-0.90* 0.22 
-1.04* 0.44 
-0.07 031 
031 0.30 
0.61* 0.30 
0.74* 0.31 
0.88* 0.29 
1.2r 0.29 
1.81* 031 
-1.00 1.13 
-0.19 012 
0.25 0.13 
0.76* 0.20 
-0.02 0.21 
0.05 0.19 
-0.24 0.24 
-0.08 0.12 
-0.03 0.04 
Special 
benefits for 
Aborigines 
Yes/It 
depends 
583(33%) 
PE 
-1.73* 
0.32 
0.43 
0.27 
0.34" 
0.40 
0.07 
0.16 
0.07 
-0.03 
-0.54" 
021 
-0.38" 
-0.54* 
0.06 
0.66* 
SE 
0.37 
0.19 
0.24 
021 
0.15 
0.27 
0.18 
0.19 
0.20 
019 
0.13 
014 
0.18 
021 
021 
030 
0.4r 0.18 
-0.53 
-0.11 
-0.02 
0.01 
-0.03 
0.28 
0.02 
039 
0.09 
-0.04 
0.24 
0.58 
0.48 
0.24 
-0.03 
-0.14 
-0.43 
-0.15 
-0.06 
-0.10 
0.12 
-0.77 
038 
0.40 
0.40 
0.29 
0.13 
030 
0.28 
0.24 
0.22 
0.24 
0.25 
031 
0.30 
0.23 
0.14 
0.22 
0.26 
0.19 
0.32 
0.35 
0.20 
0.40 
0.75* 0.27 
0.58* 
0.44 
0.51 
0.85' 
0.72" 
0.58 
1.11 
-0.03 
0.08 
1.18" 
0.04 
-0.03 
0.09 
-0.05 
-0.03 
0.27 
0.28 
0.29 
0.28 
028 
0.30 
0.69 
0.12 
0.13 
0.19 
021 
0.18 
0.22 
0.12 
0.04 
Special 
benefiu for 
Aborigines 
No different/ 
get too many 
222(67%) 
PE SE 
1.68' 037 
-0.29 019 
-0.38 024 
-0.24 0.21 
-0.3r 0.15 
-0.41 0.27 
-0.06 017 
-0.16 019 
-0.08 0.19 
0.08 0.19 
0.50" 0.13 
-021 0.14 
036' 0.18 
0.42" 0.20 
-0.03 0.21 
-0.86' 0.29 
-0.51' 0.18 
0.54 0.38 
0.11 0.40 
-0.11 0.40 
-0.15 0.28 
0.02 0.13 
-0.21 0.30 
-0.04 0.28 
-0.40 0.24 
-0.08 0.22 
0.05 0.23 
-0.24 0.25 
-0.62' 0.31 
-0.49 0.30 
-0.26 0.22 
0.04 0.14 
0.12 0.22 
0.39 0.26 
0.11 0.19 
-0.02 0.32 
0.03 0.34 
-0.15 0.20 
0.64 0.39 
-0.75' 0.27 
-O.sr 0.27 
-0.44 0.28 
-0.48 0.29 
-0.89' 0.27 
-0,69' 0.28 
-0.63' 0.29 
-1.04 069 
0,02 0.12 
-0.07 0.13 
-1.20' 0.19 
0.02 0.21 
0.06 0.18 
-0.01 0.22 
0.09 0.12 
0.04 0.04 
196.13 
TABLE A5.5(i): INFLUENCE OF SOOAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1984 NSSS, N=2701) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Qassified 
ReUgion - Cathohc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 (55001-59000) 
hicome 3 (59001-513000) 
hicome 4 (513001-517000) 
hicome 5 (517001-521000) 
hicome 6 ($21001-$25000) 
hicome 7 ($25001-$29000) 
Income 8 (over $29001) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
Tr. un. M'ship - unknown 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (3) 59-67 (Ref:>67) 
Age (4) 51-58 
Age (5) 43-50 
Age (6) 35-42 
Age (7) 27-34 
Age (8) 18-26 (+ 19 misshig) 
Gender - Female 
Education - Clompleted Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Govemment 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force + other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Ideology-
Left 
63(2%) 
Freq(%) PE SE 
297(11) 
157(6) 
274(10) 
662(25) 
516(19) 
699(26) 
521(19) 
267(10) 
354(13) 
737(28) 
632(23) 
383(14) 
264(10) 
248(9) 
335(12) 
326(12) 
123(5) 
65(2) 
136(5) 
65(2) 
1438(53) 
50(2) 
316(12) 
245(9) 
287(11) 
334(12) 
233(9) 
150(6) 
304(11) 
492(18) 
1547(57) 
555(21) 
396(15) 
417(15) 
453(17) 
107(4) 
193(7) 
304(11) 
62(2) 
309(11) 
285(14) 
275(10) 
460(17) 
565(21) 
524(19) 
1393(51) 
930(34) 
456(17) 
698(26) 
1373(51) 
336(12) 
1202(45) 
-3.41' 
-0.20 
0.42 
-0.18 
-0.35 
-0.03 
0.58 
0.27 
1.18' 
-0.06 
-0.23 
0.90 
0.64 
0.60 
0.52 
0.41 
0.53 
0.42 
0.44 
0.40 
0,60 
036 
0,7r 0,37 
0,54 0.45 
-0.68 
0.25 
0.59 
-0.02 
-0.14 
-5.60 
0.78 
0.53 
0.47 
0.44 
0.79 
8.25 
0.98' 0.48 
-0.66 1.06 
-021 
0.67 
-0.32 
-0.81 
-1.10 
-0.92 
-0.92 
-0.29 
-1.24 
-0.53 
-0.51 
0.45 
-0.73 
031 
0.71 
0.48 
0.62 
0.60 
0.57 
0.62 
0.65 
0.65 
0.52 
0.38 
0.39 
0.42 
-0.9r 0.47 
-1.53' 0.57 
-1.40 
-1.17 
-1.14 
-6.51 
0.45 
0.52 
0.23 
0.53 
0.47 
0.49 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.66 
0.06 
-0.41 
0.10 
-0.12 
1.06 
0.78 
0.60 
8.58 
0.63 
0.67 
0.75 
0.64 
0.61 
0.58 
031 
0.35 
044 
0.52 
0.49 
0.63 
0.29 
Ideology-
Right 
235(9%) 
-2.14' 
0.28 
0.20 
-0.46 
0.24 
-0.12 
-0.09 
021 
-0.55 
-0.17 
0.41" 
-0.35 
-0.18 
-0.28 
-028 
-0.13 
-021 
0.35 
0.46 
0.25 
0.37 
0.36 
0.20 
0.27 
0.22 
0.20 
0.35 
0.26 
017 
0.20 
0.23 
0.27 
0.29 
0.24 
0.25 
0.36 
1.16* 0.40 
-0.18 038 
0.92* 0.38 
0.35* 0.16 
0.41 048 
-0.02 
-0.01 
-0.10 
0.32 
0.56 
0.05 
0.04 
0.50 
0.24 
-0.15 
-0.39 
-0.20 
-0.13 
O02 
0.14 
0.42 
0.64 
-0.09 
-0.24 
-0.58 
-0.52 
0.29 
0.32 
0.34 
031 
033 
0.43 
0.34 
0.27 
0.22 
0.28 
0.26 
0.25 
0.24 
0.38 
0.29 
0.26 
0.44 
0.25 
0.28 
031 
0.27 
-1.36* 031 
-1.08* 0.29 
-0.49* 0.17 
0.16 
-0.22 
-0.33 
0.07 
0.48 
-0.04 
0.17 
0.27 
0.28 
0.23 
0.29 
016 
Business-
Neutral 
493(18%) 
PE SE PE SE 
-2.43* 
-0.02 
0.08 
-0.11 
-0.08 
0.03 
-0.25 
-0.13 
-0.33 
-0.19 
0.35 
0.20 
0.26 
021 
014 
0.20 
0.15 
0.15 
021 
0.18 
028* 0.12 
-0.02 0.15 
0.33* 0.16 
0.04 0.19 
0.19 0.19 
0.06 0.18 
0.20 0.16 
0.27 0.26 
0.66* 
0.23 
0.19 
0.39* 
-0.11 
014 
0.03 
0.14 
0.16 
031 
Oi l 
019 
0.15 
0.19 
0.01 
0.20 
0.39* 
028* 
0.06 
0.12 
0.33 
0.17 
0.23 
-0.09 
0.07 
031 
0.24 
0.34 
0.11 
0.43 
0.21 
0.23 
0.23 
0.22 
0.24 
0.29 
0.24 
021 
0.15 
0.18 
0.17 
0.17 
0.17 
0.28 
0.23 
0.20 
038 
0.22 
0.25 
0.25 
0.00 0.23 
0.29 0.22 
0.59* 0.21 
0.07 012 
-0.28* 0.12 
-0.50* 0.18 
0.21 0.20 
-0.26* 0.10 O.ir 0.05 
0.04 
0.11 
0.12 
0.07 
0.18 
0.23 
Oi l 
0.04 
Business-Not 
loo much 
Power 
548(20%) 
PE SE 
-1.46 
0.39' 
0.19 
-0.29 
0.28" 
0.06 
-0.09 
-0.05 
-0.72" 
-0.09 
-0.07 
-0.15 
-0.03 
0.34 
-0.08 
-0.39" 
-0.09 
-0.78" 
-0.09 
-0.16 
-0.18 
0.33 
0.18 
0.23 
0.22 
0.14 
021 
0.15 
0.14 
0.22 
0.17 
0.13 
0,14 
0.16 
0.18 
0.19 
0.19 
0.16 
031 
0.34 
0.24 
0.34 
0.25* 0.12 
0.52 0.36 
021 
0.29 
0.27 
0.35 
0,19 
0,58' 
0.56' 
0.35 
0.20 
-0.05 
0.17 
0.00 
0.14 
-0.01 
-0.06 
0.02 
-0.01 
-0.27 
-0.08 
-0.01 
-0.16 
-0.18 
-0.45' 
0.22 
0.24 
0.24 
0.23 
0.25 
0.27 
0.24 
0.22 
0.14 
0.18 
0.16 
0.16 
0.16 
0.28 
0.22 
0.19 
0.36 
0.22 
0.23 
0.23 
021 
021 
021 
-0.4r 0.12 
033' 0.12 
0.35' 
-0.33 
-0.00 
-031 
-021 
017 
019 
0.16 
0.24 
0.11 
Business-
Too much 
Power 
1660(61%) 
PE SE 
1.10* 0.27 
-0.32* 016 
-0.19 O20 
025 0.17 
-0,15 0.12 
-0,06 0,16 
0,23 012 
0,12 
0,68' 
0,19 
-0,14 
0,12 
-0,21 
-0,26 
012 
017 
014 
OlO 
012 
0,13 
0,15 
-0,06 0.16 
021 0.14 
-0.07 
0.28 
-0.40 
-0.04 
0.00 
-0.43* 
-0.31 
-0.23 
-0.20 
-0.26 
-0.34 
-032 
-0.49* 
0.13 
0.22 
0.27 
0.19 
0.27 
0.09 
031 
017 
019 
019 
0.18 
0.20 
0,23 
-0,55* 0,20 
-0,32 017 
-0.26* 
0.01 
-0.25 
-0.25 
0.12 
0.14 
0.14 
0.13 
-0.2r 0.13 
-0.03 0.23 
-0.02 
-0.23 
-0.08 
0.03 
0.11 
-0.05 
0.11 
-0.06 
-0.12 
0,28* 
-0,04 
0,08 
0,11 
-0,01 
0.13 
0.06 
0.18 
0.16 
0.29 
0.18 
0.19 
0.20 
0.18 
0.18 
017 
OlO 
0.10 
0.14 
016 
014 
0.19 
0.09 
Spend on 
Welfare 
867(32%) 
PE SE 
-0.93* 0.29 
-0.28 0.19 
-0.15 
0,22 
-0,08 
-0,16 
033* 
0,01 
0,60' 
0,22 
017 
012 
018 
0,13 
0,13 
0,17 
035* 015 
-0,71' 012 
046* 012 
-0,34" 015 
-0,07 016 
-038" 
-0.18 
021 
018 
0.05 
0.20 
-0.35 
-0.10 
-021 
0.12 
-0.38 
-0.01 
-0,35 
-0.34 
-0.35 
-0.73" 
0.17 
0.16 
0.14 
021 
0.28 
0.20 
0.30 
OlO 
0.33 
0.17 
0.20 
0.19 
019 
021 
0.24 
021 
-0.45" 018 
0.05 0.12 
0.2r 0,14 
-0,19 0.15 
-0.07 
-0.11 
0.18 
0.03 
-0,40" 
-0.93" 
-0.17 
0.12 
-0.08 
-015 
-0,02 
0,04 
0.15 
0.14 
0.14 
0.23 
0.19 
0.17 
0.33 
019 
0.20 
021 
0,19 
0.19 
0.18 
OlO 
0.24" 0.11 
0 6 r 0.15 
0.15* 0.04 -0.14* 0.03 
0,43* 
021 
0.14 
0.00 
-0.13* 
0,18 
0,16 
0.22 
0.09 
0.03 
Reduce 
Taxes 
1745(65%) 
PE SE 
0,49" 0,28 
021 018 
0,03 
-0,26 
0.04 
014 
022 
0.17 
012 
0.17 
-0.30" 0,13 
-O02 013 
-0.65" 016 
-0,40" 0,15 
0,73" Oil 
-0,34" 012 
0,41' 014 
0,08 016 
049" 017 
014 015 
-0,29" 
-0,20 
-0,05 
-0,22 
0,33 
012 
0.01 
-0.09 
041" 
0,03 
0,36 
036 
042 
083" 
a i 3 
021 
027 
0,20 
029 
OlO 
032 
017 
019 
019 
019 
020 
024 
021 
0,40" 0.18 
0.00 012 
-0.23 
019 
0,00 
012 
-0.18 
-0.01 
031 
014 
014 
014 
014 
023 
019 
0.17 
0.90' 032 
033 019 
O02 019 
0,22 020 
035 
0,22 
0.11 
-0,19 
-0.18 
-0,63" 
-0,39* 
-0,13 
-0,06 
0,03 
0.13" 
019 
018 
0.18 
0.10 
0.10 
015 
0,17 
0,16 
021 
0,09 
0,03 
196.14 
TABLE A5.5(u): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1984 NSSS. N=2701) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Qassified 
ReUgion - CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 ($5001-$9000) 
hicome 3 (59001-513000) 
hicome 4 (513001-517000) 
hicome 5 (517001-521000) 
hicome 6 (521001-525000) 
hicome 7 (525001-529000) 
Income 8 (over 529001) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
Tr. un. M'ship - unknown 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
Religiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (3) 59-67 (Ref:>67) 
Age (4) 51-58 
Age (5) 43-50 
Age (6) 35-42 
Age (7) 27-34 
Age (8) 18-26 -^  19 missing 
Gender - Female 
Education - (Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Govemment 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force + other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Keep Death 
Penalty 
Freq(%) PE SE 
297(11) 
157(6) 
274(10) 
662(25) 
516(19) 
699(26) 
521(19) 
267(10) 
354(13) 
737(28) 
632(23) 
383(14) 
264(10) 
248(9) 
335(12) 
326(12) 
123(5) 
65(2) 
136(5) 
65(2) 
1438(53) 
50(2) 
316(12) 
245(9) 
287(11) 
334(12) 
233(9) 
150(6) 
304(11) 
492(18) 
1547(57) 
555(21) 
396(15) 
417(15) 
453(17) 
107(4) 
193(7) 
304(11) 
62(2) 
309(11) 
285(14) 
275(10) 
460(17) 
565(21) 
524(19) 
1393(51) 
930(34) 
456(17) 
698(26) 
1373(51) 
336(12) 
1202(45) 
1.01* 0.27 
-033* 016 
-0.37 021 
-0.11 
0.12 
0.03 
-0.17 
0.02 
-0.62* 
-0.17 
031" 
-0.33* 
-0.44" 
0.16 
0.12 
0.16 
0.12 
0.12 
0.16 
0.14 
0.10 
Oil 
013 
034" 016 
0.05 016 
-0.09 014 
0.26" 0.13 
0.08 0.21 
0.58* 
0.07 
0.33 
-0.03 
-0.23 
-0.11 
-0.00 
0.08 
0.15 
0.20 
-0.10 
0.03 
-0.20 
-0.04 
-0.24 
015 
-0.08 
0.18 
-0.12 
-0.25 
-0.51* 
0.29 
019 
028 
0.09 
031 
017 
019 
018 
018 
0.20 
0.23 
019 
017 
012 
014 
014 
013 
0.14 
0.22 
0.18 
016 
-0.62* 0.29 
0.14 018 
0.00 
0.11 
-0.11 
-0.07 
-0.17 
-0.42' 
019 
0.20 
0.18 
0.18 
0.17 
0.10 
-0.26' 0.10 
-0.79' 0.14 
-0.04 016 
0.17 
0.11 
-0.03 
0.06' 
014 
019 
0.09 
0.03 
Abohsh 
Death 
Penalty 
1553(57%) 715(26%) 
-1.74' 0.31 
0.29 018 
0.49' 0.22 
0.12 0.18 
0.07 
0.00 
017 
0.06 
0.80' 
0.33' 
-031' 
0.32" 
0.36' 
-0.15 
-0.11 
0.22 
-0.15 
-0.18 
-0.38 
-0.37 
-0.24 
-0.03 
0.07 
0.19 
-0.03 
-0.14 
-0.19 
-0.26 
0.17 
-0.26 
0.18 
0.17 
0.32' 
-0.25 
-0.12 
-0.16 
0.08 
021 
013 
0.18 
0.14 
0.14 
0.17 
0.16 
0.12 
0.13 
0.15 
018 
0.18 
016 
015 
0.24 
0.32 
0.22 
031 
0.10 
0.34 
0.19 
021 
021 
021 
0.23 
0.25 
0.22 
0.19 
0.13 
0.16 
0.16 
0.15 
0.15 
0.25 
0.20 
0.4r 0.17 
0.59' 0.29 
-0.20 
-0.13 
-0.07 
0.24 
-0.01 
0.10 
0.15 
021 
0.22 
0.22 
0.20 
0.20 
0.19 
0.11 
0.3r 0.11 
1.03' 0.15 
0.03 
-0,24 
-0.09 
-0.04 
-0.04 
0.18 
0.16 
021 
0.10 
0.03 
Pomography Pomography Royalty Uranium 
-Disagree -Agree ImporUnce Mining-
Stricter Stricter (OLS) Middle 
Controls Controls Position 
235(9%) 2145(79%) 663(25%) 
PE SE PE SE 
-2.18' 
0.53 
0.55 
0.45 
0.27 
0.53 
0.11 
-0.50* 
0.29 
0.06 
0.52 
0.28 
0.33 
0.29 
0.21 
0.36 
021 
0.25 
0.23 
0.26 
0.48* 0.17 
-0.02 0.21 
0.15 
0.09 
0.54* 
0.29 
-0.15 
031 
-0.14 
-036 
Oi l 
-038* 
0.22 
0.51 
-0.04 
0.68 
0.25 
0.28 
0.25 
0.25 
0.24 
0.36 
0.52 
0.39 
044 
0.17 
0.47 
037 
0.42 
037 
0.75* 0.36 
0.45 0.39 
0.75 
0.63 
028 
-0.29 
-0.05 
-0.36 
0.42 
0.38 
0.39 
0.19 
0.22 
0.22 
-0.4r 0.23 
-0.72* 0.24 
-0.86 0.46 
-1.44* 0.45 
-1.28* 0.39 
- l .or 0.64 
-1.3r 0.58 
-0.11 0.44 
0.31 0.42 
0.68 0.38 
0.75* 0.38 
088* 037 
-1.25* 0.19 
0.23 0.18 
0.42 0.26 
-0.73* 0.26 
-0.65* 0.22 
-0.66 036 
-0.06 0.16 
-0.10* 0.05 
PE SE 
1.49* 0.38 
-0.47* 0.20 
-0.56* 0.24 
-0.17 021 
-0.14 
-0.12 
-0.11 
0,40' 
0,06 
-0,09 
-0.28' 
-0.09 
-0.10 
0.00 
-0.34 
0.23 
0.42' 
-0.30 
0.25 
0.14 
0.20 
0.19 
-0.46 
0.15 
0.29 
-0.19 
-0.22 
OOO 
0.03 
-0.23 
-0.22 
0.24 
0.02 
0.40' 
0.43' 
0.15 
0.23 
015 
0.16 
0.18 
018 
0.13 
0.15 
0.17 
0.20 
0.19 
0.19 
0.18 
0.25 
0.35 
0.25 
035 
012 
0.36 
0.24 
0.26 
0.24 
0.23 
0.26 
0.29 
0.25 
0.24 
014 
016 
0.16 
016 
0.76' 0.17 
1.16' 0.32 
1.53" 0.29 
1.6r 0.27 
2.0^ 0.54 
-0.04 0.34 
-0.81' 032 
-0.74' 032 
-1.2r 0.30 
-1.41' 0.29 
-2.04' 0.28 
1.06' 
-0.24" 
-0.34 
0.32 
0.30 
0.25 
0.06 
0.01 
0.12 
012 
018 
0.20 
017 
0.25 
0.11 
0.04 
PE SE PE SE 
1.72" 0.08 
0.10' 0.05 
0.12 0.07 
0.05 0.05 
014" 0.04 
0,01 0.05 
-0,24" 0.04 
-0.08' 0.04 
-0.2r 0.05 
-0.19' 0.05 
0.08" 0.03 
0.03 0.04 
016" 0.04 
0.09 0.05 
-0.02 0.05 
0.16' 0.04 
0.14' 0.04 
-0.2r 0.07 
-0.09 0.09 
-0.01 0.06 
-0.24' 0.09 
O.or 0.03 
0.17 0.10 
0.01 
-0,03 
0,03 
0,00 
-0,10 
0,05 
0,06 
0,06 
0,06 
0,06 
-0,14' 0.07 
-0.05 0.06 
0.06 
0.06 
O.ir 
0.01 
0.11' 
0.05 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
O.ir 0.04 
0.22' 0.07 
0.23' 0.06 
0.26' 0.05 
021 ' 0.09 
0.06 0.06 
-O.ir 0.06 
-0.30' 0.06 
-0.33' 0.06 
-0.40' 0.06 
-0.49' 
0.10* 
-0.11* 
-0.28" 
OOl 
0.01 
0.03 
0.02 
0.05 
0.03 
0.03 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.06 
0.03 
-135* O30 
-0.32 0.19 
-0,02 
-0,28 
-0,14 
O06 
-0.26* 
-0,12 
-0,21 
-0,28 
-0,03 
0,06 
0,03 
-0.41" 
-0.03 
0.07 
-0.08 
016 
-0,11 
O02 
0,05 
-0,02 
-0.25 
023 
019 
013 
018 
0,13 
0,13 
0,18 
0.16 
0.12 
013 
015 
019 
0,17 
0,16 
0.15 
0.23 
032 
021 
031 
0.10 
0.37 
OOO 0.18 
-0.28 021 
0.14 
-019 
-0.11 
-0,12 
-0,08 
-0,08 
-0.04 
0,09 
0.16 
0.23 
0.24 
0.35 
0.20 
0.20 
0,22 
0,26 
0,22 
0,19 
0,13 
0.15 
0.15 
0.15 
0.15 
0.24 
0.06 021 
0.48" 018 
0.23 0,33 
O.or 0.01 
-0.26 
-0.06 
0,04 
0.08 
0.09 
0,36 
0,51* 
0,07 
-0,08 
0.12 
0,01 
-021 
-0,02 
-0.02 
021 
0.21 
0.22 
0.20 
0.20 
0.19 
0.11 
0.11 
0.16 
018 
0.17 
0.22 
0.10 
0.03 
Uranium 
Mining-
Against 
845(31%) 
PE SE 
-1,60* 
0,08 
018 
0,61" 
0,06 
0,30 
018 
-0.03 
o,6r 
o,4r 
-0,12 
0,17 
0,03 
-0.17 
O06 
0,26 
-0,01 
Oil 
-0.39 
-0.18 
-0.41 
-0.09 
-0,22 
0,00 
-0,22 
-0,23 
-031 
-0,36 
-0.58" 
-0.70" 
-0.38' 
-0,07 
-0,10 
0,00 
-0,08 
-0,07 
0.00 
0.09 
-0.32 
0.09 
-0.06 
0.30 
016 
0.64" 
082" 
o.8r 
0,49" 
0,03 
0.21 
0,14 
0,07 
0,04 
-0,01 
-0,08" 
030 
018 
0,22 
017 
012 
017 
013 
013 
0,16 
015 
Oil 
012 
014 
017 
017 
015 
014 
022 
030 
020 
030 
OlO 
033 
018 
020 
019 
019 
021 
025 
021 
018 
012 
015 
014 
014 
014 
024 
019 
018 
030 
021 
021 
022 
020 
019 
0.19 
OlO 
Oil 
015 
018 
0.16 
021 
0,09 
0,03 
196.15 
TABLE A5.5(iii): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SCXHAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1984 NSSS, N=2701) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmen 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Qassified 
ReUgion - CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 (55001-59000) 
hicome 3 ($9001-$13000) 
hicome 4 ($13001-$17000) 
hicome 5 ($17001-$21000) 
hicome 6 ($21001-$25000) 
hicome 7 ($25001-529000) 
Income 8 (over $29001) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
Tr. un. M'ship - unknown 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (3) 59-67 (Ref:>67) 
Age (4) 51-58 
Age (5) 43-50 
Age (6) 35-42 
Age (7) 27-34 
Age (8) 18-26 
Gender - Female 
Education - Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Govemment 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force -t- other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
297(11) 
157(6) 
274(10) 
662(25) 
516(19) 
699(26) 
521(19) 
267(10) 
354(13) 
737(28) 
632(23) 
383(14) 
264(10) 
248(9) 
335(12) 
326(12) 
123(5) 
65(2) 
136(5) 
65(2) 
1438(53) 
50(2) 
316(12) 
245(9) 
287(11) 
334(12) 
233(9) 
150(6) 
304(11) 
492(18) 
1547(57) 
555(21) 
396(15) 
417(15) 
453(17) 
107(4) 
193(7) 
304(11) 
62(2) 
309(11) 
285(14) 
275(10) 
460(17) 
565(21) 
524(19) 
1393(51) 
930(34) 
456(17) 
698(26) 
1373(51) 
336(12) 
1202(45) 
-
Uranium 
Mining-
Support 
1193(44%) 
PE SE 
0.5r 0.27 
0.12 
-0.13 
-0.42" 
0.04 
-0.33" 
0.05 
0.11 
-0.51' 
-021 
0.12 
-0.22 
-0.05 
0.44' 
-0.02 
-0.29* 
-0.05 
-0.24 
0.16 
021 
0.17 
0.12 
0.16 
0.12 
0.12 
017 
0.15 
0.10 
012 
013 
0.16 
0.16 
014 
0.13 
0.22 
0.4r 028 
0.16 
0.32 
0.09 
0.36 
-0.01 
0.42* 
0.08 
0.20 
0.28 
0.09 
0.32 
0.17 
0.19 
0.19 
0.4r 0.18 
0.42* 0.20 
0.6r 0.23 
0.69* 
0.40* 
0.10 
0.01 
-0.13 
-0.11 
-0.13 
-0.29 
-0.13 
-0.11 
-0.29 
0.22 
-0.20 
-0.18 
-0.61* 
-0.79' 
-1.13' 
-0.86' 
-0.10 
-0.16 
-0.19 
-0.03 
0.19 
0.03 
0.09' 
0.20 
0.17 
0.12 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
0.23 
0.18 
0.16 
0.30 
0.18 
0.19 
0.20 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
OlO 
0.10 
0.15 
016 
0.14 
0.19 
0.09 
0.03 
Marijuana -
Agree 
LegaUsation 
656(24%) 
PE SE 
-1.52' 035 
012 0.19 
0.37 0.23 
0.17 0.19 
-0.02 0.14 
0.14 0.20 
0.13 0.14 
-0.22 0.15 
039' 0.17 
-0.02 017 
-0.06 0.12 
0.03 0.13 
-0.28 0.16 
-0.24 019 
-0.25 0.18 
-0.36' 0.17 
-0.01 016 
-0.66' 0.28 
-0.20 0.32 
-0.40 0.24 
0.63' 0.29 
-0.11 0.11 
0.46 0.34 
-021 021 
-021 0.22 
-0.4r 0.22 
-0.30 0.21 
-0.21 0.23 
-0.14 0.26 
-0.38 0.23 
-0.37 0.22 
0.11 0.13 
0.3r 0.16 
-0.23 0.15 
-O.sr 0.15 
-0.48' 0.15 
-0.73* 028 
-133* 0.26 
-1.44* 0.23 
-1.60* 0.46 
0.48 0.28 
0.9r 0.28 
0.83* 0.29 
1.26* 0.26 
1.63* 0.26 
1.88* 0.25 
-0.17 0.11 
-0.05 0.12 
0.32* 0.16 
0.03 0.19 
-0.03 0.17 
-0.47 0.25 
-021* 0.10 
-0.04 0.03 
Marijuana -
Disagree 
LegaUsation 
1663(62%) 
PE 
0.78* 
-0.18 
-0.43 
-031 
-0.17 
-0.09 
-0.15 
0.46* 
-0.38* 
0.18 
SE 
0.29 
0.17 
0.22 
0.17 
0.12 
0.18 
0.13 
0.13 
0.16 
0.15 
0.26* 0.11 
0.07 
0.17 
0.22 
-0.02 
0.18 
-0.10 
0.29 
0.58 
0.23 
-0.13 
0.13 
-0.58 
0.17 
0.33 
0.51* 
0.29 
0.03 
0.15 
018 
0.28 
0.08 
-0.05 
015 
0.12 
0.14 
0.17 
0.16 
0.15 
0.14 
0.23 
0.30 
021 
0.29 
0.10 
0.33 
0.18 
0.20 
0.20 
0.19 
021 
0.24 
021 
0.19 
0.12 
0.14 
0.14 
0.3r 0.14 
0.32* 
0.50* 
1.04* 
1.39* 
1.53* 
-0.37 
-0.53* 
-0.62* 
-0.99* 
-1.51* 
0.14 
0.24 
0.21 
0.19 
0.36 
0.22 
0.22 
0.23 
021 
0.20 
-l.sr 0.20 
0.10 
-0.01 
-0.44* 
-0.12 
0.00 
0.03 
0.09 
0.00 
0.10 
0.10 
0.15 
0.17 
0.15 
021 
0.09 
0.03 
Special 
benefits for 
Aborigines: 
YesAit 
depends 
632(23%) 
PE SE 
-2.22* 0.34 
0.07 0.19 
0.48* 0.22 
021 0.18 
0.07 0.14 
-0.19 021 
0.19 014 
-0.15 0.15 
0.48* 0.17 
0.18 0.17 
-0.43* 0.13 
0.18 0.13 
-0.27 016 
-038* 0.19 
-0.16 0.19 
-0.04 0.17 
-0.00 0.16 
-0.51 0.27 
-0.05 0.31 
-0.27 0.22 
-021 0.32 
0.18 0.11 
0.56 0.34 
0.07 0.21 
-0.09 0.23 
-0.38 0.22 
-0.25 0.22 
0.00 0.23 
-0.12 0.26 
0.02 0.23 
-0.03 0.21 
-0.11 0.13 
0.05 0.16 
-021 0.16 
-0.17 0.16 
-0.26 0.16 
-0.25 0.28 
-0.19 0.22 
-0.16 0.19 
019 031 
0.12 0.24 
0.44 025 
0.47 0.25 
0.51* 0.23 
0.72* 0.22 
0.5r 0.22 
021 0.11 
0.40* 0.12 
1.19* 0.15 
0.30 0.19 
0.16 0.18 
0.11 0.24 
0.13 0.10 
-0.05 0.04 
Special 
benefits for 
Aborigines: 
as others/ 
get too much 
2040(76%) 
PE SE 
1.9r 033 
-0.03 0.19 
-0.41* 0.22 
-0.19 018 
-0.06 0.14 
0.23 0.20 
-0.18 0.14 
0.11 0.15 
-0.44* 0.17 
-0.15 0.16 
0.39* 0.13 
-0.13 0.13 
0.32" 016 
0 4 r 0.19 
0.24 0.19 
0.11 0.17 
0.00 0.15 
0.49 0.26 
OOl 0.30 
0.24 0.22 
0.06 0.30 
-0.14 0.11 
-0.64 0.33 
-0.08 0.20 
0.07 0.22 
0.39 0.22 
0.28 021 
0.01 0.22 
015 026 
0.00 0.22 
0.02 0.21 
015 013 
0.00 0.16 
021 016 
0.22 016 
0.26 0.16 
0.24 0.27 
0.09 021 
0.06 018 
-0.13 031 
-0.02 0.23 
-0.30 0.24 
-0.37 0.24 
-0.38 0.22 
-0.63* 0.21 
-0.41 021 
-021 0.11 
-0.38* 012 
-1.20" 0.15 
-0.30 0.19 
-0.18 0.17 
-0.20 0.23 
-0.12 0.10 
0.03 0.03 
196.16 
TABLE A5.6(i): INFLUENCE OF SOdAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1986 NSSS. N=1471) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managen & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Qassified 
ReUgion - (Dathohc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Region - not known 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 ($5001-$11000) 
hicome 3 (511001-517000) 
hicome 4 (517001-523000) 
hicome 5 (523001-529000) 
hicome 6 (529001-535000) 
hicome 7 ($35001-$41000) 
Income 8 (over $41001) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
Tr. un. M'ship - unknown 
ReUgiosity (2) less than 1 x yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 70- (Ref:45-52) 
Age (3) 61-69 
Age (4) 53-60 
Age (6) 37-44 
Age (7) 29-36 
Age (8) 18-28 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - C^ompleted Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Government 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force + other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Ideology-
Left 
38(3%) 
FrBq(%) PE SE 
Ideology-
Right 
150(10%) 
Busmess-ioo Business-Not Business-
much Power loo much Neutral 
Power 
497(34%) 242(16%) 732(50%) 
PE SE 
201(14) 
115(11) 
142(10) 
337(23) 
243(17) 
390(27) 
287(20) 
127(9) 
218(15) 
391(27) 
195(13) 
385(26) 
193(13) 
171(12) 
146(10) 
51(4) 
1033(12) 
79(5) 
43(3) 
47(3) 
90(6) 
621(42) 
86(6) 
203(14) 
226(15) 
250(17) 
187(13) 
106(7) 
69(5) 
70(5) 
169(12) 
959(65) 
56(4) 
277(19) 
221(15) 
243(17) 
48(3) 
132(9) 
147(10) 
45(3) 
96(7) 
146(10) 
165(11) 
269(18) 
257(18) 
271(18) 
84(6) 
696(47) 
520(35) 
244(17) 
698(26) 
1373(39) 
336(27) 
689(47) 
-3.73' 
1.26 
1.08 
088 
1.52' 
1.05 
-0.96 
-0.25 
0.74 
0.07 
-0.32 
-0.68 
031 
-1.76 
0.07 
-0.02 
-0.25 
0.42 
0.71 
i.8r 
-6.26 
0.93 
-0.78 
1.42 
Oi l 
0.06 
031 
0.42 
-0.51 
-7.03 
-6.77 
-0.55 
-O.sr 
-7.63 
-0.48 
-0.92 
0.03 
-0.14 
-0.11 
-0.47 
0.23 
-0.02 
-0.84 
-0.24 
-0.50 
-0.48 
0.07 
-0.72 
-0.32 
-0.74 
0.32 
0.46 
1.09 
0.98 
-0.42 
-0.22 
1.49 
0.74 
0.97 
0.84 
0.56 
0.71 
0.61 
0.56 
0.59 
0.60 
0.46 
0.59 
0.45 
1.08 
0.57 
0.63 
1.11 
0.50 
0.74 
0.91 
14.86 
0.68 
0.46 
075 
0.71 
0.69 
0.66 
0.73 
0.99 
12.68 
12.72 
0.81 
0.42 
14.30 
0.54 
0.71 
0.57 
1.14 
0.74 
0.87 
1.18 
O80 
0.91 
0.74 
0.69 
0.69 
0.61 
0.95 
0.39 
0.46 
0.57 
1.19 
1.13 
1.20 
0.39 
0.13 
-2.43' 0.61 
-0.25 0.32 
-0.43 0.45 
-0.58 0.41 
-0.07 0.27 
0.10 0.35 
0.27 0.28 
0.04 0.28 
0.17 0.39 
0.06 031 
0.39 0.22 
0.62' 0.26 
-0.33 0.24 
-0.19 0.29 
-0.53 0.34 
-0.11 032 
-0.13 0.49 
-0.53 0.34 
-0.30 0.48 
0.47 0.45 
0.33 0.46 
-0.17 0.39 
037 0.21 
0.02 0.45 
0.29 0.36 
0.18 038 
0.68 0.36 
017 0.44 
0.90' 0.44 
0.37 0.56 
-0.10 0.58 
0.53 0.39 
0.6r 0.25 
0.19 0.59 
-0.43 0.33 
-0.24 0.34 
-0.12 0.32 
l.or 0.42 
0.35 0.36 
031 0.35 
O.sr 0.47 
0.62 0.41 
-0.05 0.38 
0.00 0.36 
-0.40 034 
-0.74' 0.37 
-037 0.35 
0.11 0.43 
-0.02 0.20 
0.23 0.22 
-0.16 0.32 
-0.35 0.34 
-0.7r 0.30 
-0.86' 0.37 
-0.12 0.20 
0.13' 0.06 
PE SE 
0.05 0.41 
-0.54' 0.23 
0.03 0.27 
0.22 0.23 
-039' 017 
-0.21 0.22 
-0.09 017 
-0.14 017 
0.56' 0.23 
-0.06 0.20 
-0.05 
-0.04 
-0.01 
0.18 
-0.40 
-0.05 
-0.01 
-0.01 
-0.01 
-0.11 
0.55 
0.03 
0.14 
0.18 
0.15 
0.19 
021 
021 
033 
0.18 
0.20 
0.37 
033 
0.26 
-0.43' 014 
-0.01 031 
-0.01 0.22 
-0.46' 0.23 
-0.16 0.22 
-0.56' 0.25 
-0.25 0.30 
-0.80' 0.36 
-0.44 035 
-0.56' 0.27 
-0.39' 0.15 
-036 0.33 
-0.24 
-0.03 
-0.22 
-0.55 
0.07 
-0.22 
-0.04 
-0.16 
031 
0.32 
-0.17 
-0.17 
-0.06 
-0.23 
-0.07 
0.07 
018 
0.20 
0.20 
0.38 
0.24 
0.24 
037 
0.30 
0.25 
0.24 
0.22 
0.22 
0.22 
0.32 
0.13 
0.14 
0.50' 0.20 
0.24 0.27 
0.23 
0.28 
0.01 
-O.ir 
0.24 
0.28 
0.13 
0.04 
PE SE 
-1.41" 048 
0.29 0.24 
-0.19 035 
-0.42 0.32 
-0.30 0.22 
-0.27 0.30 
0.29 0.22 
0.37 021 
-0.61 038 
-0.30 0.27 
-0.02 0.18 
0.06 0.24 
-0.22 0.20 
0.09 0.24 
-0.01 0.25 
0.14 0.26 
-0.30 0.47 
-0.12 0.25 
0.48 0.33 
0.07 0.42 
0.28 0.40 
-0.48 0.39 
039' 0.17 
-0.73 0.49 
-0.03 0.27 
-0.27 0.28 
-0.47 0.29 
-0.30 0.32 
-0.09 0.36 
-0.25 0.43 
0.06 0.38 
-031 0.33 
021 0.20 
015 0.44 
0.16 0.25 
0.02 0.26 
034 0.25 
1.00' 038 
-0.02 032 
-0.10 0.33 
0.46 0.44 
0.40 0.37 
0.19 033 
0.15 031 
0.18 0.27 
-0.15 0.29 
0.36 0.29 
-0.01 0.42 
0.02 0.17 
0.02 0.18 
-0.46 0.27 
-0.40 0.28 
-0.74' 0.25 
-0.76' 0.31 
0.22 0.16 
013' 0.05 
PE SE 
-0.98" 0.37 
0.20 0.20 
0.08 0.26 
0.01 0.22 
0.51' 016 
032 0.21 
-0.08 0.16 
-0.10 0.16 
-0.28 0.22 
0.20 0.19 
0.06 0.13 
-0.03 017 
0.12 0.14 
-0.20 0.18 
031 0.19 
-0.06 0.20 
0.15 031 
0.06 0.18 
-0.27 0.26 
0.10 033 
-0.70' 0.33 
0.20 0.24 
0.15 0.13 
0.28 0.29 
0.06 0.21 
O.sr 0.21 
0.40 0.21 
0.66* 0.24 
0.29 0.28 
0.8r 0.32 
0.36 0.31 
0.66' 0.24 
0.25 0.14 
0.26 0.31 
0.13 017 
0.03 0.19 
0.01 0.19 
-0.24 0.33 
-0.02 0.22 
0.27 0.23 
-0.20 0.35 
-0.09 0.28 
-0.37 0.24 
-0.37 0.23 
0.05 0.20 
0.20 0.21 
-0.13 021 
0.20 0.29 
0.06 0.12 
-0.08 013 
-0.19 0.19 
0.14 0.23 
033 021 
0.29 0.25 
-0.13 0.12 
0.05 0,04 
Spend on 
Welfare 
155(9%) 
PE SE 
-0.99 
-0.13 
0.15 
019 
-0.17 
0,07 
017 
-0,01 
053" 
041 
-0,36" 
-0,08 
0.33 
-0.26 
0.27 
-0.32 
0.07 
-0.09 
-o.9r 
-0.27 
-0.65 
-0.20 
-0.43' 
0.54 
0.17 
0.46 
0.26 
031 
0,26 
0,20 
0,25 
0,20 
O20 
0,26 
0,23 
0,17 
021 
0,17 
0,23 
0,22 
0,26 
038 
021 
0,35 
041 
0,45 
0,29 
0,16 
032 
0,23 
-0.6r 0.25 
-0.71" 0.25 
-0.86" 0,28 
-1.00" 036 
-1.23" 0.46 
-0.8r 0.42 
-0.6r 0,29 
-021 0.17 
Oil 
0.27 
0.07 
0.03 
031 
021 
-0.26 
081" 
0,00 
038 
-0,23 
-0,25 
-0,22 
038 
0,24 
0,13 
021 
0.35 
021 
0.23 
0.23 
0.39 
0.27 
0.29 
038 
0.34 
028 
0.29 
0.26 
0.26 
0.25 
0.34 
0.15 
0.16 
Reduce 
Taxes 
373(21%) 
PE SE 
O.sr 0.44 
014 0,25 
-0,14 
-0,24 
021 
-021 
-0,19 
0,01 
-0,42 
-038 
0,24 
-0,10 
-0,30 
0,26 
-013 
0,43 
0,04 
0,06 
030 
025 
019 
024 
019 
019 
025 
0,22 
016 
0,20 
016 
022 
021 
0,26 
037 
021 
0,89" 034 
0.16 0.39 
0,65 0,43 
0,25 028 
03r 016 
-0,61 031 
-0,17 022 
0,69" 024 
0,66* 024 
0,83" 028 
0,98" 035 
1.28" 0,45 
0,80" 0,40 
074* 028 
0,22 017 
-0,36 034 
-0,13 020 
0,04 0.22 
0,09 022 
-0.16 038 
0.82" 0.23 
0.13 0.30 
-0.04 0.28 
-0.13 032 
0.13 014 
-0.14" OOS 
0.01 
O30 
-0,56 
-0,20 
-0,40 
0,08 
0.18 
Oil 
-0.47 
-0.53 
-0,26 
-0.14 
-0.69* 
-0,05 
027 
027 
038 
032 
028 
028 
026 
025 
0,25 
033 
014 
016 
0,22 
0,29 
0,09 0,27 
019 031 
-0.14 014 
O.ir 0.05 
196.17 
TABLE A5,6(ii): INFLUENCE OF SOdAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1986 NSSS. N=1471) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Classified 
ReUgion - CathoUc 
Religion - Uniting 
Religion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Region - not known 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 ($5001-$11000) 
hicome 3 ($11001-$17000) 
hicome 4 ($17001-$23000) 
hicome 5 ($23001-$29000) 
hicome 6 ($29001-$35000) 
hicome 7 ($35001-$41000) 
Income 8 (over $41001) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
Tr. un. M'ship - unknown 
ReUgiosity (2) less than 1 x yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 70- (Ref:4S-52) 
Age (3) 61-69 
Age (4) 53-60 
Age (6) 37-44 
Age (7) 29-36 
Age (8) 18-28 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Govemment 
Works for private compiany 
Not in work-force + other 
Qass BackgrcL - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
201(14) 
115(11) 
142(10) 
337(23) 
243(17) 
390(27) 
287(20) 
127(9) 
218(15) 
391(27) 
195(13) 
385(26) 
193(13) 
171(12) 
146(10) 
51(4) 
1033(12) 
79(5) 
43(3) 
47(3) 
90(6) 
621(42) 
86(6) 
203(14) 
226(15) 
250(17) 
187(13) 
106(7) 
69(5) 
70(5) 
169(12) 
959(65) 
56(4) 
277(19) 
221(15) 
243(17) 
48(3) 
132(9) 
147(10) 
45(3) 
96(7) 
146(10) 
165(11) 
269(18) 
257(18) 
271(18) 
84(6) 
696(47) 
520(35) 
244(17) 
698(26) 
1373(39) 
336(27) 
689(47) 
-
Favour 
Death 
Penalty 
977(66%) 
PE 
1.01* 
-0.41 
-0.89* 
-0.58* 
-0.20 
-0.16 
-o.4r 
-0.20 
-1.04* 
-0.32 
0.13 
0.07 
-0.20 
-0.32 
0.17 
0.16 
0.29 
SE 
O40 
0.22 
0.27 
0.23 
0.18 
0.23 
018 
0.18 
0.23 
021 
0.15 
019 
0.15 
0.19 
021 
0.22 
035 
0.4r 0.20 
1.10' 
1.18' 
0.41 
O40 
0.00 
-0.25 
-0.16 
-0.05 
-0.15 
0.23 
-0.02 
0.32 
-0.18 
0.43 
0.16 
0.16 
0.00 
0.20 
-0.20 
0.22 
-0.64' 
-0.43 
-0.94* 
-0.16 
0.27 
0.15 
0.59* 
0.51 
0.08 
-0.12 
-0.53* 
-0.25 
-0.68* 
0.37 
0.39 
0.25 
0.10 
0.02 
0.32 
0.42 
0.35 
0.26 
014 
031 
0.22 
0.23 
0.23 
0.26 
0.30 
0.35 
0.33 
0.28 
0.15 
0.34 
0.19 
021 
0.20 
038 
0.24 
0.24 
0.35 
0.30 
0.26 
0.24 
0.22 
0.22 
0.22 
031 
0.13 
0.15 
0.20 
0.25 
0.23 
0.27 
0.13 
0.04 
Not IT 1 
Favour 
Death 
PenaUy 
306(21%) 
PE 
-2.08* 
0.20 
0.74* 
0.25 
-0.09 
014 
SE 
0.48 
0.25 
0.30 
0.27 
021 
028 
O.sr 021 
0.35 
1.26* 
019 
-0.02 
-0.13 
0.19 
0.46* 
-0.26 
0.14 
-0.39 
-0.40 
021 
0.26 
0.25 
017 
0.22 
0.18 
0.22 
0.25 
0.25 
0.43 
0.23 
-0.86* 0.38 
-1.02' 
-0.41 
0.51 
0.42 
-l.or 035 
0.09 
0.51 
0.40 
-0.03 
-0.24 
-031 
-0.03 
-0.18 
0.28 
-0.28 
0.02 
0.02 
OOO 
0.00 
0.05 
-0.11 
0.73' 
O.sr 
l.ir 
-0.08 
-0.18 
0.10 
-0.41 
-0.54' 
-0.09 
-0.14 
0.54' 
0.26 
0.88* 
-0.10 
-0.20 
-0.23 
-0.19 
-0.04 
0.17 
0.36 
0.26 
0.27 
0.28 
0.30 
035 
0.40 
037 
0.32 
0.18 
0.40 
0.23 
0.25 
0.25 
0.45 
0.27 
0.27 
0.38 
0.35 
0.30 
0.28 
0.26 
0.27 
0.26 
0.37 
0.15 
0.18 
0.22 
0.29 
0.26 
031 
0.15 
0.05 
Attitude 
to Migrants 
(OLS) 
PE SE 
138* 033 
-0.26 0.17 
-0.51* 0.23 
-0.80* 0.20 
-0.39' 0.14 
0.03 0.19 
-0.36' 0.14 
-0.11 0.14 
-0.38' 0.20 
-0.44' 0.17 
0.19 012 
0.04 0.15 
-0.13 0.13 
0.01 0.16 
-033* 0.16 
-0.09 017 
0.36 0.27 
-0.90* 0.16 
-1.08* 0.23 
-0.53 0.30 
-0.05 0.28 
-0.13 021 
-0.07 0.11 
0.09 0.25 
-0.20 019 
-0.32 0.19 
-0.43 0.19 
-0.39 0.21 
-0.66* 0.24 
-0.86* 0.28 
-0.45 0.28 
-0.09 0.21 
-0.23 0.12 
-0.40 0.27 
-0.14 0.15 
-0.09 0.16 
-0.17 0.16 
-0.24 0.29 
-0.58* 0.20 
-0.71* 0.20 
-0.6r 0.30 
0.03 0.25 
-0.39 021 
0.08 0.20 
-0.06 0.18 
0.05 0.18 
0.52* 0.19 
0.06 0.26 
-0.36* 0.11 
-0.29* 0.12 
-0.34* 0.17 
0.33 0.20 
0.4r 0.19 
0.4r 0.22 
-0.07 0.10 
-0.03 0.03 
Pomography 
-Disagree 
Stricter 
Controls 
251(17%) 
PE SE 
-0.7r 0.52 
-0,09 0,28 
-0,10 035 
0,21 0,29 
0,05 0,23 
-0.13 0.36 
0.05 0.23 
0.03 0.23 
0.74* 0.26 
0.21 0.27 
-0.24 0.19 
0.03 0.25 
0.10 0.19 
0.03 0.25 
-0.33 0.28 
-0.05 0.27 
-1.11 063 
0.20 0.25 
0.32 0.35 
0.76 0.43 
0.64 0.40 
0.25 0.32 
0.11 0.18 
0.51 0.44 
0.08 0.34 
-0.22 0.33 
-0.25 0.32 
-0.02 0.34 
-0.20 0.39 
0.27 0.41 
0.41 0.41 
-0.56 0.42 
0.00 0.19 
0.23 0.46 
-0.07 0.22 
-0.11 0.24 
-0.28 0.25 
-033 0.47 
-1.84* 0.46 
-1.22* 0.37 
-1.51* 0.65 
-1.46* 0.52 
-0.93* 0.40 
-0.70* 0.35 
0.13 0.27 
0.00 0.27 
0.36 0.27 
-0.29 0.41 
-1.22* 0.18 
0.37 0.18 
0.74* 0.25 
-0.25 0.30 
-0.20 0.27 
-0.26 0.37 
-0.42' 0.17 
0.01 0.05 
Pomography 
-Agree 
Stricter 
(Controls 
1000(68%) 
PE 
0.29 
021 
0.46 
0.05 
0.18 
0.11 
-0.03 
-0.12 
SE 
0.43 
0.23 
0.30 
0.25 
0.19 
0.27 
0.19 
0.18 
-0.6r 0.24 
-0.03 
0.16 
025 
-0.20 
-0.35 
0.41 
-0.12 
031 
0.02 
-0.44 
-0.57 
-0.06 
-0.66' 
-0.26 
-0.51 
0.08 
-0.13 
0.26 
-0.04 
0.08 
-0.13 
-0.39 
0.41 
-0.05 
-0.42 
0.18 
0.08 
0.22 
1.10' 
1,60' 
134' 
1.59" 
0.83" 
0.99" 
0.27 
-0.02 
-0.11 
-0.71' 
-0.18 
l.or 
-0.28 
-0.38 
-0.15 
-0,05 
0,08 
0.14 
-0.03 
0.22 
0.16 
021 
0.16 
0.20 
0,23 
0,23 
039 
0,20 
0,30 
037 
0,36 
0,27 
0.15 
034 
0.26 
0.25 
0.25 
0.27 
032 
0.36 
0.35 
031 
0.16 
0.36 
0.19 
0.20 
021 
0.43 
031 
O30 
0.50 
0.36 
0.32 
0.27 
0.23 
0.23 
0.23 
0.33 
0.14 
0.15 
021 
0.26 
0.23 
0.30 
0.14 
0.04 
Royalty 
Importance 
(OLs; 
PE 
1.63' 
0.09 
0,09 
0,06 
0.05 
0.09 
-0.16" 
0,04 
-0,32" 
-0,08 
0,02 
0.04 
0,10" 
1 
SE 
013 
0.07 
0.09 
0.08 
0.06 
0.07 
0.06 
0.06 
0.08 
0,07 
0.05 
0,06 
0,05 
O i r 0,06 
014" 
0.02 
0,03 
0.06 
0.07 
Oi l 
0,2r 0.06 
-0.32" 
-0.34" 
-o,2r 
-0,18" 
-0,07 
-0,14 
0,00 
-0,03 
0,02 
-0,04 
-0,06 
-0,13 
-0,07 
015 
0,08 
O06 
0,07 
0,07 
0,26' 
0,24" 
0,28" 
038" 
o,2r 
0,22" 
0,18" 
0,12 
-0,13 
-021' 
-0,28' 
-0,05 
0,06 
-0,05 
-0.14" 
-0.09 
-0.07 
-0.16 
0.08" 
O09 
0.12 
0.11 
0,08 
0.05 
0.10 
0.07 
0.07 
0,07 
0.08 
0.10 
0.11 
Oil 
0.08 
0.05 
0.11 
0.06 
0.06 
0,06 
Oi l 
0,08 
0,08 
0.12 
0.10 
0,08 
0,08 
0,07 
0,07 
0,07 
0,10 
0,04 
0,05 
0,07 
0.08 
0.07 
0.09 
0.04 
O.or OOl 
Uranium 
Mining 
Middle 
Position 
317(22%) 
PE SE 
-2.89' 0.50 
019 0.25 
0,03 031 
OlO 027 
0.18 019 
-0.32 026 
-0,13 0,20 
-0,30 0.20 
-0,41 029 
0.33 0.22 
-0,07 0,16 
-0,11 021 
OOl 018 
025 021 
-0.07 0.23 
0.37 0.23 
0.71" 035 
0.03 022 
-0,10 031 
0,49 038 
-0,44 0,44 
015 028 
-0,33 016 
-0.62 0.37 
0.06 025 
-0,26 0,26 
0,05 025 
-0,09 029 
0,01 034 
-0,29 0,43 
-0,03 0,40 
0,07 0,29 
0,24 0,17 
0,39 035 
0,50" 021 
-0,07 024 
0,34 023 
-0,67 0,51 
0,35 0,27 
0,27 028 
-0,01 0,42 
0,53 0,37 
031 033 
O30 031 
0,68" 027 
0,79" 0,28 
0,94" 0,28 
1,18" 0.36 
027 015 
-0.27 017 
0.10 0.23 
0.66" 0.32 
0.90" 030 
0.71' 034 
-0.04 014 
-0,04 0,05 
196,18 
TABLE A5.6(ui): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOQAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1986 NSSS, N=1471) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Classified 
ReUgion - ClathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
Religion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Region - not known 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 ($5001-$11000) 
hicome 3 ($11001-$17000) 
hicome 4 ($17001-$23000) 
hicome 5 ($23001-529000) 
hicome 6 (529001-535000) 
hicome 7 ($35001-$41000) 
hicome 8 (over $41001) 
Income 9 (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
Tr, un. M'ship - unknown 
ReUgiosity (2) less than 1 x yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 70- (Ref:45-52) 
Age (3) 61-69 
Age (4) 53-60 
Age (6) 37-44 
Age (7) 29-36 
Age (8) 18-28 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - (Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Government 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force + other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
201(14) 
115(11) 
142(10) 
337(23) 
243(17) 
390(27) 
287(20) 
127(9) 
218(15) 
391(27) 
195(13) 
385(26) 
193(13) 
171(12) 
146(10) 
51(4) 
1033(12) 
79(5) 
43(3) 
47(3) 
90(6) 
621(42) 
86(6) 
203(14) 
226(15) 
250(17) 
187(13) 
106(7) 
69(5) 
70(5) 
169(12) 
959(65) 
56(4) 
277(19) 
221(15) 
243(17) 
48(3) 
132(9) 
147(10) 
45(3) 
96(7) 
146(10) 
165(11) 
269(18) 
257(18) 
271(18) 
84(6) 
696(47) 
520(35) 
244(17) 
698(26) 
1373(39) 
336(27) 
689(47) 
-
Uranium 
Mining-
Against 
432(29%) 
PE 
-1.10' 
0.05 
0.09 
SE 
0.42 
0.23 
0.29 
0.7r 0.23 
-0.26 
0.36 
0.06 
0.28 
0.18 
0.24 
0.19 
0.18 
0 7 r 0.24 
-0.03 
-0.07 
-0.05 
0.29 
-0.19 
-0.05 
-0.15 
0.13 
0.04 
0.39 
-0.47 
0.22 
-0.18 
-0.08 
0.45 
-0.05 
0.05 
0.03 
-0.32 
0.05 
-0.48 
-0.68 
-0.52 
-0.18 
-0.19 
-0.27 
0.16 
-0.02 
0.18 
0.36 
-0.05 
0.67 
-1.23' 
-0.73' 
-0.49 
-0.17 
0.08 
0.19 
-0.41 
0.68' 
0.15 
0.26 
-0.24 
-0.03 
-0.04 
-0.03 
-0.06 
0.22 
0.15 
0.20 
0.16 
021 
021 
0.23 
0.34 
0.20 
0.27 
041 
0.34 
0.27 
0.15 
0.32 
0.24 
0.24 
0.23 
0.26 
0.30 
0.38 
0.39 
0.28 
015 
0.34 
0.20 
021 
021 
0.36 
0.25 
0.26 
0.36 
0.37 
0.28 
0.26 
0.22 
0.22 
0.22 
0.33 
0.13 
0.15 
021 
0.27 
0.24 
0.28 
0.13 
0.04 
Uranium 
Mining-
Support 
722(49%) 
PE 
1.04' 
-0.19 
-0.10 
-0.84' 
0.06 
-0.09 
0.04 
-0.03 
-0.40 
-0.24 
0.09 
0.12 
-0.24 
-0.01 
0.11 
-0.16 
SE 
0.39 
0.20 
0.27 
0.24 
017 
0.22 
0.17 
0.17 
0.23 
0.20 
0.14 
0.18 
015 
0.18 
0.19 
0.20 
-0.6r 0.33 
-0.06 
-0.30 
-0.07 
0.07 
0.04 
031 ' 
0,04 
-U.02 
0.12 
-0.06 
0.36 
-0.04 
0.61 
0.54 
0.36 
-0.01 
-0.10 
-0.14 
-0.10 
-021 
0.20 
-0.61' 
-0.13 
-0.54 
0.54 
0.40 
0.22 
-0.27 
-0.60' 
-0.83' 
-0.45 
-0.76' 
0.07 
-0.32 
-0.16 
-0.52' 
-0.35 
0.07 
0.08' 
018 
028 
0.35 
0.33 
0.25 
0.14 
0.29 
0.22 
0.22 
0.22 
0.24 
0.28 
0.34 
0.33 
0.25 
0.15 
0.32 
0.18 
0.19 
0.19 
0.34 
0.24 
0.23 
0.36 
0.29 
0.25 
0.23 
021 
021 
0.22 
030 
0.13 
0.14 
0.20 
0.24 
0.22 
0.26 
0.12 
0.04 
Marijuana-
Agree 
LegaUse 
293(20%) 
PE SE 
-1.04' 0,48 
0,09 0.26 
0.30 0.32 
0.25 0,28 
-0,19 021 
0.49 0.28 
-0.02 0.22 
0.05 0.21 
0.9r 0.25 
0.18 0.24 
0.08 0.17 
0.02 0.23 
-0.28 0.18 
-0.51' 0.24 
-0.19 0.24 
0.05 0.25 
-1.00' 0.49 
-0.37 0.25 
0.03 0.32 
0.00 0.44 
0.42 0.38 
-0.32 0.32 
-0.12 0.17 
0.02 0.38 
-0.42 0.27 
-0.49 0.27 
-0.05 0.26 
-0.56 0.30 
-0.64 0.36 
-0.61 0.44 
-0.10 0.39 
-0.62 0.33 
-0.12 0.18 
0.57 0.36 
-0.13 021 
-0.07 0.23 
-0.33 0.23 
-0.52 0.46 
-0.43 0.30 
-0.90' 0.34 
-2.06' 0.74 
-0.26 0.39 
-0.26 0.34 
-0.42 0.34 
-0.15 0.28 
0.47 0.26 
1.08' 0.26 
-0.24 0.39 
-0.04 0.15 
0.11 0.17 
0.26 0.24 
-0.04 031 
0.16 0.28 
0.07 0.33 
-0.14 0.15 
0.02 0.05 
Marijuana-
Disagree 
LegaU ise 
972(66%) 
PE 
0.17 
021 
-0.29 
-0.13 
0.28 
-0.10 
-0.07 
0.07 
-0.94' 
0.06 
0.13 
0.19 
0.29 
0.29 
0.44' 
0.13 
0.44 
0.19 
0.17 
-0.14 
-0.23 
0.00 
Oi l 
0.01 
0.54' 
0.50' 
0.37 
SE 
0.41 
0.22 
028 
0.24 
0.18 
0.24 
0.18 
018 
0.23 
021 
0.15 
0.20 
0.16 
0.20 
021 
0.22 
0.35 
0.20 
0.29 
0.37 
0.34 
0.26 
0.15 
031 
0.23 
0.23 
0.23 
0.7r 0.26 
0.64 
0.55 
0.26 
0.43 
0.05 
-0.59 
-0.09 
-0.13 
0.22 
0.43 
0.37 
031 
0.36 
0.34 
0.27 
0.15 
033 
0.18 
0.20 
0.20 
0.38 
0.25 
0.96' 0.28 
1.70* 
0.07 
0.04 
021 
-0.11 
-0.72* 
-1.50* 
-0.33 
-0.09 
0.00 
-0.20 
021 
0.05 
0.24 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.51 
033 
0.28 
0.27 
0.23 
0.23 
0.23 
0.32 
0.13 
0.15 
021 
0.26 
0.23 
0.28 
0.13 
0.04 
Spend more 
on 
Aborigines 
521(35%) 
PE SE 
-2 . i r 042 
028 021 
0,23 0,27 
0,27 0.24 
0,25 0.17 
0.61" 0.22 
0.43" 0.17 
0.27 0.17 
0.76" 0.23 
0.4r 0.20 
0.17 0.14 
0.22 0.18 
0.66* 0.15 
0.18 0.19 
0.11 0.20 
-0.10 0.22 
1.38* 0.32 
-0.14 0.19 
0.20 0.27 
0.26 0.35 
0.24 0.33 
0.51* 0.24 
-0.18 0.14 
-0.01 0.30 
0.26 0.22 
-0.08 0.23 
-0.10 0.23 
-0.30 0.26 
-0.16 0.30 
-0.19 035 
-0.12 034 
0.10 0.26 
-0.15 0.15 
0.06 0.32 
0.00 0.19 
-0.03 0.20 
0.25 0.20 
-0.15 036 
0.48* 0.23 
0.44 0.23 
028 0.36 
0.26 0.29 
-0.10 0.26 
-0.10 0.24 
0.02 0.21 
-0.21 0.22 
-0.13 0.22 
022 0.30 
0.23 0.13 
0.12 0.14 
0.45* 0.20 
0.63* 0.26 
0.51* 0.24 
0.27 0.28 
0.07 0.13 
-0.13' 0.04 
Do not 
spend more 
on 
Aborigines 
627(43%) 
PE SE 
0.48 0.38 
-0,26 0,20 
-0,30 0.26 
-0.24 0,23 
-0,29 016 
-0,34 0,22 
-0,24 017 
-0,12 016 
-0,36 0,23 
-0,40" 0,20 
0.09 0.14 
-0.07 0.18 
-0.6r 0.15 
-0.05 0.18 
-0.09 0.19 
0.15 0.20 
-1.09" 035 
-0.18 018 
-0.82" 0.30 
-0.35 0.35 
-0.30 033 
-0.65" 0.26 
0.18 013 
036 O30 
-0.12 0.22 
-0.10 0,22 
-0,01 0,22 
0.11 0.24 
0.07 028 
033 033 
-0.01 032 
-0.27 0.25 
039" 0.14 
0.23 032 
0,18 0,18 
-0,22 019 
-0,01 0.19 
0.24 0.34 
-0.30 0.23 
-0.46 0.24 
-0.56 0,37 
-0.84' 0.29 
-0.11 025 
-0.13 0.23 
-0.18 021 
0.06 0.21 
-0.37 0.22 
-0.70' 031 
-0.20 0.12 
-0.14 0.14 
-0.24 0.20 
0.01 0.24 
0.11 021 
0.13 0.25 
-0.01 0.12 
O i r 0.04 
196.19 
TABLE A5.7(i): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1987 AES, N=1677) 
VARIABLE Ideology-
Left 
136(8%) 
Ideology- Business-loo Business-not Spend on 
Right much Power loo much Welfare 
393(24%) 835(50) 293(18%) 233(14%) 
Reduce 
Taxes 
1053(63%) 
Measure 
Fieq(%) PE SE PE SE PE SE PE SE PE SE PE SE 
0.33 
0.17 
0.23 
0.20 
0.15 
021 
0.15 
0.15 
0.18 
0.20 
0.11 
0.13 
0.20 
0.29 
016 
0.25 
0.33 
0.20 
031 
013 
017 
Uitercept -2.22' 0.65 -0.95' 0.38 0.02 
Qass - Managers & Fanners 275(16) -0.05 031 -0.00 019 -0.24 
Qass - Upper Professionals 125(7) -136'0.63 -0.38 0.29 -0.18 
Qass - Other Professionals 158(9) -038 0.39 -0.07 0.25 0.18 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 340(20) 0.14 0.25 -0.160.19 -0.04 
Qass - Not Classified 179(11) -0.88'0.43 0.40 0.24 -0.19 
ReUgion - Cathohc 493(29) -0.07 0.30 0.06 0.18 -0.11 
ReUgion - Unituig 322(19) -0.01 0.30 -0.11 0.18 0.09 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 312(19) 0.96* 0.29 -0.78* 0.24 0.07 
ReUgion - Other 170(10) 0.23 0.37 -0.16 0.24 -0.08 
Region - Rural 579(35) -0.33 0.22 0.14 0.13 0.01 
Sute-Vic 434(26) 0.15 0.24 -0.01 0.16 OlO 
Sute-Qld 276(16) 0.17 0.29 -0.06 0.18 0 3 r 0.16 
Sute-SA 189(11) -0.22 0.35 -0.25 0.22 -0.04 0.18 
Sute - WA 136(8) 0.32 0.34 -0.47 0.26 0.14 
Sute-Tas 58(3) 0.28 0.52 -0.47 037 0.51 
Ethnicity - British Isles 206(12) 0.06 0.29 -0.26 0,20 -0,29 
Ethnicity - Southem Eurxjpe 84(5) 1,02* 0,38 -0.59 0.33 0.26 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 46(8) -1.32 1.03 -0.18 0.40 -0.32 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 140(8) -0.08 0.36 0.42 0.22 0.02 
Ethnicity - Other 50(3) -0.09 0.56 0.11 036 -0.43 
Qass IdenL - Middle 682(41) -0.10 0.23 040*0.15 -0.36* 
Qass IdenL - None 295(18) 0.25 0.29 -0.01 0.20 -0.16 
Not a Trade-Union Member 1117(67) -0.6r 0.24 0.42*0.17 -0.2r 0.13 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ixyr. 232(14) -0.46 0.33 -0.27 0.20 -0.39*0.16 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 184(11) -0.15 0.34 031 021 -0.24 0.18 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 201(12) -0.22 0.33 -0.07 0.21 -0.30 0.18 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 55(3) -0.91 0.76 0.12 0.34 -0.23 0.30 
ReUgiosity (6) X a month 54(3) -0.13 059 -0.08 036 -0.08 031 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 219(13) 014 0.33 -021 0.22 -0.08 0.18 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 80(5) -0.37 0.57 -0.04 0.31 0.22 0.27 
Age (3) 63-70 (Ref:71-98) 181(11) 038 0.52 039 0.28 0.18 0.25 
Age (4) 54-62 198(12) 0.23 0.52 0.17 0.28 0.47 0.25 
Age (5) 46-53 208(12) -0.19 0.56 034 0.28 0.11 0.26 
Age (6) 38-45 279(17) 0.35 0.51 -0.19 0.28 0.29 0.25 
Age (7) 30-37 296(18) 0.11 0.53 -0.14 0.29 0.14 0.25 
Age (8) 18-29 383(23) 0.67 0.50 -0.6r 0.29 -0.15 0.24 
Age-Unknown 18(1) 0.71 0.92 -0.01 0.58 -1.07 0.62 
Gender - Female 863(51) 0.13 021 -0.18 0.14 -0.03 0.11 
Education - Completed Sec. 494(29) -0.18 0.23 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.13 
Education - Tertiary 256(15) -0.01 030 -0.07 0.19 0.03 016 
Works for the Govemment 413(25) -0.03 039 -0.64*0.25 0.19 0.22 
Works for private company 728(43) -0.43 035 -0.29 0.20 0.19 019 
Not Ul work-force -t- other 371(22) 0.24 0.42 -0.32 0.26 0.45 0.23 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 720(43) 0.06 0.20 0.07 013 0.20 0.11 
Partisan Background - -0.06 0.06 0.14* 0.04 -0.12* 0.03 
-l.sr 042 
0.20 0.21 
0.05 0.29 
-0.06 0.27 
0.29 0.20 
-0.29 0.30 
-0.40* 0.20 
-0.31 0.19 
-0.30 0.23 
-1.39* 0.33 
0.07 0.15 
0.00 0.17 
-O.sr 0.23 
0.25 0.22 
0.16 0.26 
0.12 036 
0.13 021 
-0.04 0.36 
0.04 0.43 
0.34 0.25 
0.00 0.43 
049' 0.17 
0.08 0.23 
0.50' 0.18 
-0.16 0.22 
0.14 0.23 
0.39 0.22 
0.26 0.37 
-0.39 0.45 
0.26 0.24 
-0.24 0.40 
-0.72' 0.33 
-0.61 0.32 
-0.55 0.33 
-0.22 031 
-0.47 0.32 
-0.07 0.30 
-0.09 0.71 
-0.24 0.15 
012 0.17 
0.09 0.21 
0.03 0.27 
-0.19 0.23 
0.00 0.30 
0.08 0.15 
0.12' 0.04 
-0.79 
-0.12 
0,00 
0,39 
0.19 
0.33 
-0.13 
-0,06 
0.46 
0.27 
035 
0.29 
0.22 
0.28 
0,24 
0,22 
0,54" 0,24 
0,46 0,28 
-0,38" 0.17 
0.64" 0.19 
0.40 0.23 
0.12 
-0.20 
0.57 
0.05 
0.19 
-0.53 
-0.10 
-0.40 
-0.19 
012 
-0.53" 
0.27 
0.33 
0.41 
0.23 
0.36 
0.56 
0.28 
0.47 
0.19 
0.23 
0.20 
-0.6r 0.26 
-0.20 0.27 
-0.36 
-0.58 
-0.22 
-0.22 
-0.33 
0.09 
-0.29 
-0.84' 
-1.48' 
-1.00" 
0.27 
0.50 
0.49 
0.26 
038 
031 
0.32 
0.34 
0.37 
0.34 
-0.72" 0.32 
-0.41 0.67 
013 
-016 
0.35 
-0.12 
-0.43 
-0.15 
-0.02 
-0.09 
017 
0.19 
0.23 
0.33 
0.29 
0.33 
0.16 
0.05 
0.04 
0.11 
0.17 
-0,26 
-0,07 
-0,44" 
-0,13 
-Oil 
-0,61' 
-o,5r 
0.17 
-0.17 
034 
018 
0.24 
021 
0,15 
021 
016 
016 
018 
021 
0.12 
014 
-0.20 0.16 
-0,06 018 
0.51" 
0.11 
-0.19 
-0.23 
-0.07 
0.01 
0.17 
0.14 
-0.11 
0.33" 
0.22 
031 
0.17 
0.26 
0.33 
0.20 
0.32 
0.13 
0.17 
0.14 
0.4r 017 
0.14 0.19 
Oi l 
Oi l 
041 
019 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.22 
0.64' 
0.18 
031 
0.34 
019 
0.27 
0.25 
0.25 
0.26 
1.10" 0.26 
0.60" 0.26 
0.30 0.25 
0,73 
-0,16 
0,24 
-0,06 
-0,12 
-0.03 
-0.10 
0.10 
0.11' 
0.55 
0.12 
0.13 
0.17 
0.23 
0.20 
0.24 
0.12 
0.04 
196.20 
TABLE A5.7(u): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1987 AES. N=1677) 
VARIABLE Bring 
Back Death 
PenaUy 
Do not bring 
Back Death 
Penalty 
Immigration-
Asians Uke 
anyone else 
Immigration-
C^ou Asian 
Migration 
Immigration-
no Asian but 
Europe OK 
Immigration- Immigration-
Only Britain No more 
& N. Europe migrants 
983(59%) 387(23%) 370(22%) 390(23%) 44(3%) 111(7%) 718(43%) 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Fanners 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Qassified 
ReUgion - (CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
Not a Trade-Unicm Member 
ReUgiosity (2) less than 1 x yr 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (3) 63-70 (Ref:71-98) 
Age (4) 54-62 
Age (5) 46-53 
Age (6) 38-»S 
Age (7) 30-37 
Age (8) 18-29 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Govemment 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force + other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
-req(%) 
275(16) 
125(7) 
158(9) 
340(20) 
179(11) 
493(29) 
322(19) 
312(19) 
170(10) 
579(35) 
434(26) 
276(16) 
189(11) 
136(8) 
58(3) 
206(12) 
84(5) 
46(8) 
140(8) 
50(3) 
682(41) 
295(18) 
1117(67) 
232(14) 
184(11) 
201(12) 
55(3) 
54(3) 
219(13) 
80(5) 
181(11) 
198(12) 
208(12) 
279(17) 
296(18) 
383(23) 
18(1) 
863(51) 
494(29) 
256(15) 
413(25) 
728(43) 
371(22) 
720(43) 
-
PE SE 
0.7r 0.34 
-0.04 
-0.36 
-0.42' 
-0.25 
-0.26 
-0.23 
-0.10 
-0.71* 
-0.30 
0.17 
0.23 
021 
0.15 
0.22 
016 
0.16 
018 
0.20 
0.2r 0.12 
-0.16 
-0.59* 
-0.13 
021 
-0.57 
-0.24 
-0.03 
0.30 
0.35 
0.22 
-0.23 
-0.20 
-0.04 
0.34 
0.39 
0.00 
0.53 
-0.10 
-0.29 
-0.32 
0.36 
0.29 
0.14 
0.16 
0.18 
021 
0.29 
0.16 
0.26 
0.33 
0.20 
0.32 
0,13 
0,17 
0.14 
0.17 
0.19 
0.18 
0.32 
031 
0.18 
0.27 
0.26 
0.26 
0.7r 0.26 
O.sr 0.25 
0.63* 
0.41 
0.38 
-0.20 
-0.11 
-0.53" 
-0.46" 
-0.06 
0.00 
0.10 
0.06 
0.26 
0.25 
0.55 
0.12 
0.13 
0.16 
0.22 
0.19 
0.24 
0.11 
0.04 
PE SE 
-3.00* 0.43 
0.23 021 
0.58* 0.26 
0.82' 0.23 
039' 0.18 
021 0.27 
0.19 0.19 
0.04 0.20 
0,82' 0,21 
031 0,24 
-0.14 0.14 
0.26 0.17 
0.56' 0.19 
0.08 0.22 
0.15 0.25 
0.7r 0.34 
-0.08 0.19 
-0.17 031 
-0.66 0.44 
-0.63* 0.25 
0.01 035 
0.30 0.16 
0.19 021 
0.03 0.16 
-0.39 0.21 
-0.29 0.24 
0.08 021 
-0.49 0.40 
-0.02 0.37 
0.6r 0.21 
0.13 0.30 
-O.08 0.32 
0.26 0.31 
-0.17 0.32 
0.04 0.31 
-0.30 031 
-0.17 031 
0.78 0.63 
021 0.14 
0.44* 0.16 
O80* 0.18 
0.83* 0.28 
0.53* 0.25 
0.40 031 
Oi l 0.14 
-0.08* 0.04 
PE SE 
-3.49* 0.51 
0.53* 0.22 
0.34 0.28 
0.8r 0.24 
0.39 0.20 
0.37 0.29 
0.59* 0.21 
014 0.23 
1.09* 0.22 
0.73* 0.25 
-031* 0.15 
032 0.17 
-0.11 021 
032 0.22 
-0.33 0.27 
-0.14 0.42 
0.44* 0.21 
1.16* 0.28 
0.9r 0.36 
1.43* 021 
-0.11 0.39 
0.10 0.16 
-0.02 0.23 
-0.25 0.17 
0.05 0.21 
-0.53* 0.26 
-0.29 0.24 
0.36 0.35 
-0.00 0.37 
0.29 0.23 
041 0.30 
0.91* 0.43 
0.51 0.43 
1.2r 0.42 
1.14* 0.42 
1.48* 0.42 
1.3r 0.41 
0.51 0.73 
-0.01 0.14 
0.24 0.17 
0.78* 0.19 
-0.19 0.27 
-0.13 0.24 
0.08 0.30 
-0.09 0.14 
0.04 0.04 
PE 
-1.83" 
0.16 
SE 
0.41 
0.20 
0.7r 0.25 
-0.14 
0.24 
-0.17 
-0.17 
-0.33 
0.01 
-0.50 
-0.22 
0.19 
0.00 
0.12 
0.26 
0.50 
-0.04 
0.03 
-0.25 
0.25 
018 
028 
0.18 
0.19 
0.22 
0.26 
0.14 
0.16 
0.19 
021 
0.24 
0.33 
0.19 
0.30 
0.39 
-0.66* 0.26 
041 
0.43* 
-0.44* 
0.48* 
0.29 
0.53* 
035 
0.15 
0.23 
0.16 
0.20 
0.22 
O.sr 0.20 
046 
-0.24 
0.76* 
0.05 
-0.06 
0.40 
-0.10 
0.23 
-0.58 
-036 
-1.14 
-021 
0.18 
0.00 
0.41 
0.15 
0.03 
-0.36" 
-0.02 
035 
0.41 
0.22 
0.34 
031 
0.30 
031 
0.30 
031 
0.30 
1.07 
0.14 
0.15 
0.19 
0.26 
0.22 
0.28 
• 014 
0.04 
PE 
-3.73* 
-0.06 
-1.35 
-0.15 
0.29 
0.85 
0.07 
OOl 
-2.14* 
-0.84 
0.15 
-0.34 
0.02 
0.42 
0.34 
-5.98 
015 
-0.80 
0.96 
-0.92 
1.68" 
-0.45 
-0.42 
0.79 
0.06 
-0.86 
0.09 
-1.17 
-0.78 
-0.75 
-1.07 
-0.68 
-0.76 
-0.48 
-0.02 
-0.90 
-0.44 
1.44 
0.03 
-0.46 
0,65 
0,44 
0,16 
-0,57 
0,60 
0,06 
SE 
1.02 
0.53 
1.11 
0.72 
0.44 
0.64 
0.45 
0.43 
1.06 
0.81 
0.35 
0.46 
0.47 
0.49 
0.56 
8.90 
0.49 
1.09 
0.84 
1.08 
0.58 
0.41 
0.55 
0.43 
0.48 
0.67 
0.47 
1.19 
1.08 
0.62 
1.09 
0.76 
0.79 
0.76 
0.70 
0.78 
0.73 
1.03 
0.35 
0.44 
0.49 
0.68 
0.59 
0.78 
0.35 
Oi l 
PE 
-1.34* 
-0,05 
-0,54 
0,27 
-0,16 
O30 
-0.39 
019 
-1,50* 
-0.79 
-033 
-0.07 
-0.13 
-0.52 
-0,36 
0.13 
1.10* 
0.64 
0.30 
0.59 
0.73 
018 
0.37 
-0.27 
-0.18 
052 
-0.31 
-1 21 
0.00 
-0,20 
0,28 
0,50 
-0,18 
-0,45 
-0.03 
-0.51 
-0.92 
1.08 
-o.7r 
028 
-0.91' 
-0.63 
-0.55 
-1,09" 
018 
0,02 
SE 
0,61 
033 
0,59 
041 
032 
043 
0.32 
0.28 
O50 
0.47 
0.24 
0.27 
0,32 
0.39 
0.42 
0.58 
0.27 
0.51 
0.67 
0.39 
0.58 
0.26 
0.34 
0,27 
033 
0,32 
0.37 
1,02 
0,67 
039 
0.54 
0.44 
0.47 
0.52 
046 
0.49 
0.50 
0.76 
0.24 
0.24 
0.43 
041 
0.33 
• 0.45 
0,23 
0,07 
PE SE 
037 0,34 
-0,3r 018 
-0,73* 026 
-0,5r 0.22 
-0,3r 015 
-0,41 0,22 
-0.16 016 
022 016 
-0.25 019 
0.18 021 
0.3r 012 
-0,32* 014 
013 016 
-0,23 019 
015 021 
-0,13 030 
-O.sr 017 
-1,00* 0.29 
-0.72 037 
-l.or 0.23 
-0.71* 033 
-038* 013 
021 018 
-0.16 014 
-0.04 017 
-0.07 019 
-035 019 
-0,27 032 
0.34 033 
-0,51" 020 
-0.10 028 
-0.24 0,26 
-0,27 0,27 
-0,10 027 
-0,45 0,26 
0,13 0,26 
O09 025 
-0,36 0.57 
0.40" 012 
-0.22 0.13 
-0,6r 018 
-0,03 023 
0.07 0.20 
0,29 0,24 
030" 012 
0,02 0,04 
196.21 
TABLE A5.7(iii): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOQAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1987 AES, N=1677) 
VARIABLE Read & see 
what they 
Uke 
Some 
(Censorship 
Royalty 
Importance 
(OLS) 
Uranium -
Mhie& SeU 
Uranium -
Mine but 
Safeguards 
Uranium -
.Mine, only 
use in Aust. 
Uranium 
Keep in 
Ground 
481(29%) 962(58%) 223(13%) 921(55%) 159(10%) 309(18%) 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Qassified 
ReUgion - (CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (3) 63-70 (Ref:71-98) 
Age (4) 54-62 
Age (5) 46-53 
Age (6) 38-45 
Age (7) 30-37 
Age (8) 18-29 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Govemment 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force + other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
=req(%) 
275(16) 
125(7) 
158(9) 
340(20) 
179(11) 
493(29) 
322(19) 
312(19) 
170(10) 
579(35) 
434(26) 
276(16) 
189(11) 
136(8) 
58(3) 
206(12) 
84(5) 
46(8) 
140(8) 
50(3) 
682(41) 
295(18) 
1117(67) 
232(14) 
184(11) 
201(12) 
55(3) 
54(3) 
219(13) 
80(5) 
181(11) 
198(12) 
208(12) 
279(17) 
296(18) 
383(23) 
18(1) 
863(51) 
494(29) 
256(15) 
413(25) 
728(43) 
371(22) 
720(43) 
-
PE SE 
-1.03' 0.40 
0.14 0.19 
0.24 0.27 
0.24 0.23 
0.02 0.17 
0.59' 0.25 
-0.16 0.18 
0.26 0.17 
-0.02 0.19 
-0.08 0.24 
-0.15 0.13 
-0.15 015 
-0.20 0.18 
-0.36 O20 
-0.42 0.23 
-0.42 0.34 
0.34 0.18 
0.71' 0.28 
0.53 0.37 
-0.05 0.23 
0.48 0.33 
-032' 0.15 
-0.04 019 
-0.06 0.15 
-0.24 0.18 
-0.24 0.20 
-0.37 0.20 
0.05 0.32 
-121' 0.44 
-1.04' 0.24 
-1.66' 0.43 
0.35 033 
0.9r 0.33 
l . i r 0.33 
0.89" 0.33 
1,00" 033 
1.6r 0.32 
0.52 0.67 
-0.93' 0.13 
-0.14 0.14 
-0.10 019 
-0.10 0.24 
0.04 0.21 
0.03 0.27 
0.05 013 
0.01 0.04 
PE 
0.58 
0.12 
-0.02 
-0.11 
0.12 
-0.05 
0.12 
-0.11 
-0.13 
0.06 
0.06 
0,07 
013 
0.17 
SE 
036 
0.17 
0.24 
021 
0.15 
0.22 
0.16 
016 
0.18 
021 
0.12 
0.14 
016 
0.18 
0.4r 0.21 
038 
-0.23 
-0.73" 
-0.91' 
-0.23 
031 
0.17 
0.26 
0.34 
0.20 
-0.6r 0.31 
015 
-0.15 
-0.05 
0.03 
0.29 
0.29 
-0.09 
0.36 
0.13 
018 
0.14 
0.16 
019 
0.18 
0.30 
0.32 
0.7r 0.20 
1.66' 
-0.20 
-0.73' 
-1.13' 
-0.82' 
-0.90' 
-1.68' 
-1.08 
0.71' 
0.18 
0.13 
0.02 
-0.10 
-0.08 
0.04 
0.03 
0.35 
0.29 
0.28 
0.29 
028 
0.28 
0.28 
0.56 
0.12 
0.13 
0.17 
0.22 
0.19 
0.24 
0.12 
0.04 
PE SE 
1.91' 0.12 
0.07 0.06 
-0.07 0.08 
-0.04 0.07 
0.02 0.05 
0.18' 0.08 
-0.24' 0.05 
-0.07 0.05 
-0.38' 0.06 
-0.18" 0.07 
0.06 0.04 
0.02 0.05 
0.00 0.05 
0.03 0.06 
-0.11 0.07 
0.01 0.10 
O i r 0.06 
-0.34' 0.09 
-0.23' 0.11 
0.11 0.07 
-0.14 0.11 
0.01 0.04 
-0.03 0.06 
0.01 0.05 
0.06 0.06 
0.10 0.06 
0.14 0.06 
021" OlO 
0.07 0.11 
021 ' 0.06 
0.26' 0.09 
-0.02 0.09 
-0.08 0.09 
-0.23' 0.09 
-0.21' 0.09 
-0.3r 0.09 
-0.3r 0.09 
-0.12 0.19 
0.03 0.04 
-0.06 0.05 
-0.12' 0.06 
-0.02 0.08 
OlO 0.07 
-0.02 0.08 
-0.03 0.04 
0.04 0.01 
PE 
-0.76 
-0.22 
-0.02 
-038 
-0.53' 
-0.16 
0.06 
-0.25 
-0.24 
-0.23 
-0.07 
0.01 
-0.07 
0.17 
015 
-0.56 
0.14 
0.42 
038 
-0.12 
-0.10 
-0.14 
-0.06 
0.04 
-0.02 
0.25 
-0.19 
-0.07 
-0.42 
-0.35 
-0.09 
0.27 
-0.10 
-0.26 
-0.05 
-0.22 
-0.13 
-0.22 
SE 
0.46 
0.23 
0.33 
0.32 
0.23 
031 
0.22 
0.22 
0.27 
031 
0.17 
0.20 
023 
0.25 
028 
0.50 
0.23 
0.33 
0.42 
031 
0.46 
0.19 
0.25 
0.19 
0.23 
0.25 
0.26 
0.44 
0.51 
0.28 
0.41 
0.35 
0.36 
0.38 
0.36 
0.37 
0.35 
0.84 
-0.5r 0.17 
-0.22 
-0.20 
-0.34 
-0.24 
-0.39 
-0.17 
0.07 
0.18 
0.25 
0.30 
0.25 
0.32 
0.16 
0.05 
PE 
0.26 
017 
0.14 
-0,09 
0,16 
-0,10 
0,09 
0,20 
-0,20 
0,15 
0,05 
-0,01 
-0.10 
0.22 
0.07 
-0.03 
0.00 
-0.90' 
-0.43 
0.01 
0.05 
021 
-o.4r 
-0.04 
018 
-0.35 
030 
-0.23 
-0.20 
016 
o,6r 
-0,18 
021 
0.10 
-0.08 
-0.30 
SE 
0,33 
017 
0,23 
0,20 
0,15 
021 
0,15 
015 
0,18 
0,20 
Oi l 
013 
0.16 
0.18 
0.20 
0.29 
0.16 
0.26 
0.33 
0.20 
0.30 
0.13 
0.17 
0.13 
0.16 
0.18 
0.18 
030 
0.31 
0.18 
0.28 
0.26 
0.26 
0.26 
0.25 
0.25 
-0.6r 0.25 
0.03 
-0.13 
0.17 
0.05 
-0,05 
0,08 
0.15 
-0.03 
O02 
0.54 
0.11 
0.13 
0.16 
0.22 
0.19 
0.23 
0.11 
0.03 
PE SE 
-2.2r 0.55 
0.11 
-0.37 
-0.13 
-0.17 
0.13 
-0.49 
0,04 
0.09 
-0.94" 
0.06 
-0.17 
0,22 
-0.18 
0.37 
0.26 
-0.38 
0.80' 
-0.49 
0.34 
-1.62 
0.28 
0.46 
036 
0.25 
0.33 
0.26 
0.24 
O30 
0.42 
019 
0.23 
0.25 
0.33 
0.32 
0.45 
O30 
037 
0.76 
0.32 
1.01 
-0.4r 0.23 
0.49 
-0.02 
0,23 
0,81" 
-0.01 
0.24 
053 
0.52 
-0.82 
-0.25 
-0.64 
-0.25 
-0.28 
-0.25 
-0.03 
0.03 
033 
-0.16 
-0.13 
0.24 
0.07 
-0.23 
0.18 
-0,06 
0.26 
0.22 
0.27 
0.28 
031 
0.51 
0.50 
031 
0.75 
0.41 
0.43 
041 
0.40 
0.41 
0.39 
0.85 
0.19 
0.22 
0.29 
038 
0.34 
0.41 
0.19 
0.06 
PE SE 
-2,8r 0,47 
-0,21 0,24 
014 0.29 
0,47 024 
0,11 019 
0,25 0,27 
-0,04 020 
-015 021 
0,4r 0,22 
0,12 0,26 
-0,06 0,15 
0,15 0,17 
0,16 0,20 
-0,45 0,26 
-0,38 028 
021 036 
0,09 021 
023 032 
0,46 039 
-0,13 0,25 
013 0,37 
-0.01 017 
039 021 
-0.05 017 
-0,35 0.22 
-0.26 024 
-0.30 023 
OlO 036 
0.51 036 
-0.20 0.24 
-0.55 037 
0.25 038 
0.28 038 
0.37 038 
0.67 0.37 
0.98" 036 
1.14" 035 
0.31 073 
0.48" 0.15 
0.17 0.17 
0.30 0,20 
027 030 
OlO 0,27 
0,35 032 
0,14 0,14 
-0.02 0.04 
196.22 
TABLE A5,7(iv): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1987 AES, N=1677) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Qassified 
ReUgion - (CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (3) 63-70 (Ref:71-98) 
Age (4) 54-62 
Age (5) 46-53 
Age (6) 38-45 
Age (7) 30-37 
Age (8) 18-29 
Age - not known 
Gender - Female 
Education - Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Govemment 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force + other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
275(16) 
125(7) 
158(9) 
340(20) 
179(11) 
493(29) 
322(19) 
312(19) 
170(10) 
579(35) 
434(26) 
276(16) 
189(11) 
136(8) 
58(3) 
206(12) 
84(5) 
46(8) 
140(8) 
50(3) 
682(41) 
295(18) 
1117(67) 
232(14) 
184(11) 
201(12) 
55(3) 
54(3) 
219(13) 
80(5) 
181(11) 
198(12) 
208(12) 
279(17) 
296(18) 
383(23) 
18(1) 
863(51) 
494(29) 
256(15) 
413(25) 
728(43) 
371(22) 
720(43) 
-
Marijuana-
Ban should 
S ^ 
1129(68%) 
PE 
1.68' 
0.23 
-0.13 
-0.08 
-0.14 
-0.12 
-0.15 
-0.03 
-0.66' 
-0.24 
-0.08 
-0.04 
-0.20 
0.23 
0.15 
031 
-021 
-0.12 
-0.04 
0.23 
-0.03 
0.09 
-0.03 
-0.10 
0.05 
-0.17 
0.22 
0.09 
0.45 
SE 
0.40 
0.19 
0.25 
0.22 
0.16 
0.24 
0.17 
017 
019 
0.22 
0.12 
015 
0.17 
0.20 
0.22 
032 
0.18 
028 
0.35 
0.21 
033 
0.14 
0.19 
0.14 
0.17 
0.19 
0.19 
0.32 
0.35 
0.7r 0.22 
121' 
-0.32 
-0.83' 
-0.72' 
-0.62 
-1.49' 
-1.62' 
-0.75 
0.13 
-0.16 
OlO 
0.11 
0.05 
0.15 
0.10 
0.00 
036 
0.34 
0.33 
0.33 
0.32 
0.32 
031 
0.61 
0.12 
0.14 
0.18 
0.23 
0.20 
0.26 
0.12 
0.04 
Marijuana-
Legalise 
988(20%) 
PE SE 
-1.92' 0.49 
-0.07 0.22 
0.27 0.29 
0.05 0.26 
-0.06 0.18 
0.02 0.30 
0.04 0.20 
-0.09 0.20 
0.53' 0.20 
013 0.26 
-0.13 0.15 
0.06 0.17 
021 0.19 
-0.28 0.24 
0.03 0.25 
-0.71 0.43 
019 021 
0.07 0.33 
0.22 0.40 
-0.27 0.25 
0.05 0.39 
-0.23 0.16 
0.07 0.22 
0.14 0.16 
-0.27 0.20 
-0.01 0.22 
-0.50' 0.23 
-0.30 038 
-0.98 0.50 
-0.59' 0.25 
-2.43' 0.69 
0.31 0.45 
0.94' 0.43 
0.72 0.44 
0.63 0.43 
1.28' 0.42 
1.59' 041 
0.34 0.86 
-0.07 0.14 
0.09 0.16 
-0.17 021 
-0.10 0.26 
-0.30 0.23 
-0.52 0.31 
-0.07 0.14 
0.02 0.04 
Special 
benefits for 
aborigines 
Yes/ 
it depends 
437(26%) 
PE 
-1.51' 
SE 
0.38 
0 4 r 0.19 
0.53' 
0.63' 
0.25 
0.29 
OlO 
-0.02 
0.25 
0.22 
0.18 
0.25 
0.18 
0.18 
0.76' 0.20 
031 
-0.72' 
0.26 
0.19 
-0.11 
-035 
0.41 
-0.08 
0.08 
-0.80 
-0.06 
-0.17 
0.23 
0.14 
0.15 
0.18 
0.21 
0.25 
0.34 
0.19 
028 
044 
021 
0.34 
0.3r 0.15 
0.15 
-0.15 
0.06 
-0.05 
-0.10 
0.09 
0.25 
0.08 
-0.33 
0.23 
-0.15 
-0.22 
0.16 
-0.13 
0.06 
-0.67 
0.11 
0.09 
0.20 
0.15 
0.19 
021 
021 
0.34 
0.34 
021 
031 
0.29 
0.30 
0.30 
0.29 
0.29 
0.29 
0.70 
0.13 
0.15 
0.4r 0.18 
-0.08 
-0.16 
-0.02 
0.03 
-0.09' 
0.25 
021 
0.27 
0.13 
0.04 
Special 
benefits for 
Aborigines 
No,as others/ 
get too much 
1232(74%) 
PE SE 
1.51' 038 
-0.48' 0.19 
-O.sr 0.25 
-0.6r 0.22 
-0.24 0.17 
-0.28 0.25 
-0.09 0.18 
0.05 0.18 
-0.76' 0.20 
-0.27 0.23 
0.70' 0.14 
-0.28 0.15 
-0.17 0.18 
014 021 
0.37 0.25 
-0.37 0.33 
0.11 0.19 
-0.03 0.28 
0.85 0.43 
0.04 0.21 
0.20 0.34 
-038' 0.15 
-0.10 0.20 
0.14 0.15 
-0.07 0.18 
0.03 0.21 
0.07 0.21 
-0.27 0.33 
-0.25 0.34 
-0.12 021 
034 031 
-0.30 0.29 
0.13 0.30 
0.14 O30 
-0.24 0.29 
0.10 0.29 
-0.09 0.28 
0.63 0.69 
-0.09 013 
-0.09 0.15 
-0.41' 0.17 
0.05 0.25 
013 021 
-0.07 0.27 
0.00 0.13 
0.08' 0.04 
196.23 
TABLE ASM)- INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1988 NSSS, N=1532) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Qassified 
ReUgion - (CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Region - not known 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 ($5001-$11000) 
hicome 3 ($11001-517000) 
hicome 4 ($17001-$23000) 
hicome 5 ($23001-529000) 
hicome 6 ($29001-$35000) 
hicome 7 ($35001-$41000) 
hicome 8 (over $41001) 
Income (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
Tr. un. M'ship - unknown 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 72- (Ref:47-54) 
Age (3) 63-71 
Age (4) 55-62 
Age (6) 39-46 
Age (7) 31-38 
Age (8) 18-30 
Gender - Female 
Education - (Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Govemment 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force -t- other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
202(13) 
131(9) 
167(11) 
390(26) 
193(13) 
407(27) 
309(20) 
152(10) 
175(12) 
424(28) 
49(3) 
402(26) 
216(14) 
138(9) 
146(10) 
50(3) 
199(13) 
70(5) 
53(4) 
48(3) 
101(7) 
791(52) 
59(4) 
189(12) 
198(13) 
243(16) 
193(13) 
140(9) 
96(6) 
129(8) 
167(11) 
1113(73) 
22(2) 
220(14) 
192(13) 
257(17) 
65(4) 
119(8) 
164(11) 
26(2) 
91(6) 
140(9) 
159(10) 
284(19) 
294(19) 
380(25) 
761(50) 
360(24) 
389(25) 
422(28) 
651(43) 
326(21) 
667(44) 
-
Ideology-
Left 
24(2%) 
PE SE 
-12.2813.18 
0.11 
2.03 
1.62 
l.sr 
2.17 
-0.93 
-0.01 
l.sr 
121 
-0.07 
-8.04 
-0.29 
-0.09 
-1.88 
-1.26 
-7.04 
-0.73 
1.02 
0.45 
-7.84 
-0.64 
0.01 
-6.98 
-0.35 
-0.76 
-0.56 
-1.55 
-1.08 
-9.05 
-9.13 
-8.26 
-0.10 
-8.29 
-038 
-0.19 
-031 
1.41 
0.77 
-0.54 
-7.37 
088 
-6.54 
1.54 
0.58 
0.52 
-0.08 
0.26 
1.26 
1.05 
7.44 
5.59 
6.16 
-0.36 
-0.58* 
1.51 
1.24 
0.96 
0.88 
1.24 
0.92 
0.85 
0.80 
0.82 
0.62 
19.79 
0.58 
0.73 
1.19 
121 
23.03 
0.75 
1.03 
1.34 
21.52 
121 
053 
18.35 
0.86 
0.85 
0.81 
0.93 
0.95 
15.82 
13.78 
11.92 
0.60 
30.15 
0.79 
1.18 
0.82 
1.06 
0.93 
1.26 
29.60 
1.20 
12.82 
0.97 
0.97 
0.96 
0.96 
0.57 
0.73 
0.70 
13.10 
13.10 
13.11 
0.55 
0.20 
Ideology-
Right 
87(6%) 
PE 
-3.92* 
1.00* 
0.42 
0.30 
0.15 
0.82 
-0.08 
SE 
0.90 
0.40 
0.57 
0.51 
0.38 
0.47 
0.34 
-O.sr 0.37 
0.13 
-0.23 
0.47 
0.44 
0.5r 0.27 
0.54 
0.46 
-0.02 
0.11 
031 
0.71 
-0.78 
-1.24 
0.11 
0.63 
0.28 
0.17 
0.14 
1.06 
138* 
0.62 
0.34 
1.81* 
0.69 
1.72' 
1.51' 
-0.02 
-4.36 
-0.06 
-1.16 
-0.19 
0.24 
0.63 
039 
0.03 
0.96 
-0.16 
0.56 
-0.18 
-0.09 
-0.03 
-0.08 
0.08 
-1.43' 
-0.59 
-0.20 
-0.57 
-0.43 
0.23' 
0.57 
031 
0.41 
0.44 
0.43 
0.68 
0.46 
1.06 
0.68 
0.61 
0.46 
0.28 
0.54 
0.60 
0.61 
0.67 
0.72 
0.65 
0.77 
0.67 
0.62 
0.34 
5.29 
0.42 
0.59 
0.41 
0.63 
0.43 
0.41 
0.85 
0.51 
052 
0.45 
0.45 
0.47 
0.45 
0.27 
031 
0.42 
0.47 
0.39 
0.49 
0.28 
0.09 
Business-
Negative 
369(24%) 
PE SE 
-0.22 0.41 
-0.18 0.23 
-0.02 0.28 
013 0.23 
-0.12 0.18 
-0.09 0.27 
-0.02 0.18 
-0.23 0.18 
0.49' 0.22 
-0.08 0.23 
0.03 0.15 
0.29 0.36 
0.02 0.16 
-0.25 0.20 
-0.40 0.24 
-0.41 0.24 
-0.34 0.37 
0.15 018 
-0.15 0.33 
-0.30 0.37 
-0.60 0.40 
-0.63' 0.29 
-0.07 0.14 
0.15 033 
-0.36 0.25 
-0.29 0.25 
-0.45 0.25 
-021 0.25 
-0.27 0.28 
-0.24 0.31 
-0.69' 0.32 
-O.sr 0.27 
-0.18 016 
-0.11 0.54 
-0.13 0.20 
-0.30 0.23 
-0.29 021 
-0.19 0.34 
-0.27 0.27 
030 0.23 
0.19 049 
0.06 0.32 
031 0.27 
0.11 0.26 
0.05 0.23 
-0.14 0.23 
-0.31 0.23 
-0.03 0.14 
0.20 0.17 
021 0.18 
0.04 0.25 
-021 0.24 
-0.29 0.29 
-0.17 0.14 
-0.11' 0.04 
Business-
Positive 
673(44%) 
PE 
-0.74' 
0.06 
0.28 
-0.23 
0.11 
0.23 
-0.01 
0.19 
-0.42' 
-0.22 
0.06 
-0.12 
0.01 
0.24 
-0.13 
-0.13 
0.09 
-0.39' 
-0.30 
-0.04 
0.05 
0.35 
0.03 
-0.05 
-0.04 
0.08 
0.18 
0.14 
0.02 
-0.00 
0.69' 
0.12 
0.14 
-0.32 
-0.05 
0.10 
0.34' 
0.27 
-0.01 
0.09 
0.29 
0.36 
0.11 
-0.56' 
-0.10 
-0.09 
0.09 
-0.16 
0.05 
0.08 
0.17 
0.28 
0.03 
0.18 
0.07 
SE 
0.37 
0.20 
0.24 
021 
0.15 
0.23 
015 
0.15 
021 
0.20 
0.13 
0.32 
0.14 
0.17 
0.20 
0.20 
031 
0.17 
0.28 
031 
0.32 
0.22 
0.12 
0.30 
0.22 
0.22 
0.22 
0.23 
0.25 
0.28 
0.27 
0.23 
0.14 
0.47 
0.17 
0.18 
0.17 
0.29 
0.23 
021 
043 
028 
0.24 
0.23 
0.20 
0.20 
0.19 
0.12 
0.14 
0.16 
0.22 
021 
0.25 
0.12 
0.04 
Business-
Neutral 
490(32%) 
PE 
-l.or 
0.09 
-0.33 
0.12 
-0.02 
-0.16 
0.03 
-0.03 
-0.02 
031 
-0.11 
-0.11 
-0.03 
-0.05 
SE 
0.39 
021 
0.27 
0.22 
0.16 
0.23 
0.17 
0.16 
0.22 
021 
0.13 
0.33 
0.15 
0.18 
0.4r 0.20 
0.4r 0.20 
0.19 
0.28 
0.46 
031 
0.43 
0.09 
0.03 
-0.06 
038 
0.26 
0.19 
0.06 
0.24 
0.23 
-0.25 
0.37 
0.00 
0.44 
0.16 
0.11 
-0.16 
-0.15 
0.24 
-0.40 
-0.51 
-0.51 
-0.42 
0.33 
0.17 
0.29 
0.32 
0.32 
0.24 
0.13 
0.32 
0.24 
0.23 
0.23 
0.24 
0.27 
0.30 
0.30 
0.24 
0.15 
0.46 
0.18 
0.19 
0.19 
0.32 
0.23 
0.23 
0.48 
0.32 
0.27 
0.4r 0.24 
0.06 
021 
0.15 
0.22 
-0.22 
-0.28 
-0.23 
-0.13 
021 
-0.05 
-0.02 
021 
021 
0.21 
0.13 
015 
017 
0.24 
0.22 
0.26 
0.12 
0.04 
Spend on 
Welfare 
387(25%) 
PE 
-0.90' 
SE 
0.43 
-O.sr 0,25 
0.02 0.28 
0.4r 0.23 
-0.11 
-0.46 
-0.15 
-0.12 
o.5r 
-0.10 
-0,25 
0.19 
0.18 
-0.23 
0.05 
-0.12 
-0.49 
0.20 
-0.05 
-0.13 
-021 
0.24 
017 
0.26 
0.18 
0.18 
0.23 
0.23 
015 
035 
016 
021 
0.23 
0.23 
0.39 
0.19 
0.33 
0.37 
0.37 
0.25 
-0.4r 0.14 
-0.19 
0.04 
-0.30 
-0.68' 
-0.51' 
-0.45 
-0.39 
-0.89' 
-0.61' 
0.08 
0.34 
0.24 
0.24 
0.25 
0.26 
0.29 
0.33 
0.34 
0.26 
016 
l.or 0.48 
0.16 
-0,10 
0.02 
-O.sr 
-0.15 
0.41 
0.23 
0.43 
0.33 
0,29 
-0,24 
-0,05 
0,06 
0,34" 
0.02 
0.20 
0.22 
0.20 
0.42 
0.28 
0.23 
0.48 
0.32 
0.28 
0.26 
0.25 
0.24 
0.23 
0.14 
0.17 
0.4r 0.18 
021 
-0.01 
0.15 
-0.01 
-0.18" 
0.27 
0.26 
0.30 
0.14 
0.04 
Reduce 
Taxes 
1110(73%) 
PE SE 
0,78 0.42 
0,54' 024 
0.08 0.27 
-0,44 023 
0,18 017 
0,44 0.25 
024 018 
0.05 0,18 
-0.58" 0.22 
0.09 023 
029' 0,15 
-0.06 035 
-0,18 015 
0,27 020 
0,02 023 
0,24 0,23 
041 0,37 
-0.24 018 
019 033 
0.26 0.37 
0,06 035 
-0.23 024 
0.49" 0.14 
018 033 
0.00 0.23 
0.34 024 
0.73" 024 
0.58" 025 
0,60" 028 
0,48 032 
0.9r 033 
0,56" 0,25 
-0.10 016 
-1.13" 0.47 
-0.14 020 
-0.04 022 
-0.05 020 
039 036 
0.19 0.27 
-0.50" 023 
-0,34 0,46 
-0.49 031 
-0.37 027 
-0.28 0.26 
0.25 024 
0.06 023 
-0,02 023 
-0,3r 0.14 
-0,04 0.17 
-0.43" 0.18 
-0.31 027 
-0,06 0,25 
-0,23 030 
0,01 0,13 
O i r 0,04 
196.24 
TABLE A5.8(u): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SOCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1988 NSSS, N=1532) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Classified 
ReUgion - (CathoUc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Region - not known 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southern Europe 
Ethnicity - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 ($5001-$11000) 
hicome 3 ($11001-$17000) 
hicome 4 ($17001-$23000) 
hicome 5 ($23001-$29000) 
hicome 6 ($29001-$35000) 
hicome 7 ($35001-$41000) 
hicome 8 (over $41001) 
Income (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
Tr. Un. M'ship - unknown 
ReUgiosity (2) less than 1 x yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a month 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 72- (Ref:47-54) 
Age (3) 63-71 
Age (4) 55-62 
Age (6) 39-46 
Age (7) 31-38 
Age (8) 18-30 
Gender - Female 
Education - Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Govemment 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force +• other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
202(13) 
131(9) 
167(11) 
390(26) 
193(13) 
407(27) 
309(20) 
152(10) 
175(12) 
424(28) 
49(3) 
402(26) 
216(14) 
138(9) 
146(10) 
50(3) 
199(13) 
10(5) 
53(4) 
48(3) 
101(7) 
791(52) 
59(4) 
189(12) 
198(13) 
243(16) 
193(13) 
140(9) 
96(6) 
129(8) 
167(11) 
1113(73) 
22(2) 
220(14) 
192(13) 
257(17) 
65(4) 
119(8) 
164(11) 
26(2) 
91(6) 
140(9) 
159(10) 
284(19) 
294(19) 
380(25) 
761(50) 
360(24) 
389(25) 
422(28) 
651(43) 
326(21) 
667(44) 
-
Favour 
Death 
Penalty 
993(65%) 
PE SE 
1.4r 0.40 
-0.19 021 
-0.49' 0.25 
-0.56' 0.22 
-0.07 0.17 
Oi l 0.25 
0.11 0.17 
-0.04 0.17 
-0.73' 0.22 
-0.29 021 
018 0.14 
0.08 0.35 
-0.16 0.15 
-0.34 0.18 
0.00 0.22 
0.30 0.22 
-0.44 033 
0.04 0.18 
-0.01 0.30 
0.59 0.35 
0.24 0.34 
-0.01 0.24 
-0.10 0.13 
-0.16 032 
0.14 0.24 
0.03 0.23 
0.10 0.23 
0.27 0.25 
014 0.27 
0.54 0.31 
0.00 0.28 
0.28 0.25 
-0.32 0.15 
-0.10 0.52 
-0.40' 0.19 
-0.25 0.20 
-0.19 0.19 
-0.49 0.30 
-0.01 0.25 
-0.9r 0.22 
-0.66 0.45 
-0.07 030 
-0.32 0.25 
0.10 0.24 
0.22 0.22 
0.35 0.22 
0.24 0.21 
-0.25 0.13 
-0.20 0.16 
-0.89' 0.17 
-0.07 0.24 
0.03 0.22 
0.20 0.27 
0.12 0.13 
0.07 0.04 
Not In 
Favour (A 
Death 
Penalty 
336(18%) 
PE SE 
-2.69' 0.47 
0.16 0.25 
0.38 0.28 
0.60' 0.25 
0.10 0.20 
-0.26 0.32 
-0.08 0.20 
0.08 0.20 
O.sr 0.24 
0.32 0.25 
-0.20 0.17 
-0.41 0.47 
032 0.17 
031 021 
0.19 0.25 
-0.33 0.27 
0.61 038 
-0.06 021 
0.06 0.35 
-0.38 0.40 
-0.01 038 
-0.18 0.27 
0.24 0.16 
0.73' 0.36 
0.08 0.28 
0.09 028 
0.02 0.27 
-0.26 0.29 
0.00 0.31 
-0.25 0.35 
0.23 031 
-0.36 031 
0.28 0.18 
0.34 0.61 
0.41 0.22 
0.12 0.25 
0.13 0.23 
0.45 0.34 
-0.11 031 
0.93' 0.24 
0.90 0.49 
0.29 0.34 
0.29 0.29 
0.04 0.28 
-0.29 0.25 
-0.30 0.26 
-0.21 0.25 
0.25 0.15 
039 0.19 
1.08* 0.19 
0.32 0.28 
0.15 0.26 
-0.06 0.32 
-0.22 0.15 
-0.06 0.05 
Pomoj 
-Disag 
jraphy 
ree 
Stricter 
Controls 
255(17%) 
PE 
-231* 
-0.09 
0.50 
-0.16 
0.09 
0.70* 
0.17 
-0.10 
0.40 
0.14 
-0.11 
-0.27 
028 
0.15 
0.07 
0.18 
0.47 
0.41 
0.21 
0.67 
1.28' 
SE 
0.54 
0.30 
031 
0.30 
0.22 
0.34 
0.22 
0.23 
0.25 
0.28 
O.IS 
0.46 
0.19 
0.24 
028 
0.27 
0.42 
0.23 
0.39 
0.40 
0.36 
l .or 0.27 
0.19 
0.47 
0.33 
0.36 
0.10 
0.18 
0.49 
0.65 
0.65 
0.35 
-0.03 
-0.66 
-0.19 
0.18 
0.41 
0.36 
0.35 
0.34 
0.35 
0.37 
0.39 
0.39 
036 
0.18 
0.79 
0.23 
-1.06' 0.30 
-0.17 
-0.00 
-0.91' 
0.23 
0.38 
0.37 
-O.sr 0.33 
-1.09 
-0.76 
-0.96' 
0.20 
0.50 
1.00' 
0.72' 
-1.08' 
-0.29 
-0.09 
0.36 
0.25 
0.11 
-0.29 
0.00 
0.79 
0.50 
0.46 
0.35 
0.29 
0.29 
0.29 
0.17 
0.20 
0.22 
031 
0.29 
0.39 
0.17 
0.05 
Pomography 
-Agree 
Stricter 
Controls 
998(65%) 
PE SE 
1.06' 0.42 
0,28 0,23 
-0.18 0.26 
0.47 0.24 
-0.09 0.17 
-0.34 0.27 
-0.01 017 
0.16 0.17 
-0.34 0.22 
0.25 0.23 
0.23 0.14 
-0.01 0.36 
-0.17 0.15 
0.10 0.19 
0.32 0.23 
-0.03 0.22 
0.15 035 
-0.03 0.19 
-0.48 031 
-0.9r 0.34 
-0.71' 0.34 
-1.00' 0.25 
-0.19 0.14 
-0.15 034 
-0.39 028 
-0.44 0.27 
-0.39 0.26 
-0.42 0.27 
-O.sr 0.29 
-0.90' 0.32 
-0.66' 0.31 
-0.51 0.28 
-0.09 0.15 
0.53 0.56 
0.22 0.19 
0.27 0.20 
0.6r 0.19 
0.08 0.32 
1.08' 0.29 
l .or 0.26 
0.74 0.53 
0.72 0.37 
0.6r 0.31 
0.01 0.27 
-0.44 0.23 
-0.89' 0.23 
-0.93' 0.22 
0.8S' 0.13 
0.04 0.16 
-0.03 018 
-0.20 0.25 
-0.14 0.23 
0.09 0.30 
0.10 0.13 
0.04 0.04 
Royali ty 
Importance 
(OLS) 
PE 
1 
SE 
l . e r 0.12 
0.11 
0.08 
-0.12 
0.03 
0.02 
-0.23' 
-0.02 
-0.34' 
-0.12 
0.03 
-0.11 
-0.03 
0.05 
-0.01 
O02 
-0.05 
0.16' 
-0.44' 
-0.31' 
-o.2r 
-0.03 
0.09 
0.12 
0.07 
0.11 
0.05 
0.00 
-0.02 
0.00 
-0.02 
-0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
-0.03 
0.07 
0.08 
0.07 
0.05 
0.08 
0.05 
0.05 
0.07 
0.07 
0.04 
0.11 
0.05 
0.06 
0.07 
0.07 
0.11 
0.06 
0.10 
0.10 
0.11 
0.08 
0.04 
0.10 
0.08 
0.08 
0.07 
0.07 
0.09 
0.09 
0.09 
0.07 
0.04 
0.16 
0.06 
O.ir 0.06 
0.2r 0.06 
0 3 r 0.10 
019' 
0.20" 
0.08 
0.07 
0.4r 0.15 
021 ' 
0.14 
0.04 
-0.08 
0.10 
0,08 
0.08 
0.07 
-O.ir 0.07 
-0.23' 
0.05 
0.06 
-0.10" 
-0.13 
-0.07 
0.02 
-0.00 
0.07 
0.04 
0.05 
0.05 
0.08 
0.07 
0.09 
0.04 
O.or 0.01 
Uranium 
Mining 
Middle 
Position 
342(22%) 
PE SE 
-1.31' 0.43 
-0,42 024 
-0,13 029 
-0,03 0,25 
-0,36' 018 
016 026 
OlO 0.19 
0.18 0.18 
-0.19 026 
0.29 0.24 
0.06 015 
0.73' 0.34 
-0.22 0.17 
-0.07 0.20 
-0.24 0.25 
0.25 0.22 
0.9r 0.32 
-0.18 0.20 
-0.03 0.33 
-0.01 0.36 
-0.76 0.46 
0.06 0.26 
-0.15 0.15 
-0.33 0.37 
0.38 0.27 
0.47 0,26 
0,20 0,26 
0.5r 0.27 
0.10 031 
0.16 035 
0.33 0.33 
0.09 0.28 
0.23 0.17 
-0.67 0.66 
-0.36 0.21 
0.05 021 
-0.15 0.20 
-0.78 040 
0.00 0.26 
-0.14 0.24 
-0.90 0.58 
-0.06 0.34 
-0.33 0.30 
-0.06 0.27 
0.28 0.23 
-0.00 0.24 
-0.05 023 
0.34' 0.14 
-0.11 0.17 
-0.04 0.19 
-0.37 0.26 
-0.18 0.24 
-0.23 0.29 
-0.04 0.14 
0,02 0.04 
196.25 
TABLE A5.8(iU): INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND SCXCIAL-BACKGROUND FACTORS ON INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY (1988 NSSS. N=1532) 
VARIABLE 
Measure 
Intercept 
Qass - Managers & Farmers 
Qass - Upper Professionals 
Qass - Other Professionals 
Qass - Other Non-Manual 
Qass - Not Classified 
ReUgion - Cathohc 
ReUgion - Uniting 
ReUgion - No ReUgion 
ReUgion - Other 
Region - Rural 
Region - not known 
Sute - Vic 
Sute - Qld 
Sute - SA 
Sute - WA 
Sute - Tas 
Ethnicity - British Isles 
Ethnicity - Southem Europe 
Ethnitaty - Eastem Europe 
Ethnicity - NW Europe 
Ethnicity - Other 
Qass IdenL - Middle 
Qass IdenL - None 
hicome 2 (55001-511000) 
hicome 3 ($11001-$17000) 
hicome 4 (517001-523000) 
hicome 5 ($23001-$29000) 
hicome 6 ($29001-$35000) 
hicome 7 ($35001-$41000) 
hicome 8 (over $41001) 
Incxxne (Not Known) 
Not a Trade-Union Member 
Tr. un. M'ship - unknown 
ReUgiosity (2) less than Ix yr. 
ReUgiosity (3) once a year 
ReUgiosity (4) x a year 
ReUgiosity (5) once a m<xith 
ReUgiosity (6) x a month 
ReUgiosity (7) once a week 
ReUgiosity (8) x a week 
Age (2) 72- (Ref:47-54) 
Age (3) 63-71 
Age (4) 55-62 
Age (6) 39-46 
Age (7) 31-38 
Age (8) 18-30 
Gender - Female 
Education - (Completed Sec. 
Education - Tertiary 
Works for the Government 
Works for private company 
Not in work-force + other 
Qass Backgrd. - Manual 
Partisan Background 
Freq(%) 
202(13) 
131(9) 
167(11) 
390(26) 
193(13) 
407(27) 
309(20) 
152(10) 
175(12) 
424(28) 
49(3) 
402(26) 
216(14) 
138(9) 
146(10) 
50(3) 
199(13) 
70(5) 
53(4) 
48(3) 
101(7) 
791(52) 
59(4) 
189(12) 
198(13) 
243(16) 
193(13) 
140(9) 
96(6) 
129(8) 
167(11) 
1113(73) 
22(2) 
220(14) 
192(13) 
257(17) 
65(4) 
119(8) 
164(11) 
26(2) 
91(6) 
140(9) 
159(10) 
284(19) 
294(19) 
380(25) 
761(50) 
360(24) 
389(25) 
422(28) 
651(43) 
326(21) 
667(44) 
-
Uranium 
Mining-
Against 
518(34%) 
PE SE 
-1.14' 039 
-0.07 021 
-0.19 0.26 
0.27 0.22 
0.03 0.16 
-0.27 0.24 
-0.12 0.17 
0.06 0.16 
0.40 021 
-0.06 0.21 
0.02 013 
0.03 0.34 
0.36' 0.15 
O30 0.18 
0.06 0.22 
0.06 0.21 
0.20 0.33 
0.03 0.18 
0.30 0.29 
-0.09 0.33 
0.79' 0.32 
-021 0.25 
0.01 0.13 
0.54 0.32 
-0.27 0.23 
-0.25 0.23 
-0.20 0.22 
-0.46 0.24 
-0.34 0.26 
-0.14 0.29 
-0.69' 0.30 
-0.26 0.24 
-0.11 0.14 
034 0.48 
-0.07 0.18 
-0.24 0.20 
-0.13 0.19 
0.17 0.30 
0.11 0.24 
0.11 0.22 
038 0.45 
-0.03 0.31 
-0.02 0.27 
-0.09 0.25 
0.13 0.22 
0.58' 0.21 
0.48' 0.21 
0.53' 0.13 
0.17 0.15 
0.19 0.17 
031 0.24 
-0.01 0.22 
-0.04 0.27 
-0.16 0.12 
-0.11' 0.04 
Uranium 
Mining-
SupfKDrt 
672(44%) 
PE SE 
015 0.37 
0.37 0.20 
0.28 0.24 
-0.25 0.22 
0.23 0.15 
0.09 0.23 
0.02 016 
-0.20 016 
-0.28 0.22 
-0.20 0.21 
-0.05 0.13 
-0.69' 0.34 
-0.18 014 
-0.23 0.17 
0.11 0.20 
-0.27 0.20 
-1.16' 0.36 
0.09 0.17 
-0.24 0.29 
Oi l 031 
-0.29 0.33 
0.16 0.23 
0.10 0.13 
-031 031 
-0.03 0.23 
-0.11 0.23 
0.03 0.22 
0.04 0.24 
0.26 0.26 
0.01 0.29 
0.34 0.27 
0.19 0.24 
-0.07 0.14 
0.04 0.47 
0.32 0.18 
0.18 0.19 
0.23 0.18 
0.36 0.29 
-0.10 0.23 
0.01 021 
031 0.43 
0.07 0.29 
0.25 0.24 
0.12 0.23 
-031 O20 
-0.54' 0.20 
-0.39 0.20 
-0.74' 0.12 
-0.08 0.15 
-0.16 0.16 
-0.03 0.22 
0.15 021 
0.23 0.25 
0.18 0.12 
0.09' 0.04 
Marijuana-
Agree 
LegaUse 
313(20%) 
PE SE 
-1.00' 0.47 
-0.43 0.27 
-0.17 0.30 
0.11 0.26 
021 018 
-0.01 0.30 
0.50' 0.19 
-0.03 0.20 
0.9r 0.23 
-0.20 0.28 
0.02 0.16 
0.23 0.42 
-0.23 0.18 
-0.08 0.21 
-0.16 0.26 
-0.27 0.26 
-0.11 038 
-0.02 0.21 
-0.43 039 
0.20 0.37 
-0.07 0.39 
-0.57 031 
0.07 0.16 
0.00 0.39 
-0.19 0.28 
-0.16 0.27 
-0.33 0.27 
-0.60' 0.29 
-031 031 
-0.36 0.35 
0.11 0.32 
-0.38 0.29 
-0.07 0.17 
0.39 0.54 
-021 021 
-0.27 0.23 
-0.49' 0.22 
-0.48 0.38 
-0.72' 0.32 
-0.70' 0.29 
-1.28 0.77 
0.13 0.42 
0.15 035 
0.40 0.32 
0.15 0.29 
0.7r 0.27 
1.04' 0.27 
-0.24 0.15 
-0.01 0.18 
0.22 0.20 
-0.45 0.27 
-0.33 0.25 
-0.42 0.32 
-0.10 0.15 
-0.06 0.05 
Mariju lana-
Disagree 
LegaU se 
1000(65%) 
PE 
0.45 
0.48' 
0.43 
-0,04 
O04 
031 
SE 
0.40 
0.22 
0.26 
0.22 
016 
0.25 
-0,4r 017 
0,05 
-0,72' 
-0,23 
0,08 
0.05 
0.14 
0.03 
0.16 
0.17 
038 
-0.16 
0.27 
0.07 
0.46 
0.06 
0.03 
0.11 
0.43 
0.22 
O30 
0.53 
0.19 
0.12 
0.34 
0.18 
0.05 
-0.64 
0.22 
0.02 
0.41' 
0.41 
0.92' 
0.93' 
017 
021 
0.22 
0.14 
0.36 
0.15 
0.18 
0.22 
021 
0.34 
0.18 
0.30 
0.33 
0.35 
0.24 
0.13 
0.34 
0.25 
0.23 
0.23 
0.25 
0.27 
0.30 
0.29 
0.25 
0.15 
0.47 
0.18 
0.19 
0.18 
031 
0.27 
0.24 
1.4r 0.57 
030 
-0.30 
-0.18 
-0.45 
-0.91" 
-1.04" 
0.24 
-0.18 
-0.42" 
0.23 
0.14 
-0.05 
0.08 
0.02 
0.36 
0.28 
0.27 
0.23 
0.22 
0.22 
0.13 
0.15 
0.17 
0.24 
0.22 
0.28 
0.13 
0.04 
Spend 
on 
more 
Aborigines 
376(25%) 
PE 
-1.72' 
-0.15 
0.07 
058' 
OOO 
0.17 
-0.04 
0.08 
0.66" 
0.41 
-0.45' 
-0.03 
0.25 
-028 
0.17 
-0.22 
1.00" 
014 
0.45 
0.16 
0.27 
0.81" 
SE 
0.44 
0.25 
028 
0.24 
0,18 
0,26 
0,19 
0.19 
0.23 
0.23 
016 
0.34 
0.16 
0.22 
0.24 
0.24 
0.33 
0.19 
031 
0.35 
0.35 
0.24 
-0.2r 0.15 
0.51 
-0.66' 
-0.20 
-0.23 
-035 
-0.20 
-0.27 
-0.11 
-0.15 
0.42' 
0.61 
-021 
-0.42 
-0.1S 
0.27 
0.03 
018 
0.37 
0.39 
0.23 
0.03 
-0.24 
-0.09 
0.19 
0.34" 
0.20 
0,25 
0.29 
-0.05 
0.22 
-0.12 
-O.lO 
0.32 
0.26 
0.25 
0.25 
0.27 
0.29 
033 
031 
0.26 
0.17 
0.52 
021 
0.24 
021 
0.33 
0.26 
0.24 
0.46 
0.32 
0.28 
0.27 
0.24 
0.24 
0.23 
0.14 
0.17 
019 
0.27 
0.26 
O30 
014 
• 0.04 
Do not 
spend more 
on 
Aborigines 
577(38%) 
PE SE 
028 038 
021 0.20 
-0,39 0,25 
-0,60" 0,23 
-0,02 016 
-0,03 0,24 
0,23 016 
-0,16 0.16 
-0.21 022 
-0,48* 0.22 
018 013 
0.29 0,35 
-0.27 0.15 
0.08 017 
0.08 0,20 
0,4r 0,20 
-0,83" 0.36 
-0.09 0,17 
-0.90" 0.33 
-0,05 0,32 
-0,40 0.34 
-1.00' 0.28 
0.28' 013 
013 0,31 
017 0,24 
0.42 0,23 
0,28 0,23 
0,23 0,24 
0.19 027 
019 030 
0,48 0.28 
0.00 0.25 
-0.40" 014 
-0.98 054 
0.10 0.18 
0.24 019 
-0.06 0.18 
-0.33 0.32 
-0.06 0.24 
-0.16 0.22 
-1.42" 0.64 
-0.18 030 
-0,41 0,26 
-0.09 0,24 
-0,09 021 
-0,07 021 
0,05 0,20 
-0.2r 0.13 
O03 0.15 
-0.02 0.17 
-0.58' 0.23 
-0.51" 021 
-0.53" 0,26 
OlO 012 
0,07 0,04 
196,26 
1. There is no data available on the values, beliefs and attitudes of the respondents' parents. Partisan background is included 
as a smrogate measure, for these attitudes and beliefs. 
2. The 1987 NSSS election study was also a panel study, interviewing 1311 respondents who were interviewed m 1984. 
However, the second wave did not coUect data on the indicators of ideology. Another panel study is presently being 
conducted which includes similar measures at two time points, by the principle investigators of the National Social Science 
Study. 
3. The sample sizes of these two studies (the 1986 and 1988 NSSS) made it not possible, to use the oldest age cohorts as the 
reference categories. 
4. The reference group has no identification with a major party. 
5. The exception to these guidelines is the variable age. The oldest age group was generally specified as the reference group. 
6. Mathematically the Cramer's V (V) statistic is expressed as: 
N [Min (r-1, c-1)] 
where X^ is the value of chi-square statistip 
N is the total number of cases in the sample 
Min (r-1. c-1) refers to the number of rows (r) or columns (c), whichever is smaller, minus one. 
From Blalock (1979:305) 
7. The value of the likelihood function for the null model (L )^ can be evaluated by the following formula (Aldrich & Nelson, 
1984:56): 
Log(L )^ = NttLog(N^) + N,Log(N,/N) 
where N is the sample size 
No is the number of observations Y=0 
N, is the number of observations Y=l 
log is to the base e. 
The likelihood ratio statistic (c) is calculated is simply the ratio or difference between the scaled deviances for the null and 
full models (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984:55): 
c=-21og(LVL,)= [-21og(L„)]-[21og(L,)] = -2[log(I^-log(L,)] 
The value of the likelihood fimction for the full model (L,) is a fimction of the differences between the observed values of 
the dependent variable and the predicted values, predicted by the parameters estimated in the model. 
8. More simply the null model has no predictor variables. 
9. This procedure was stricdy adhered to, although it may not always be the most appropriate approach (Achen, 19~'2: 46-
51). However, the sheer number of coefficients estimated necessitates a strict approach. 
10. These analyses were carried out, but the results are too extensive to present here. As noted in the text, other measures of 
association also show low correlations between mdicators. 
11. The Liberal party was led by Mr Holt in 1967 and Mr Gorton in 1969, so the stability of evaluations of the Prime 
Minister could not be investigated. 
12. In this analysis the Cramer's V statistic is an imderestimate of the stabUity of party identification since the same weight 
is given to any one unit change on the party identification scale. A more appropriate measure would be Pearson's r, as it is 
based aroimd the mean giving more weight to greater deviations. The value of Pearson r for the 7 point measure of party 
identification, over these two time points is 0.78. 
13. In the 1987 AES ideological alignment was measured by a ten point scale, whereas in the other studies it was measured 
by a question on ideological self-placement on the left, right or centre. For details on the construction of this measure, see 
appendix 1. 
14. A question on Royalty was not asked in the 1969 ANPA study. 
15. The exception to this generalisation is the 1984 NSSS data where a supplementry sample collected data on attitudes of 
parents and their children. 
16. Rural residents did not figure in the analyses of the two other indicators of post-materialism - attitudes to uranium mining 
and the legaUsation of marijuana. 
17. The sample sizes for the 'no religion', tertiary educated and rural residents were too small to perform confirmatory 
analyses on their consistency regarding these attitudes. 
18. Explanations to Tables 
(i) Tables A5.1(i) to A5.1(iii) 
Variable : Dichotomous measures constructed from the categories of the indicators of ideology (scored 1 for category, 0 other 
response). The names of the categories are presented at the top of the columns. When the variables analysed are quite 
different the names of these categories are noted in the column and refer to all lower entries until a new name appears in the 
column. Details of the construction of these measures can be found in appendix 1. 
NuU Model : Value of Scaled deviance for dichotomous measure analysed. Formula presented in an earUer endnote. 
With Model : Value of Scaled deviance after the social structiu'al model has been fitted. 
Change (d of f) : Scaled deviance of nuU model minus scaled deviance of fitted model referred to in the line above. (Degree 
of freedom for null model minus degrees of freedom for fitted model) 
Percent : The change in scaled deviance expressed as a percentage of the scaled deviance of the null model. This percentage 
gives an estimate as to the degree of fit of the model. 
With Model + Partis. : Values of scaled deviance when model includes the two partisanship measures, party identification 
(entered as a 7 category continuous variable) and the measure of relative attitude to the parties (entered as a continuous 
variable). Partisan background not included in these models. 
(ii) Tables A5.2(i) to A5.8(m) 
Table A5.2(i) to A5.2(iii) - the 1967 ANPA sample 
Table A5.3(i) to A5.3(iii) - die 1969 ANPA sample 
Table A5.4(i) to A5.4(iv) - the 1979 ANPA sample 
Table A5.5(i) to A5.5(iu) - the 1984 NSSS sample 
Table A5.6(i) to A5.6(iu) - the 1986 NSSS sample 
Table A5.7(i) to A5.7(iv) - the 1987 AES sample 
Table A5.8(i) to A5.8(iii) - the 1988 NSSS sample 
Variable : For the categorical measures, the value label at the top of each pair columns is presented. The number of cases m 
this category and this nimiber expressed as a {jercentage of the cases in the sample is noted below the headings. For the 
continuous measures, the importance of royalty and attitude to migrants, the variable label is presented. 
Measure : The predictor variables. Details on the construction of these variables can be foimd in appendix 1. The reference 
categories are mcluded in these tables. They are manual workers, AngUcans, non-rural residents, 'Australians' (that is the 
Australian bom with parents also bom in Australia), identification with the working class, the lowest income group, trade 
union members, those who never went to church, the oldest age group except in the 1986 and 1988 samples where the 
reference group were bom between 1934 and 1941, males, not completed secondary school, self-employed, and a non-manual 
class backgroimd. 
Freq(%) : Number of cases in each category of the nominal predictor variables. This number is expressed as a piercentage. 
PE : Parameter estimate (logh) 
SE : Standard error of parameter estimate 
Abbreviations: 
Vic : Victoria 
Qld : (Queensland 
SA : South Australia 
WA : Westem Australia 
Tas : Tasmania 
NW : North and Westem 
IdenL : Identification 
Ix : one time 
x : a couple of times 
Tr. un. M'ship : Trade union membership 
yr. : year 
Completed Sec. : Completed secondary school 
Backgrd. : Backgroimd 
CHAPTER 6 
ELECTTORAL CHOICE 
This chapter investigates the effects of partisanship, ideology, issues and candidates on electoral 
choice. As in the previous two chapters, the analyses presented in this chapter are based on, part of 
the model of electoral choice presented in chapter 3 (figure 6.1). 
Partisan 
Background 
Social 
Factors 
Candidates 
Partisanship 
Ideology, 
Vote 
Issues 
Figure 6.1: The part of the model investigated in this chapter. 
The model distinguishes between the factors that have effects on vote, the long term electoral 
forces, partisanship and ideology and the short term forces, issues and candidates. Partisanship is 
understood as the most important factor, since voters generally vote in accordance with their 
partisanship. However, it is possible that issues and the evaluations of candidates, motivates some 
electors to vote contrary to their partisanship. Furthermore, those voters lacking a partisanship are 
likely to be influenced by these short-term forces. In the case of ideology, the model hypotheses that 
for some voters, ideology rather than partisanship is the basis for their vote. 
The general concept 'partisanship' includes the specific concepts, party identification and attitude 
to the parties. 'Ideology' encompasses the generally non-partisan attitudes to a range of economic and 
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social matters. 'Issues' include the issues on the political agenda at a particular point in time. The 
general concept 'candidates', is restricted to the evaluations of the leaders of the two major parties. 
In relation to ideology, two general conclusions were drawn from the analyses of the previous 
chapter. First, the hypothesis that ideology could be understood as distinct dimensions was not 
supported. Second, the relationships between social structural factors and the indicators of ideology 
were generally weak. Therefore, it is debateable whether ideology should be included in these 
investigations. The indicators of ideology are included in these investigations, since the findings of 
the previous chapter, do not exclude the possibility that ideology is relevant to electoral choice. 
Furthermore, the 'no religion' and the tertiary educated groups often (and consistendy) took distinctive 
positions on the indicators of ideology (chapter 5), but were less distinctive in terms of party 
identification (chapter 4). Therefore, ideology may be relevant in the process of electoral choice for at 
least these groups. Hence, the indicators of ideology are included in these investigations. 
The investigations presented in this chapter are limited to the direct impacts of partisanship, 
ideology, issues and candidates on vote. The indirect and non-recursive effects are not investigated 
here. These investigations are limited to direct effects for the following reasons. First, specification 
of non-recursive effects between each short-term factor with partisanship, is likely to cause almost 
insurmountable statistical problems'. Second, many of the specific short term factors are likely to 
have no impact on vote, so should not be included in a non-recursive model^ . Third, the 
investigations presented in this chapter are in a sense exploratory, since factors relevant to electoral 
choice can be identified and then included in a confirmatory model of electoral choice investigated in 
the following chapter. 
The investigations of this part of the model will allow conclusions to be drawn about the 
following aspects of electoral behaviour in Australia. First, to assess the impact of partisanship on 
vote, in a model including a variety of other political factors. Furthermore, changes in the relationship 
between partisanship and vote, can be observed. Changes in this relationship, allows conclusions to be 
drawn as to whether Australians have become, more or less likely to deviate from their partisanship. 
Second, these investigations will indicate if, ideology has a consistent role to play in the process of 
electoral choice and if this role has changed over time. Furthermore, if 'ideology' is found to have 
little or no role in the process of electoral choice, then it should not be included in the confirmatory 
model of electoral choice. In addition, these investigations will show if indicators relating to 'post-
materialism' have any influence on vote. Third, the issues that did and did not have an impact on 
electoral choice, at particular time points, can be identified. When a particular issue is found to have a 
significant effect on vote, it can be concluded that this issue either motivated partisans to vote contrary 
to their partisanship, and/or was important to non-partisans. These analyses will also show what are 
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the effects (if any) of personal or sociotropic, retrospective and prospective economic evaluations on 
vote. Fourth, the impact of the party leaders on electoral choice can be assessed and compared over 
time. This part of the investigation tests the political folklore, that particular leaders were instrumental 
to a party's political fortunes. Furthermore, these analysis may inform on questions, such as, is 
Australian politics becoming more 'presidential'? Have leaders become less important influences on 
electoral choice. 
This chapter also presents the results obtained from investigation of the validity of the model of 
electoral choice. The purpose of these investigations is to test some of the propositions implied by the 
model. These propositions are, first, social factors have no direct effects on vote, second, the model 
applies across the electorate in general and fmally, the effects of party identification on vote, are not 
seriously undermined by the exclusion of partisan leaners from the measure. 
The first test concems the proposition that social structural factors, do not have direct impacts on 
vote. The model specifies that the effects of social structural factors on vote, are mediated by long-
term electoral forces. This aspect of the model was discussed in chapter 3. Briefly, explanations of 
the relationships between social structural factors and vote, such as party loyalties, self-interest and 
ideological appeals, imply that partisanship and ideology mediate these relationships. If individual 
social structural factors are found, frequendy and consistendy, to have effects on vote choice, net of 
partisanship and ideology, then die model is in need of revisioa 
The second test examines die proposidon that the model of electoral choice applies generally 
across different social groups. The purpose of the test is not to idendfy those electoral factors (mosdy 
issues) that are particularly relevant to certain groups, but to investigate whether the process of 
electoral choice differs substantially between social groups. If sustained differences are found between 
social groups, then the general model is also, in need of revisioa 
A third test of model focuses on the measure of party identification. In the three ANPA studies, 
a third question on partisan leanings was asked of respondents, who did not initially admit to a party 
identification. In die NSSS and AES studies, diis third question was not asked. It is possible diat the 
omission of information gained from this question underestimates, die relation between party 
identification and vote. Therefore, it could be argued that, since the measure of party identification is 
incomplete, short-term factors that were foimd to have significant associations with vote, only do so, 
because the party identifications of leaners were not included in the analyses. In the investigations 
with the revised measure, it is expected that die effect of party identification on vote, will be only 
slighdy greater. However, if substantially different results are found between the two groups of 
analyses, then questions are raised as to the suitability of the measures of party identification. 
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6.1 MODEL SPECmCATION, DATA, MEASURES, ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE 
The data employed in these studies are the seven data sets used, in the investigations reported in 
earlier chapters. The studies from which the data were obtained are presented in appendix 1. 
The specific measures included in the model are: party identification, relative aditude to the 
parties, the indicators of ideology, measures of issues at the time die data^ was collected and the 
relative evaluations of the leaders. Rationales for die measures of the issues included in each analysis 
are discussed in appendix 1. Additional analyses were undertaken, in which separate measures for the 
leaders were included in the models, so that the effects of the two leaders on vote can be compared. 
Details on the measures employed are presented in appendix 1. 
The response variable, vote was measured with two categories, Labor vote (scored 1) and non-
Labor vote (scored zero). These measures were constructed from questions on intended vote at a 
federal election in die 1967, 1979, 1984, 1986 and 1988 studies and from questions on vote at die 
immediate past federal election, for the 1969 and 1987 stiidies'^ . This measure of Labor vote versus 
non-Labor vote was employed, since it maximises die number of useable cases to be analysed. It is 
the results from the analyses of this measure, that this chapter focuses on. As a check on the results 
obtained from this measure, other measures of vote were also analysed, major party vote (Labor versus 
die coalition)^ and in the case of die three ANPA studies, two-party preferred vote*. These 
additional analyses are helpful in die interpretation of the results of die analyses of Labor vote. The 
results from die analyses of these additional measures of vote, are presented in tables diat constitute 
die appendix to diis chapter. 
In diese analyses party identification was included as a categorical, radier dian ordinal variable. 
There are two reasons for adopting diis procedure. First, including die seven-level measure as a 
continuous measure forces its effect to be symmetrical. That is, die estimate for very strong Labor 
identifiers will be of die same magnitude but in die opposite direction, to die effect for very strong 
coalition identifiers. It is more likely diat partisan forces differ between Labor and coalition 
identifiers. Second, an ordinal measure assumes that the effects of party identification on vote are 
incremental. For example, the estimate of die effect for very strong identifiers must be greater dian 
die effect for fairly strong identifiers, which in turn must be greater dian die effect for not very strong 
identifiers. This assumption of die electoral behaviour of different groups of identifiers may not 
always be valid. 
Categorical measures were employed for most of die odier predictor (independent) variables. 
Many of die independent variables are at best crude ordinal measures widi two distinctive categories, 
plus a residual "don't know" category. One assumption of regression analysis is diaL given a 
continuous dependent variable, die relationship between an independent variable and dependent 
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variable is linear (Lewis-Beck, 1980:26)\ This means diat the independent variables should be 
interval (or cardinal) rather than ordinal. In the case of an ordinal variable with a large nimiber of 
categories, an ordinal variable can be assumed to have interval properties (Kim, 1975; Labovitz, 1970 
& 1972). However, a three-level ordinal variable, widi a middle category of "don't know" responses, 
does not constitute an essentially interval variable. Therefore, most independent variables were 
included in these analyses as dummy variables*. 
A minority of independent variables was included in these analyses as continuous measures. The 
measures of attitude to the parties and the evaluations of the leaders were included in each analysis as 
continuous variables, since they have a large number of levels, near-normal distributions and are 
conceptually ordinal'. A small number of other measures, were also included as continuous variables. 
These are measures of the issue of taxation from the 1986 and 1988 NSSS, attitudes towards migrants 
in the 1986 NSSS and the measures of the importance of the issues of inflation, interest rates, taxation 
and die environment in the 1987 AES. These measures were considered to be 'reasonable' ordinal 
measures, as they also have a large number of levels, near-normal distributions and are conceptually 
ordinal. 
The major source of missing data in the analysis of Labor vote, are respondents who did or did 
not intend to vote for one of die political parties. Missing values were treated list-wise, since pair-
wise deletion of missing values is not possible with the statistical technique employed - Uiat is logistic 
regression. The amount of missing data in die analysis of major party vote was obviously higher, 
since minor party voters were excluded from the analyses. Similarly, a proportion of minor party 
voters was excluded fix)m the analyses of two-party preferred vote. In the ANPA data sets, an 
additional source of missing data was from respondents coded as 'not applicable' to any of the 
questions fix3m which measures were developed. 
Respondents who were coded as "don't know" (or no response in the 1987 AES), were included 
in these analyses. There are several reasons why this procedure was adopted. List-wise deletion of 
these responses would gready reduce die sample size, which might make statistical inferences more 
difficult Furthermore, to many of die questions, a "don't know" response is a legitimate response to 
those matters on which respondents have no opinion'". 
The statistical technique employed in these analyses is logistic regression. The use of this 
technique contrasts with diat employed in most multivariate analyses of electoral behaviour in 
Australia, in which OLS regression has been used (Bean & Kelley, 1988; Graetz & McAllister, 1988; 
KeUey & McAllister, 1984; McAllister, 1988a). The rationale for using logistic regression, radier dian 
OLS regression, is diat it is statistically die more appropriate procedure, and second, diat die logistic 
functional fonn makes more substantive sense. 
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The statistical reasons for using logistic regressions have been discussed in die previous chapter. 
Substantively, die logistic functional form specifies diat die relationship between an independent 
variable and die dependent variable is not linear, but is of die forni of a sigmoid curve. This means 
diat, among die values of a given continuous variable at eidier end of its distiibution, a one-unit 
change is hypotiiesised not to alter die probability of voting for a particular party, as much as a one-
unit change in tiie middle part of die distribution does. One example witii respect to this model is die 
measure of relative attiUide to tiie leaders, where a one unit change at eitiier extreme is not expected to 
change die likelihood of voting for a party as much as an identical change in die middle part of die 
distribution. Similarly, changes at each end of tiie distribution of Uie measure of relative attitude 
towards die parties are likely not to alter die chances of voting for a particular party as much as 
identical changes in the middle part of the distribution. 
6.2 RESULTS 
From diese analyses information was obtained on die fit of die model, the proportions of correct 
and incorrect predictions of vote, die significance of die individual parameters and tiie significance of 
the individual variables". 
The assessment of die fit of die model by differences in die scaled deviance between die full and 
null models has been discussed in tiie last chapter. An additional way to assess tiie suitability of die 
model is to note die ability of the model to correctiy predict die votes of die respondents in die 
sample. 
The ability of die model to account for the voting preferences of die samples is indicated by the 
percentages of correct and incorrect predictions. The predicted probabilities are compared widi die 
observed values of die dependent variable. If the predicted probability of a case is greater dian or 
equal to 0.5, then that case is more likely to have an observed value of 1, on the dependent variable. 
Similarly, if a case has a predicted probability of less than 0.5, then it is more likely to have a value 
of 0 on the dependent variable. These are correct predictions (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984:57)'^ . The 
proportions of correct and incorrect predictions can be compared with the percentages of correct and 
incorrect predictions from the null model (which has no predictor variables). 
As discussed in the last chapter, tiie significance of the individual parameters for each variable is 
assessed in die usual manner by estimating the probability diat the estimate is in fact zero (that is the 
null hypothesis). The interpretation of die parameter estimates obtained from logistic regression is 
more difficidt than the inteipretation from OLS regression coefficients, since the relationships are not 
linear (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984:42)". To ease interpretation, die percentage effects widi respect to 
die grand mean'" are presented'^ This effect represents die number of percentage points more or 
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less likely a group is to vote Labor, relative to tiie reference category (Jones & McAllister, 1989). In 
addition, die 68% confidence limits, based on die effect at die grand mean of one standard error, are 
also presented, to indicate the likely range of die estimate'*. 
The assessment of die significance of variables from t test statistics, computed from die 
respective parameter estimates and standard errors, can be problematic (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984:55; 
Aiddn et al., 1989:87,175; Baker et al., 1985:111,109). The problems widi die t test are especially 
relevant in small samples (Aiddn et al., 1989:87), so do not really apply here. However, to insure 
against incorrect interpretations, the significance of each variable is tested by die chi-square likelihood 
ratio statistic. This test is performed by observing if significant changes occur in tiie values of tiie 
scaled deviance through tiie deletion of die relevant variable from the full model (Aitkin et al., 
1989:175-176; Baker et al., 1985:111). This procedure has die additional benefit of distinguishing 
between significant differences between the categories of an independent variable (in relation to vote) 
and die significance of die variable overall as a contributor to die fit of the model'^ A significant 
variable with insignificant parameter estimates suggests diat the variable should be re-parameterised. 
In die following section summarising die results, information on the fit of die model, the 
parameter estimates and the significance of each variable, are presented. The fit of the model is 
assessed by the change in chi-square deviance and die percentage of correct or incorrect predictions. 
The parameter estimates, standard errors, estimated effects and 68% confidence limits, for each 
estimate, are also presented. In the tables of results, the columns headed 'Freq(%)' presents the 
frequencies (and percentages) of cases in each category of tiie nominal variables. In die case of 
continuous variables, the mean and the standard deviation (mean ± standard deviation) are presented. 
The first entry in tills column is die frequency (and percentage) of respondents who voted Labor, diat 
is the counts and percentages of cases that scored 1 on the response variable. 
6.2.1 The 1967 ANPA 
In die analysis of the 1967 ANPA, a total of 1770 cases in the 1967 sample were analysed. The 
null model had a scaled deviance of 2429, with 1769 degrees of freedom. The full model had a scaled 
deviance of 604 with 1716 degrees of freedom. The log likelihood ratio was significant 
[AX^= 1825(53), P<0.05]. Therefore, die fuU model could account for, 75.1% of die scaled deviance of 
the null model. 
The number of cases whose vote was incorrectiy predicted by the model was 117 (6.6%). 
Therefore, die model was able to correctiy predict the intended vote of 1653 cases (93.4%). This 
compares with 55.9% correct predictions and 44.1% incorrect predictions from tiie nuU model. The 
model improved the percentage of correct predictions by 37.5%, from a possible 44.1% (tiiat is 85%). 
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TABLE 6.1(i): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF LABOR PARTY PREFERRED VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1770:1967 ANPA)'» 
VARUBLE 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identification - No Major Party 
Party Identification - V. Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Fairiy Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V. Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V. Strong Coahtion 
Party Identification - Fairly Strong Coahtion 
Party Identification - Very Strong Coahtion 
Relative Attitude to parties 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 
General Ideological Position - Left 
General Ideological Position - Right 
Big Business - Too Much Power 
Big Business - Don't Know (D.K.) 
Big Business - Does not have too much power 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - D.K. 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Reduce Taxes 
Death Penalty - Don't Know 
Death Penalty - Keep Death Penalty 
Death Penalty - Abolish 
Migration - On no racial/ethnic grounds 
Migration - Quota on Asian immigrants 
Migration - No Asian, but British & European O.K. 
Migration - Only from Britain & N. Europe 
Migration - No more migrants 
Migration - No Opinion 
Censorship - Read and see what they hke 
Censorship - Don't Know 
Censorship - Some Censorship 
Royalty - Unimportant 
Royalty - Somewhat important 
Royalty - Very Imponant 
Royalty - Don't Know 
Freq(%) 
780(44.1) 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dof 0 
0.89 0.90 
201(11.4) 
277(15.6) 
273(15.4) 
155(8.8) 
198(11.2) 
409(23.1) 
257(14.5) 
0.10 ± 2.2 
1537(86.8) 
53(3.0) 
180(10.2) 
925(52.3) 
209(11.0) 
636(35.9) 
95(5.4) 
1207(68.2) 
468(26.4) 
140(7.9) 
975(55.1) 
655(37.0) 
348(19.7) 
655(37.0) 
114(6.4) 
364(20.6) 
232(13.1) 
57(3.2) 
701(39.6) 
23(1.3) 
1046(59.1) 
816(46.1) 
452(25.5) 
474(26.8) 
28(1.6) 
-
4.58" 
3.81' 
3.2r 
-l.ir 
-2.12* 
-2.or 
-0.20* 
. 
1.79' 
-0.45 
-
0.11 
-0.05 
-
0.57 
0.18 
-
0.94* 
0.75 
-
-0.17 
-0,65 
-0,70 
-0,16 
-0,04 
-
-0.11 
-0.46 
-
-0.29 
-0.26 
-0.40 
-
0.60 
0,39 
0.38 
0.34 
0,38 
0,59 
0,07 
. 
0,82 
0.47 
-
0.38 
0.25 
-
0.47 
0.49 
-
0.42 
0.42 
-
0.30 
0,51 
0,37 
0,40 
0,58 
-
0.73 
0,23 
-
0.29 
0.29 
0.81 
-
55 ± 15 
53 ± 10 
51 ± 9 
-24 ± 8 
-35 ± 9 
-35 ± 15 
see text 
-
38 ±20 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
23 ± 11 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
617(6)' 
7(1)' 
6(2)' 
0(2) 
3(2) 
5(2) 
5(5) 
4(2) 
1(3) 
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TABLE 6.1(ii): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF LABOR PARTY INTENDED VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP. INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N= 1770:1967 ANPA) 
VARIABLE 
ISSUES 
Vietnam - Send Volunteers and Conscripts 
Vietnam - Send Only Volunteers 
Viemam - Only Civilian Experts 
Vietnam - Withdraw 
Vietnam - Don't Know 
Trade-Unions - Don't Know 
Trade-Unions - Not too much power 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 
State Aid - None to private <fe Church Schools 
State Aid - None until Govemment Schools Improve 
Slate Aid - Don't Know 
State Aid - To only Really Needy Church Schools 
State aid - To both Church & private Schools 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 
Sunple Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 
Trade with China - SeU wheat 
Trade with China - Don't Know 
Trade with China - No Trade with China 
Relations with U.S. - Less close hnks 
Relations with U.S. - Fairly close hnks 
Relations with U.S. - Very close hnks 
Relations with U.S - Don't Know 
Fust ProWem - No Difference/ D.K. 
First ProHem - Coahtion Better 
First Problem - Labor Better 
Second Problem - No Difference/ D.K. 
Second Problem - Coahtion Better 
Second Problem - Labor Better 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders 
Freq(%) 
505(28.5) 
793(44.8) 
137(7.7) 
262(14.8) 
73(4.1) 
208(11.4) 
715(40.4) 
847(47.9) 
277(15.6) 
384(21.7) 
58(3.3) 
224(12.7) 
827(46.7) 
691(39.0) 
342(19.3) 
737(41.6) 
896(50.6) 
207(11.7) 
667(37.7) 
1408(79.5) 
118(6.7) 
244(13.8) 
1351(76.3) 
227(13.4) 
182(10.3) 
1108(62.6) 
140(7.9) 
522(29.5) 
144(8.1) 
693(39.2) 
893(50.3) 
40(2.3) 
706(39.9) 
445(25.1) 
619(35.0) 
1005(56.8) 
327(18.5) 
438(24.7) 
-0.60 ± 2.1 
Parameter 
Estimate 
-
0.75" 
1.08' 
0.89* 
0.96 
-
-0.71' 
-1.11' 
-
-0.07 
-0.38 
0.06 
-0.17 
-
-0.03 
-0.50 
-
-0.10 
-0.23 
-
-0.26 
0.09 
-
-l.sr 
0.88 
-
-0.12 
-0.16 
-
-0.37 
-0.54 
-0.31 
-
-0.67 
1.25* 
-
-0.43 
0.05 
-0.44' 
Standard 
Error 
-
0.29 
0.42 
0.38 
0.63 
-
0.36 
0.36 
-
0.37 
0.73 
0.43 
0.33 
-
0.33 
0.27 
-
0.41 
0.26 
-
0.51 
0.40 
-
0.57 
0.53 
-
0.42 
0.25 
-
0.44 
0.44 
0.77 
-
0.35 
0.29 
-
0.37 
0.30 
0.07 
Effea 
± Range 
-
18 ± 7 
26± 11 
22 ± 10 
0 
-
-16 ± 9 
-23 ± 9 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
-33 ± 14 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
29 ± 7 
-
0 
0 
see text 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dofO 
10(4)' 
10(2)' 
0(4) 
4(2) 
1(2) 
0(2) 
17(2)' 
0(2) 
3(3) 
36(2)' 
2(2) 
49(1)' 
The results presented in table 6.1 show that the variables with significant effects on intended 
vote in 1967 were party identification, relative attitude to tiie parties, general ideological position, 
attitudes to die Vietnam war, and trade-union power. In addition, significant effects on vote were also 
observed with the measures of partisan personal prospective economic evaluations, evaluation of the 
best party at handling die first problem mentioned and the relative evaluation of tiie two party leaders 
(table 6.1). 
These results show the importance of party identification in relation to vote. Deleting party 
identification from the model decreases the scaled deviance by 617 units, witii 6 degrees of freedom, 
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statistically significant at die P<0.05 level [AX^=617(6), P<0.05]. This amounts to 34% of tiie change 
in scaled deviance for die model. 
Among Labor identifiers tiiere were littie differences in tiie propensity to vote Labor. Very 
strong identifiers witii the Labor party were estimated to be 55% more likely to vote Labor dian non-
identifiers. Fairly strong identifiers were 53% more likely and not very strong Labor i '^ntifiers 51% 
more likely to do so. For coalition identifiers, very strong and fairly strong coalition identifiers, were 
35% less likely to vote Labor, and not very strong coalition identifiers were 24% less likely. 
The measure of relative attitude to die parties was also found to be significantiy associated with 
vote [AX^=7(1), P<0.05]. Respondents who scored one (either a net like for the Liberal party or a net 
dislike for the Labor party), were 4.9% less likely to vote Labor compared witii the 30% of sample 
who scored zero. The effects of this measure on vote, for each level of the measure, are summarised 
in table 6.2. 
TABLE 6.2: PERCENTAGE EFFECT FOR RELATIVE ATTITUDE TO THE PARTIES - 1967 ANPA 
Score 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Labor 
Effect at 
Party 
Grand Mean 
5.0 
10.0 
14.9 
19.6 
24.1 
28.3 
32.1 
15.5 
-
-
no.(%) with 
score 
250(14.1) 
156(8.8) 
88(5.0) 
38(2.1) 
29(1.6) 
10(0.6) 
9(0.5) 
2(0.1) 
0 
0 
Liberal 
Effea at 
Grand Mean 
-4.9 
-9.5 
-13.9 
-17.9 
-21,6 
-24.9 
-27.8 
-
-32.5 
-
Party 
no.(%) 
with score 
264(14.9) 
185(10.5) 
111(6.3) 
49(X8) 
23(1.3) 
16(0.9) 
7(0.4) 
0 
1(0.1) 
0 
The 53 respondents in this sample who indicated tiiey were to the left ideologically, were found 
to be 38% more likely to vote for tiie Labor party. The overall measure of ideology was significantiy 
related to vote [AX^=6(2), P<0.05]. These results indicate diat for a very smaU proportion of die 
electorate, general ideological position was a basis for their vote. 
The measure of attimde to the deadi penalty, just failed to be significant at die 0.05 level 
[AX^=5(2), not significant (ns)]. However, supporters of die deatii penalty were found to be 
significantiy more likely (23%) to vote Labor tiian diose who responded "don't know" to diis question. 
However, opponents of die death penalty were not significantiy different Irom die reference group. 
The similar magnitudes (and signs) of tiie estimates indicate tiiat opponents and supporters of the deadi 
penalty were no different in relation to vote. This seemingly counter-intuitive result is of littie 
consequence, since die variable overall is not a significant contributor to the model. 
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The measure of attitudes to censorship also failed to be significant [AX^=5(2), ns]. Altiiough the 
parameter estimate for tiie 'some censorship' group is in the expected (negative) direction, it also just 
failed to be significant relative to die 'read and see what diey like' group. However, in die analysis of 
two-party preferred vote, die variable was significant [AX^=6(2), P<0.05] and die 'some censorship' 
group were found to be 13% less likely to vote Labor dian the reference group (table A6.2). These 
fmdings suggest that 'censorship' was important in relation to second preferences of those who 
intended to vote for minor parties, probably voters for the Democratic Labor Party (D.L.P)''. 
However, it is not clear whether this behaviour of D.L.P. voters reflects a general conservative position 
in regard to non-economic ideology or the prominence of the censorship debate during tiie 1960s. 
This question stems from die more general concern, as to whedier 'censorship' is an indicator of 
ideology or, at that time, a political issue. 
One important residt from this analysis was the finding that die issue of the Viemam war had a 
significant effect on voting preference [AX^=10(4), P<0.05]. This finding indicates that this issue was 
importanL net of partisanship. Relative to the group who chose the most pro-government position, 
'send volimteers and conscripts', the 'only send volunteers' group were 18% more likely to vote 
Labor, the 'only civilian experts' group, 26% more likely and the 'complete withdrawal' group, 22% 
more likely. These effects do not correspond to the expected order of effects, since given the Labor 
party's opposition to the war, the effect for the complete witiidrawn group, would be expected to be 
the greatest. 
The similarity of effects for tiiese diree policy positions indicates tiiat in relation to vote, the 
Vietnam war issue centred on conscription. The division appears to be between those who took the 
view that conscription was part of Australia's forward defence and those who took die view, that 
conscripts should not be sent to fight in Vietiiam. This interpretation is quite plausible, since for most 
people, direct contact with the war was limited to tiie possibility that they, or a young male friend or 
relative, could die in Uiat conflict. 
Two conclusions can be drawn regarding the Vietoam war issue. First, a substantial minority of 
the electorate voted contrary to their party identifications, because of the Viemam issue. Second, in 
electoral terms die important division cended on die question, as to whether conscripts should or 
should not be, sent to Viemam. 
In this analysis, die measure of attitudes to the power of trade-unions, was found to be 
significantiy associated with vote [AX^=10(2), P<0.05]. Respondents who viewed trade-unions as 
having eitiier too much power or too littie power, were significantiy more likely to vote for tiie 
coalition parties. By implication, tiie "don't know" respondents were more inclined to vote for die 
Labor party. One possible explanation for tiiis fmding is tiiat some fomi of cognitive dissonance was 
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operating. A substantial proportion of "don't know" responses, may be tiie product of a general 
sympathy with the dade-union movement, together with a weakly held view that trade-unions do have 
too much power. This possible explanation is suggested by tiie high proportion (11%) of tiie 1967 
sample, who responded "don't know" to this question. 
The issues of state aid, wheat sales to China, relations witii tiie United States and the party best 
able to handle second problem mentioned, were found to have no significant effect on vote. The same 
results were obtained in relation to, botii major party and two-party preferred vote. 
Partisan personal prospective economic evaluations, were found to be significantiy associated 
with vote [AX^=17(2), P<0.05]. Respondents who diought diey would be worse off under a Labor 
govemment were 33% less likely to vote for the Labor party than those respondents who thought tiiat 
there would be no change. This result may reflect the electoral effects of claims by members of the 
coalition, that Australia's prosperity was due to soimd economic management by the coalition 
govemment. 
The private political concems of individuals appear to be at least as important as the Viemam 
issue, when comparing changes in scaled deviance. The omission of the measure of best party at 
handling the most important problem facing the federal govemment, decreased the scaled deviance by 
36 units compared, to a change of about 10 units for the Vietnam war issue^. Respondents who 
indicated that die Labor party wotdd be best able to handle the most important problem they 
mentioned, were 29% more likely to vote for that party. Examination of tiie responses to tiiese open 
questions show diat the 1967 electorate was quite concemed with social matters such as, healdi, 
pensions, housing and education (Aiddn, 1982b:218). 
The measure of relative evaluations of the two leaders was significantiy associated with intended 
vote. Approximately 30% of die sample indicated no net preference for eitiier leader. The percentage 
effect on vote, for each level of response is presented in table 6.3. 
TABLE 6.3: PERCENTAGE EFFECTS FOR RELATIVE ATTITUDE TO THE PARTIES - 1967 ANPA 
Score 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Mr Whitiam 
Effea at 
Grand Mean 
11.0 
21.4 
30.6 
38.0 
43.6 
47.6 
50.4 
52.3 
-
-
no.(%) with 
score 
318(18.0) 
206(11.6) 
108(6.1) 
76(4.3) 
43(2.4) 
21(1.2) 
15(0.8) 
7(0.4) 
0 
0 
Effea at 
MrHoh 
Grand Mean 
-10.4 
-19.4 
-26.7 
-32.1 
-36.0 
-38.8 
-
-
-
-43.1 
no.(%) 
with score 
252(14.2) 
108(6.1) 
57(3.2) 
30(1.7) 
5(0.3) 
2(0.1) 
0 
0 
0 
1 
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The substitution of tiie composite leadership measure, by separate measures for tiie two party 
leaders indicated diat they had comparable (but of course opposite) effects on vote^'. The estimate 
for evaluations of tiie Prime Minister, Mr Holt was -0.46 and for evaluations of the Leader of the 
Opposition, Mr Whitiam 0.42. Both estimates were significant. 
6.2.2 The 1969 ANPA 
The model analysed for the 1969 ANPA data differed only slightiy, from tiie model analysed in 
the 1967 data. Measures of attitudes to royalty and both retrospective and prospective partisan 
economic evaluations coidd not be included in this model, since appropriate questions were not 
included in the 1969 ANPA study. A new measure of attimde to conscription, was included in die 
1969 study. Table 6.4 presents die results of die analysis of the model for the 1969 sample. 
After the list wise deletion of missing values, a total of 1745 cases were analysed. The null 
model had a scaled deviance of 2407, witii 1744 degrees of freedom. The fuU model had a scaled 
deviance of 935 with 1694 degrees of freedom. The log likelihood ratio was significant 
[AX^= 1472(50), P<0.05]. Therefore, the fuU model could account for 61.2%, of the scaled deviance of 
the null model. The fit of diis model is substantially less tiian the fit for the 1967 model. 
The number of cases whose vote was incorrectiy predicted by the model was 171 (9.8%). This 
compares with 54.2% correct predictions and 45.8% incorrect predictions from the nuU model. 
Therefore, the model improved tiie percentage of correct predictions by 36.0%, of a possible 45.8% 
(diat is 78.6%). The percentage of correct predictions (90.2%) is slightiy lower tiian diat found for the 
1967 sample (93.4%). 
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TABLE 6.4<i): EFFECT OF LABOR VOTE ON PARTISANSfflP, IDEOLOGY, ISSUES, AND LEADERS (N=1745:1969 ANPA) 
VARIABLE 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identification - No Major Party 
Party Identification - V. Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Fairiy Strong Labor 
Patty Identification - Not V. Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V. Strong Coahtion 
Party Identification - Fairiy Strong Coahtion 
Party Identification - Very Strong Coahtion 
Relative Attitude to parties 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 
General Ideological Position - Left 
General Ideological Position - Right 
Big Business - Too Much Power 
Big Business - Don't Know (D.K.) 
Big Business - Does twH have txx) much power 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - D.K. 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Reduce Taxes 
Death Penalty - Don't Know 
Death Penalty - Keep Death Penalty 
Death Penalty - Abolish 
Migration - On no radaiyethnic grounds 
Migration - Quota on Asian immigrants 
Migration - No Asian, but British & European O.K. 
Migration - Only from Britain & N. Europe 
Migration - No more migrants 
Migration - No Opinion 
Censorship - Read and see what they like 
Censorship - Don't Know 
Censorship - Some Censorship 
Freq(%) 
799(45.8) 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dofO 
-0.84 0.74 
225(12.9) 
293(16.8) 
297(17.0) 
114(6.5) 
164(9.4) 
430(24.6) 
222(12.7) 
-0.22 ± 2.4 
1515(86.8) 
69(4.0) 
161(9.2) 
960(55.0) 
205(11.7) 
580(33.2) 
63(3.6) 
1245(71.3) 
437(25.0) 
148(8.5) 
795(45.6) 
802(46.0) 
394(22.6) 
729(41.8) 
83(4.8) 
298(17.1) 
188(10.8) 
53(3.0) 
732(41.9) 
18(1.0) 
995(57.0) 
-
2.6r 
1.93' 
2.23* 
-l.ir 
-2.19" 
-2.20' 
-0.23' 
-
0.27 
-0.30 
-
-0.18 
0.04 
-
-0.04 
0.20 
-
0.08 
0.22 
-
0.24 
-0.38 
0.22 
-0.13 
-0.34 
-
-1.53 
-0.18 
-
0.36 
0.26 
0.34 
0.28 
0.30 
0.43 
0.05 
. 
0.52 
0.36 
-
0.30 
0.20 
-
0.46 
0.48 
-
0.34 
0.34 
-
0.23 
0.47 
0.28 
0.33 
0.51 
-
0.83 
0.18 
47 ± 
40 ± 
43 ± 
-25 ± 
-37 ± 
-37 ± 
see text 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
433(6)' 
20(1)' 
m 
0(2) 
m 
1(2) 
4(5) 
4(2) 
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TABLE 6.4(u): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF LABOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP. INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY. ISSUES. 
AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1745:1969 ANPA) 
VARIABLE 
ISSUES 
Vietnam - Send Volunteers and Conscripu 
Viemam - Send Only Volunteers 
Vietnam - Only Civilian Experts 
Vietnam - Withdraw 
Vietnam - Don't Know (D.K.) 
Trade-Unions - Don't Know 
Trade-Unions - Not too much power 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 
State Aid - Notjc to private & Church Schools 
State Aid - None until Govemment Schools Improve 
Sute Aid - Don't Know 
State Aid - To only Really Needy Church Schools 
State aid - To both Church & private Schools 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Sunple Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 
China a worry - Don't know 
China a worry - A lot to worry about 
China a worry - China won't be a problem 
Relations with U.S. - Less close hnks 
Relations with U.S. - Fairly close hnks 
Relations with U.S. - Very close links 
Relations with U.S. - Don't Know 
Conscription - For all young men 
Conscription - Keep present ballot system 
Conscription - Do National Service in other ways 
Conscription - No conscription 
Conscription - Don't Know 
First Problem - No Difference/D.K. 
First ProWem - Coahtion Better 
First ProWem - Labor Better 
Second ProWem - No Difference/D.K. 
Second ProWem - Coahtion Better 
Second ProWem - Labor Better 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders 
Freq(%) 
407(23.3) 
776(44.5) 
209(12.0) 
317(18.2) 
36(2.1) 
178(10.2) 
626(35.9) 
941(53.9) 
202(11.6) 
444(25.4) 
35(2.0) 
282(16.2) 
782(44.8) 
759(43.5) 
240(13.8) 
746(42.8) 
925(53.0) 
172(9.9) 
648(37.1) 
213(12.2) 
607(34.8) 
925(53.0) 
155(8.9) 
793(45.4) 
773(44.3) 
24(1.4) 
714(40.9) 
125(7.2) 
577(33.1) 
292(16.7) 
37(11) 
504(28.9) 
478(27.4) 
763(43.7) 
717(41.1) 
378(21.7) 
650(37.2) 
-0.22 ± 2.3 
Parameter 
Estimate 
-
1.05' 
0.98' 
0.76' 
-0.01 
-
-0.06 
-0.26 
-
0.24 
1.63' 
0.12 
0.12 
-
-0.03 
0.10 
-
-0.28 
-0.19 
-
-0.13 
-0.45 
-
-0.21 
-0.13 
1.12 
-
0.02 
-0.30 
-0.23 
-0.13 
-
-0.53 
0.60' 
-
-0.41 
0.10 
-0,09' 
Standard 
Error 
-
0,26 
0,35 
0.33 
0.61 
-
0.31 
0.30 
-
0.32 
0.64 
0.35 
0.29 
-
0.28 
0.20 
-
0.33 
0.20 
-
0.30 
0.28 
-
0.33 
0.34 
0.87 
-
0.36 
0.21 
0.27 
0.56 
-
0.28 
0.23 
-
0.30 
0.22 
0.04 
Effea 
± Range 
. 
25 ± 6 
24 ± 9 
19 ± 8 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
35 ± 16 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
15 ± 6 
-
0 
0 
see text 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dofO 
20(4)' 
1(2) 
7(4) 
0(2) 
1(2) 
4(2) 
3(3) 
2(4) 
19(2)' 
3(2) 
4(1)' 
The results presented in table 6.4 indicate that the variables with significant effects on vote at 
the 1969 election were party identification, relative attitude towards the parties, tiie Viemam war, 
evaluation of best party at handling first problem mentioned and tiie relative evaluation of the leaders. 
The importance of party identification on vote is again apparent from inspection of table 6.4. 
Deleting party identification from tiie model decreased the scaled deviance by 433 units, or 29.4% of 
the change in scaled deviance. This figure is slightiy less than the equivalent figure (of 34%) found in 
tiie 1967 sample. 
Compared with 1967 there was a slight decline in the association between Labor identification 
and vote. Very strong Labor identifiers were estimated to be 47% more likely to vote for the Labor 
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party dian non-identifiers. Fairly strong identifiers were 40% more likely and not very strong Labor 
identifiers were 43% more likely. The respective figures for tiie 1967 analysis were 55%, 53% and 
51%. 
As was found in tiie analysis of die 1967 data, two groups of coalition identifiers had similar 
propensities to vote for a non-Labor party. The effects on vote for different levels of identification 
witii tiie coalition parties were 37% less likely to vote Labor for very sdong and fairiy strong 
identifiers and 25% for not very strong coalition identifiers. The respective figures for tiie 1967 
analysis were 35%, 35% and 24%. 
The measure of attimde to the two major parties was again found to be significantiy associated 
witii intended vote [AX^=20(2), P<0.05]. A lower proportion (22%) of tiie 1969 sample had notiiing 
to say or were neutral, to the two major parties compared with tiie 30% of the 1967 sample. The 
percentage effects on voting Labor for respondents at each level on this variable, relative to those widi 
a score of zero, are presented in table 6.5. 
TABLE 6.5: PERCENTAGE EFFECTS FOR RELATIVE ATTITUDE TO THE PARTIES - 1969 ANPA 
Score 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Labor Party 
Effea at 
Grand Mean 
5.7 
11.4 
17.0 
22.2 
26.9 
31.3 
35.1 
38.4 
41.2 
43.6 
no.(%) 
with score 
270(15.5) 
165(9.5) 
123(7.0) 
62(3.6) 
42(2.4) 
22(1.3) 
9(0.5) 
9(0.5) 
4(0.2) 
1(0.1) 
Liberal F 
Effea at 
Grand Mean 
-5.6 
-11.0 
-16.0 
-20.6 
-24.7 
-28.3 
-31.3 
-34.0 
-
' 
'arty 
no.(%) 
with score 
272(15.6) 
185(10.6) 
99(5.7) 
59(3.4) 
20(1.1) 
7(0.4) 
3(0.2) 
2(0.1) 
0 
0 
The measures of general ideological position, attitude to the death penalty, attitiides to 
censorship and attimde to dade-union power were found not to be significantiy associated widi vote. 
The same results were obtained when the response variable was major party vote or two-party 
preferred vote (tables A6.3, A6.4). 
As was foimd in the analysis of the 1967 sample, the issue of the Vietnam war had significant 
effects on vote. The parameter estimates are very similar to those obtained from the analysis of the 
1967 data. In the 1969 analysis, effects of 25%, 24%, and 19% relative to the 'send volunteers and 
conscripts' group were found for the 'send ordy volunteers', 'only civilian experts', and 'witiidrawal' 
groups respectively. In 1967, tiie respective effects were, 18%, 26%, and 22%. In addition, tiie 
effects associated with the policy options also did not correspond to the expected order of responses. 
These restdts indicate that the same two conclusions can be drawn regarding tiie Viemam issue, as 
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tiiose derived from the analysis of the 1967 sample. First, tiie Viemam war issue motivated some 
voters to vote contrary to their partisanship, and/or was important for non-identifiers. Second, tiie 
electoral impact of tiie issue cended around conscription. Furthermore, it appears tiiat tiiere was littie 
difference in tiie way in which tiie Vietiiam issue influenced vote at tiiese two time points. 
There are indications that the issue was more important in 1969 tiian in 1967. First, the change 
in scaled deviance from deletion of the measure in the 1969 model was double that for tiie 1967 
model [ 1967:AX^= 10(4), P<0.05; 1969:AX^=20(4), P<0.05]. Second, tiie coefficient for tiie largest 
group - the 'send only volunteers' group - is greater in 1969 (1.05) compared witii 1967 (0.75). 
As well as having direct effects on vote, it is also possible that the Vietnam issue was important 
because it was involved in the change towards higher levels of Labor partisanship in tiie electorate 
between 1967 and 1969 (figure 4.4). The proportion who took the most conservative position, 'We 
shoidd have doops in Viemam, including conscripts' feU by about 5% between 1967 and 1969. This 
change may have had effects on partisanship. Therefore, part of the electoral effect of the Viemam 
war in 1969 is under-estimated, since it had already contributed to changes in partisanship. Some 
evidence for this possibUity can be found in chapter 4, since strong but transient pro-Labor effects on 
party identification were identified among the tertiary educated (table 4.8)". 
The measure of attitude to conscription was found not to be significantiy related to vote 
[AX^=2(4), ns]. This result does not contradict tiie conclusions reached above, regarding the Viemam 
issue. The question on conscription did not pertain to the most relevant electoral aspect. The question 
on conscription focused on the form conscription should take and whether or not there should be 
conscription, rather than on the question of sending conscripts to fight in Viemam. 
Respondents who indicated that the Labor party would be best able to handle the most important 
problem mentioned, were found to be 15% more likely to vote Labor. Together witii tiie restdts of 
analyses of the 1967 sample, this residt is further evidence, that tiie personal political concems of 
voters can have substantial electoral effects. The (15%) effect was considerably lower than the effect 
of 29% found in the 1967 sample, suggesting that these personal concems were less important in 1969 
than in 1967. Similarly, the change in scaled deviance was smaller in 1969 than in 1967 
[1967:AX2=36(2), P<0.05; 1969:AX^= 19(2), P<0.05]. 
The measures of simple personal redospective and prospective economic evaluations, tiireat from 
China, relations witii the United States, conscription, and party best able to handle second problem 
mentioned, were found to have no significant relation widi vote. The 35 respondents who answered 
"don't know" to the state aid question were found to be significantiy more likely to vote Labor. 
However, tiiis result has litde substantive interest and overall, tiie 'state aid' variable did not make a 
significant contribution to tiie model [X^=7(4), ns]. Togedier widi die insignificant effects of state aid 
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in the analysis of the 1967 sample, these results suggesL that whatever the electoral effects of state aid 
issue were, tiiey were exhausted by tiie time of the 1967 ANPA study. 
The measure of relative evaluations of tiie two leaders was significantiy associated widi intended 
vote [AX^=4(1), P<0.05]. The parameter estimate (-0.09) was considerably smaller tiian tiiat found for 
the 1967 sample (-0.44) and tiie change in scaled deviance was also much smaller [1967:AX^=49(1), 
P<0.05]. The proportion of the (1969) sample with no opinion in eitiier direction (23%) was lower 
than tiiat found in 1967 sample. These findings may reflect bodi disenchandnent widi tiie Liberal 
leader, Mr Gorton (who was replaced in 1971), and tiie end of tiie new Labor leader's 'honeymoon' 
period witii tiie electorate^. The effects on having voted Labor at the 1969 election, for each level 
of response for tills variable, are presented in table 6.6. 
TABLE 6.6: PERCENTAGE EFFECT FOR RELATIVE EVALUATION OF THE LEADERS - 1969 ANPA 
Score 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Mr Whitiam 
Effea at 
Grand Mean 
2.2 
4.5 
6.7 
9.0 
11.2 
13.4 
15,5 
17,7 
19.7 
21.7 
no.(%) 
with score 
285(16.3) 
241(13.8) 
161(9.2) 
102(5.8) 
50(2.9) 
31(1.8) 
12(0.7) 
5(0.3) 
1(0.1) 
2(0.1) 
Effea at 
Mr 
Grand Mean 
-2.2 
-4.4 
-6.6 
-8.7 
-10.8 
-12.8 
-14.8 
-
-
-
Gorton 
no.(%) 
with score 
217(12.4) 
131(7.5) 
65(3.7) 
25(1.4) 
12(0.7) 
2(0.1) 
1(0.1) 
0 
0 
0 
Substimtion of the combined measure by separate measures for the party leaders, revealed that 
evaluations of the Leader of the Opposition leader, Mr Whitiam had significant effects on vote 
[Parameter estimate(PE)= 0.16, Standard Error(SE)=0.07]. In contrast, evaluations of the Prime 
Minister, Mr Gorton had no significant effects [PE=-.03, SE=0.07]. 
6.2.3 The 1979 ANPA 
After the list wise deletion of missing values, 1774 cases remained to be analysed in tiie 1979 
ANPA sample. The nidi model had a scaled deviance of 2459, with 1773 degrees of freedom. The 
fuU model had a scaled deviance of 618 with 1714 degrees of freedom. The log likelihood ratio was 
significant [AX^= 1841(59), P<0.05]. Therefore, the fuU model could account for 74.9% of die scaled 
deviance, of the null model. This figure is comparable to die figure of 75.1%, calculated for tiie 1967 
sample and is substantiaUy higher tiian tiie figure of 61.2%, obtained from tiie analysis of tiie 1969 
sample. 
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The model correctiy predicted tiie votes of aU but 6.6% of tiie sample. This compares witii 
50.1% correct predictions and 49.9% incorrect predictions from tiie nuU model. Therefore, tiie model 
improved tiie percentage of correct predictions by 43.3% from a possible 49.9% (tiiat is 86.7%). 
TABLE 6.7(i): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1979 MAJOR PARTY INTENDED VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY, ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1774: 1979 ANPA) 
VARIABLE 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identification - No Major Party 
Party Identificauon - V. Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Fairiy Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V. Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V. Strong Coahtion 
Party Identificauon - Fairly Strong Coahtion 
Party Identificauon - Very Strong Coahtion 
Relative Attitude to parties 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 
General Ideological Position - L.eft 
General Ideological Position - Right 
Big Business - Too Much Power 
Big Business - Don't Know 
Big Business - Does not have too much power 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - D.K. 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Reduce Taxes 
Death Penalty - Don't Know 
Death Penalty - Keep Death Penalty 
Death Penalty - Abolish 
Migration - On no redal/ethnic grounds 
Migration - Quota on Asian immigrants 
Migration - No Asian, but British & European O.K. 
Migration - Only from Britain & N. Eurc^ 
Migration - No more nugrants 
Migration - No Opmion 
Censorship - Read and see what they like 
Censorship - Don't Know 
Censorship - Some Censorship 
Royalty - Not Important 
Royalty - Somewhat Important 
Royalty - Very Important 
Royalty - Don't Know 
Uranium Mining - Mine and Sell Uraruiun 
Uraruum Mining - Mine but Safeguards 
Uranium Mining - Mine but only Austrahan use 
Uranium Mining - Keep in the ground 
Uranium Mining - Don't Know 
Marijuana - Ban should stay 
Marijuana - Legahsation and commercial sale 
Marijuana - Legahsation for personal use only 
Marijuana - Don't Know 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Special Benefits 
Special benefits for Aborigines - No differently 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Get too many 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - h Depends 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Don't Know 
Freq(%) 
889(50.1) 
254(14.3) 
295(16.6) 
363(20.5) 
129(7.3) 
139(7.8) 
350(19.7) 
244(13.8) 
-0.42 ± 2.44 
1437(81.0) 
127(7,2) 
205(11,8) 
1136(64.0) 
118(6.7) 
520(29.3) 
72(4.1) 
665(37.5) 
1037(58.5) 
103(5.8) 
1113(62.7) 
558(31.5) 
472(26.6) 
520(29.3) 
45(2.5) 
95(5.4) 
611(34.4) 
31(1.7) 
762(43.0) 
24(1.4) 
988(55.7) 
809(45.6) 
505(28.5) 
445(25.1) 
15(0.8) 
222(12.5) 
958(54.0) 
155(8.7) 
373(21.0) 
66(3.7) 
1100(610) 
436(24.6) 
171(9.6) 
67(3.8) 
472(26.6) 
1149(64.8) 
29(1.6) 
111(6.3) 
13(0.7) 
Parameter 
estimate 
-0.33 
-
2.6r 
l.ir 
2.12* 
-1.55' 
-2.50' 
-3.61' 
-0.12 
-
-0.11 
-0.33 
-
0.04 
-0.14 
-
0.47 
0,49 
-
-0.17 
0.04 
-
0.52 
0.93 
0.54 
l.ir 
0.03 
-
-0.40 
-0.37 
-
0.29 
-0.33 
-0.36 
-
-0.39 
-0.43 
-0.82' 
-0.53 
-
-0.33 
-0.30 
-0.76 
-
-0.18 
0.34 
0.37 
-0.09 
Standard 
error 
1.09 
-
0.49 
0.34 
0.39 
0.35 
0.41 
1.05 
0.07 
-
0.53 
0.54 
-
0.46 
0.26 
-
0.58 
0.58 
-
0.47 
0.48 
-
0.30 
0.74 
0.58 
0.31 
0.81 
-
0.87 
0.23 
-
0.26 
0.31 
1.33 
-
0.36 
0.49 
0.41 
0.71 
-
0.27 
0.37 
0.52 
-
0.26 
0.85 
0.51 
1.01 
Effea 
± Range 
0 
-
43 ± 12 
44± 8 
39 ± 10 
-32 ± 9 
-42 ± 10 
Al ±24 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
25 ± 8 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-19 ± 10 
Q 
• • 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dofO 
-
339(6)' 
3(1) 
0(2) 
0(2) 
1(2) 
1(2) 
15(5)' 
3(2) 
4(3) 
4(4) 
3(3) 
2(4) 
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TABLE 6.7(ii): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1979 LABOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP. INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1675:1979 ANPA) 
VARIABLE 
ISSUES 
Priority InflationAJnemploymeni - Both 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Unemployment 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Inflation 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Don't Know 
Trade-Unions - Don't Know 
Trade-Uruons - Not too much power 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Sunple Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 
Sunple Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE.,- No Change 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 
China - China won't be a problem 
China - Don't Know 
China - a lot to worry about 
Relations with U.S. - Less close hnks 
Relations with U.S. - Fairly close hnks 
Relations with U.S. - Very close links 
Relations with U.S - Don't Know 
Fust ProWem - No Difference/ D.K. 
First ProWem - Coahtion Better 
First ProWem - Labor Better 
Seamd ProWem - No Difference/ D.K. 
Second ProWem - Coahtion Better 
Second ProWem - Labor Better 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders 
Freq(%) 
303(17,1) 
879(49,5) 
557(31.4) 
35(2.0) 
85(4.8) 
306(17.2) 
1383(78.0) 
713(40.2) 
490(27.6) 
571(32.2) 
928(52.3) 
381(21.5) 
465(26.2) 
1061(59.8) 
526(29.7) 
187(10.5) 
1098(61.9) 
309(17.4) 
367(20.7) 
926(52.2) 
181(10.2) 
667(37.6) 
168(9.5) 
834(47,0) 
752(42.4) 
20(1.1) 
477(26,9) 
512(28.9) 
785(44.3) 
641(36.1) 
443(25.0) 
690(38.9) 
-0.77 ± 2.44 
Parameter 
Estimate 
-
0.36 
0.13 
-0.33 
-
-0.26 
-1.45' 
-
-0,04 
0.06 
-
0,33 
-0,08 
-
0.31 
-0.14 
-
-l.or 
0.20 
-
0.24 
-0.03 
-
0.29 
0.39 
1.10 
-
-0.58 
1.14' 
-
-0.78' 
0.72' 
-0.23' 
Standard 
Error 
-
0.31 
0.33 
0.90 
-
0.67 
0.62 
-
0.29 
0.27 
-
0.29 
0.28 
-
0,26 
0,49 
-
0,43 
0,33 
-
0.36 
0.24 
-
0.40 
0.41 
1.03 
-
0.35 
0.27 
-
0.36 
0.27 
0.06 
Effea 
± Range 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
-31 ± 15 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
-24 ± 11 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
26 ± 7 
-
-18 ± 9 
17 ± 7 
see text 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dof 0 
2(3) 
17(2)' 
0(2) 
2(2) 
2(2) 
8(2)' 
1(2) 
2(3) 
33(2)' 
20(2)' 
15(1)' 
The results presented in table 6.7 indicate tiiat the variables widi significant effects on intended 
Labor vote in 1979 were party identification, attitudes to migration and trade-union power. In 
addition, partisan personal prospective economic evaluations, best party at handling both the first and 
second problems mentioned and the relative evaluation of the leaders, were found to be significantiy 
related to vote. 
As found in tiie analyses of tiie 1967 and 1969 samples, tiie importance of party identification on 
vote was again apparenL Deleting party identification from the model decreased the scaled deviance 
by 339 tmits, or 18.4% of tiie likeUhood ratio. These figures are considerably lower tiian tiie 
equivalent values obtained in the 1967 and 1969 samples. 
Very strong identifiers witii tiie Labor party were estimated to be 43% more likely to vote Labor 
than non-identifiers. Fairly strong identifiers were found to be 44% more likely and not very strong 
Labor identifiers, 39% more likely. The effect of party identification for tiie tiiree groups of coalition 
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identifiers were 47% for very strong identifiers, 42% for fairly strong identifiers and 32% for not very 
strong coalition identifiers. These fmdings indicate that strength of identification was more relevant 
(in terms of vote) for coaUtion identifiers tiian for Labor identifiers. 
The measure of relative attimde to tiie (two major) parties just failed to be significantiy 
associated widi intended vote [AX^=3(1), ns]. Approximately 21% of tiie sample indicated no net 
likes or dislikes for either party, a figure comparable with the 1969 sample, but substantiaUy lower 
than that obtained for the 1967 sample. This measure was also found not to be significant in tiie 
analysis of major party vote, but significant in the analysis of two-party preferted vote (tables A6.5 & 
A6.6). These findings suggest that the second preferences of minor party voters, were influenced by 
their evaluations of the two major parties. 
General ideological alignment was found not to be significantiy related to Labor vote [AX^=0(1), 
ns]. However, in the analysis of major party vote and two-party preferred vote (tables A6.5 & A6.6), 
ideology was found to be significant [Major Party:AX^= 14(2), P<0.05; Two-Party 
Preferred:AX^= 12(2), P<0.05]. It appears that general ideological aUgnment is important in 
distinguishing votes between the Labor party and the coalition parties. However, a significant 
proportion of those with a 'left' position gave their first preference to minor parties, thereby 
undermining die relationship between ideology and Labor vote. 
These results show that the measure of attitude to migration had a significant association with 
intended vote [AX^=15(5), P<0.05]. Respondents whose preferred option was 'no more migrants' were 
found to be 25% more Ukely to vote for Labor than the reference ('no racial/etiinic grounds') group, a 
result not found in the 1967 and 1969 samples. This result may reflect the heightened concems over 
immigration, given the prominence of the Viemamese 'boat people' at this time. 
The parameter estimates associated widi the otiier options on migration were found not to be 
significantiy different from the reference group. Pemsal of tiie estimates and their standard errors, 
indicate that significant differences in relation to vote between these groups is very unlikely. 
OveraU the variable 'attitude to uranium mirung' was found not to be significantiy associated 
with intended vote [AX^=4(4), ns]. However, the group of respondents who took the view that 
'uranium should stay in the ground* were fotmd to be 19% less likely to vote Labor than those who 
took the view that Australia should mine and seU its uranium. Altiiough this result first appears 
counter-intuitive, the most likely explanation is tiiat, this 'keep in tiie ground' group intended to vote 
for tiie Australian Democrats. This explanation is suggested by tiie non-significant differences found, 
in the analyses of major party vote and two-party preferred vote (tables A6.5 & A6.6). 
Attimdes to the power of trade-unions were found to be significantiy associated with vote 
[AX^=17(2), P<0.05]. Respondents who tiiought that trade-unions had too much power were 
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significantiy less Ukely to vote for the Labor party. This result suggests tiiat tiie conventional wisdom 
that industrial action by unions has detrimental effects on the electoral standing of tiie Labor party, has 
a degree of tmtii. However, of tiie seven samples analysed, only in this sample was tiiis measure 
found to have a significant effect on vote. 
As was found from the analysis of the 1967 sample, the measure of partisan personal prospective 
economic evaluations, was found to be sigidficantiy associated witii vote [AX^=8(2), P<0.05]. 
Respondents who tiiought they would be worse off under a Labor govemment (tiie coalition parties 
being in office at die time die survey was conducted), were 24% less lUcely to vote for die Labor party 
tiian tiiose respondents who considered tiiat tiiere would be no change. The most readily apparent 
explanation for this finding is tiie memory of economic problems during the period of tiie Whitiam 
govemment, a major tiieme of the Liberal party's 1977 election campaign. 
Partisan personal retrospective economic evaluations were found not be significantiy related to 
vote [AX^=2(2), ns]. An insignificant result was also found in die analyses of die 1967 sample. 
However, significant effects were found in relation to major party vote and two-party preferred vote 
(tables A6.5 & A6.6)^. In relation to major party vote, tiiose who tiiought tiiey had become worse 
off were 21% more lUcely to vote Labor. In relation to tiie two-party preferted vote this group was 
16% more lUcely to prefer Labor. The explanation for these fmdings is tiiat a substantial proportion of 
this group gave tiieir first preference to a minor party, thereby imdermining the relationship between 
(negative) retrospective evaluations and Labor vote. 
Bodi die measures of best party at handling die first and second most important problem, were 
found to be significantiy associated witii vote [First:AX^=33(2), P<0.05; Second:AX^=20(2), P<0.05]. 
In die analyses of the 1967 and 1969 samples, only die first most important problem proved to be 
significantiy associated with vote. This residt is a further indication tiiat voters may frequentiy vote 
contrary to their partisanship, in response to their own personal concems, and that tiiis behaviour was 
more prevalent in 1979. 
As was found in the analyses of tiie 1967 and 1969 samples, the issues associated witii relations 
with (Zhina and the United States had no significant association with vote. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that issues relating to foreign affairs and 'communism' had no substantive influence on vote 
at these time points and probably during the period, 1967 to 1979. 
The measure of relative evaluations to the two leaders, was significantiy associated witii intended 
vote [AX^=15(1), P<0.05]. The effect for leaders on vote in this 1979 sample, was comparable to that 
found in 1967 and considerably higher than tiiat observed in 1969. The effects on voting Labor are 
presented in table 6.8. 
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TABLE 6.8: PERCENTAGE EFFECT FOR MEASURE OF RELATIVE ATTITUDE TO THE LEADERS - 1979 ANPA 
Score 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Mr Hayden 
Effea at 
Grand Mean 
5.7 
11.3 
16.6 
21.5 
25,9 
29.9 
33.3 
36.2 
38.7 
40.8 
no.(%) with 
score 
282(15,9) 
247(13.9) 
158(8.9) 
129(7.3) 
57(3.2) 
33(1.9) 
12(0.7) 
6(0.3) 
1(0.1) 
1(0.1) 
Effea 
Mr Frasei 
at 
Grand Mean 
-5.7 
-11.3 
-16.6 
-21.5 
-26.0 
-29.9 
-33.4 
-36.4 
-38.9 
-
no.(%) 
with score 
195(11,0) 
128(7,2) 
74(4,2) 
51(2.9) 
21(1.2) 
4(0.2) 
2(0.1) 
1(0.1) 
1(0.1) 
0 
When entered in tiie model as separate variables, similar but opposite estimates were obtained -
coefficients of -0.22 for tiie Prime minister, Mr Fraser and 0.24 for tiie Leader of tiie Opposition, Mr 
Hayden. Both estimates were significant. 
6.2.4 The 1984 NSSS 
In die 1984 NSSS sample, a total of 2701 cases were analysed. The nuU model had a scaled 
deviance of 3728 widi 2700 degrees of freedom. The fuU model had a scaled deviance of 1105, witii 
2650 degrees of fi'eedom. The log lUceUhood ratio was significant [AX^=2623(50), P<0.05]. 
Therefore, the fuU model could account for 70.4% of the scaled deviance of tiie nuU model 
The model correctiy predicted tiie votes of aU but 7.6% of the sample. This compares witii 
53.9% correct predictions and 46.1% incorrect predictions from the nidi model. Therefore, die model 
improved the percentage of correct predictions by 38.5% from a possible 46.1% (a percentage of 
83.5%). 
The results for the analysis of tiie model on the 1984 sample are presented in table 6.9. 
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TABLE 6 9(i): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1984 LABOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP. INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES. AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=2701:1984 NSSS) 
VARIABLE Freq(%) Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dofO 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identification - No Major Party 
Party Identification - V. Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Fauly Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Not V. Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V. Strong Coahtion 
Party Identificauon - Fairiy Strong Coahtion 
Party Identificauon - Very Strong Coahtion 
Relative Attitude to parties 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 
General Ideological Position - Left 
General Ideological Position - Right 
Big Business - Don't Know/neutral 
Big Business - Too much power 
Big Business - Does not have too much power 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Don't Know 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Reduce Taxes 
Death Penalty - Don't Krww 
Death Penalty - Keep Death Penally 
Death Penalty - Abolish 
Censorship - Middle Position 
Censorship - Disagree Stricter Controls 
Censorship - Agree Stricter Controls 
Royalty - Not Important 
Royalty - Somewhat Important 
Royalty - Very Important 
Uratuimi Mining - Middle Position 
Uranium Mining - Against Uranium Mining 
Uranium Mining - Support Uranium Mining 
Marijuana - Strongly Agree Legahsation 
Marijuana - Somewhat Agree Legahsation 
Marijuana - Somewhat Disagree Legahsation 
Marijuana - Strongly Disagree Legahsation 
Marijuana - Neutral/ Don't Know 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Special Benefits 
Special benefits for Aborigines - No differently 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - h Depends 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Don't Know 
1457(53.9) -0.37 0.56 
344(12.7) 
384(14.2) 
607(22.5) 
290(10.7) 
269(10.0) 
477(17.7) 
330(12.2) 
-0.44 ± 2.33 
2403(89.0) 
63(2.3) 
235(8.7) 
493(18.3) 
1660(61.5) 
548(20.3) 
867(32.1) 
89(3.3) 
1745(64.6) 
433(16.0) 
1553(57.5) 
715(26.5) 
321(11.9) 
235(8.7) 
2145(79.4) 
1473(54.5) 
792(29.3) 
436(16.1) 
663(24.5) 
845(31.3) 
1193(44.2) 
186(6.9) 
470(17.4) 
734(27.2) 
929(34.4) 
382(14.1) 
484(17.9) 
2040(75.5) 
148(5.5) 
29(1.1) 
-
1.81' 
1.63' 
1.94' 
-0.78' 
-i.4r 
-2.54' 
-0.35* 
-
-0.53 
-0.62 
-
-0,01 
0.45 
-
-0.06 
-0,35 
-
0.12 
0.06 
-
-0.39 
-0.25 
-
0.09 
-0.71' 
-
-0.69' 
-0.09 
-
0.51 
0,20 
0.59 
0.35 
-
0.02 
0.13 
0.24 
-
0.40 
0.25 
0.27 
0.24 
0.28 
0.76 
0.08 
-
0.62 
0.42 
-
0.21 
0.27 
-
0.44 
0.18 
-
0.22 
0.24 
-
0.34 
0,24 
-
0,19 
0,27 
-
0,21 
0,21 
-
0.34 
0.34 
0.34 
0.36 
-
0.21 
0.34 
0.78 
-
35 ± 10 
32 ± 
35 ± 
-19 ± 
-32 ± 
6 
7 
6 
7 
-46 ± 18 
see text 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
Q 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
-17 ± 
-
-17 ± 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
7 
5 
198(6)' 
20(1)' 
3(2) 
5(2) 
4(2) 
0(2) 
2(2) 
8(2)' 
13(2)-
6(4) 
0(3) 
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TABLE 6.9(u): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1984 LABOR PARTY EXTENDED VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, E^TDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY. ISSUES. AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=2701:1984 NSSS ANPA) 
VARIABLE 
ISSUES 
Priority Inflation/UnemfJoyment - Both 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Unemployment 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Inflation 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Don't Know 
Trade-Unions - Not Too much Power 
Trade-Unions - Don't Know 
Trade-Uruoiu - Too much power 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. 
Partisan Persoiul Rarospective EE. 
Partisan Penonal Rttrospective EE. 
Partisan (Lib) Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan (Lib) Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan (Lib) Personal Prospective EE. 
Partisan (Lab) Personal Prospective EE. 
Partisan (Lab) Personal Prospective EE. 
Partisan (Lab) Personal Prospective EE. 
Envirotunentahsts - Neutral, don't know 
Envirotunentahsts - Positive 
Envirotunentahsts - Negative 
Best Party Unemployment - No Difference, DK 
Best Party Unemployment - Liberals 
Best Party Unemployment - Labor 
Best Party Inflation - No Difference. DK 
Best Party Inflation - Liberals 
Best Party Inflation - Labor 
Best Party Economic Growth - No CHfference, DK 
Best Party Economic Growth - Liberals 
Best Party Economic Growth - Labor 
Typw of Economy - Mixed Economy 
Type of Economy - Sodahst 
Type <rf Economy - All Private Enterprise 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders 
No Change 
Negative 
Positive 
Positive 
No Change 
Negative 
Positive 
Freq(%) 
680(25.2) 
1142(42.3) 
849(31.4) 
30(1.1) 
477(17.7) 
32(1.2) 
2192(81.3) 
1280(47.4) 
722(26.7) 
699(25.9) 
1364(50.5) 
688(25.5) 
649(24,0) 
926(34.3) 
884(32.7) 
891(33.0) 
612(22.7) 
1372(50.8) 
717(26.5) 
1002(37.1) 
422(15.6) 
1277(47.3) 
1000(37.0) 
576(21.3) 
1125(41.7) 
956(35.4) 
752(27.8) 
993(36.8) 
1684(62.3) 
330(12.2) 
687(25.4) 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
0.53' 
0.71' 
0.46 
0.86 
-0.00 
-0.56' 
0.31 
-o,6r 
-1,34' 
-o,5r 
0.33 
-0,40 
-0.49' 
-0.37 
0.82' 
-0.17 
0.36 
-o.5r 
0.11 
0.28 
-0.18 
1.53 ± 3.96 0.21' 
0.21 
0.23 
0.92 
0.73 
0.23 
0.23 
0.23 
0,24 
0,28 
0,23 
0.22 
0.21 
0.24 
0.45 
0.20 
0.34 
0.22 
0,26 
0.23 
0.27 
0.20 
0.04 
Effea 
± Range 
13 ± 5 
17 ± 6 
0 
0 
0 
-13 ± 6 
0 
-16 ± 6 
-30 t 7 
-14 ± 6 
0 
-12 ± 6 
0 
18 ± 5 
0 
0 
-15 ± 6 
0 
0 
0 
see text 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(doff) 
10(3)' 
2(2) 
9(2)' 
27(2)' 
11(2)' 
5(2) 
21(2)' 
4(2) 
6(2)' 
2(2) 
27(1)' 
The results presented in table 6.9 indicate that die variables witii significant effects on intended 
vote in 1984 NSSS sample were party identification, relative confidence in the parties, attimde to the 
importance of royalty, attitudes to uranium mirung, priority to inflation or unemployment, partisan 
personal retrospective and prospective economic evaluations, best party on the issues of unemployment 
and economic growth and the relative evaluation of the two party leaders. 
Deleting party identification from the model decreased tiie scaled deviance by 198 units. In 
percentage terms, die change in scaled deviance (7.5%) is considerably lower than those changes 
observed, from identical procedures carried out on the ANPA samples. 
As was fotmd in the analysis of tiie 1979 data, sdength of identification was more relevant (in 
relation to vote) for coalition identifiers than for Labor party identifiers. Very strong identifiers with 
the Labor party were fotmd to be 35% more likely to vote for tiie Labor party than non-identifiers. 
Fairiy strong identifiers were 32% more lUcely and not very strong Labor identifiers, 35% more likely. 
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The effect of party identification for tiie three groups of coaUtion identifiers were, 46% less likely to 
vote Labor for very strong identifiers, 32% for fairiy stix)ng identifiers and 19% for not very strong 
coalition identifiers. 
The measure of relative attimde to tiie two major parties was found to be sigidficantiy associated 
witii intended vote [AX^=20(1), P<0.05]". The parameter estimate for this measure (-0.35), was 
higher than those obtained in the analyses of the ANPA samples. Approximately 23% of the 1984 
sample did not have any more confidence in one or other of tiie parties. This figure is comparable 
with the proportion of the 1969 and 1979 samples who indicated no net Ukes or dislikes to a major 
party. Table 6.10 presents the percentage effects on voting Labor, for each level of tiiis measure. 
TABLE 6.10: PERCENTAGE EFFECT OF RELATIVE CONFIDENCE IN THE PARTIES - 1984 NSSS 
Score 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Effea 
Labor Party 
L a t 
Grand Mean 
8.5 
16.3 
23.1 
28.7 
33.1 
no. (%) 
with score 
398(14.7) 
353(13.1) 
240(8.9) 
142(5.3) 
134<5.0) 
Liberal 
Effea at 
Grand Mean 
-8,7 
-17,2 
-24,9 
-31,5 
-37,0 
Party 
no. (%) 
with score 
283(10,5) 
234(8,7) 
158(5,8) 
86(3.2) 
62(2.3) 
The measure of royalty was found to be, significantiy associated witii intended vote [AX^=8(2), 
P<0.05]. Using a different model on tills data, KeUy (1988:70-71) found tiiat a measure of 'royalism' 
was sigruficantiy associated with choice of poUtical party. In the analyses reported here, respondents 
who indicated that the Queen and royal family were very important to Australia, were 17% less likely 
to vote for the Labor party than respondents who viewed royalty as imimportant. 
The measure of attimde to uranium mining was found to be significantiy associated with 
intended vote [^^^=13(2), P<0.05). Respondents who were opposed to uranium mining were 16% 
less likely to vote for the Labor party^*. This result has simUarities with the results obtained in the 
1979 sample, where the 'keep in tiie ground' group, were significantiy less likely to vote Labor. As in 
the case of tiie 1979 sample, the most readily apparent explanation for this finding is tiiat tiiis group 
intended to vote for the AustraUan Democrats. This explanation is supported by the analysis of major 
party vote, where neither the variable nor die parameters associated widi tiie variable were found to be 
significant (table A6.7). 
The measure of whether the federal govemment should give priority to inflation or 
unemployment was found to be significantiy associated witii vote [AX^=10(3), P<0.05]. The same 
measure was found not to be significant in the analysis of the 1979 ANPA data [AX^=2(2), ns]. In 
tius analysis of tiie 1984 NSSS sample, tiie parameter estimates obtained are quite puzzling. The 
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group of respondents who indicated priority should be given to unemployment and tiie group who 
suggested priority should be given to inflation, were botii found to be significantiy more Ukely to vote 
Labor tiian respondents who indicated tiiat neither economic problem should be given priority over tiie 
otiier. A readUy apparent explanation would be, that this question is equivalent to asking respondents 
which is tiie most important economic problem. Those tiiat opt for a single economic problem are 
also likely to view Labor as the best party to handle that single problem. This explanation was tested 
by deleting this measure from the model. However, this test did not support this explanation. The 
estimates and standard errors associated witii the measures of best party at handling unemployment and 
inflation did not change. 
Further analysis with measures of social stmcmral factors revealed that only tiie mral/non-mral 
measure altered the estimates for the 'priority to inflation/unemployment' measure^ .^ The (Pearson) 
correlation between living in a mral area and selection of the 'both' option was 0.23. It is suggested 
that rural respondents tended to select the 'botii' option and urban respondents tended to select eitiier 
inflation or unemployment as priorities. Therefore, this measure is in part a surrogate measure for 
urban or non-rural residence and tills part is responsible for the sigruficant effects of this measure. 
The measure of attimdes to the power of trade-uiuons was found to be not significantiy 
associated with vote [AX^=1(2), ns]. This residt contrasts with that found in the 1979 sample where 
this measure was found to be sigiuficanL The success of the accord between the Labor govemment 
and tiie trade-union movement which decreased the frequency and severity of industrial disputes may 
be responsible for tiie change between 1979 and 1984. 
Partisan personal retrospective economic evaluations were found to be significantiy associated 
widi intended Labor vote [AX^=9(2), P<0.05]. Respondents who considered that they had become 
worse off under a Labor govemment were 13% less likely to vote Labor tiian respondents who 
considered there had been no change. In the analysis of major party vote the variable was also 
significant [AX^=8(2), P<0.05]. Respondents who tiiought they had become worse off were 20% less 
likely to vote Labor. These residts suggest that negative personal retrospective evaluations transferted 
votes from die Labor party to the coalition parties. In die 1967 and 1979 ANPA samples personal 
retrospective evaluations were foimd not to be significantiy associated with Labor vote, altiiough a 
significant effect was observed in relation to major party vote in the 1979 sample. 
The two measures of partisan personal prospective economic evaluations were found to be 
significantiy associated with Labor vote. The standard question on whetiier changes in economic 
circumstances would occur if the opposition came to govemment and a second measure based on tiie 
continuance of the Labor party in office, were botii found to be significantiy associated witii vote^ * 
[Change to Liberals:AX2=27(2), P<0.05; Continuation of Labor,AX^=1 1(2), P<0.05]. 
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Focusing first on the standard question on economic prospects under tiie altemative party being 
in govemment tiie parameter estimates give unanticipated results. Botii respondents who tiiought tiiey 
would be worse off and better off under a Liberal govemment were significantiy less likely to vote 
Labor than those respondents who tiiought that there would be no difference. 
The explanation for die group who thought they would be better off under a Liberal govemment 
is straight forward - they judged they would be better off witii tiie altemative govemment and voted 
accordingly. This group were also fotmd to be significantiy more likely to vote for the coaUtion 
parties in the major party vote model. The parameter estimates are of sunilar magnitude, 1.34 in this 
Labor vote model and 1.51 in tiie major party vote model. These residts suggest a direct translation of 
support from the Labor party to the coaUtion parties. 
The group of respondents who tiiought they would be worse off (under a Liberal govemment) 
were also significantiy less likely to vote Labor, not because they intend to vote for tiie coalition 
parties but because they intended to vote for one of tiie minor parties. This explanation is indicated by 
tiie analysis of major party vote - this group was found to be not significantiy different from the 
reference ('no change') group (table A6.7). 
The second measure of personal prospective economic evaluations focusing on economic 
prospects with the continuance of the Labor party in office, shows that respondents who except they 
wiU become worse off were 14% less Ukely to vote Labor. Again, it appears that this group tended to 
vote for minor parties rather than for the coalition since a similar result was not obtained in relation to 
major party vote (table A6.7). 
The surrogate measure for environmental issues^' just faUed to be significantiy associated with 
vote [AX^=5(2), ns]. However, respondents who felt positive to environmentalists were 12% less 
likely to vote for the Labor party. This group were less lUcely to vote Labor since they tended to 
support the AustraUan Democrats. Analysis of major party vote supports this explanation since 
significant differences were not observed (table A6.7). 
The measures of best party at dealing with unemployment and economic growth also proved to 
be significantiy associated witii vote [Unemployment:AX^=21(2), P<0.05; Economic growtii:AX^=6(2), 
P<0.05]. Respondents who judged Labor as the best party at deaUng witii unemployment were 18% 
more Ukely to vote Labor than respondents who tiiought neitiier party was best Respondents who 
viewed the Liberals as being tiie best party in dealing with economic growtii were 15% less likely to 
vote Labor. In relation to major party vote the economic growth measure was found to be not 
significant [AX^=1(2), ns]. The implication of tius result is tiiat tiiose who tiiought tiie Liberals were 
the best party at handling economic growtii tended to vote for minor parties ratiier tiian for tiie 
coalition parties. The measure of best party at handling mflation was found not to be significantiy 
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associated with Labor vote. However, it was foir 1 to be significantiy related to major party vote 
[AX^=7(2), P<0.05] witii tiiose who tiiought Labor was best at handling inflation 15% more likely to 
vote Labor. One interpretation of these results for the inflation measure is tiiat tiiis issue transferted 
votes between the major parties but insignificant results are obtained when minor party voters are 
included in the analysis since some mmor party voters viewed Labor as best on tiiis issue. 
The measure of preferred type of economy which was included to assess tiie political impact of 
the promotion of a more market based economy by tiie 'new right', was found not to be significantiy 
associated with vote. However, the signs of the parameter estimates were in the excepted directions. 
Leadership was found to be significantiy associated with vote. The (absolute) magnimde of the 
coefficient (0.21) is comparable to that found (0.23) in the 1979 ANPA sample^. The effects on 
voting Labor at each level of this variable are presented in table 6.11. 
TABLE 6.11: PERCENTAGE EFFECT FOR MEASURE OF RELATIVE ATTITUDE TO LEADERS - 1984 NSSS 
Score 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Mr Hawke 
Effea at 
Grand Mean 
5.2 
10.1 
14.8 
19.5 
23.1 
26.6 
29.6 
32.3 
34.6 
36.6 
no.(%) 
with score 
257(9.5) 
288(10.7) 
234(8.7) 
242(9.0) 
190(7.0) 
112(4.1) 
119(4.4) 
44(1.6) 
56(11) 
70(Z6) 
Mr Peacock/Howard 
Effea at 
Grand Mean 
-5.2 
-10.5 
-15.5 
-20.4 
-24.9 
-29.0 
-32,7 
-i6.Q 
-18.9 
-41.4 
no.(%) 
with score 
162(6.0) 
121(4.5) 
98(3.6) 
90(3.3) 
66(14) 
46(1.7) 
44(1.6) 
5(0.2) 
24(0.9) 
16(0.6) 
An additional analysis substimting tiie relative evaluation of leaders measure, witii two separate 
measures for each party leader mdicated that Mr Hawke's leadership had a greater electoral impact 
tiian tiiat of tiie Leader of tiie Opposition '^. The coefficients were 0.31 and -0.08 respectively, tiie 
coefficient for the Leader of the Opposition being not significant. 
6.2.5 The 1986 NSSS 
In die 1986 NSSS sample a total of 1471 cases were analysed. The nuU model had a scaled 
deviance of 2011 widi 1470 degrees of freedom. The fuU model had a scaled deviance of 649 widi 
1415 degrees of fi'eedom. The log lUceUhood ratio was significant [AX^= 1362(55), P<0.05]. 
Therefore, die full model could account for 67.7% of die scaled deviance of die nuU model. 
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The model correctiy predicted die votes of aU but 9.5% of die sample. This compares witii 
56.9% cortect predictions and 43.1% incorrect predictions from tiie nuU model. The model improved 
the percentage of correct predictions by 33.6% from a possible 43.1%, a percentage of 78.0%. 
TABLE 6.12(1): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1986 LABOR PARTY INTENDED VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY, ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=l471:1986 NSSS) 
VARIABLE 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identification - No Major Party 
Party Identification - V. Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Fairiy Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V. Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V. Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identification - Fairiy Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identification - Very Strong Coahtion 
Relative Attitude to parties 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 
General Ideological Position - Left 
General Ideological Position - Right 
Big Business - Neutral. Don't Know 
Big Business - Agree: too much power 
Big Business - Disagree: too much power 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Don't Know 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Reduce Taxes 
Death Penally - Neutral. Don't Know 
Death Penalty - In favour Death Perudty 
Death Penalty - Not ui Favour 
Feelings towards Migrants 
Pomography - Middle Position 
Pomography - Disagree Stricter Controls 
Pomography - Agree Stricter Controls 
Royalty - Not Important 
Royalty - Somewhat Important, Don't Know 
Royalty - Very Important 
Uraruum Mining - Middle Position 
Uraruum Mining - Against Uranium Mining 
Uranium Mining - Support Uranium Mining 
Marijuana - Neutral, Don't Know 
Marijuana - Strongly Agree LegaUsation 
Marijuana • Somewhat Agree Legahsation 
Marijuana - Somewhat Disagree Legahsation 
Marijuana - Strongly Disagree LegaUsation 
Spend more for Aborigines - Neutral 
Spend more for Aborigines - Spend more 
Spend more for Aborigines - Do not spend more 
Freq(%) 
634(43.1) -0,98 
Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X' 
Deviance 
(dof 0 
0,63 
138(9.4) 
186(12.6) 
322(21.9) 
179(12,2) 
150(10,2) 
294(20,0) 
202(13.7) 
-0.17 ± 4.33 
1283(87.2) 
38(2.6) 
150(10.2) 
732(49.8) 
497(33.8) 
242(16.5) 
335(22.8) 
37(2.5) 
1099(74.7) 
188(12.8) 
977(66.4) 
306(20.8) 
0.09 ± 1.96 
220(15.0) 
251(17.1) 
1000(68.0) 
768(52.2) 
412(28.0) 
291(19.8) 
317(21.5) 
432(29.4) 
722(49.1) 
206(14.0) 
116(7.9) 
177(12.0) 
386(26.2) 
586(39.8) 
323(22,0) 
521(35.4) 
627(42.6) 
-
3.48* 
2.48* 
1.50' 
-0.17 
-0,62 
-2.42' 
-0.31' 
-
-0.24 
-0.44 
-
0.30 
0.13 
-
-0.17 
0.12 
-
0.00 
-0.04 
-0.08 
-
0.58 
0.28 
-
0.01 
0.18 
-
-0.52 
0.13 
-
-0.72 
-0.06 
-0.36 
-0.47 
-
-0.19 
-0.22 
-
0,58 
0,34 
0.32 
0.40 
0.46 
1.15 
0.06 
-
0.64 
0,64 
-
0.24 
0,34 
-
0.71 
0.26 
-
0.33 
0,38 
0.06 
-
0.38 
0.31 
-
0.25 
0.33 
-
0.29 
0.28 
-
0.46 
0.38 
0.35 
0.35 
-
0.28 
0.29 
52 ± 13 
47 ± 8 
34 ± 8 
0 
0 
-37 ± 27 
see text 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
142(6)' 
32(1)' 
1(2) 
2(2) 
0(2) 
0(2) 
2(1) 
2(2) 
0(2) 
7(2)' 
4(4) 
1(2) 
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TABLE 6 12(u)- LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1986 LABOR PARTY INTENDED VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY, ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1471:1986 NSSS) 
VARIABLE 
ISSUES 
Priority Inflation/Unemploymettt - Inflation 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Unemployment 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Don't Know 
Trade-Unions - Not too much power 
Trade-Unions - Middle position, don't know 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 
Partisan Sociotrojric Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan SocioUopic Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan Sociotropic Retrospective EE - Positive 
Partisan (Lib) Sociotropic Prospective - No Change 
Partisan (Lib) Sociotropic Prospective - Negative 
Partisan (Lib) Sociotropic Prospective - Positive 
Partisan (Lab) Sociotropic Prospective - No Change 
Partisan (Lab) Sociotropic Prospective - Negative 
Partisan (Lab) Sociotropic Prospective - Positive 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE - Positive 
Partisan (Lib) Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan (Lib) Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan (Lib) Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 
Partisan (Lab) Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan (Lab) Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan (Lab) Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 
Issue ol Taxation 
FeeUngs towards Environmentalists - Neutral 
Feelings towards EnvirorunentaUsts - Positive 
Feelings towards envirotunentaUsts - Negative 
Privatisation - Supportive 
Privatisation - Neutral 
Privatisation - Not Supportive 
Feelings state govemment - Neutral 
Feelings state goverrunent - Anti ALP/Pro LNP 
FeeUngs state goverrunent - Pro ALP/Anti LNP 
Type <rf Economy - Mixed Economy 
Type of Economy - SodaUst 
Type <rf Economy - Private Enterprise except Utilities 
Type (rf Economy - AU Private Enterprise 
LEADERS 
Relative Attimde to Leaders 
Freq(%) 
792(53.8) 
574(39.0) 
105(7.1) 
316(21.5) 
60(4.1) 
1095(74.4) 
378(25.7) 
656(44,6) 
437(29.7) 
401(27.3) 
589(40,0) 
481(32,7) 
548(37,3) 
443(30.1) 
480(32.6) 
588(40.0) 
691(47.0) 
192(13.1) 
603(41.0) 
424(28.8) 
444(30.2) 
530(36.0) 
709(48.2) 
232(15.8) 
1.52 ± 1.86 
389(26.4) 
583(39.6) 
499(33.9) 
769(52.2) 
76(5.2) 
626(42.6) 
287(19.5) 
566(38.5) 
618(42.0) 
413(28.1) 
137(9.3) 
628(42.7) 
293(19.9) 
1.49 ± 4.2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
-
-0.14 
-0,40 
-
0.40 
0.10 
-
-0.50 
0.39 
-
0,01 
-0.65 
-
-0.41 
0.09 
-
-0.34 
-0.68 
-
-0.11 
-0.19 
-
-0.21 
0.93' 
0.02 
-
-0.34 
0.10 
-
-0.56 
0,05 
-
-0.30 
0.71' 
-
-0.49 
-0.14 
-0.13 
0.05 
Standard 
Error 
-
0,22 
0.59 
-
0.87 
0.26 
-
0,32 
0,32 
-
0,31 
0.36 
-
0.35 
0.32 
-
0.31 
0.42 
-
0.30 
0.40 
-
0.31 
0.40 
0.06 
-
0.26 
0.29 
-
0.82 
0.23 
-
0,29 
0.27 
-
0.38 
0.25 
0.34 
0.04 
Effea 
± Range 
-
Q 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
23 ± 10 
0 
-
a 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
18 ± 7 
-
0 
0 
0 
see text 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dof 0 
1(2) 
0(2) 
6(2)' 
2(2) 
3(2) 
3(2) 
0(2) 
8(2)' 
0(1) 
3(2) 
1(2) 
16(2)' 
2(3) 
1(1) 
The results presented m table 6.12 indicate tiiat tiie variables witii significant effects on intended 
vote in the 1986 sample were party identification, relative attimde to the parties, attimde to uraruum 
mining, partisan sociotropic redospective economic evaluations, partisan personal prospective 
economic evaluations, and feeUngs toward the state govemment. The measure of relative attitude to 
the party leaders was found to be not significanL 
Deletmg party identification from the model decreased the scaled deviance by 142 units or 
10.4% of the change in scaled deviance. This figure comparable witii that observed from an identical 
operation performed on the 1984 NSSS data. 
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In cond'ast to tiie findings from tiie 1979 and 1984 samples, tiie strengtii of identification became 
relevant for Labor party identifiers. Very strong identifiers with the Labor party were 52% more 
likely to vote Labor dian non-identifiers. Fairly strong identifiers were 47% more likely and not very 
strong Labor identifiers 37% more Ukely. Very sdong coalition identifiers were found to be 51% less 
likely to vote for tiie Labor party than non-identifiers. 
In tills analysis of Labor vote, two groups of identifiers, not very strong and fairly strong 
coalition identifiers were found to be not significantiy different from die 'no major party' group. 
However, in the analysis of major party vote both these groups were found to be sigruficantiy less 
likely to vote Labor, 31% for fairly strong coalition identifiers and 35% for not very strong coaUtion 
identifiers. In condast, not very sdong Labor identifiers who were significantiy more lUcely to vote 
Labor in the analysis of Labor vote, were found to be not significantiy different from non-identifiers. 
These seemingly anomalous results are due to changes in the composition of tiie reference (no major 
party identification) group. In the Labor vote model approximately 50% of tius reference group were 
minor party voters. This group was therefore less Ukely to vote Labor and not significantiy different 
from two weakest groups of coaUtion identifiers. When mmor party voters are excluded from tiie 
analysis (as in the major party model), the reference group becomes 'more Labor' and significant 
differences between this group and the two weakest groups of coalition identifiers emerge. However, 
the more pro-Labor orientation of the reference group residted in non-significant differences between 
this group and not very sdong Labor identifiers. 
The measure of relative attimde to the parties was found to be significantiy associated with 
intended vote [AX^=35(1), P<0.05]. The estimate of -0.31 for tius measure is aUnost identical witii tiie 
estimate obtained from analysis of the 1984 NSSS sample which employed a measure based on tiie 
'confidence' rather than feeling thermometer scores. The foUowing table (table 6.14) presents the 
percentage change for each response compared with respondents who were not warmer or colder to 
one party than the other (scored 0). The percentage of respondents in this category was 22%. 
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TABLE 6.13: PERCENTAGE EFFECT FOR MEASURE OF ATTITUDE TO THE PARTIES - 1986 NSSS 
Labor Party 
Score 
1 
2 
1 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Effea at 
Grand Mean 
7.7 
15.3 
22.7 
29.3 
35.0 
39.9 
43.8 
46.9 
49.4 
51.3 
no.(%) with 
score 
85(5.8) 
103(7.0) 
75(5.1) 
79(5.4) 
75(5.1) 
46(3.1) 
40(17) 
18(1.2) 
30(10) 
35(14) 
Liberal Party 
Effea at 
Grand Mean 
-7.4 
-14.1 
-20.1 
-25.1 
-29.3 
-32.6 
-35.1 
-37.1 
-38.7 
-39.8 
no.(%) 
with score 
76(5.2) 
136(9,2) 
81(5.5) 
70(4.8) 
59(4.0) 
44(3.0) 
43(19) 
14(1.0) 
22(1.5) 
23(1.6) 
As in the analysis of tiie 1979 and 1984 data, tiie measure of atiitude to uranium mining was 
found to be significantiy associated witii mtended vote [AX^=6(2), P<0.05]. However, the two 
parameter estunates were found not be significant at the P<0.05 level. Reparameterisation of tills 
measure showed that respondents who were opposed to uranium muting were significantiy less lUcely 
to vote for the Labor party than respondents supportive of uranium muiing^ .^ The explanation for 
this result is tiie same as that for simUar residts obtained in the analyses of the 1979 and 1984 samples 
- respondents opposed to uraiuiun mirung intended to vote for mmor parties. Analysis of tiie major 
party vote supports this explanation since tiiis variable and its associated parameters were not 
significant (table A6.8). 
Attimdes to the legalisation of marijuana and govemment assistance to Aborigines were found 
not to be sigruficantiy associated with vote. In the analysis of major party vote the measure of attitude 
to the smoking of marijuana was also fotmd to be not significantiy associated with vote, although 
respondents who 'somewhat' disagreed with legalisation were more likely to vote for tiie coaUtion. 
The measure of partisan sociotropic retrospective economic evaluations was also found to be 
significantiy associated with vote [AX^=6(2), P<0.05], although the parameter estimates were not 
significanL Reparameterisation of this measure showed tiiat respondents who thought Australia had 
become worse off imder a Labor govemment were significantiy less likely to vote Labor than 
respondents who had positive evaluations^^ 
In contrast, the measures of partisan sociotropic prospective economic evaluations, either witii a 
change of govemment or the continuation of the Labor party in office, were found not to be 
significantiy associated with vote [Liberals:AX^=2(2), ns; Labor:AX^=0(2), ns]. These measures were 
also not significant in the major vote model (table A6.8). 
Partisan personal retrospective economic evaluations were found not be significant in relation to 
Labor or major party vote (tables 6.12 & A6.8). These results contrast witii the significant effects 
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found with both Labor vote and major party vote in the 1984 NSSS and witii major party vote in the 
1979 ANPA. 
The measure of partisan personal prospective economic evaluations relating to a change of 
govemment was not significantiy associated with vote [AX^=0(2), ns]. This finding condasts witii 
significant effects found from the analysis of die 1967, 1979 and 1984 samples. One explanation for 
this result is tiiat its impact on vote is overcome by the prospective measure based on tiie continuation 
of tiie Labor party in govemment, diis measure being significant. However, deletion of tills measure 
from the model did not aUow the 'change of government' measure to become significant^. 
Therefore, the conclusion is that m 1986 voters were not prompted to change tiieir vote by their 
judgement of whether they would become better or worse off with a change of government In 
contrast, such judgements did influence vote in tiie years 1967, 1979 and 1984. 
Partisan personal prospective economic evaluations relating to the continuation of the Labor 
party in office were found to be significantiy associated witii intended vote [AX^=8(2), P<0.05]. A 
similar result was obtained from the analysis of the 1984 NSSS sample. Respondents who expect they 
wiU become better off imder the Labor govemment were 19% more Ukely to vote Labor than 
respondents who considered there wiU be no change. Respondents who expected that they would 
become worse off were not sigruficantiy less lUcely to vote Labor, although the parameter estimate is 
in the expected (negative) direction. The variable was also significant in relation to major party vote 
suggestmg a direct transfer of votes between the major parties. 
The surrogate measure for environmental issues based on feeUngs towards 'environmentaUsts' 
was found not to be sigruficantiy associated witii vote [AX^=3(2), ns]. In contrast to tiie 1984 
analysis, none of tiie parameter estimates associated witii tius variable were significant. The 
impUcation of dus finding is diat environmental issues had no effect on vote in 1986 whereas diey had 
some effect in 1984. 
One important fmding of tills analysis, is that the evaluations of tiie state govemment where the 
respondent resides have significant effects on vote [AX^=16(2), P<0.05]. Respondents who, eitiier 
were negative towards tiie conservative govemment in tiieir state or positive towards tiieir state Labor 
govemment, were 18% more lUcely to vote Labor at a Federal election. This result indicates tiie 
performance of state govemments can have effects at Federal elections. 
As was found in the analysis of tiie 1984 NSSS sample, tiie measure of preferted type of 
economy was found not to be significantiy associated witii vote [AX^=2(3), ns]. 
In contrast to tiie results obtained from tiie analysis of tiie data sets coUected at eariier time 
points tiie relative evaluation of the leaders was found not to be significantiy associated witii vote 
[AX^=1(1), ns). The sign of tiie parameter estimate is in tiie expected direction but is almost equal to 
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its standard error. Additional analyses substimtmg the relative evaluation measure by separate 
measures for each leader showed that evaluations of Mr Hawke had a significant positive association 
witii vote [PE=0.19, SE=0.06], whereas tiie evaluations of Mr Howard were not sigruficantiy 
associated witii vote and the estimate was in tiie wrong direction [PE=0.10, SE=0.06]. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that sigruficant effects of the combined leadership measure on Labor vote were not 
found because the evaluations of Mr Howard had slighdy contradictory effects^ .^ 
In the analysis of major party vote the measure of relative evaluation of the leaders was found to 
be significant [AX^=5(1), P<0.05] and tiie parameter estimate (0.14) was also significant. The 
significant effect found m tiie major party vote model condasts widi the non-sigruficant effect in the 
Labor vote model. The explanation for this apparent discrepancy is that a substantial proportion of 
minor party voters had quite positive evaluations of Mr Hawke, deflating the association between 
leader evaluations and vote for the Labor part/*. 
6.2.6 The 1987 AES 
A total of 1677 cases were employed in the analysis of the 1987 AES sample. The nuU model 
had a scaled deviance of 2324 with 1676 degrees of freedom. The fuU model had a scaled deviance 
of 739 with 1605 degrees of freedom. The log lUcelUiood ratio was sigruficant [AX^= 1586(71), 
P<0.05]. Therefore, tiie fuU model could account for 68.2% of the scaled deviance of the nuU model. 
The model correctiy predicted tiie votes of 91.8% of the sample. This compares witii 51.0% 
correct predictions and 49.0% incortect predictions from the nuU model. The model improved tiie 
percentage of correct predictions by 40.8% from a possible 49.0% (a percentage of 83.3%). 
232 
TABLE 6.15(i): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1987 LABOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1677:1987 AES) 
VARIABLE Freq(%) Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dofO 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identificauon - No Major Party 
Party Identification - V. Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Fairiy Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V, Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Not V. Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identificauon - Fairiy Strong Coahtion 
Party Identification - Very Strong Coahtion 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre (4-7) 
General Ideological Position - Left (1-3) 
General Ideological Position - Right (8-10) 
Big Business - too much power 
Big Business - It Depends, No response (NR) 
Big Business - Does not have too much power 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - It Depends, NR 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Less Tax 
Death Penalty - Not Sure, No Response (NR) 
Death Penalty - Agree: Bring Back 
Death Penalty - Disagree: Bring Back 
Migration - On no racial/ethnic grounds 
Migration - Quota on Asian imnugrants 
Migration - No Asian, but British & European 0,K. 
Migration - Only from Britain & N. Europe 
Migration - No more migrants 
Migration - No Response 
Censorship - None 
Censorship - h Depends, No Response 
Censorship - Some Censorship 
Royalty - Not Important 
Royalty - Somewhat Important 
Royalty - Very Important 
Royalty - No Response 
Uraniiun Mining - Mine and SeU Uraiuum 
Uranium Mining - Mine but Safeguards 
Uraruum Mining - Mine but only Austrahan use 
Uranium Mining - Keep in the ground 
Uranium Mining - Does'nt Matter 
Uranium Mining - No Response 
Marijuana - Strongly Favour Legalisation 
Marijuana - Favour LegaUsation 
Marijuana - It depends. No Response 
Marijuaiui - Favour remaining Dlegal 
Marijuana - Strongly Favour remaining Dlegal 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Special Benefits 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - No differentiy 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Get too many 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - It Depends 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - No Response 
856(51.0) -2.50" 0.91 -44 ±20 
173(10.3) 
170(10.1) 
419(25.0) 
234<14.0) 
230(13.7) 
324(19.3) 
127(7.6) 
1148(68.5) 
136(8.1) 
393(23.4) 
835(49.8) 
549(32.7) 
293(17.5) 
391(23.3) 
233(13.9) 
1053(618) 
307(18.3) 
983(58.6) 
387(23.1) 
370(211) 
390(23.3) 
44(16) 
111(6.6) 
718(42.8) 
44(16) 
481(28.7) 
234(14.0) 
962(57.4) 
878(52.4) 
487(29.0) 
311(18.5) 
1(0.1) 
223(13.3) 
921(54.9) 
159(9.5) 
309(18.4) 
53(3.2) 
12(0.7) 
101(6.0) 
232(13.8) 
215(12.8) 
350(20.9) 
779(46.5) 
160(9.5) 
896(53.4) 
336(20.0) 
277(16.5) 
8(0.5) 
-
3,20' 
2.55* 
1,92' 
-0,94' 
-1,30' 
-2.35' 
-
-0.74 
-0,61' 
-
0.14 
0.39 
-
-0.22 
-0.41 
-
0.08 
0.02 
-
0.05 
-0.83 
0.43 
0.36 
0.98 
-
0,21 
-0,06 
-
-0,20 
-0.31 
4.53 
-
0.10 
0.15 
-0.00 
-0.26 
0,18 
-
0.43 
0,58 
1.31' 
1.03' 
-
-0.09 
0,05 
0.06 
0.24 
-
0.57 
0.32 
0.30 
0.33 
0.37 
1.05 
-
0.38 
0,29 
-
0,24 
0,31 
-
0.36 
0.25 
-
0.29 
0.32 
-
0,29 
0.66 
0.48 
0.28 
0.76 
-
0.32 
0.24 
-
0.23 
0.32 
13.72 
-
0.31 
0.44 
0.38 
0.58 
1.18 
-
0.46 
0.47 
0.46 
0.43 
-
0.37 
0.44 
0.41 
1.25 
241(6)' 
45 ±20 
42 ± 
37 ± 
-22 ± 
-29 ± 
8 
7 
8 
9 
-42 ±24 
0 
-15 ± 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7 
28 ± 11 
23 ± 
0 
0 
0 
0 
11 
7(2)* 
2(2) 
3(2) 
0(2) 
7(5) 
1(2) 
2(3) 
1(5) 
12(4)' 
0(4) 
233 
TABLE 6 15(u): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1987 LABOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1677:1987 AES) 
VAIUABLE 
ISSUES 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Both Equal, NR 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Unemployment 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Inflation 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 
Trade-Unions - It depends 
Trade-Unions - Not too much power 
Trade-Unions - No Response (NR) 
Sunple Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Sunple Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - NR 
Simple Sociotropic Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Sunple Sociotropic Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Sunple Sociotrofac Rarospective EE. - Positive 
Sunple Sociotrofac Rarospective EE. - NR 
Mediated Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Mediated Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Mediated Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Mediated Personal Retrospective EE. - NR 
Mediated Sociotropic Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Mediated Sociotropic Retrospective EE - Negative 
Mediated Sociotropic Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Mediated Sociotropic Retrospective EE. - NR 
Mediated Sociotropic Prospective EE. - No Change 
Mediated Sociotropic Prospective EE. - Negative 
Mediated Sociotropic Prospective EE. - Positive 
Mediated Sociotropic Prospective EE. - NR 
Importance of the issue of Inflation 
Importance of the issue of Interest Rates 
Importance of the issue of Taxation 
Importance of the issue of the Envirotunent 
Labor Party Divided - United 
Labor Party Divided - Not Sure 
Labor Party [Mvidcd - Divided 
Labor Party Divided - No Response (NR) 
Liberal Party Divided - United 
Liberal Party Divided - Not Sure 
Liberal Party Divided - Divided 
Liberal Party Divided - No Response (NR) 
National Party Divided - Ututed 
National Party Divided - Not Sure 
National Party Divided - Divided 
National Party Divided - No Response (NR) 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders 
Freq(%) 
985(58.7) 
395(23.6) 
297(17.7) 
1171(69.8) 
258(15.4) 
229(13.7) 
19(1,1) 
628(37,4) 
727(43.4) 
311(18.5) 
11(0.7) 
371(211) 
771(46.0) 
526(31.4) 
9(0.5) 
980(58,4) 
502(29.9) 
167(10.0) 
28(1.7) 
643(38.3) 
505(30.1) 
475(28.3) 
54(3.2) 
671(40.0) 
302(18.0) 
680(40.5) 
24(1.4) 
1.15 ± 1.11 
1.11 ± 1.09 
1.26 ± 1.05 
0.70 ± 1.03 
1057(63.0) 
314(18.7) 
272(16.2) 
34(10) 
157(9.4) 
316(18.8) 
1118(66.7) 
86(5.1) 
113(6.7) 
399(23.8) 
1061(63.3) 
104(6.2) 
1.33 ± 5.2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
-
-0,48 
0.63' 
-
0,54 
0.49 
1.08 
-
-0.26 
0.01 
1,28 
-
-0.46 
-0.34 
-0,75 
-
-0,38 
-0,24 
-2,02' 
-
-0.12 
0.90' 
0.76 
-
-0.23 
0.69' 
0,69 
-0,04 
0.15 
0.22 
-0.16 
-
0.12 
-0.71' 
-1.10 
-
0.15 
0.56 
2.66' 
-
0.47 
0.20 
-1.10 
0,20' 
Standard 
Error 
-
0,26 
0,30 
-
0.30 
0.33 
1,13 
-
0,26 
0.32 
1,67 
-
0.28 
0,30 
1.73 
-
0.28 
0.44 
0.91 
-
0.28 
0.30 
0.65 
-
0.39 
0.25 
0.89 
0.14 
0.13 
0.15 
0.14 
-
0.28 
0,30 
0.91 
-
0.48 
0.44 
1.26 
-
0.48 
0.45 
1.14 
0.03 
Effea 
± Range 
-
0 
15 ± 7 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
Q 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-40 ±21 
-
0 
21 ± 7 
0 
-
0 
17 ± 6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
-17 ± 8 
0 
-
0 
0 
43 ±27 
-
0 
0 
0 
see text 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dof 0 
9(2)' 
5(3) 
2(3) 
3(3) 
6(3) 
11(3)' 
9(3)" 
2(1) 
0(1) 
1(1) 
1(1) 
8(3)' 
7(3) 
3(3) 
43(1)' 
The residts presented m table 6.15 indicate that tiie variables with sigruficant effects on intended 
vote in the 1987 AES sample were party identification, general ideological position, attitude to the 
legaUsation of marijuana, attitude to priority of inflation or unemployment, both mediated sociodopic 
retrospective and prospective economic evaluations, evaluation of whether the Labor party was united 
or divided and the relative evaluation of the leaders. 
Deleting party identification from the model decreases the scaled deviance by 241 units or 
15.2% of the change ui scaled deviance. 
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The effects on vote for different levels of Labor identification varied in the expected maimer. 
Very strong identifiers were 45% more likely to vote for tiie Labor party than non-identifiers. Fairly 
strong identifiers, 42% more likely and not very strong Labor identifiers 37% more likely. 
The effects of party identification for the tiiree groups of coaUtion identifiers had a greater range. 
Very strong coaUtion identifiers were 42% less likely to vote Labor party, fairly strong identifiers 29% 
less likely and for not very strong coalition identifiers 22% less likely. Again the strength of 
identification was more relevant in relation to vote, for coalition identifiers than for Labor party 
identifiers. 
The constmcted measure of general ideological position was found to be significantiy associated 
with vote [AX^=7(2), P<0.05]. Respondents who placed themselves on the right (at positions 8 to 10 
inclusive), were 15% less likely to vote Labor tiian respondents who placed themselves towards tiie 
centre (positions 4 to 7). The group that saw themselves as bemg to the left (positions 1 to 3), were 
not significantiy different from the centre group and the sign of the coefficient was not in the expected 
direction. The signs were in expected directions witii the analysis of major party vote mdicating that a 
substantial proportion of those who placed themselves on the left voted for minor parties. 
The only other 'ideological' indicator significantiy associated with vote was the measure of 
attimdes to the legalisation of marijuana [AX^ =12(4), P<0.05]. Respondents who indicated tiiey were 
in favour or strongly in favour of marijuana remaining iUegal were 28% and 23% more likely to vote 
Labor compared with respondents who sdongly favoured legalisation. These results may appear at 
first counter-inmitive but the explanation again centres on mmor party voters. In tiie analysis of major 
party vote, the measure of 'marijuana' faUs to be significant at tiie 0.05 level [X^=9(4), ns] and the 
parameter estimates were not significantiy different from zero (table A6.9). The impUcation is that 
those who favoured legalisation tended to vote for minor parties. 
The priority of govemment policy to unemployment or mflation was found to be significantiy 
associated with vote [AX^=9(2), P<0.05]. Respondents who gave higher priority to inflation were 15% 
more Ukely to vote Labor than those who gave neitiier problem priority. Those who gave priority to 
unemployment just faUed to be significantiy less likely to vote Labor (T ratio=1.84). In the analysis 
of major party vote simUar estimates were obtained (table A6.9), altiiough tiie estimate for tiie inflation 
group just faUed to be significant at tiie P<0.05 level. 
The measures of simple personal and retrospective economic evaluations were found not to be 
significantiy related to vote. Similarly, the measure of mediated personal retrospective evaluations was 
also not significant. 
The measures of both mediated sociotropic redospective and prospective economic evaluations 
were found to be significantiy associated with vote [Retrospective:AX^=ll(3), P<0.05; 
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Prospective:AX^=9(3), P<0.05]. Voters who considered AustraUa had become better off under tiie 
policies of the govemment were 21% more lUcely to vote for the Labor party than respondents whose 
judgement was tiiat there had been no change. In relation to prospective evaluations tiiose who 
considered Australia wotdd become better off through the policies of tiie govemment were 17% more 
likely to vote Labor. 
The contmuous measures of the miportance of tiie issues of inflation, interest rates, taxation and 
the environment, were aU foimd to be not sigruficantiy associated witii vote. 
Measures developed from the question on whether the respondents thought the Labor party was 
imited or divided was fotmd to be sigruficantiy associated with vote [AX^=8(3), P<0.05]. The 
parameterisation used in this analysis showed that, voters who viewed the Labor party as divided were 
17% less Ukely to vote Labor than respondents who viewed the Labor party as united. Similarly when 
the variable is reparameterised, respondents who see tiie Labor party as being united were significantiy 
more Ukely to vote Labor than respondents who tiiought the party was divided. This result is one of 
the first empirical confirmations of another maxim of Australian political foUdore - tiiat voters favour 
uruted parties. 
These residts would be more satisfactory if the measure for the Liberal party being divided was 
also found to be significantiy related to vote. Deletion of the 'Labor uruted/divided' measure from the 
model did not markedly alter the coefficients associated widi (or the sigruficance of) the 'Liberals 
uruted/divided' measure. Ordy the 86 respondents ui die 'no response' group of tills measure were 
found to be significantiy more Ukely to vote Labor tiian the 'Liberal party uruted' group. This result 
(for the 'no response' group) is responsible for the variable overaU being almost being significant 
[AX'=7(3), 0.10<P<0.05]. 
Altiiough one of tiie most notable feamres of tiie 1987 election campaign was tiie spUt between 
the Queensland and Federal Nationals evaluations on tiie unity of the National party had no sigruficant 
effect on vote [AX^=3(3), ns]. Furtiier analysis witii a measure of the evaluations of tiie Queensland 
Premier''' was also found to have no significant effect on vote [PE=0.00, SE=0.03]^l From tiiese 
analyses it can be concluded tiiat die spUts in die National party or the entrance of tiie Queensland 
premier to the federal arena had no effect on vote at the 1987 election. 
The measure of relative attimde to the two major party leaders was found to be significantiy 
associated widi vote. The foUowuig table (table 6.16) presents die effects on voting Labor relative to 
the neudal position, for each score on the mdex. 
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TABLE 6.16: PERCENTAGE EFFECT FOR RELATIVE ATTITUDE TO THE LEADERS - 1987 AES 
Score 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Mr Hawke 
Effea at 
Grand Mean 
5,0 
9,8 
14.5 
18.8 
ns 26.5 
29.8 
317 
35.3 
37.5 
no.(%) with 
score 
92(5.5) 
119(7.1) 
103(6.1) 
85(5.1) 
177(10.6) 
81(4.8) 
69(4.1) 
67(4.0) 
47(18) 
104(6.2) 
Effea 
Mr Howard 
at 
Grand Mean 
-5,0 
-9.9 
-14.6 
-19.1 
-23.3 
-27.1 
-30.6 
-33.7 
-36.3 
-38.7 
no.(%) 
with score 
70(4.2) 
64(3.8) 
79(4.7) 
63(3,8) 
80(4,8) 
47(2.8) 
34(10) 
43(16) 
22(1.3) 
48(17) 
Substimtion of the combmed measure witii separate measures for the two party leaders revealed 
that the evaluations of both party leaders had significant effects on vote. The magnitude of tiie 
parameter estimate for tiie leader of the govemment (0.29) was larger than tiiat for the leader of tiie 
opposition (-0.13) indicating tiiat evaluations of Mr Hawke were more important. 
6.2.7 The 1988 NSSS 
After the Ust wise deletion of missing values a total of 1556 cases were analysed in the 1988 
NSSS sample. The nidi model had a scaled deviance of 2141 witii 1555 degrees of freedom. The fuU 
model had a scaled deviance of 700 with 1515 degrees of freedom. The log lUceUhood ratio was 
sigruficant [AX^= 1440(40), P<0.05]. Therefore, the fuU model could account for 67.2% of tiie scaled 
deviance of the nidi model. 
The model correctiy predicted tiie votes of aU but 9.3% of the sample. This compares with 
55.1% cortect predictions and 44.9% incorrect predictions from the nuU model. The model unproved 
the percentage of correct predictions by 35.6% from a possible 44.9% (a percentage of 79.3%). 
The residts of the analysis of die model on the 1988 sample are presented in table 6.17. 
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TABLE 6.17(i): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1988 LABOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1556: 1988 NSSS) 
VARIABLE Freq(%) Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(doff) 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identification - No Major Party 
Party Identification - V. Strong l^bor 
Party Identificauon - Fairiy Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V. Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V. Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identification - Fairiy Strong Coahtion 
Party Identification - Very Strong CoaUtion 
Relative Attitude to parties 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 
General Ideological Position - Left 
General Ideological Position - Right 
Feelings Big Business - Neutral, Don't Know 
FeeUngs Big Business - Negative 
FeeUngs Big Business - Positive 
Spend cn welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Don't Know 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Reduce Taxes 
Death Penalty - Neutral, Don't Know 
Death Penalty - Reintroduce Death Penalty 
Death Penalty - Abolish Death Penalty 
Pomography - Middle Position 
Pomography - Disagree Stricter Controls 
Pomography - Agree Stricter Controb 
Royalty - Not Important 
Royalty - Somewhat Important, Don't Know 
Royalty - Very Important 
Uranium Mining - Middle Position 
Uraruum Mining - Against Uranium Mirung 
Uraniiun Mining - Support Uraniiun Mining 
Marijuana - Neutral, Don't Know 
Marijuana - Strongly Agree Legalisation 
Marijuana - Somewhat Agree LegaUsation 
Marijuana - Somewhat Disagree LegaUsation 
Marijuarui - Strongly Disagree LegaUsation 
Spend more for Aborigines - Neutral 
Spend more for Aborigines - Spend more 
Spend more for Aborigines - Do not spend more 
698(44.9) -1,23 0.66 
146(9.4) 
176(11.3) 
360(23.1) 
188(111) 
188(111) 
339(21.8) 
159(10.2) 
-0.45 ± 4.1 
1444(918) 
24(1.5) 
88(5,7) 
502(32,3) 
372(23,9) 
682(43.8) 
397(25.5) 
37(14) 
1122(711) 
206(13.2) 
1012(65.0) 
338(21.7) 
286(18.4) 
255(16.4) 
1015(65.2) 
396(25.4) 
881(56.6) 
279(17.9) 
349(22.4) 
529(34,0) 
678(43,6) 
222(14.3) 
111(7.1) 
206(13.2) 
381(24.5) 
636(40.9) 
587(37.7) 
385(24.7) 
584(37.5) 
-
3,01' 
2.35' 
1,53' 
-0.68 
-1.47* 
-1.55* 
-0.42' 
-
-0.85 
-0.06 
-
-0.57' 
-0.21 
-
0.07 
0.20 
-
0.38 
0.56 
-
0.31 
0.21 
-
-0,23 
-0.21 
-
-0.61' 
0,19 
-
-0,41 
0,17 
0,30 
-0,01 
-
-0,31 
-O.ir 
-
0.56 
0,31 
0,30 
0,37 
0,43 
0.80 
0.06 
. 
0,73 
0.66 
-
0.28 
0.25 
-
0,64 
0.25 
-
0.31 
0.36 
-
0.33 
0,26 
-
0,24 
0.36 
-
0,28 
0,27 
-
0.44 
0.37 
0.33 
0.32 
-
0,26 
0,25 
183(6)' 
50 ± 14 
45 ± 8 
34 ± 7 
0 
29 ± 11 
•30 ± 20 
see text 
0 
0 
•13 ± 7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-14 ± 7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-17 ± 6 
52(1)' 
1(2) 
4(2) 
1(2) 
2(2) 
1(2) 
1(2) 
11(2)' 
4(4) 
10(2)' 
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TABLE 6.17(u): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1988 LABOR PARTY INTENDED VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP. INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY, ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N= 1556:1988 NSSS) 
VARIABLE Freq(%) Parameter Standard Effea Change X^  
Estimate Error ± Range Deviance 
(dof 0 
ISSUES 
Trade-Unions - Not too much power 394(25.3) - - - 3(2) 
Trade-Unions - Middle position, don't know 13(0.8) 1.65 1,13 0 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 1149(74,0) -0.13 0.24 Q 
Issue of Taxation 1,31 ± 1.96 -0.14' 0.06 - 5(1)' 
FeeUngs towards EnvironmentaUsts - Neutral 375(24.1) - - - 4(2) 
FeeUngs towards EnvironmentaUsts - Positive 694(44,6) -0,53' 0,27 -13 ± 7 
Feelings towards Environmentahsu - Negative 487(31,3) -0.26 0.30 0 
FeeUngs towards Peace Activists - Neutral 329(21,1) - - - 2(2) 
FeeUngs towards Peace Activists - Positive 787(50,6) 0,03 0,28 0 
FeeUngs towards Peace Activists - Negative 440(28.3) 0.40 0,32 0 
Privatisation - Supportive 576(37.0) - - - 1 (2) 
Privatisation - Neutral 329(21.1) 0.26 0.29 0 
Privatisation - Not Supportive 651(41.8) 0.12 0,26 9 
Type (rf Economy - Mixed Economy 519(33.4) - - - 2(3) 
Type (rf Economy - SodaUst 150(9.6) -0.26 0.35 0 
Type <rf Economy - Private Enterprise except UtiUties 637(40.9) 0.03 0.24 0 
Type of Economy - AU Private Enterprise 250(16.1) -0.37 0.37 0 
LEADERS 
Relative Attimde to Leaders 1.68 ±4.2 0.24' 0.04 see text 36(1)' 
The results presented in table 6.17 show diat the variables with significant effects on intended 
vote in 1988 were party identification, relative attimde to tiie parties, attimde to uranium mining, 
attitude to govemment assistance to Aborigines, tiie issue of taxation, feelmgs towards 
environmentalists and relative attimde to the leaders. 
Deleting party identification from the model decreases tiie scaled deviance by 183 units or 
12.7% of tiie change in scaled deviance. This figure is simUar to those obtained when the same 
procedure was performed on the 1984, 1986 and 1987 samples. The group of not very sdong 
coalition identifiers were found to be not significantiy different, ui terms of intended vote from tiie no 
major party group. 
In terms of intended vote the sdength of identification was quite relevant for Labor party 
identifiers. Very strong identifiers with die Labor party were 50% more lUcely to vote for the Labor 
party tiian non-identifiers, fairly strong identifiers 45% more Ukely and not very strong Labor 
identifiers 34% more likely. Fairiy strong and very strong coaUtion identifiers, were found to be 29% 
and 30% less lUcely to vote Labor, respectively than non-identifiers. 
The explanation for the finduig that not very strong coalition identifiers were not significantiy 
different from non-identifiers was also found ui the analysis of the 1986 NSSS data. However, in the 
major party vote model this group of coaUtion identifiers was found to be significantiy less likely to 
vote Labor (table A6.10). As was the case in tiie 1986 sample diese results are explained by tiie high 
proportion of non-identifiers who intended to vote for minor parties. In tiie Labor vote model tills 
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group is quite non-Labor but becomes more Labor when minor party voters are excluded from tiie 
analysis. 
The measure of relative attimde to the parties was found to be significantiy associated with 
intended vote [AX^=52(1), P<0.05]. The estimate of -0.42 was higher tiian tiie estimates obtained by 
analyses of the 1984 and 1986 NSSS samples. The foUowing table presents the percentage change for 
each score compared with respondents who were not more positive or negative to one party. The 
number of respondents in tius neudal category was 336 (22%). 
TABLE 6.18: PERCENTAGE EFFECT AT GRAND MEAN FOR MEASURE OF ATTITUDE TO THE PARTIES - 1988 NSSS 
Labor Party 
Score Effea at no.(%) with 
Grand Mean score 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
10.5 
20.5 
29.3 
36J 
42.1 
46.1 
49.0 
51.0 
52.4 
53.3 
101(6.5) 
131(8,4) 
96(6,2) 
86(5,5) 
82(5,3) 
51(3,3) 
42(17) 
13(0.8) 
26(1.7) 
39(15) 
Liberal 
Effea at 
Grand Mean 
-10.0 
-18.9 
-26.1 
-31.7 
-35,8 
-38.7 
-40.7 
-411 
-43.0 
Jt3.7 
Party 
no.(%) 
with score 
108(6.9) 
121(7.8) 
86(5,5) 
73(4.7) 
49(3.1) 
33(11) 
41(16) 
4(0.3) 
16(1.0) 
22(1.4) 
Of the ideological indicators only the measures pertaining to post-materialism - attimdes to 
uraruum mining and increased assistance to Aborigines - were found to be sigruficantiy associated with 
vote [Uraruum:AX^=ll(2), P<0.05; Aborigines:AX^=10(2), P<0.05]. Respondents opposed to uranium 
mining were 14% less lUcely to support the Labor party. In the analysis of major party vote both the 
variable 'attimde to uranium mming' and its parameter estimates were found to be not significant. 
These results indicate that voters opposed to uraruum mining tended to vote for the Australian 
Democrats or other muior parties. 
Voters who were opposed to govemment assistance to Aborigines were 17% less likely to 
support the Labor party. Analysis of major party vote revealed simUar results. The variable made a 
sigruficant contribution to the model [AX^=10(2), P<0.05] and voters opposed to govemment 
assistance to Aborigines were also 22% less likely to vote for the Labor party. Comparison the Labor 
vote and major party vote models suggests a direct transfer of votes between tiie parties. It is possible 
that some voters reacted to the high pubUc profile of protests by Aborigines against tiie bi-centenary 
celebrations. 
The continuous measure of tiie issue of taxation was found to be significantiy associated with 
vote [AX^=5(1), P<0.05]. This 9 point measure was scored so that higher positive scores mean greater 
support for cutting taxes. The mean of this measure (1.31) indicates tiiat overall tiie electorate was in 
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favour of lower taxes. Therefore, tiie negative coefficient means tiiat tiiose more supportive of tax cuts 
were less Ukely to vote Labor. A similar result was not obtained in tiie analysis of major party vote 
[AX^=0(1), ns] (table A6.10). These results indicate tiiat tiie advocacy of lower taxes by tiie coaUtion 
had negative effects on the level of Labor support but did not directiy help the coalition. 
No questions on economic evaluations of the economy were included in tiie 1988 NSSS 
questionnaire. Therefore, tiie associations of tiiese measures witii vote found in otiier samples cannot 
be compared with tius data seL 
The surrogate measure for envirormiental issues was found to be not significantiy associated witii 
vote [AX^=4(2), ns]. However, respondents witii positive feelings towards environmentalists were 13% 
less likely to vote Labor. Using major party vote as the response variable the variable moved into 
significance [AX^=7(2), P<0.05] and respondents positive to environmentalists were not significantiy 
difference from the reference group. However, those negative to environmentalists were 26% more 
likely to vote for the coaUtion parties in the major party vote model. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from tiie analyses of attimde to environmentaUsts. First, the 
group who had negative feeUngs towards environmentalists were less lUcely to vote Labor (in tiie 
Labor vote model), because they voted for minor parties. Second, removal of minor party voters from 
the analysis brings into sharper focus the significant tendency for those negative to environmentalists 
to vote for the coalition parties. These results suggest that environmental issues did effect vote in 
1988. 
The measures of attimdes to the power of trade-unions, privatisation, and the preferred type of 
economy were found to be not sigruficantiy associated with vote. Similar results were found ui the 
analysis of die two earlier (1984 and 1986) NSSS data sets. Evaluations of peace activists were also 
found to have no impact on vote. 
The measure of relative evaluation of the leaders was found to be significantiy associated witii 
Labor vote [AX^=36(1), P<0.05]. The foUowing table presents tiie effect on voting Labor relative to 
the neudal position for each score on the index. 
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TABLE 6.19: PERCENTAGE EFFECT FOR MEASIHIE OF RELATIVE ATTITUDE TO THE LEADERS - 1987 AES 
Score 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Effea 
Mr Hawke 
at 
Grand Mean 
6.0 
11.9 
17.7 
23.1 
28.1 
32.6 
36.5 
39.9 
42.7 
45.1 
no.(%) with 
score 
134(8.6) 
138(8.9) 
97(6,2) 
133(8.5) 
130(8.4) 
85(5.5) 
80(5.1) 
25(1.6) 
51(3.3) 
46(3.0) 
Effea 
Mr Howard 
at 
Grand Mean 
-5.8 
-11.4 
-16.5 
-21.1 
-25.2 
-28.7 
-31.7 
-34,2 
-36.3 
-38,0 
no.(%) 
with score 
102(6.6) 
86(5.5) 
59(3,8) 
40(16) 
43(18) 
21(1.3) 
33(11) 
6(0.4) 
12(0.8) 
12(0.8) 
The parameter estimate of 0.24 is slightiy lower than tiiat obtained from the 1987 AES and is 
comparable with that estimate obtained from analysis of the 1986 NSSS. This effect is due mainly to 
evaluations of Mr Hawke (PE=0.44, SE=0.06), rather tiian the evaluations of Mr Howard which had 
no significant effect on vote (PE=-0.05, SE=0.05). 
6.2.8 Tests of die Model 
This section reports on the tests of the model as discussed earUer in this chapter. There are a 
number of propositions implied by the model. These propositions are: (i) that social-stmctural factors 
do not have direct effects on vote, tiie total effects tiiey do have are mediated by long-term electoral 
forces, (ii) the model of electoral choice is not substantiaUy different between social groups, that is the 
model applies to whole electorate and (iii) tiiat the measure of partisanship is not seriously undermined 
by the measure of party identification employed, which does not include the partisan orientations of 
those who do not irutiaUy profess to a party identification (that is leaners). 
A. Additional Effects of Social-Stmcmral Variables 
Table 6.20 presents the changes in the values of the scaled deviance witii the additional of a 
variety of social-stmcmral measures'"'. 
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TABLE 6.20: EFFECT ON CHANGES IN CHI-SQUARE DEVLkNCE FOR ADDITIONAL EFFECTS ON SOCUL STRUCTURAL 
VARUBLES ON MODEL (LABOR VOTE v OTHER VOTE)" 
Measure 
Qass 
ReUgion 
Region 
Suite 
Ethnicity 
Class Identification 
Income 
Union Membership 
Seaor 
Age Cohort 
Gender 
Education 
Qass Background 
Partisan Background 
Type of Electorate 
Rural V Urban sample (1984) 
1967 
ANPA 
9(6) 
2(4) 
0(1) 
3(5) 
3(5) 
4(2) 
8(8) 
1(2) 
-
9(6) 
0(1) 
0(2) 
0(1) 
1(1) 
3(2) 
-
1969 
ANPA 
11(6) 
7(4) 
0(1) 
7(5) 
5(5) 
1(2) 
11(8) 
2(2) 
-
5(6) 
0(1) 
4(2) 
1(1) 
0(1) 
3(2) 
-
1979 
ANPA 
6(6) 
8(4) 
1(1) 
10(5) 
3(5) 
2(2) 
11(8) 
0(1) 
1(3) 
8(8) 
1(1) 
4(2) 
1(1) 
8(1)' 
1(2) 
-
1984 
NSSS 
2(6) 
8(4) 
16(1)' 
19(5)' 
2(5) 
2(2) 
12(8) 
16(2)' 
2(3) 
6(7) 
2(1) 
0(2) 
2(1) 
0(1) 
-
23(1)' 
1986 
NSSS 
5(6) 
3(4) 
5.6(2) 
10(5) 
4.5(5) 
2(2) 
5(8) 
3(7) 
8,5(3)' 
7(7) 
0(1) 
5(2) 
0(1) 
0(1) 
-
-
1987 
AES 
4(6) 
3(4) 
0(1) 
4(5) 
3(5) 
7(2)' 
-
0(1) 
2(3) 
12(7) 
2(1) 
3(2) 
1(1) 
0(1) 
-
-
1988 
NSSS 
11(6) 
8(4) 
1(2) 
10(5) 
4(5) 
1(2) 
11(8) 
1(2) 
2(3) 
5(6) 
2(1) 
3(2) 
0(1) 
10) 
-
-
Of the 108 instances where a social-stmcmral factor was added to the model only in 7 instances 
did tiie factor make a sigruficant contribution to tiie fit of the model. Of these 7 instances, 4 of tiiem 
were found in tiie analyses of the 1984 NSSS sample. There is no consistency in which social-
stmcmral variables make sigruficant contributions. In 1979, partisan background brought about a 
significant improvement ui fu, in 1984 mral/non-mral region (type of sample), state of residence and 
trade-imion membership sigruficantiy improved the fit of tiie model, in the 1986 sample employment 
sector and in the 1987 sample, class identification. Since there is no consistency m which social 
stmcmral variables, brought about sigruficant improvements in fit, it can be concluded that in general 
social stmcmral factors do not have direct effects on vote, net of the model. Those instances where 
improvements ui fit are found, are Ukely to be due to associations between these variables and short-
term factors not included in the model. In summary, the assumption that the effects of social 
stmctural factors are mediated by the concepts in the model, has been largely confirmed. 
B. The UruversaUty of the Model 
The second test concems the proposition tiiat die model generally appUes across the electorate. 
This test involved adduig to the model an interactive term, between the social stmctural factor of 
interest and the model'**. The results of this analysis are presented in the following table (table 6.21). 
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TABLE 6.21: EFFECT ON CHANGES IN CHI-SQUARE DEVUNCE FOR INTERACTION EFFECTS WITH SCOAL STRUCTURAL 
VARIABLES (LABOR VOTE v NON-LABOR VOTE) 
Measure 
Qass (Manual v Other) 
ReUgion (Cathohc v Other) 
Region (Rural v non-rural) 
Income (4 lowest income groups v Other) 
Education (< Secondary completed v Other) 
Age (3 youngest v Other) 
Gender (Men v Women) 
1967 
ANPA 
77(53)' 
78(53)' 
48(53) 
79(53)' 
51(53) 
66(53) 
80(53)' 
1969 
ANPA 
49(50) 
72(50)' 
58(50) 
54(50) 
68(50)' 
65(50) 
43(50) 
1979 
ANPA 
81(59)' 
-
90(59)' 
69(59) 
106(59)' 
74(59) 
70(59) 
1984 
NSSS 
56(50) 
54(50) 
73(50)' 
49(50) 
42(50) 
55(50) 
54(50) 
1986 
NSSS 
74(55)' 
55(55) 
59(55) 
77(55)' 
66(55) 
69(55) 
54(55) 
1987 
AES 
85(68) 
98(68)' 
107(68)' 
-
94(68)* 
68(68) 
68(68) 
1988 
NSSS 
53(40) 
39(40) 
49(40) 
33(40) 
43(40) 
37(40) 
42(40) 
These results show that tiiere is a degree of heterogeneity ui tiie model of electoral choice. In 
1967, tiie process of electoral choice for women was significantiy different from that of men. 
Sunilarly, electoral choice differed between the manual group and the non-manual group in 1967, 1979 
and 1986. Electoral choice differed between CatiioUcs and otiier religious denominations, in the late 
1960s. However, there is Uttie consistency across tiie samples. For example, of tiie four variables 
where interaction effects were found ui tiie 1967 sample only one of these was observed in the 1969 
sample. Sunilarly, electoral choice differed between the two educational groups in 1969, 1979 and 
1987, but not at otiier time pomts. Since there is Uttie consistency in which social stmcmral factors 
produce sigruficant interaction effects, it can be concluded that there are no sustained differences in tiie 
process of electoral choice between the social groups unplied by these variables. The significant 
interaction effects observed are most likely due to differences in the way social groups respond to 
poUtical issues at particular times. There are no consistent differences'*^ 
C. Includmg leaners in the Party Identification Measure 
It may be argued that the results presented in previous section are biased because of tiie measure 
of party identification employed. It could be argued that many of tiie issue items have a partisan 
component: questions on whether the respondent would financiaUy 'better off under the a Liberal or 
Labor govemment, which party is best able to deal witii tiie problem mentioned, which party is best at 
handling tiie economic problems of unemployment and inflation. Each of these questions does have a 
partisan component and sigruficant effects of such variables on vote, may be due to be absence of 
'leaners' from the party identification measure. The tiurd test substimtes the usual measure of party 
identification by a second party identification measure which includes the partisan orientations of tiie 
leaners. Table 6.22 presents the changes m scaled deviance for tiie two measures of party 
identification. This comparison is restricted to tiie three ANPA data sets since the tiiird party 
identification question was not asked in these NSSS and AES studies''^ 
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TABLE 6.22: COMPARISON OF THE TWO MEASURES OF PARTY IDENTmCATION 
Measure 
Party Identification (without leaners) 
Party Identification (FuU) 
Relative Attimde to Parties 
General Ideological Position 
Power of big Business 
Tax cuts/spend on welfare 
Death Penalty 
Migration 
Censorship 
Royalty 
Uranium Mining 
Legahse Marijuana 
Benefits for Aborigines 
Viemam 
Power of Trade-Uiuorts 
State Aid 
Simple personal retrospective EE. 
Simple personal prospective EE. 
Partisan personal retrospective EE. 
Partisan personal prospective EE. 
Attitude to Communist Qiina 
Relations with the United States 
First Important Problem 
Second Important Problem 
Conscription 
Priority Inflation/unemployment 
Relative evaluation of the Leaders 
1967 1967 1969 1969 1979 1979 
ANPA(l) ANPA(2) ANPA(l) ANPA(2) ANPA(l) ANPA(2) 
617(6)' 433(6)' 339(6)' 
-
7(1)' 
6(2)' 
0(2) 
3(2) 
5(2) 
5(5) 
4(2) 
1(3) 
-
-
-
10(4)' 
10(2)' 
0(4) 
4(2) 
1(2) 
0(2) 
17(2)' 
0(2) 
3(3) 
36(2)' 
2(2) 
-
-
49(1)' 
628(6)' 
6(1)' 
5(2) 
0(2) 
2(2) 
5(2) 
4(5) 
5(2) 
0(3) 
-
-
-
8(4) 
8(2)' 
1(4) 
2(2) 
1(2) 
1(2) 
17(2)' 
0(2) 
2(3) 
33(2)' 
1(2) 
-
-
46(1)' 
-
20(1)' 
1(2) 
0(2) 
1(2) 
1(2) 
4(5) 
4(2) 
-
-
-
-
20(4)' 
1(2) 
7(4) 
0(2) 
1(2) 
-
-
4(2) 
3(3) 
19(4)' 
3(2) 
2(4) 
-
4(1)' 
454(6)' 
15(1)' 
1(2) 
0(2) 
1(2) 
1(2) 
4(5) 
3(2) 
-
-
-
-
16(4)' 
3(2) 
7(4) 
0(2) 
2(2) 
-
-
4(2) 
3(3) 
16(2)' 
3(2) 
2(4) 
-
4(1)' 
-
3(1) 
0(2) 
0(2) 
1(2) 
1(2) 
15(5)' 
3(2) 
4(3) 
4(4) 
3(3) 
2(4) 
-
17(2)' 
-
0(2) 
2(2) 
5(2) 
8(2)' 
1(2) 
2(3) 
33(2)' 
20(2)' 
-
2(3) 
15(1)' 
366(6)" 
3(1) 
1(2) 
1(2) 
0(2) 
0(2) 
9(5) 
2(2) 
3(3) 
4(4) 
3(3) 
2(4) 
-
11(2)' 
-
0(2) 
0(2) 
1(2) 
6(2)' 
1(2) 
3(3) 
27(2)' 
18(2)' 
-
1(3) 
12(1)' 
Inspection of table 6.23 shows that die second measure of party identification does not 
dramaticaUy change the interpretation of tiie models. Most measures that were sigruficant contributors 
to the model with the first measure were also significant contributors to the second mcxlel. There two 
exceptions to this general finding, the Viemam issue in 1967 and attitudes to migration in 1979. 
Although the Viemam issue in 1967 moved out of significance witii the second measure of party 
identification the parameter estunates were only slightiy attenuated. The estimates were 0.65, 0.98, 
and 0.72 compared with 0.75, 1.08 and 0.89 with the first measure of party identification. Only the 
third estimate (associated with the 'withdrawal' group) was found not to be significant witii the second 
measure of party identification. This finding suggests tiiat leaners leant to Labor because of the 
Vietnam war issue. Focusing on the 1979 attimdes to immigration measure those respondents in the 
first model classified as 'non-identifiers' and who took the option 'no more migrants' may have 
responded to the question on partisan leanings as if it were a question on intended vote, since tiie 
change in scaled deviance decreased substantiaUy with the second measure. These interpretations are 
compatible with the suggestion tiiat the question on partisan leanings is often understood as a question 
on intended vote (Shively, 1980)^ 1 
Therefore, U can be concluded that inclusion of partisan leanings to the measure of party 
identification does not in general change the conclusions drawn from analyses of the models. 
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6.3 DISCUSSION 
This section begins with a review of tiie fit of tiie models foUowed by discussions on each of tiie 
general concepts in tiie model, partisanship, ideology, issues and candidates (leaders). Summaries of 
tiie measures witii significant effects on Labor vote (table 6.23) and major party vote (table 6.24) are 
presented in the foUowing tables. (The numbers in the table refer to die last table of appendix 1 
which presents and tiie measures and tiie questions from which tiie measures were derived). 
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TABLE 6,23: SUMMARY OF SIGNIHCANT MEASURES FOR LABOR VOTE 
Measure 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party identification (index -3 to 3) 
Relative attitude to parties 
roEOLOGY 
General ideologica] position 
Attitude to (big) business 
Choice of tax cuts or spend mote on social services 
Attitude to death penalty 
Attitude to migration 
Attitude to censorship 
Attitude to royalty 
Attitude to uianium mining 
Attitude to legalisation of Marijuana 
Attitude to Government support for Aborigines 
ISSUES 
Attitude to Vietnam war 
Attitude to the power of trade-unions 
Attitude to state aid to non-government schools 
Simple personal retrospective eccnomic evaliutions 
Simple personal prospective economic evaluations 
Partisan personal retrospective eccnomic evaluations 
Partisan personal prospective economic evaluations 
Attitude to communist China 
Attitude to relations with the United Sutes 
Best party - first most important problem 
Best party - second most important problem 
Attitude to conscription 
Priority lowering Inflation or unemployment 
Partisan peisanal prospective EE(2) (Labor still in office) 
Best Party inflation, unemployment(*), econ. growth(*) 
Preference for type of economy (new right) 
Partisan sociotropic retrospective economic evaL(PSREE) 
Partisan sociotropic prospective economic evaL 
Partisan sociotropic prospective economic evaL (PSPE2) 
Attitude to taxation (Index) 
Feelings towards environmentalists 
Feelings towards the state Govemment 
Attitude to privatisation 
Simple sociotittpic retrospective economic eval (SSREE) 
Mediated personal retrospective economic evaL (MPREE) 
Mediated sociotropic retrospective economic evaL (MSREE) 
Mediated sociotropic prospective economic evaL (MSPEE) 
Importance of issues 
Liberal, Labor(*), National Parties divided 
Feelings towards peace activisu 
CANDIDATES 
Relative evaluation of the leaders 
Prime Minister 
Leader of the Opposition 
1%7 
ANPA 
60* 
62* 
66* 
69 
74 
77-1 
SO 
82 
86 
-
-
. 
1%9 
ANPA 
60* 
62* 
66 
69 
74 
77 
80 
82 
-
-
-
-
1979 
ANPA 
60* 
62 
66 
69 
74 
77 
80* 
82 
86 
90'' 
94 
98 
1984 
NSSS 
60* 
63* 
67 
70 
75 
78 
-
83 
87* 
91" 
95 
98 
101* 
102* 
106 
107 
109 
110 
112* 
115 
117 
118* 
119 
101* 
102 
106*' 
107 
109 
116 
117 
118* 
119 
120 
102* 
107 
109 
110 
112* 
116 
117 
118* 
119* 
121 
102 
U l* 
113* 
121* 
124* 
126* 
127 
133 
1986 
NSSS 
60* 
64* 
68 
71 
75 
78 
81 
84 
88 
92* 
96 
99 
103 
111 
114 
122 
125* 
128 
129* 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134* 
135 
1987 
AES 
60* 
69* 
72 
76 
79 
80 
85 
89 
93 
97* 
100 
104 
108 
123* 
144* 144* 
ns 
144* 145* 145 
137 
138" 
139* 
140* 
141 
142* 
146* 
1988 
NSSS 
60* 
64* 
68 
73 
75 
78 
94* 
96 
99* 
105 
128 
132* 
133* 
136 
143 
145* 
Key: 
Numbers refer to details of variable constructian in appendix 1 (uble A 1,4) 
* = Significant at the P<0,05, no asterisk therefore not significant (ns) 
m ' = Variable not significant but one or more paiameterx are. 
= Not included in analysis 
247 
TABLE 6,24: SUMMARY OF SIGNIHCANT MEASURES FOR MAJOR PARTY VOTE 
Measure 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party identification (index -3 to 3) 
Relative attitude to parties 
IDEOLOGY 
(jeneral ideological position 
Attitude to (big) business 
Choice of ux cuts or spend more on social services 
Attitude to death penalty 
Attitude to migration 
Attitude to censorship 
Attitude to royalty 
Attitude to uranium mining 
Attitude to legalisation of Marijuana 
Attitude to Govemment support for Aborigines 
ISSUES 
Attitude to Viemam war 
Attitude to the power of trade-unions 
Attitude to state aid to ncn-govemment schools 
Simple personal retrospective economic evaluations 
Simple personal prospective e<»nomic evaluations 
Partisan peisanal retrospective economic evaluations 
Partisan pcraonal prospective economic evaluations 
Attitude to communist Chiiu 
Attitude to relations with the United Sutes 
Best party - first most important problem 
Best party - second most important problem 
Attitude to conscription 
Priority lowering Inflation or unemployment 
Partisan personal prospective economic evaluations-2 
Best Party inflation, unemployment(*), econ. growth(*) 
Preference for type of economy (new right) 
Partisan sociotropic retrospective economic eval,(PSREE) 
Partisan sociotropic prospective economic evai (PSPEE) 
Partisan sociotropic prospective economic evaL (PSPE2) 
Attitude to uxation (Index) 
Feelings towards environmentalists 
Feelings towards the state Government 
Attitude to piivatisatian 
Simple sociotropic retrospective economic evaL (SSREE) 
Mediated personal retrospective economic eval. (MPREE) 
Mediated sociotropic retrospective economic evaL (MSREE) 
Mediated sociotropic prospective economic evaL (MSPEE) 
Importance of issues 
Liberal, LaboT(*), National Parties divided 
Feelings towards peace activists 
CANDIDATES 
Relative evaluation of the leaders 
1967 
ANPA 
60* 
62* 
66* 
69 
74 
77* 
80 
82 
86 
. 
-
. 
1969 
ANPA 
60* 
62* 
66 
69 
74 
77 
80 
82 
. 
-
-
^ 
1979 
ANPA 
60* 
62 
66* 
69 
74 
77 
80* 
82* 
86 
90 
94 
98 
1984 
NSSS 
60* 
63* 
67* 
70 
75 
78 
-
83 
87* 
91 
95 
98 
1986 
NSSS 
60* 
64* 
68 
71 
75 
78 
81 
84 
88 
92 
96" 
99 
1987 
AES 
60* 
-
69* 
72 
76 
79 
80 
85 
89 
93 
97* 
100 
1988 
NSSS 
60 
64* 
68 
73 
75 
78 
-
84 
88 
94 
96 
99* 
101* 
102* 
106 
107 
109 
110 
112* 
115 
117 
118* 
119 
-
101* 
102 
106" 
107 
109 
-
-
116 
117 
118* 
119 
120 
102* 
107 
109 
no* 
112* 
116 
117 
118* 
119* 
121 
102 
111* 
113* 
121" 
124* 
126* 
127 
103 
111 
114 
122 
125* 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134* 
135 
104" 
1.08 
123* 
144* 144* 144* 145* 145* 
137 
138* 
139* 
140 
141 
142* 
146* 
105 
128 
132* 
133* 
134 
136 
143 
145* 
Key: 
Numbers refer to details of variable construction in appendix 1 (table Al ,4) 
* = Significant at the P<0,05, no asterisk therefore not significant (ns) 
m" = Variable not significant but one or more parameters are. 
= Not included in analysis 
At this point it should be noted that multicoUinearity was found not be a problem in tiiese 
analyses. After the deletion of each variable, tiie parameter estimates were carefuUy assessed to find if 
substantial changes in the parameters or their sigruficance had occurred. No substantial changes were 
found. Furthermore, the analyses presented ui tius chapter make a high degree of substantive sense 
indicating the analyses were not undermined by problems of multicoUinearity. 
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6.3.1 OveraU fits of tiie Model 
GeneraUy tiie models were very good fits to the data. Two measures of fit, tiie first based on 
tiie percentage of scaled deviance of the nuU model accoimted for and the second based on the 
percentage of correct predictions, show very good fits of the models to the data (figure 6.2). 
Percent 
100 
40 
20 
X 
F I T OF MODELS 
X X x - x - x 
Scaled Deviance (X) 
— e — 
Correct Predictions (.X) 
- - X- -
J_ ± 
1970 1975 1980 
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1985 1990 
Figure 62: Percentage of scaled deviance and correct predictions accounted for by the 
model. 
OveraU, the fit of the models has remained remaricably constant over the 21 year period, during 
which the data was coUected. The smaUer percentage of correct predictions in the 1969 sample 
compared with the 1967 and 1969 samples, is probably because measures of relevant short term 
factors operatuig at that election were not included in tiiis model. One such measure is partisan 
personal prospective economic evaluations which was found to have significant effects in tiie 1967 and 
1979 samples. 
6.3.2 Partisanship 
In each sample analysed tiie variable witii tiie largest impact on vote was party identification. 
This result was not suiprising given that otiier studies have also found large effects of party 
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identification on vote (Aitidn, 1982b: 142; Bean, 1988:45-46; Bean & KeUey, 1988; Graetz & 
McAllister, 1988:266-270). 
The second measure of partisanship, attimde to tiie parties also had significant effects on vote in 
aU samples except tiie 1979 ANPA. These results strongly suggest tiiat benefits are gained by 
understanding partisanship as a relative evaluation of the parties in addition to an identification witii a 
particular party. However, the contribution tiie relative evaluation measures made to tiie model was 
always much smaUer than tiie contribution of party identification. In 1967, the respective 
contributions to the model were 617 and 7 uruts, in 1984, 198 and 20 units. Only in tiie 1988 sample 
did the contribution of the measure of relative attitude to the parties, approach that of party 
identification. (The contribution was 52 uruts for relative attitude to the parties and 183 for party 
identification). 
One important fmding from the results presented in this chapter is a declme of partisanship as a 
contributor to the fit of the models of vote. Figure 6.3 presents the percentage contribution of 
partisanship and party identification to the Ukelihood ratio in relation to the Labor/non-Labor measure 
of vote"". A quite dramatic decUne is evident, the percentage decreasing quite steadUy from aroimd 
40% in 1967, to about 10% in 1984 and thereafter remaining quite steady. The implication of this 
fmding is that partisanship and/or party identification have become, overaU less important as 
contributors to the process of electoral choice. 
One readUy apparent explanation for this finding is that decline is due to the rise of the 
Australian Democrats from tiie late 1970s. This explanation is quite atiractive since tiie 
coalition/Labor measure of partisanship would be expected to be less powerful at later time points, 
because a greater proportion of tiie samples indicated a vote for minor parties'*^ hi order to test tiiis 
'minor party' explanation the same calculations of percent change of scaled deviance were calculated 
for the major party vote models (figure 6.4). 
The decline in the percentage change in scaled deviance for the major party vote models, foUows 
the same pattem as for die Labor vote model. Therefore, explanations focusing on minor parties 
cannot account for the observed decUne. 
These findings may be criticised on a number of grounds. First, deletion of party identification 
from tiie model contradicts the causal order of tiie model since partisanship is prior to most of tiie 
otiier factors m tiie model. Therefore, tiiese results have no theoretical relevance. 
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Figure 6J: Changes in the percentage of change in scaled deviance accounted for by party 
identification and partisanship (Labor party vote). 
This argument can be responded to with the foUowing pomts. First, die backward deletion of 
partisanship does not contradict tiie casual order of the model, since it is a measure of tiie variable's 
contribution to the model rather tiian tiie effect of partisanship on vote. Furtiiermore, die percentage 
of scaled deviance contributed by partisanship does not necessarily mean that the direct effects of party 
identification on vote have decUned (although this is part of the explanation), but that party 
identification has become less important in 'structuring' the process of electoral choice. Second, 
comparisons of models where the measures of partisanship are simply added to die nuU model suffers 
from the problem of model specification - the measures of partisanship wiU become surrogate 
measures for aU tiie other factors that have impacts on vote. Third, deletion of tiie two measures of 
partisanship Irom a minimal model of long-term electoral forces (which includes ordy the measures of 
partisanship and ideology) also shows a decUne. Partisanship contributes to 83% of the change in 
scaled deviance in 1967, 69.2% in 1979 and 67.8% in 1984^ .^ 
A second argument may explain the decUne as a consequence of changes in tiie correlation 
between party identification and otiier factors. Short term factors may have been more highly 
associated with partisanship in the later models and these factors were able to act as surrogate 
measures of partisanship in tiiese models. However, pemsal of tiie pairs of cortelation coefficients 
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Figure 6.4: Changes in the percentage of change in scaled deviance accounted for by party 
identification and partisanship (Major party vote). 
between the samples do not support this explanation'*'. 
A tiiird argimient would focus on the smdies themselves. It could be argued that data on 
relevant electoral issues were not coUected in die early ANPA smdies but were coUected in the NSSS 
and AES smdies. Therefore, party identification made a larger contribution to tiie early models. 
However, this argument is not supported by die empirical analyses presented here. In the 1967 
sample, 7 other variables besides party identification had sigruficant effects on vote, in 1969 4 otiier 
variables, in 1979 6, in 1984 11, in 1986 5, in 1987 7, and in tiie 1988 sample only 5 variables otiier 
than party identification had sigruficant effects on vote. It carmot be concluded that the three ANPA 
studies coUected fewer relevant measures. This issue of die decline of partisanship as a contributor to 
the model of vote wiU be furtiier discussed in tiie next chapter. However, part of die decUne of 
partisanship as a contributor to the fit of tiie model can be attributed to a decline in tiie effect of 
partisanship on vote. 
One explanation as to tiie decline of partisanship as a conttibutor to die model of vote is tiiat die 
effect of party identification on vote has decUned. Figure 6.5 presents changes in the absolute sum of 
the coefficients for party identification for both models of Labor vote and major party vote''*. 
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Figure 6.5: The absolute values of the coefficients for party identification in each sample. 
Although tiie decUne ui these absolute values is not as great as diat for the contribution of die 
variable to the fit of the model a decline is also apparent. The magnitude of the absolute values has 
declined by about one third since 1967. The pattem is a Uttie confused by the 1979 sample which is 
higher that would be expected given the changes in scaled deviance. 
Similar pattems are apparent when three or seven level continuous measures of party 
identification are included in logistic regression models of both Labor party and major party vote. 
However, decUnes are not evident when the technique of OLS regression is employed (figures 6.6 & 
6.7)"'. The coefficients on which these figures (6.6 and 6.7) are based are presented in table A6.11 
in the appendix to tills chapter. 
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PARTY IDENTIFICATION COEFFICIENTS CLABOR VOTED 
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Figure 6.6: Coefficients for 3 and 7 level continuous measures of party 
identification in both logistic and OLS regression models (Labor vote). 
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Figure 6.7: Coefficients for 3 and 7 level continuous measures of party 
identification in both logistic and OLS regression models (Major party Vote). 
A subsequent question arises - does the decline of the effect of party identification on vote apply 
equaUy to Labor and coalition identifiers or it is specific to a particular group (or groups) of 
identifiers? Figure 6.8 shows the percentage effects (about the grand mean) on voting Labor for tiie 
six different groups of party identifiers on Labor vote. 
The restUts presented ui figure 6.8 indicate a number of processes. First, after 1979, not very 
strong and very strong coaUtion identifiers became less inclined to vote in accordance witii their 
partisanship. Since the response variable is Labor vote, it can be concluded that tiiese groups became 
more incUned to vote Labor rather than for minor parties. Second, there is a decline in die propensity 
of all groups of Labor identifiers to vote Labor between 1967 and 1984 and this trend was continued 
among the most numerous group of Labor identifiers, the not very strong group. 
Figure 6.8 also makes clear the general finding mentioned throughout this chapter, that there is 
littie difference among Labor identifiers in the propensity to vote Labor. In contrast, tiie strength of 
identification is generaUy more important for coalition identifiers. 
Two general conclusions can be made on changes in partisanship. First, partisanship has become 
less important in structuring the process of electoral choice in the twenty years since 1967. Second, 
part of this decline is due to a decline in die direct impact on party identification on vote. Third, the 
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Figure 6.8: Effects for the six different groups of identifiers (Labor vote). 
decline in the effect of party identification on vote can be attributed to an increase in tiie propensity of 
Labor identifiers, not to vote in accordance witii tiieir partisanship between 1967 and 1979 and in later 
years, an increased propensity of fairly strong and not very strong coalition identifiers to vote Labor. 
6.3.3 Ideology 
The general finding that ideology is only weakly associated with vote confirms previous smdies 
which showed little or no direct effects of ideology on vote (Bean & Kelley, 1988; Graetz & 
McAllister, 1988:258-260; KeUey, 1988). 
Measures relating to general ideological position were found to be significantiy associated witii 
vote in the 1967, 1979^, and die 1987 data. However, die effect of general ideological position on 
vote is not consistent and applies to ordy a very smaU proportion of the electorate. 
Conclusions as to the role of economic liberaUsm/conservatism are hampered by die question of 
measurement. There are only two indicators of non-economic ideology, attitude to the business and 
priority to spending more on social services or decreasing the level of taxation. Assuming tiiat tiiese 
two items are indicators of economic liberalism/conservatism, neitiier of these measures were found to 
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be significantiy associated witii vote in any of the samples analysed. The conclusion can tentatively 
be made that economic Uberalism-conservatism has no major direct influence on vote. 
The second ideological dimension proposed non-economic liberaUsm conservatism also appears 
to have littie direct effect on vote. However, there were instances when the indicators of non-
economic Uberalism/conservatism were found to have significant effects on vote. There is some 
evidence that DLP voters in 1967 were influenced by non-economic ideology, since tiie attitudes to 
censorship were found to be sigruficantiy associated with vote in the analysis of the 1967 data. It is 
possible that a simUar restUt would be found if analyses were carried out upon data coUected in tiie 
late 1950s and early 1960s. However, widiout data coUected at this time points it is impossible to 
conclude that non-economic liberalism/conservatism was a durable influence on vote, or tiiat simply 
attimdes to censorship became politicised during the late 1960s, hi tiie analysis of tiie 1979 data, 
voters who opposed aU migration were sigruficantiy more likely to vote Labor. This result may be 
indicative of tiie social conservatism of some groups of Labor supporters. However, this measure was 
not found to be significantiy associated witii vote m the analysis of the 1967 and 1987 data and witii 
diff^ erent measures in the 1986 data. The ordy otiier measure of non-economic ideology tiiat was 
found to be sigruficantiy associated witii vote was attitudes to royalty in tiie 1984 data. The lack of 
any consistent effect of these indicators on vote suggests tiiat non-economic liberalism/conservatism 
has Uttie or no influence on vote choice. 
In data coUected since 1979 some of the measures relating to post-materialism were found to be 
significantiy associated with vote or tiiat parameters associated with these variables were significant. 
These include: opposition to uranium mining ui 1979, 1984, 1986 and 1988; opposition to the 
legaUsation of marijuana in 1987; and opposition to spending more for Aborigines in 1988. The 
coefficients associated with post-materialist positions had negative signs indicating that these groups 
were less Ukely to vote Labor. Therefore, it can be concluded tiiat if anytiiing 'post-materialism' 
values or more precisely attimdes to matters argued to relate to post-materialism has had detrimental 
effects on die (primary) Labor vote '^. 
6.3.4 Issues 
This foUowing discussion is in two parts. The first part is a discussion on the specific issues 
that were found to influence electoral choice. The second part discusses the overaU impact of issues. 
These analyses have found tiiat a number of specific issues did have effects on vote, net of 
partisanship. Analysis of the 1967 and 1969 ANPA samples revealed tiiat tiie Viemam war issue did 
have electoral effects. This smdy is likely to be die first to identify electoral effects of tiie Viemam 
war issue controUmg for partisanship and a variety of otiier factors. As mentioned already tiiese 
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results indicate diat electors were concemed witii tiie sending of conscripts to fight in tiiat war rather 
than tiie 'moral' dimension to AustraUa's involvement. 
The analyses presented in this smdy have shown that economic concems are often associated 
with vote. Both retrospective and prospective economic evaluations were found associated widi vote 
and tn the later data sets sociotropic evaluations. 
Partisan personal prospective economic evaluations had significant effects on vote in 1967, 1979, 
1984 and 1986^ .^ The importance of prospective evaluations as opposed to retrospective evaluations, 
was noted by Kukluiski & West (1981) in die analysis of voting at American Senate elections. 
Analysing the 1990 Australian election smdy data, Gow (1990) found that a measure of household 
prospective evaluations had a sigruficant effect on vote. 
In relation to personal retrospjective economic evaluations fewer significant effects were found. 
The results obtained from the analyses of the 1979 and 1984 samples are one of the few empirical 
demonstrations of personal retrospective economic evaluations effecting electoral choice in survey 
data. 
Analysing data coUected in the United States, a number of smdies have found littie effect of 
(retrospective) changes in personal economic situation on vote choice (Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979 & 
1981, KukUnski & West, 1981). SimUar results have been obtained from analysis of data collected in 
Britain (Hibbing, 1987; Lewis-Beck, 1986). In the analyses of major party and two-party preferted 
vote in the 1979 sample and both Labor party and major party vote in the 1984 NSSS sample, only 
tiie group that has a negative personal retrospective evaluations are sigruficantiy different from die 
reference ('no change') group. These findings point to an asymmetrical relationship between 
retrospective evaluations and vote. Govemments are purushed if voters became worse off but not 
rewarded if they become better off. 
Data on sociotropic (or coUective) economic evaluations was only coUected in the 1986 and 
1988 studies. Retrospective sociotropic evaluations were found to have significant effects on vote in 
both samples. This restUt has similarities widi studies conducted overseas, where coUective 
(sociotropic) retrospective evaluations were found to have significant effects on vote (Kinder & 
Kiewiet, 1979 & 1981; Kmder, Adams & Gronke, 1989; Lewis-Beck, 1986) and more recentiy in 
Australia (Gow, 1990). In this smdy botii measures were mediated by reference to 'government 
policies' or 'The Labor government' so these measures had a partisan component. A measure of 
simple sociotropic evaluation was found not to have significant effects on vote in tiie 1987 AES 
sample. It appears tiiat attributing blame to the govemment or govemment policies is part of tiie 
process of how sociotropic evaluations effect electoral choice. 
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In relation to Labor vote, tiie 1984 NSSS measures of which party was best at handling 
unemployment and economic growth appeared to support the issue domain model. A high proportion 
of voters viewed Labor as the best party on unemployment (47%) and this group were significantiy 
more Ukely to vote Labor. Altiiough, a smaUer proportion viewed the Liberals as best on economic 
growth (28%) this group were less likely to vote Labor. However, the issue domain is not supported 
by the analyses of the 1987 AES sample. Respondents who gave priority to inflation ratiier tiian 
unemployment were more likely to vote Labor. Similarly, in tiie major party model of the 1984 
NSSS, evaluations of best party at handling inflation appeared to advantage die Labor party ratiier tiian 
the coalition parties. 
One noteworthy result of these analyses is that the individual concems of voters on die problems 
the govemment should tackle and which party wotdd be best able to deal with that problem have 
electoral effects. In aU three instances where such measures coiUd be included in die model the 
measures (of best party at handUng the first most important problem) were found to be significant. In 
the 1979 sample, both measures of the first and second most unportant problem proved to be 
sigruficant. The impUcation of this finding is that voters are not always moved by die national issues 
focused on by poUticians and the media, but can be influenced by quite local or personal issues. This 
residt has implications for fumre electoral research since simUar questions have not been included in 
die more recent NSSS and AES smdies. 
Some evidence was found that the political 'maxim' that voters prefer united political parties 
was found in the analysis of the 1987 Australian election smdy. However, simUar questions were not 
asked in the other smdies. 
These analyses suggest tiiat environmental issues had electoral impacts during tiie 1980s. 
Although the measure was cmde, attimdes to environmentalists were found to be significantiy 
associated with vote in 1984 and 1988. This fmding casts some doubt on die argument that the 1990 
election represented the first election where environmental issues were important (see Bean, McAUister 
& Waiiiurst, 1990). The results also show that voters who were sympatiietic to environmentalists (and 
therefore environmental causes) were less likely to vote for the Labor party and analyses of die major 
party vote models suggests that they voted for the minor parties. This finding does not necessarily 
contradict die generaUy held view that environmental issues have positive electoral effects for the 
Labor party since data on the two-party preferred vote were not mcluded in these studies. However, it 
is indicated that those positive to environmental causes were less incluied to cast their primary vote for 
tiie Labor party. 
The analysis of feelings to the state govemment in the 1986 NSSS lend support to the 
proposition tiiat attitudes to the performance of state govemments has electoral implications in tiie 
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federal arena. It is suggested that the differences frequentiy observed between the states (botii in terms 
of aggregate levels of party support and swings between parties at Federal elections), may be due to 
evaluations of tiie performance of the state govemment ratiier than differences between die states per 
se?'^. This argument is supported by die fmding tiiat tiiere are no enduring differences between die 
states in relation to party identification (chapter 4). 
There are a number of non-results which are also of interest. The issue of 'communism' 
measured in terms of either trade witii or fear of China was not found to be associated with vote in the 
three data sets m which this issue was analysed. The insignificance of this measure found in data die 
coUected during the late sixties is a littie surprising since one of tiie major arguments used to justify 
Australia's involvement in Viemam was to halt the southward advancement of communism. 
Furthenmore, die D.L.P. were stiU a significant political force untU 1974, and tiieir rhetoric often 
referred to communism. Without national survey data with better measures of attimdes to 
communism, the effect of the issue of communism net of partisanship cannot be evaluated. 
The unimportance of the issue of state aid in die 1967 and 1969 samples is not unexpected as by 
that time the Labor party had substantiaUy moderated its position on this issue. 
These analyses indicate that issues added to die political agenda during the 1980s by tiie 'new 
right' were of littie or no electoral consequence. Two measures were used, a composite measure of 
attimde to seUing govemment owned airlines and Telecom and a measure based on the preferred type 
of economy. Both were found not to be associated with vote. One explanation for this finding is that 
the position of the Labor party on these issues was unclear undermining any electoral impact. This 
may be an example of a party defusuig issues by adopting some of poUcies advocated by the party's 
opponents. 
The analyses in this smdy revealed tiiat attitudes to the power of trade-unions did not generaUy 
influence electoral behaviour. The exception is the year 1979 where voters who viewed trade-unions 
as having too much power were significantiy less likely to vote Labor. The general result is a littie 
surprising given the emphasis conservative poUticians have put on the disruptiveness of trade-unions. 
The absence of an effect in data coUected during die 1980s can be attributed to the accord which had 
reduced the number of strikes and therefore the inconvenience the electorate experienced from the 
activities of unions. 
There are difficulties in assessing changes in tiie effect of 'issues' ui general on vote from tiiese 
analyses. One method is to observe changes in scaled deviance after the deletion of all issue variables 
from the model. The restdts of this analysis is presented in figure 6.9. These results indicate that 
issues had a generaUy stable impact on Labor vote witii exception of tiie 1984 NSSS sample. This 
fmding is not tmexpected since more measures of issues were significant in the analysis of this sample 
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tiian in the analyses of die otiier samples. However, conclusions on changes in tiie importance of 
issues cannot be made for die foUowing reasons. First, tius analysis includes aU issues not just tiiose 
had significant effects and second, die effect of issues may be attenuated since reciprocal effects on 
issues on party identification were not specified in the models analysed in this chapter. 
Percent 
20 
15 
10 
All Issues (Labor Vote) 
-X 
_L 
SSUES 
All Issues (Major Party Vote) 
--X--
I 
1970 1975 1980 
Year of Survey 
1985 1990 
Figure 6.9: Changes in the scaled deviance from deletion of all issue measures. 
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6.3.5 Candidates (Leaders) 
Figure 6.10 presents a graph of die coefficients associated witii the measures of relative 
evaluation of the leaders on vote. 
LEADERS 
Parameter Estimate (Absolute) 
0, 5 
0, 4 
G. 3 
0. 2 
0, 1 
Leaders CKajor Party Vote) 
--X--
Leaders (Labor Vote) 
— e — 
X 
1970 1975 1980 
Year of Survey 
1985 1990 
Figure 6.10: Changes in the effects of relative evaluation of the leaders on vote (Labor 
vote). 
From these fmdings several conclusions can be drawn. First, the effects of the relative 
evaluations of leaders on vote has fluctuated over the period of these investigations. Leaders had 
substantial effects in 1967, not matched until the late 1980s. Second, die effects of leaders are greater 
if minor party voters are excluded from the analyses. These results give Uttie evidence to suggest tiiat 
leaders have become more or less unportant influences on vote choice. It could be argued tiiat leaders 
have become less important, since leader measures in die later NSSS and AES samples are generaUy 
understood as superior to the ANPA measures based on die relative number of positive negative 
comments. However, definitive conclusions on changes in tiie effects of leaders on electoral choice 
cannot be made imtil the confirmatory model of electoral choice has been analysed. This confirmatory 
model also aUows reciprocal effects between leaders and partisanship. 
Figure 6.11 presents die effects on vote for the separate measures of tiie two party leaders. This 
graph shows tiiat mcumbency nor party are tiie reasons why a leader has an important effects. In 1967 
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LEADERS CSEPARATE MEASURES^ 
Parameter Estimate 
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Figure 6.11: Changes in the effects of the two individual party leaders on vote (Labor 
vote). 
and 1969, the evaluations of Whitiam had a considerable impact on vote. In 1979, Fraser and Hayden 
had almost equal effects. Since 1984, Mr Hawke's leadership of the Labor party has had substantial 
positive effects on the Labor vote. In contrast, tiie various leaders of tiie opposition had Uttie effect on 
the vote during the 1980s. These results support the conventional wisdom that Hawke was an 
electoral asset to die Labor party and that the leadership of Peacock and Howard did not help the 
coalition. These results suggest that Labor leaders have had an increasing effect on vote (since 1969) 
and Liberal leaders, a decreasing effect. As mentioned above, defuiitive conclusions on changes in the 
effects of leaders, await analyses of the confirmatory model of electoral choice presented in die next 
chapter. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 6 
TABLE A6.1(i): IXKJISTIC REGRESSION OF MAJOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP. INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, ISSUES. 
AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1702:1967 ANPA) 
VARIABLE 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identification - No Major Party 
Patty Identification - V, Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Fairly Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V, Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V. Strong Coalition 
Party Identification - Fairly Strong Coalition 
Party Identification - Very Strong Coalition 
Relative Attitude to parties 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 
General Ideological Position - Left 
General Ideological Position - Right 
Big Business - Too Much Power 
Big Business - Don't Know 
Big Business - Does not have too much power 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - D.K. 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Reduce Taxes 
Death Penalty - Don't Know 
Death Penalty - Keep Death Penalty 
Death Penalty - Abolish 
Migration - On no racial/ethnic grounds 
Migration - Quota on Asian immigrants 
Migration - No Asian, but British & Europiean O.K. 
Migration - Only from Britain & N. Europe 
Migration - No more migrants 
Migration - No Opinion 
Censorship - Read and see what they Uke 
Censorship - Don't Know 
Censorship - Some Censorship 
Royalty - Unimportant 
Royalty - Somewhat important 
Royally - Very Important 
Royalty - Don't Know 
Freq(%) 
780(45.8) 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(doff) 
-0.71 0.98 
142(8.3) 
276(16.2) 
271(15.9) 
155(9,1) 
195(11.5) 
406(23,9) 
257(15.1) 
0,08 ± 2.2 
1485(87.3) 
50(19) 
167(9.8) 
833(51.9) 
197(11.6) 
622(36.5) 
89(5.2) 
1160(68.2) 
453(26.6) 
137(8.0) 
938(55.1) 
627(36.8) 
332(19.5) 
624(36.7) 
113(6,6) 
351(20.6) 
225(13.2) 
57(3.3) 
683(40.1) 
20(1.2) 
999(58.7) 
772(45.4) 
437(25.7) 
465(27.3) 
28(1.6) 
-
4.01" 
3.32' 
2.58' 
-1,89' 
-2.94' 
-2.82' 
-0.24' 
-
3.31' 
-0.10 
-
0.04 
-0.16 
-
0.74 
0.26 
-
1.16' 
0,92" 
-
-0.20 
-0,61 
-0.69 
0.04 
-0,25 
-
0.28 
-0.44 
-
-0.22 
-0.36 
-0,69 
-
0.67 
0.42 
0.40 
0.36 
0.42 
0.60 
0.08 
-
1.22 
0.50 
-
0.42 
0.26 
-
0.52 
0.54 
-
0,44 
0,44 
-
0,33 
0,53 
0,40 
0.43 
0.60 
-
0,90 
0.25 
-
0.31 
0.31 
0.84 
52 ± 17 
50 ± 10 
46 ± 10 
-34 ± 9 
-42 ± 10 
-41 ± 15 
50 ±28 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
27 ± 11 
22± 11 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
600(6)' 
9(1)' 
9(2)' 
0(2) 
4(2) 
7(2)' 
4(5) 
4(2) 
2(3) 
TABLE A6.1(ii): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF MAJOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, ISSUES, 
AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1702:1967 ANPA) 
VARIABLE 
ISSUES 
Vietnam 
Vietnam 
Vietnam 
Vietnam 
Vietnam 
Send Volunteers and Conscripts 
Send Only Volunteers 
Only Civilian Experts 
Withdraw 
Don't Know 
Trade-Unions - Don't Know 
Trade-Unions - Not too much power 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 
State Aid - None to private & Church Schools 
State Aid - None until Government Schools Improved 
State Aid - Don't Know 
State Aid - To only Really Needy Church Schools 
State aid - To both Church & private Schools 
Simple Personal Retiospective EE. - No Change 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Simple Penonal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. T Negative 
Simple Personal Prospective EE, - Positive 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 
Trade with China - Sell wheat 
Trade with China - Don't Know 
Trade with China - No Trade with China 
Relations with U.S. - Less close links 
Relations with U.S. - Fairly close Unks 
Relations with U.S. - Very close links 
Relations with U.S - Don't Know 
First Problem -No Difference/ D.K. 
First Problem - CoaUtion Better 
First ProWem - Labor Better 
Second Problem - No Difference/ D.K. 
Second Problem - CoaUtion Better 
Second Problem - Labor Better 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders 
Freq(%) 
479(28,1) 
766(45,0) 
132(7.8) 
252(14,8) 
73(4.3) 
200(11,8) 
693(40,7) 
809(47,5) 
272(16,0) 
378(22.2) 
57(3.3) 
219(12.9) 
776(45,6) 
668(39,2) 
330(19,4) 
704(41,4) 
868(51,0) 
191(11.2) 
643(37.8) 
1355(79.6) 
110(6.5) 
237(13.9) 
1297(76.2) 
227(13.3) 
178(10.5) 
1067(62.7) 
135(7,9) 
500(29.4) 
142(8.3) 
677(39.8) 
845(49.6) 
38(2,2) 
664(39.0) 
427(25.1) 
611(35.9) 
959(56.3) 
317(18.6) 
426(25.0) 
-0,06 ±2.1 
Parameter 
Estimate 
-
0.82' 
1.18' 
0.92' 
0.93 
-
-0.96' 
-1.29' 
-
-0.17 
-0,50 
-0.15 
0,07 
-
0,02 
-0,23 
-
0,22 
-0,32 
-
-0.02 
0.10 
-
-1.72' 
1.68' 
-
0.06 
-0.05 
-
-0.31 
-0,37 
0,31 
-
-0.72' 
1.19' 
-
-0.39 
0.07 
Standard 
Error 
-
0,31 
0.47 
0.41 
0.64 
-
0,40 
0,39 
-
0,39 
0,75 
0,45 
0,36 
-
0.35 
0.29 
-
0.45 
0.27 
-
0.56 
0,43 
-
0,58 
0.62 
-
0,46 
0,27 
-
0,48 
0,47 
0,87 
-
0.36 
0.30 
-
0.39 
0,32 
Effea 
± Range 
-
20 ± 8 
28 ± 12 
22 ± 10 
0 
-
-21 ± 10 
-27 ± 10 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
• 
0 
0 
-
-33 ± 14 
36 ± 15 
-
0 
0 
-• 
0 
0 
0 
-
-17 ±9 
28 ± 8 
-
0 
0 
Change X' 
Deviance 
(dofO 
10(4)-
11(2)' 
1(4) 
1(2) 
2(2) 
0(2) 
20(2)' 
0((2) 
1(3) 
31(2)' 
1(2) 
-0,44' 0,07 40(1)' 
262.2 
TABLE A6.2(i): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF TWO-PARTY PREFERRED VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES. AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1759:1967 ANPA) 
VARIABLE 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identification - No Major Party 
Party Identification - V. Strtxig Labor 
Party Identificauon - Fairly Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V. Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Not V. Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identificauon - Fairly Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identificauon - Very Strong CoaUtion 
Relative Attitude to piaities 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 
General Ideological Position - Left 
General Ideological Position - Right 
Big Business - Too Much Power 
Big Business - Don't Know 
Big Business - Does not have too much power 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - D.K. 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Reduce Taxes 
Death Penalty - Don't Know 
Death Penalty - Keep Death Penalty 
Death Penalty - Abolish 
Migration - On no radal/ethnic grounds 
Migration - Quota on Asian immigrants 
Migration - No Asian, but British & European O.K. 
Migration - Only from Britain & N. Europe 
Migration - No more migrants 
Migration - No Opinion 
Censorship - Read and see what they like 
Censorship - Don't Know 
Censorship - Some Censorship 
Royalty - Unimportant 
Royalty - Somewhat important 
Royally - Very Important 
Royalty - Don't Know 
Freq(%) 
791(45,0) 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
-0.76 0.93 
192(10,9) 
277(15,7) 
272(15,5) 
155(8.8) 
197(11.2) 
409(23.3) 
257(14.6) 
0.09 ± 2.2 
1527(86,8) 
52(3.0) 
180(10.2) 
919(52.2) 
207(11.8) 
633(36.0) 
93(5.3) 
1201(68,3) 
465(26,4) 
140(8.0) 
970(55.1) 
649(36.9) 
346(19.7) 
651(37.0) 
114(6.5) 
361(20.5) 
230(13,1) 
57(3.2) 
698(39,7) 
21(1.2) 
1040(59.1) 
809(46.0) 
449(25.5) 
473(26.9) 
28(1.6) 
-
4,30* 
3.35' 
2.76* 
-1,62* 
-2.58" 
-2.46' 
-0.26' 
_ 
2.56* 
-0,25 
-
0.07 
-0.17 
-
0.68 
0.36 
-
1,08" 
1,00' 
-
-0,06 
-0.44 
-0,48 
0.02 
-0,10 
-
-0.08 
-0.56' 
-
-0.31 
-0,35 
-0.61 
-
0.66 
0,39 
0.37 
0,34 
0,38 
0.58 
0.08 
_ 
0.96 
0.45 
-
0.38 
0,25 
-
0.49 
0.51 
-
0,42 
0.42 
-
0.31 
0.51 
0.38 
0.40 
0.58 
-
0.82 
0.24 
-
0.30 
0.29 
0.81 
Effea 
± Range 
53 ± 16 
51 ± 10 
48 ± 9 
-31 ± 8 
-39 ± 9 
-38 ± 14 
46 ±22 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
26 ± 10 
24 ± 10 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
13 ± 6 
0 
0 
0 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dof 0 
601(6)' 
34(1)' 
8(2)' 
1(2) 
3(2) 
7(2)' 
3(5) 
6(2)' 
2(3) 
262.3 
TABLE A6.2(ii): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF TWO-PARTY PREFERRED VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP. INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N= 1759:1967 ANPA) 
VARIABLE Freq(%) 
ISSUES 
Vietnam - Send Volunteers and Conscripts 503(28.6) 
Vietnam - Send Only Volunteers 791(45,0) 
Vietnam - Only Civilian Experts 135(7.7) 
Vietnam - Withdraw 257(14.6) 
Vietnam - Don't Know 73(4,2) 
Trade-Unions - Don't Know 204( 11,6) 
Trade-Unions - Not too much power 713(40,5) 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 842(47,9) 
State Aid - None to private & Church Schools 275(15,6) 
State Aid - None until Govemment Schools Improved 384(21,8) 
State Aid - Don't Know 57(3.2) 
State Aid - To only Really Needy Church Schools 224(12.7) 
State aid - To both Church & private Schools 819(46,6) 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 686(39,0) 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 340(19.3) 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 733(41.7) 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 889(50.5) 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 207(11.8) 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 663(37.7) 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 1399(79.5) 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 118(6.7) 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 242(13.8) 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 1340(76.2) 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 237(13,5) 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 182(10.3) 
Trade with China - SeU wheat 1100(62.5) 
Trade with China - Don't Know 139(7.9) 
Trade with China - No Trade with China 520(29,6) 
Relations with U.S. - Less close Unks 144(8.2) 
Relations with U.S. - Fairly close Unks 689(39,2) 
Relations with U.S. - Very close Unks 887(50.4) 
Relations with U.S - Don't Know 39(2.2) 
First Problem -No Difference/ D.K. 698(39.7) 
First Problem - CoaUtion Better 443(25,2) 
First Problem - Labor Better 618(35.1) 
Second Problem - No Difference/ D.K. 995(56,6) 
Second Problem - CoaUtion Better 327(18,8) 
Second Problem - Labor Better 437(24.8) 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders -0.60 ±2.1 
Parameter 
Estimate 
-
0,76' 
1,08' 
0.89' 
0.82 
-
-0,74' 
-1,06' 
-
-0,22 
-0,51 
-0,17 
-0.17 
-
-0.09 
-0.35 
-
-0,05 
-0.33 
-
0.46 
0.11 
-
-1.34* 
i.3r 
-
0.04 
-0.17 
-
-0.31 
-0.50 
0.65 
-
-0.72' 
1,12' 
-
-0,34 
0,09 
Standard 
Error 
-
0,29 
0.44 
0.39 
0.62 
-
0.38 
0.37 
-
0.38 
0.74 
0.44 
0.34 
-
0.33 
0.27 
-
0.41 
0,26 
-
0,53 
0,40 
-
0,51 
0.58 
-
0.43 
0.26 
-
0.45 
0.45 
0.81 
-
0.34 
0.29 
-
0.36 
0.30 
Effea 
± Range 
-
19 ± 7 
26± 11 
22 ± 10 
0 
-
-17 ± 10 
-23 ± 9 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
-27 ± 13 
31 ± 14 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
-16 ± 9 
26 ±7 
-
0 
0 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dof 0 
10(4)' 
8(2)' 
1(4) 
2(2) 
2(2) 
1(2) 
15(2)' 
0(2) 
4(3) 
32(2)' 
1(2) 
-0.3/ 0,07 34(1)' 
2614 
TABLE A6.3(i): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF MAJOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, ISSUES, 
AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1610:1969 ANPA) 
VARIABLE 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identificauon - No Major Party 
Party Identificauon - V. Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Fairly Strong Labor 
Patty Identification - Not V. Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Not V. Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identificauon - Fairly Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identification - Very Strong CoaUtion 
Relative Attitude to parties 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 
General Ideological Position - Left 
General Ideological Position - Right 
Big Business - Too Much Power 
Big Business - Don't Know 
Big Business - Does not have too much power 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - D.K. 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Reduce Taxes 
Death Penalty - Don't Know 
Death Penalty - Keep Death Penalty 
Death Penalty - Abolish 
Migration - On no radal/ethnic grounds 
Migration - Quota on Asian immigrants 
Migration - No Asian, but British & European O.K. 
Migration - Only from Britain & N. Europe 
Migration - No more migrants 
Migration - No Opinion 
Censorship - Read and see what they Uke 
Censorship - Don't Know 
Censorship - Some Censorship 
Freq(%) 
799(49,6) 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(doff) 
-0,26 0.90 
166(10.3) 
285(17.7) 
281(17.5) 
111(6.9) 
148(9.2) 
406(25,2) 
213(13.2) 
-0.22 ± 2.43 
1401(87.0) 
64(4.0) 
145(9,0) 
876(54.4) 
196(12.2) 
538(33.4) 
55(3.4) 
1151(71.5) 
404(25.1) 
144(8,9) 
733(45.5) 
733(45.5) 
360(22.4) 
669(41.6) 
74(4.6) 
282(17,5) 
175(10,9) 
50(3.1) 
685(42,5) 
15(0.9) 
910(56,5) 
-
3,00' 
1,97' 
1,89' 
-1,78' 
-2,89' 
-2,84* 
-0,34' 
-
0,14 
-0,01 
-
-0,48 
-0,11 
-
-0.03 
0.07 
-
0,30 
0.49 
-
0.18 
-0.06 
-0,01 
-0.29 
-0.49 
-
-1.94 
-0.19 
-
0.58 
0.35 
0.40 
0,33 
0,34 
0,47 
0,07 
-
0,71 
0,42 
-
0.35 
0.25 
-
0.57 
0.59 
-
0.41 
0.40 
-
0.28 
0,62 
0.33 
0,42 
0,65 
-
1,13 
0.22 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
447(6)' 
46 ± 14 
38 ± 9 
37 ± 10 
-35 ± 
-44 ± 
-44 ± 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
8 
8 
12 
28(1) 
0(2) 
2(2) 
0(2) 
2(2) 
2(5) 
3(2) 
2615 
TABLE A6.3(u): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF MAJOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY. ISSUES. 
AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N= 1610:1969 ANPA) 
VARIABLE Freq(%) 
ISSUES 
Vietnam - Send Volunteers and Conscripts 371(23,0) 
Viemam - Send Only Volunteers 726(45,1) 
Vietnam - Only Civilian Experts 191(11,9) 
Vietnam - Withdraw 291(18,1) 
Vietnam - Don't Know 31(1,9) 
Trade-Unions - Don't Know 166(10.3) 
Trade-Unions - Not too much power 581(36.1) 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 863(53.6) 
State Aid - None to private & Church Schools 186(11,6) 
State Aid - None until Govemment Schools Improved 417(25,9) 
State Aid - Don't Know 34(2.1) 
State Aid - To only ReaUy Needy Church Schools 268(16.6) 
State aid - To both Church & private Schools 705(43.8) 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 694(43.1) 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 224(13.9) 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE, - Positive 692(43,0) 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 857(53,2) 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 162(10.1) 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 591(36.7) 
China a worry - Don't know 202(12.5) 
China a worry - A lot to worry about 560(34,8) 
China a worry - China won't be a problem 848(52.7) 
Relations with U.S. - Less close Unks 144(8.9) 
Relations with U.S. - Fairly close Unks 727(45,2) 
Relations with U.S. - Very close Unks 715(44,4) 
Relations with U.S - Don't Know 24(1.5) 
Conscription - For all young men 654(40,6) 
Conscription - Keep present baUot system 121(7.5) 
Conscription - Do National Service in other ways 526(32.7) 
Conscription - No oniscripuon 273(17.0) 
Conscription - Don't Know 36(2.2) 
First Problem -No Difference/ D.K. 436(27.1) 
First Problem - CoaUtion Better 454(28.2) 
First Problem - Labor Better 720(44.7) 
Second Problem - No Difference/ D.K. 651 (40.4) 
Second Problem - CoaUtion Better 353(21.9) 
Second Problem - Labor Better 606(37.6) 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders -0.77 ± 2.28 
Parameter 
Estimate 
-
o.9r 
1.16' 
0,96' 
0.11 
-
0,06 
-0,13 
-
0.23 
1.95' 
-0.07 
0.17 
-
0.00 
-0.04 
-
-0.50 
-0.16 
-
0.06 
-0,38 
-
-0.11 
-0.03 
0.67 
-
-0.30 
-0.46 
-0.30 
-0.46 
-
-0.73' 
0.50 
-
-0.65 
0,05 
Standard 
Error 
-
0,31 
0,42 
0,40 
0.72 
-
0.37 
0.36 
-
0.38 
0.76 
0.41 
0.35 
-
0.35 
0,25 
-
0.40 
0.36 
-
0,37 
0.34 
-
0.42 
0.42 
0,98 
-
0,42 
0.26 
0.35 
0.64 
-
0.31 
0.28 
-
0.34 
0.27 
Effea 
± Range 
-
23 ± 8 
26 ± 10 
22 ± 10 
0 
-
0 
Q 
-
0 
38 ± 18 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
Q 
0 
0 
-
-17 ± 8 
0 
-
0 
0 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(doff) 
13(4)' 
1(2) 
8(4) 
0(2) 
2(2) 
4(2) 
1(3) 
3(4) 
17(2) 
5(2) 
-O.ir 0.05 10(1)' 
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TABLE A6.4(i): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF TWO-PARTY PREFERRED VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP. INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES. AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1712:1969 ANPA) 
VARIABLE 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identification - No Major Party 
Party Identification - V. Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Fairly Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Not V. Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Not V. Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identificauon - Fairiy Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identificauon - Very Strong CoaUtion 
Relative Attitude to parties 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 
General Ideological Position - Left 
General Ideological Position - Right 
Big Biuiness - Too Much Power 
Big Business - Don't Know 
Big Business - Does not have too much power 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - D.K. 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Reduce Taxes 
Death Penalty - Don't Know 
Death Penalty - Keep Death Penalty 
Death Penalty - Abolish 
Migration - On no radaiyethnic grounds 
Migration - Quota on Asian immigrants 
Migration - No Asian, but British & European O.K. 
Migration - Only from Britain & N. Europe 
Migration - No more migrants 
Migration - No Opiiuon 
Censorship - Read and see what they like 
Censorship - Don't Know 
Censorship - Some Censorship 
Freq(%) 
829(48.4) 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dof 0 
-0,31 0,79 
211(12,3) 
288(16,8) 
292(17.1) 
114(6,7) 
161(9,4) 
425(24,8) 
221(12,9) 
-0.21 ± 2.4 
1484(86.7) 
68(4.0) 
160(9.3) 
940(54.9) 
202(11,8) 
570(33.3) 
61(3.6) 
1221(71.3) 
430(25.1) 
145(8.5) 
778(45.4) 
789(46.1) 
384(214) 
715(41,8) 
81(4.7) 
295(17,2) 
184(10,7) 
53(3.1) 
715(41.8) 
15(0.9) 
982(57.4) 
-
2,92' 
1,94' 
2,04" 
-1.49' 
-2.46' 
-110' 
-0,33' 
-
-0,00 
-0,58 
-
-0,18 
-0.05 
-
-0.18 
0.06 
-
0.21 
0,36 
-
0.25 
0.04 
0.18 
-0.45 
-0,45 
-
-1.57 
-0.27 
-
0.47 
0.30 
0,36 
0,29 
0,30 
0,39 
0,06 
. 
0.59 
0.37 
-
0,31 
0,21 
-
0,50 
0,52 
-
0.37 
0.36 
-
0,24 
0,51 
0,30 
0,36 
0,55 
-
1,04 
0.19 
432(6)' 
4l- L 
38 ± 
39 ± 
-31 ± 
-41 ± 
12 
7 
9 
7 
7 
-38 ± 10 
-
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
34(1)' 
3(2) 
0(2) 
1(2) 
1(2) 
5(5) 
4(2) 
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TABLE A6.4(ii): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF TWO-PARTY PREFERRED VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1712:1969 ANPA) 
VARL\BLE Freq(%) 
ISSUES 
Vietnam - Send Volunteers and Conscripts 402(23,5) 
Vietnam - Send Only Volunteers 766(45,7) 
Vietnam - Only Civilian Experts 204(11,9) 
Vietnam - Withdraw 305(17,8) 
Vietnam - Don't Know 35(10) 
Trade-Unions - Don't Know 175(10.2) 
Trade-Uruons - Not too much power 610(35.6) 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 927(54.1) 
State Aid - None to private & Church Schools 196(11,4) 
State Aid - None until Govemment Schools Improved 439(25.6) 
State Aid - Don't Know 34(10) 
State Aid - To only ReaUy Needy Church Schools 278(16.2) 
State aid - To both Church & private Schools 765(44.7) 
Simple Personal Reuospective EE. - No Change 739(43.2) 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 237(13.8) 
Simple Pergonal Retrospective EE. - Positive 736(43.0) 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 908(53,0) 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 169(9.9) 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 635(37,1) 
China a worry - Don't know 208(12.1) 
China a worry - A lot to worry about 592(34.6) 
China a worry - China won't be a problem 912(53.3) 
Relations with U.S. - Less close Unks 150(8.8) 
Relations with U.S. - Fairly close Unks 776(45.3) 
Relations with U.S. - Very close links 762(44.5) 
Relations with U.S - Don't Know 24(1.4) 
Conscription - For aU young men 704(41.1) 
Conscription - Keep present baUot system 123(7.2) 
Conscription - Do National Service in other ways 566(33.1) 
Conscription - No conscription 282(16.5) 
Conscription - Don't Know 37(2.2) 
First Problem -No Difference/ D.K. 490(28.6) 
First Problem - CoaUtion Better 472(27.6) 
First Problem - Labor Better 750(43.8) 
Second Problem - No Difference/ D.K. 700(40.9) 
Second Problem - CoaUtion Better 372(21.7) 
Second Problem - Labor Better 640(37.4) 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders -0.80 ± 2.26 
Parameter 
Estimate 
_ 
0,99' 
0,96" 
0,94' 
0,10 
-
0,09 
0,12 
-
0.02 
1.55* 
-0.07 
-0.16 
-
-0.13 
-0,01 
-
-0.23 
-0.04 
-
0,06 
0,34 
-
-0.10 
-0.09 
0.87 
-
-0.21 
-0.28 
-0.13 
-0.46 
-
-0,64' 
0,46 
-
-0.32 
0.04 
Standard 
Error 
_ 
0,26 
0.37 
0,34 
0.62 
-
0.33 
0.32 
-
0,33 
0.70 
0.36 
0,30 
-
0.30 
0.21 
-
0.35 
0,21 
-
0,32 
0.30 
-
0.36 
0.37 
0.91 
-
0.38 
0,22 
0.30 
0.59 
-
0.28 
0.24 
-
0.30 
0.24 
Effea 
± Range 
. 
23 ± 7 
23 ± 9 
22 ± 9 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
33 ± 17 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
-15 ± 7 
0 
-
0 
0 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(d of 0 
17(4)' 
1(2) 
7(4) 
0(2) 
0(2) 
4(2) 
1(3) 
2(4) 
16(2)' 
2(2) 
0,13 0.05 7(1)' 
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TABLE A6.5(i): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1979 MAJOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP. INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY. 
ISSUES. AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1675:1979 ANPA) 
VARIABLE Freq(%) Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dof 0 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identificauon - No Major Patty 
Party Identificauon - V. Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Fairiy Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Not V. Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V, Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identification - Fairly Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identification - Very Strong CoaUtion 
Relative Attitude to parties 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 
General Ideological Position - Left 
General Ideological Position - Right 
Big Business - Too Much Power 
Big Business - Don't Know 
Big Business - Does not have too much power 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - D,K. 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Reduce Taxes 
Death Penalty - Don't Know 
Death Penally - Keep Death Penalty 
Death Penalty - Abc^sh 
Migration - On no radal/ethnic grounds 
Migration - Quota on Asian immigrants 
Migration - No Asian, but British & European O.K. 
Migration - Only from Britain & N. Europe 
Migration - No more migrants 
Migration - No Opinion 
Censorship - Read and see what they like 
Censorship - Don't Know 
Censorship - Some Censorship 
Royalty - Not Important 
Royalty - Somewhat Important 
Royalty - Very Important 
Royalty - Don't Know 
Uranium Mining - Mine and SeU Uranium 
Uranium Mining - Mine but Safeguards 
Uranium Mining - Mine but only AustraUan use 
Uranium Mining - Keep in the ground 
Uranium Mining- Don't Know 
Marijuana - Ban should stay 
Marijuana - LegaUsation and cotiunerdal sale 
Marijuana - LegaUsation for personal use only 
Marijuana - Don't Know 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Spedal Benefits 
Special benefits for Aborigines - No differently 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Get too many 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - It E>epends 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Don't Know 
889(53.1) 0.53 1,39 
184(11,0) 
292(17.4) 
358(21.4) 
123(7.3) 
131(7.8) 
343(20.5) 
244(14.6) 
-0.42 ± 2.50 
1352(80,7) 
118(7,0) 
205(12,2) 
1064(63.5) 
116(6.9) 
495(29,6) 
70(4,2) 
627(37,4) 
978(58.4) 
98(5.9) 
1054(619) 
523(31,2) 
438(26.1) 
493(29.4) 
44(2.6) 
92(5,5) 
578(34.5) 
30(1.8) 
714(416) 
22(1.3) 
939(56,1) 
755(45,1) 
479(28,6) 
426(25,4) 
15(0.9) 
217(13.0) 
908(54.2) 
143(8.5) 
343(20.5) 
64(3.8) 
1051(617) 
403(24.1) 
159(9,5) 
62(3.7) 
441(26,3) 
1092(65.2) 
26(1.6) 
104(6.2) 
12(0.7) 
-
2.32" 
119' 
1.91' 
-2.90' 
-3,56" 
-5,01' 
-0,16 
-
4,03 
-0.39 
-
-0.63 
-0.09 
-
1.05 
0.98 
-
-0.06 
0.37 
-
0.64 
0.59 
0.19 
1.39* 
-0.36 
-
-1.15 
-0,64' 
-
0.35 
-0.58 
-1.17 
-
-0.40 
-0.22 
-0.60 
-0.32 
-
0.08 
0.19 
-1.19 
-
-0.34 
1.87 
0.52 
-1.63 
-
0,70 
0,44 
0.56 
0.45 
0.48 
1,14 
0,09 
. 
1.10 
0.64 
-
0,55 
0.32 
-
0.73 
0,74 
-
0.61 
0.64 
-
0.39 
0.87 
0.69 
0.42 
0.92 
-
1.17 
0,29 
-
0,34 
0,39 
1,62 
-
0.45 
0.64 
0.52 
0.92 
-
0.35 
0,49 
0,66 
-
0,33 
1.14 
0.69 
1.43 
335(6)' 
39 ± 17 
38± 11 
35 ± 14 
-47 ± 11 
-50 ± 12 
-52 ± 25 
45 ±26 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
29 ± 10 
0 
0 
-16 ± 7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3(1) 
14(2)* 
1(2) 
2(2) 
2(2) 
14(5)' 
5(2) 
5(3) 
1(4) 
4(3) 
7(4) 
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TABLE A6.5(u): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1979 MAJOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES. AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1675:1979 ANPA) 
VARIABLE 
ISSUES 
Priority Inflation/ Unemployment - Both 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Unemployment 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Inflation 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Don't Know 
Trade-Unions - Don't Know 
Trade-Unions - Not too much power 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - No Clhange 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 
Simple Personal F*rospective EE. - Positive 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan Personal Rarospective EE. - Positive 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 
China - China won't be a problem 
China - Don't Know 
China - a lot to worry about 
Relations with U.S. - Less close links 
Relatiofu with U.S. - Fairly close links 
Relations with U.S. - Very close Unks 
Relations with U.S - Don't Know 
First Problem - No Difference/ D.K. 
First Problem - CoaUtion Better 
First Problem - Labor Better 
Second Problem - No Difference/ D.K. 
Second Problem - CoaUtion Better 
Second Problem - Labor Better 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders 
Freq(%) 
281(16,8) 
839(50,1) 
520(31.0) 
35(11) 
84(5,0) 
302(18.0) 
1289(77,0) 
670(40.0) 
462(27,6) 
543(32,4) 
877(52.4) 
357(21.3) 
441(26.3) 
1006(60.1) 
488(29,1) 
181(10.8) 
1027(61.3) 
294(17,6) 
354(21,1) 
870(51,9) 
170(10,1) 
635(37.9) 
157(9.4) 
774(46.2) 
725(43,3) 
19(1.1) 
409(24.4) 
501(29.9) 
765(45.7) 
578(34.5) 
432(25.8) 
665(39.7) 
-0.75 ± 2.46 
Parameter 
Estimate 
-
0.46 
0.32 
-1.31 
-
-0.73 
-1.66' 
-
0.07 
-0.17 
-
0,08 
-0,55 
-
0.92' 
0,31 
-
-1,32' 
0.62 
-
-0.04 
-0.07 
-
0,40 
0.13 
2.06 
-
-1.32' 
0.71' 
-
-1,19' 
0,61 
Standard 
Error 
-
0.41 
0.43 
1,02 
-
0,80 
0.75 
-
0,38 
0.35 
-
0.38 
0.36 
-
0,37 
0.59 
-
0.51 
0,47 
-
0.48 
0,31 
-
0.59 
0,59 
1.47 
-
0.45 
0.36 
-
0.45 
0,36 
Effea 
± Range 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
-35 ± 18 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
21 ± 9 
0 
-
-30 ± 12 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
-30 ± 11 
0 
-
-27 ± 11 
0 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dofO 
4(3) 
9(2)* 
0(2) 
3(2) 
7(2)' 
10(2)' 
0(2) 
3(3) 
24(2)* 
18(2)* 
-0,38' 0,08 25(1)' 
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TABLE A6.6(i): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1979 TWO-PARTY PREFERRED VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY. ISSUES. AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N= 1756:1979 ANPA) 
VARIABLE Freq(%) Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dofO 
Intercept 926(52.7) 
PARTISANSHIP 
Patty Identification - No Major Party 238(13,6) 
Party Identificauon - V, Strong Labor 295(16,8) 
Party Identification - Fairly Strong Labor 362(20.6) 
Party Identificauon - Not V. Strong Labor 128(7.3) 
Party Identificauon - Not V. Strong CoaUtion 139(7.9) 
Party Identificauon - Fairiy Strong CoaUtion 350(19,9) 
Party Identification - Very Strong CoaUtion 244(13,9) 
Relative Attitude to parties -0.42 ± 2.46 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 1423(81.0) 
General Ideological Position - Left 125(7.1) 
General Ideological Position - Right 208(11,8) 
Big Business - Too Much Power 1123(64,0) 
Big Business - Don't Know 117(6.7) 
Big Business - Does rtot have too much power 516(29,4) 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - D,K. 72(4.1) 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 656(37.4) 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Reduce Taxes 1028(58.5) 
Death Penalty - Don't Know 102(5.8) 
Death Penalty - Keep Death Penalty 1102(618) 
Death Penalty - AboUsh 552(31,4) 
Migration - On no radal/ethnic grounds 466(26,5) 
Migration - Quota on Asian immigrants 515(29.3) 
Migration - No Asian, but British & European O.K. 45(2.6) 
Migration - Only from Britain & N. Europe 93(5,3) 
Migration - No more migrants 606(34,5) 
Migration - No Opinion 31(1.8) 
Censorship - Read and see what they like 756(43,1) 
Censorship - Don't Know 24(1.4) 
Censorship - Some Censorship 976(55,6) 
Royalty - Not Important 799(45.5) 
Royalty - Somewhat Important 500(28.5) 
Royalty - Very Important 442(25,2) 
Royalty - Don't Know 15(0.9) 
Uranium Mining - Mine and SeU Uraniimi 220(12.5) 
Uranium Mining - Mine but Safeguards 950(54,1) 
Uranium Mining - Mine but only AustraUan use 149(8.5) 
Uranium Mining - Keep in the ground 371(21.1) 
Uranium Mining- Don't Know 66(3.8) 
Marijuana - Ban should suy 1090(62.1) 
Marijuana - LegaUsation and commerdal sale 431(24,5) 
Marijuana - LegaUsation personal use only 168(9.6) 
Marijuana - Don't Know 67(3,8) 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Spedal Benefits 466(26,5) 
Special benefits for Aborigines - No differently 1140(64.9) 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Get too many 27(1.5) 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - It Depends 111(6.3) 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Don't Know 12(0.7) 
1,09 
2.55" 
2.50' 
2,03* 
-2.36' 
-3.01' 
-4.43' 
-0.20' 
2.80 
-0.51 
-0.53 
-0.29 
1.04 
0.91 
-0.17 
-0.02 
0.46 
0.30 
0.11 
l.or 
-0.50 
-1.42 
-0.59* 
0.07 
-0.65 
-1.16 
-0.55 
-0.43 
-0.62 
-0.29 
-0,14 
0,23 
-1,01 
-0,32 
1,93 
0,33 
-1.61 
1,26 
0,67 
0,41 
0,50 
0,38 
0,42 
1,10 
0,08 
0.93 
0.58 
0.51 
0.29 
0.68 
0.68 
0.55 
0.57 
0.34 
0.78 
0.63 
0,35 
0.89 
0.99 
0.26 
0.29 
0.34 
1.55 
0.41 
0.57 
0.47 
0.84 
0,31 
0,43 
0,57 
0.29 
1,10 
0,57 
1,30 
344(6)* 
41 ± 16 
40± 10 
37 ± 12 
-43 ± 9 
-48 ± 10 
-51 ±25 
42 ±21 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Q 
0 
0 
0 
0 
24 ± 9 
0 
0 
-14 ± 6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7(1)" 
12(2)' 
2(2) 
2(2) 
0(2) 
12(5)* 
7(2)* 
5(3) 
2(4) 
4(3) 
7(4) 
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TABLE A6 6(ii)- LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1979 TWO-PARTY PREFERRED VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP. INDICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY. ISSUES. AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N= 1756:1979 ANPA) 
VARIABLE 
ISSUES 
Priority Inflation/ Unemployment - Both 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Unemployment 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Inflation 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Don't Know 
Trade-Unions - Don't Know 
Trade-Unions - Not too much power 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 
Simple Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 
Partisan Persortal Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE.' - Negative 
Partisan Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 
China - China won't be a problem 
China - Don't Know 
China - a lot to worry about 
Relations with U.S. - Less close Unks 
Relations with U.S. - Fairly close Unks 
Relations with U.S. - Very close links 
Relations with U.S. - Don't Know 
First Problem - No Difference/ D.K. 
First Problem - CoaUtion Better 
First Problem - Labor Better 
Second Problem - No Difference/ D.K. 
Second Problem - CoaUtion Better 
Second Problem - Labor Better 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders 
Freq(%) 
298(17.0) 
871(49,6) 
552(31,4) 
35(10) 
85(4.8) 
304(17,3) 
1367(77,8) 
706(40.2) 
486(27.7) 
564(311) 
923(52,6) 
376(21.4) 
457(26,0) 
1053(60,0) 
518(29,5) 
185(10,5) 
1084(61.7) 
306(17,4) 
366(20,8) 
914(511) 
179(10.2) 
663(37.8) 
166(9.5) 
825(47.0) 
745(42.4) 
20(1.1) 
466(26.5) 
508(28.9) 
782(44.5) 
630(35.9) 
439(25.0) 
687(39.1) 
-0.76 ± 2.44 
Parameter 
Estimate 
-
0.28 
0,15 
-1,37 
-
0,65 
-1,56* 
-
0.21 
-0.19 
-
-0.03 
0.54 
-
0.68' 
0,37 
-
-1.45* 
0.37 
-
0.01 
0,01 
-
0.09 
0,11 
1.93 
-
-1.22* 
0.58 
-
-0,60 
0.78* 
Standard 
Error 
» 
0,36 
0,37 
0,99 
-
0.77 
0,72 
-
0,33 
0.30 
-
0.33 
0.31 
-
0.30 
0.51 
-
0.45 
0.41 
-
0.42 
0,28 
-
0.49 
0.50 
1.35 
-
0.40 
0.31 
-
0.40 
0.31 
Effea 
± Range 
. 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
-34 ± 17 
-
0 
a 
-
0 
0 
-
16 ± 7 
0 
-
-32 ± 10 
0 
-
0 
Q 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
-28 ± 10 
0 
-
0 
18 ± 8 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dofO 
3(3) 
10(2)' 
1(2) 
3(2) 
5(2) 
13(2)' 
0(2) 
0(2) 
23(2)* 
15(2)* 
-0.32* 0.07 23(1)* 
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TABLE A6 7(i)- LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1984 MAJOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP. INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=2534:1984 NSSS) 
VARLVBLE Freq(%) Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dof 0 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identification - No Major Patty 
Party Identificauon - V. Strang Labor 
Party Identification - Fairiy Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Not V. Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V. Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identification - Fairiy Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identificauon - Very Strong CoaUtion 
Relative Attitude to parties 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 
General Ideological Position - Left 
General Ideological Position - Right 
Big Business - Neutral/Don't Know 
Big Business - Too much power 
Big Business - Does not have too much power 
Spend cn welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Don't Know 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Reduce Taxes 
Death Penalty - Don't Know 
Death Penalty - Keep Death Penalty 
Death Penalty - Abolish 
Censorship - Middle Position 
Censorship - Disagree Stricter Controls 
Censorship - Agree Stricter Controls 
Royalty - Not Important 
Royalty - Somewhat Important 
Royalty - Very Important 
Uranium Mining - Middle Position 
Uranium Mining - Against Uranium Mining 
Uranium Mining - Support Uranium Mining 
Marijuana - Strongly Agree LegaUsation 
Marijuana - Somewhat Agree Legalisation 
Marijuana - Somewhat Disagree LegaUsation 
Marijuana - Suongly Disagree LegaUsation 
Marijuana - Neutral/ Don't Know 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Spedal Benefits 
Special benefits for Aborigines - No differently 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - It Depends 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Don't Know 
1457(57.1) 0.99 0,76 
262(10,3) 
378(14,8) 
584(22.9) 
275(10.8) 
253(9.9) 
470(18,4) 
329(12.9) 
-0.43 ± 2.36 
2260(88,6) 
60(2.4) 
231(9,1) 
471(18.5) 
1550(61.8) 
530(20.8) 
813(31.9) 
85(3.3) 
1653(64.8) 
410(16.1) 
1480(58.0) 
661(25.9) 
301(11,8) 
223(8.7) 
2027(79.5) 
1374(53.9) 
761(29,8) 
416(16.3) 
631(24.7) 
765(30,0) 
1155(45,3) 
168(6.6) 
433(17.0) 
701(27.5) 
900(35.3) 
349(13.7) 
444(17,4) 
1946(76.3) 
133(5.2) 
28(1.1) 
-
1.30* 
1,40' 
1.59' 
-i.5r 
-119' 
-2.6^ 
-o.6r 
-
-1.01 
-1.08' 
-
0,16 
0.39 
-
-0.14 
-0.45' 
-
0,23 
0,44 
-
-0.85 
-0.33 
-
-0,14 
-0,95* 
-
-0,25 
-0,09 
-
0.39 
-0.24 
0,04 
0,24 
-
-0.23 
0.34 
-1.30 
-
0,62 
0,37 
0,37 
0,29 
0,33 
0.80 
0,12 
-
1,11 
0.49 
-
0.26 
0.33 
-
0.59 
0.23 
-
0.28 
0.32 
-
0,45 
0,32 
-
0,24 
0,36 
-
0,29 
0.26 
-
0,50 
0,49 
0.48 
0.52 
-
0.29 
0.48 
0.97 
177(6)' 
26 ± 14 
27 ± 9 
29 ± 9 
-35 ± 7 
-44 ± 8 
-49 ± 20 
0 
-26 ± 11 
0 
a 
0 
-11 ± 6 
0 
D. 
0 
0 
0 
-23 ± 8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
37(1)* 
6(2)* 
2(2) 
4(2) 
2(2) 
4(2) 
7(2)* 
1(2) 
5(4) 
4(3) 
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TABLE A6.7(ii): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1984 MAJOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP. INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=2551:1984 NSSS) 
VARIABLE 
ISSUES 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Both 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Unemployment 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Inflation 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Don't Know 
Trade-Unions - Not Too much Power 
Trade-Unions - Don't Know 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 
Partisan Personal Rarospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan Penonal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Partisan (Lib) Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan (Lib) Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan (Lib) Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 
Partisan (Lab) Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 
Partisan (Lab) Persorud Prospective EE. - Negative 
Partisan (Lab) Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 
EnvirotunentaUsts - Neutral, don't know 
EnvironmentaUsts - Positive 
EnvironmentaUsts - Negative 
Best Party Inflation - No Difference, Don't know 
Best Party Inflation - Liberals 
Best Party Inflation - Labor 
Best Party Unemployment - No Difference, DK 
Best Party Unemployment - Liberals 
Best Party Unemployment - Labor 
Best Party Economic Growth - No Difference. DK 
Best Party Economic Growth - Liberals 
Best Party Economic Growth - Labor 
Type d Economy - Mixed Economy 
Type of Economy - Sodalist 
Type (rf Economy - All Private Enterprise 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders 
Freq(%) 
640(25,1) 
1071(410) 
811(31,8) 
29(1.1) 
444(17.4) 
31(1.2) 
2076(81.4) 
1195(46.8) 
681(26.7) 
675(26,5) 
1274(59,9) 
651(25.5) 
626(24.5) 
861(33.8) 
829(32.5) 
861(33.8) 
596(23.4) 
1267(49.7) 
688(27,0) 
912(35,8) 
566(22.2) 
1073(411) 
917(35.9) 
415(16,3) 
1219(47,8) 
867(34,3) 
719(28,2) 
956(37.5) 
1586(612) 
314(12.3) 
651(25.5) 
1.5 ± 4.01 
Parameter 
Estimate 
-
0,54 
0,69* 
1,16 
-
0,22 
-0.31 
-
-0.82* 
0.06 
-
-0,31 
-1,51* 
-
-0,35 
0,40 
-
-0,13 
-0.51 
-
-0.38 
0.64* 
-
-0.39 
0.51 
-
-0.25 
0.08 
-
0,05 
-0.20 
0.28* 
Standard 
Error 
. 
0,28 
0.30 
1.11 
-
0.89 
0.33 
-
0,29 
0,32 
-
0.37 
0,35 
-
0.28 
0.30 
-
0.26 
0.30 
-
0.40 
0.30 
-
0.51 
0.26 
-
0.32 
0.31 
-
0.37 
0.25 
0.06 
Effea 
± Range 
i 
0 
16 ±7 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
-20 ± 7 
0 
-
0 
-34 ± 8 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
15 ±7 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dof 0 
6(3) 
1(2) 
8(2)* 
20(2)* 
4(2) 
3(2) 
6(2)* 
7(2)* 
U2) 
1(2) 
29(1)* 
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TABLE A6.8(i): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1986 MAJOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP. INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES, AND VALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N= 1302:1986 NSSS) 
VARIABLE Freq(%) Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dof 0 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identification - No Major Party 
Party Identification - V. Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Fairiy Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Not V. Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Not V. Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identification - Fairiy Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identification - Very Strong CoaUtion 
Relative Attitude to parties 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 
General Ideological Position - Left 
General Ideological Position - Right 
Big Business - Neutral, Don't Know 
Big Business - Agree: too much power 
Big Business - Disagree: too much p)ower 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Don't Know 
Spend on welfare/reduce taxes - Reduce Taxes 
Death Penalty - Neutral, Don't Know 
Death Penalty - In favour Death Penalty 
Death Penalty - Not in Favour 
Feelings towards Migrants 
Pomography - Middle Position 
Pomography - Disagree Stricter Controls 
Pomography - Agree Stricter Controls 
Royalty - Not Important 
Royalty - Scmiewhat Important, Don't Know 
Royalty - Very Important 
Uranium Mining - Middle Position 
Uranium Mining - Against Uranium Mirung 
Uranium Mining - Support Uranium Mining 
Marijuana - Neutral, Don't Know 
Marijuana - Strongly Agree LegaUsation 
Marijuana - Somewhat Agree LegaUsation 
Marijuana - Somewhat Disagree LegaUsation 
Marijuana - Strongly Disagree Legalisation 
Spend more for Aborigines - Neutral 
Spend more for Aborigines - Spend more 
Spend more for Aborigines - Do not spend more 
634(48.7) 1.64 0.99 
71(5.5) 
181(13.9) 
301(23.1) 
143(11,0) 
129(9.9) 
276(21.2) 
201(15.4) 
-0,13 ± 4.53 
1122(86.2) 
34(16) 
146(11.2) 
647(49.7) 
430(33,0) 
225(17,3) 
283(21.7) 
32(15) 
987(75,8) 
160(113) 
879(67.5) 
262(20.2) 
0.08 ± 1,96 
190(14,6) 
223(17,1) 
889(68.3) 
660(50.7) 
368(28,3) 
274(21.0) 
279(21,4) 
350(26.9) 
673(51.7) 
179(13.7) 
94(7.2) 
153(11.8) 
343(26.3) 
533(40.9) 
281(21.6) 
454(34.9) 
567(43.5) 
-
4.78* 
111 ' 
0,81 
-1,48' 
-1,81' 
-4,68* 
-0,48* 
-
-1.65 
-0.19 
-
0.56 
0.40 
-
0,20 
-0,59 
-
0,18 
0.25 
-0.08 
-
0.83 
0,20 
-
-0,00 
0.05 
-
-0.63 
-0.35 
-
0.07 
-0.25 
-l.or 
-0.93 
-
-0.22 
-0.79 
-
1.45 
0.56 
0,51 
0,56 
0,59 
1,69 
0,10 
-
1,02 
0.96 
-
0,37 
0.48 
-
1,24 
0,40 
-
0.47 
0.56 
0.10 
-
0.58 
0.47 
-
0.36 
0.48 
-
0,47 
0.41 
-
0.68 
0.58 
0,52 
0.51 
-
0,43 
0,42 
102(6)* 
50 ±31 
40 ± 14 
-31 ± 14 
-35 ± 15 
-48 ±34 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-24 ± 13 
0 
0 
0 
27(1)* 
2(2) 
2(2) 
2(2) 
0(2) 
1(1) 
3(2) 
0(2) 
2(2) 
7(4) 
4(2) 
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TABLE A6.8(u): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1986 MAJOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1302:1986 NSSS) 
VAIOABLE Freq(%) 
ISSUES 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Inflation 698(53,6) 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Unemployment 508(39.0) 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Don't Know 96(7,4) 
Trade-Unions - Not too much power 270(20.7) 
Trade-Unions - Middle position, don't know 52(4.0) 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 980(75.3) 
Partisan Sodotropac Rarospective EE. - No Change 325(25.0) 
Partisan Sodotropic Rarospective EE. - Negative 575(44.2) 
Partisan Sodotropic Rarospective EE. - Positive 402(30.9) 
Partisan (Lib) Sodotropic Prospective - No Change 335(25.7) 
Partisan (Lib) Sodotropic Prospective - Negative 527(40.5) 
Partisan (Lib) Sodotropic Prospective - Positive 440(33.8) 
Partisan (Lab) Sodotropic Prospective - No Change 459(35.4) 
Partisan (Lab) Sodotropic Prospective - Negative 382(29,3) 
Partisan (Lab) Sodotropic Prospective - Positive 461(35,4) 
Partisan Personal Rarospective EE. - No Change 524(40,2) 
Partisan Personal Rarospective EE. - Negative 602(46.2) 
Partisan Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 176(13.5) 
Partisan (lib) Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 471(36,2) 
Partisan (Lib) Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 614(47,2) 
Partisan (Lib) Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 217(16.7) 
Partisan (Lab) Personal Prospective EE. - No Change 520(39.9) 
Partisan (Lab) Personal Prospective EE. - Negative 358(27,5) 
Partisan (Lab) Personal Prospective EE. - Positive 424(32.6) 
Issue <rf Taxation 1,57 ± 1,85 
Feelings towards EnvirorunentaUsts - Neutral 340(26,1) 
Feelings towards EnvironmentaUsts - Positive 495(38,0) 
FeeUngs towards envirotunentaUsts - Negative 467(35.9) 
Privatisation - Supportive 683(52.5) 
Privatisation - Neutral 67(5.1) 
Privatisation - Not Supportive 552(42.4) 
FeeUngs state govemment - Neutral 241(18,5) 
FeeUngs state govemment - Anti ALP/Pro LNP 501(38.5) 
FeeUngs sute govemment - Pro ALP/ Anti LNP 560(43,0) 
Type of Economy - Mixed Economy 365(28.0) 
Type of Economy - Sodalist 116(8.9) 
Type (rf Economy - Private Enterprise except UtiUties 562(43.2) 
Type (rf Economy - All Private Enterprise 259(19.9) 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders 1.45 ± 4.34 
Parameter 
Estimate 
-
-0.57 
-1.19 
-
0.59 
-0.49 
-0,09 
0,78 
-
0.40 
-0,83 
-
-0.53 
0.09 
-
-0,17 
0,19 
-
0.57 
-0.06 
-
-0.79 
1,33 
-0,10 
-
0,05 
-0,21 
-
-0,88 
0,30 
-
0,33 
1.10* 
-
-0.88 
-0.35 
-0.34 
Standard 
Error 
-
0,34 
0,88 
-
1.33 
0.43 
0,50 
0,48 
-
0,53 
0.51 
-
0.51 
0.47 
-
0,45 
0,79 
-
0.53 
0.48 
-
0.46 
0.74 
0.10 
-
0.43 
0.44 
-
1.25 
0.34 
-
0.44 
0.41 
-
0,69 
0.38 
0.50 
Effea 
± Range 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
Q 
-
0 
Q 
-
0 
25 ± 10 
-
0 
0 
0 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dof 0 
4(2) 
2(2) 
3(2) 
2(2) 
4(2) 
0(2) 
1(2) 
10(2)* 
1(1) 
0(2) 
1(2) 
8(2)* 
2(3) 
0.14* 0.07 5(1)* 
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TABLE A6.9(i): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1987 MAJOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES. AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1590:1987 AES) 
VARIABLE Freq(%) Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dofO 
Not V. Strong CoaUtion 
Fairly Strong CoaUtion 
Very Strong CoaUtion 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identification - No Major Party 
Party Identification - V. Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Fairly Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Not V. Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon • 
Party Identification 
Party Identification 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre (4-7) 
General Ideological Position - Left (1-3) 
General Ideological Position - Right (8-10) 
Big Business - too much power 
Big Business - It Depends. No response (NR) 
Big Business - Does not have too much power 
Spend on welfare/reduce uxes - It Depends. NR 
Spend on welfare/reduce uxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce uxes - Less Tax 
Death Penalty - Not Sure. No Response (NR) 
Death Penalty - Agree: Bring Back 
Death Penalty - Disagree: Bring Back 
Migration - On no radal/ethnic grounds 
Migration - C^ou on Asian immigrants 
Migration - No Asian, but British & European O.K. 
Migration - Only from Britain & N. Europe 
Migration - No more migrants 
Migration - No Response 
Censorship - None 
Censorship - It Depends. No Response 
Censorship - Some Censorship 
Royally - Not Important 
Royalty - Somewhat Important 
Royalty - Very Important 
Royalty - No Response 
Uranium Mining - Mine and Sell Uranium 
Uraruum Mining - Mine but Safeguards 
Unmium Mining - Mine but only AustraUan use 
Uranium Mining - Keep in the ground 
Uranium Mining - Does'nt Matter 
Uranium Mining - No Response 
Marijuana - Strongly Favour LegaUsation 
Marijuana - Favour Legalisation 
Marijuana - It depends. No Response 
Marijuana - Favour remaining Qlegal 
Marijuana - Strongly Favour remaining Dlegal 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Spedal Benefits 
Spedal benefits for Aborigines - No differently 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - Ga too many 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - It Depends 
Special Benefits for Aborigines - No Response 
856(53,8) 1.11 1,15 
132(8.3) 
168(10.6) 
410(25.8) 
218(13.7) 
218(13.7) 
317(19,9) 
127(8.0) 
1083(68.1) 
126(7.9) 
381(24.0) 
779(49.0) 
525(33.0) 
286(18.0) 
375(23,6) 
217(13,6) 
998(62.8) 
296(18.6) 
935(58.8) 
359(22.6) 
346(21.8) 
374(23.5) 
40(15) 
110(6.9) 
677(42.6) 
43(17) 
452(28.4) 
218(13.7) 
920(57,9) 
820(51,6) 
469(29,5) 
300(18.9) 
1(0.1) 
215(13.5) 
883(55.5) 
150(9.4) 
281(17.7) 
50(3.1) 
11(0.7) 
88(5.5) 
216(13,6) 
203(118) 
330(20,8) 
753(47,4) 
145(9.1) 
849(53,4) 
322(20,3) 
266(16,7) 
8(0.5) 
-
3.33* 
2.35' 
1.96' 
-1,48' 
-1.80' 
-2.80' 
-
-0.47 
-0.75' 
-
-0.09 
0.10 
-
-0.14 
-0.52 
-
0.24 
0.34 
-
0.23 
-0.84 
0.28 
0.49 
0.57 
-
0.38 
-0.01 
-
-0.19 
-0,08 
-4.90 
-
-0.20 
0.40 
0.21 
-0.36 
0.60 
-
0.05 
-0.05 
1.01 
0.57 
-
-0.59 
-0.45 
-0,67 
0,18 
-
0,79 
0,39 
0,38 
0.37 
0.41 
1.09 
-
0,51 
0,33 
-
0,28 
0.36 
-
0.44 
0.30 
-
0.33 
0.39 
-
0.34 
0.79 
0.53 
0,33 
0,88 
-
0.40 
0,28 
-
0.27 
0.38 
22.56 
-
0.36 
0.52 
0.45 
0.70 
1,50 
-
0,64 
0.65 
0.63 
0.60 
-
0,46 
0,53 
0.51 
1,59 
234(6)' 
43 ± 18 
39 ± 10 
35 ± 9 
•33 ± 9 
•38 ± 10 
•47 ± 24 
-
0 
•18 ± 8 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
q 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
6(2)* 
0(2) 
3(2) 
1(2) 
5(5) 
1(2) 
1(3) 
3(5) 
9(4) 
2(4) 
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TABLE A6.9(ii): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1987 MAJOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP. DEDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY. 
ISSUES. AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1620:1987 AES) 
VAIUABLE 
ISSUES 
Priority Inflation/UnemploymerU - Both Equal, NR 
Priority Inflation/Unemployment - Unemployment 
Priority Inflati(3n/Unemployment - Inflation 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 
Trade-Unions - It depends 
Trade-Unions - Not too much power 
Trade-Unions - No Response (NR) 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Simple Personal Retrospective EE. - NR 
Simple Sodotropic Rarospective EE. - No Change 
Simple Stxaotropic Rarospective EE. - Negative 
Simple Sodotropic Rarospective EE. - Positive 
Simple Sodotropic Rarospective EE. - NR 
Mediated Persc«al Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Mediated Personal Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Mediated Personal Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Mediated Personal Retrospective EE. - NR 
Mediated Sodotropic Retrospective EE. - No Change 
Mediated Scxaotropic Retrospective EE. - Negative 
Mediated Sodotropic Retrospective EE. - Positive 
Mediated Sodotropic Retrospective EE. - NR 
Mediated Scxnotropic Prospective EE. - No Change 
Mediated S(xiotropic Prospe<iive EE. - Negative 
Mediated S<xriotropic Prospective EE - Positive 
Mediated Sodotropic Prospective EE. - NR 
Importance of the issue of Inflation 
Importance of the issue of Interest Rates 
Importance of the issue of Taxation 
Importance of the issue of the Envirotunent 
Labor Party Divided - United 
Labor Party Divided - Not Sure 
Labor Party Divided - Divided 
Labor Party Divided - No Response (NR) 
Liberal Party Divided - United 
Liberal Patty Divided - Not Sure 
Liberal Party Divided - Divided 
Liberal Patty Divided - No Response (NR) 
National Party Divided - United 
National Party Divided - Not Sure 
National Party Divided - Divided 
National Party Divided - No Response (NR) 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders 
Freq(%) 
933(58,7) 
371(23.3) 
286(18,0) 
1106(69.6) 
245(15.4) 
221(13,9) 
18(1,1) 
601(37,8) 
686(43.1) 
294(18.5) 
9(0.6) 
354(22.3) 
722(45.4) 
507(31,9) 
7(0.4) 
925(58.2) 
478(30,1) 
163(10.3) 
25(1.5) 
606(38.1) 
478(30.1) 
457(28.7) 
49(3.1) 
617(38.8) 
291(18.3) 
659(41.4) 
23(1.4) 
1.15 ± 1.11 
1.11 ± 1.09 
1.26 ± 1.05 
0.68 ± 1.03 
1005(63.2) 
296(18.6) 
257(16.2) 
32(10) 
152(9.6) 
299(18.8) 
1057(66.5) 
82(5.2) 
110(6.9) 
381(24.0) 
999(62.8) 
100(6.3) 
1.31 ±5.30 
Parameter 
Estimate 
-
-0.34 
0.70 
-
-0.78' 
0.28 
0.78 
-
0.08 
0.44 
3.44 
-
-0,53 
-0,49 
-0.24 
-
-O.ir 
-0,55 
-2.25 
-
-0.06 
1,14' 
1.24 
-
-0.40 
0.60 
0.72 
0.19 
0.15 
-0.09 
-0.04 
-
-0,07 
-0.88* 
1.38 
-
0.28 
0.58 
3.32' 
-
0.32 
0.27 
-1.62 
0,23' 
Standard 
Error 
-
0,31 
0,36 
-
0.38 
0.40 
1.25 
-
0.31 
0.39 
15,01 
-
0,33 
0,37 
15,11 
-
0.32 
0,54 
1.17 
-
0,32 
0.36 
0.90 
-
0,43 
0.31 
1.00 
0.18 
0.17 
0.17 
0.16 
-
0.32 
0.35 
1.13 
-
0.58 
0.53 
1.41 
-
0.56 
0.52 
1.24 
0,04 
Effea 
± Range 
-
0 
0 
-
-18 ± 9 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
-19 ± 8 
0 
0 
• 
0 
25 ± 9 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
-21 ± 9 
0 
-
0 
0 
43 ±29 
-
0 
0 
0 
_ 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dof 0 
6(2)' 
5(3) 
Ul) 
3(3) 
9(3)* 
13(3)* 
5(3) 
0(1) 
0(1) 
Ul) 
0(1) 
8(3)* 
7(3) 
3(3) 
42(1)* 
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TABLE A6.10(i): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1988 MAJOR PARTY VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, INDICATORS OF IDEOLOGY, 
ISSUES, AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1369:1988 NSSS) 
VARIABLE Freq(%) Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
Effea 
± Range 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dofO 
Intercept 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party Identification - No Major Party 
Party Identification - V. Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Fairiy Strong Labor 
Party Identification - Not V. Strong Labor 
Party Identificauon - Not V. Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identification - Fairiy Strong CoaUtion 
Party Identificauon - Very Strong CoaUtion 
Relative Attitude to parties 
IDEOLOGY 
General Ideological Position - None/Centre 
General Ideological Position - Left 
General Ideological Position - Right 
Feelings Big Business - Neutral, Don't Know 
Feelings Big Business - Negative 
FeeUngs Big Business - Positive 
Spend on welfare/reduce uxes - Welfare 
Spend on welfare/reduce uxes - Doa'i Know 
Spend on welfare/reduce Uxes - Reduce Taxes 
Death Penalty - Neutral, Don't Know 
Death Penalty - Reintroduce Death Penalty 
Death Penalty - AboUsh Death Penalty 
Pomography - Middle Position 
Pornography - Disagree Stricter Contiob 
Pomography - Agree Stricter Controls 
Royalty - Ncx Important 
Royalty - Somewhat Important, Don't Know 
Royally - Very Important 
Uranium Mining - Middle Position 
Uraruiun Mining - Against Uranium Miiung 
Uranium Mining - Support Uranium Mining 
Marijuana - Neutral, Don't Know 
Marijuana - Stiongly Agree Legalisation 
Marijuaiu - Somewhat Agree LegaUsation 
Marijuana - Somewhat Disagree LegaUsation 
Marijuana - Strongly Disagree Legalisation 
Spend more for Aborigines - Neutral 
Spend more for Aborigines - Spend more 
Spend more for Aborigines - Do not spend more 
699(51,1) 0,08 1,01 
69(5,0) 
175(118) 
338(24,7) 
147(10.7) 
162(11,8) 
322(23,5) 
156(11,4) 
-0.44 ± 4.29 
1268(92.6) 
17(1.2) 
84(6.1) 
443(32.4) 
311(217) 
615(44.9) 
338(24.7) 
34(15) 
997(72.8) 
180(13.1) 
908(66.3) 
281(20.5) 
245(17.9) 
225(16.4) 
899(65.7) 
361(26.4) 
750(54.8) 
258(18.8) 
313(22.9) 
420(30.7) 
636(46.5) 
196(14.3) 
88(6.4) 
176(119) 
333(24.3) 
576(42.1) 
531(38.8) 
316(23.1) 
522(38.1) 
-
1.71* 
1.42' 
1,51' 
-2.or 
-2.89' 
-2.22' 
-0.90' 
-
1.52' 
0.46 
-
0.14 
-0.39 
-
-0.55 
0,06 
-
-0.13 
0.58 
-
0,03 
-0,28 
-
-0.14 
-0.54 
-
-0.58 
-0.56 
-
-0.01 
0.54 
0.69 
0.54 
-
0.28 
-0.93* 
-
0.83 
0,54 
0.54 
0,53 
0.58 
0,94 
0,14 
-
0,74 
0,39 
-
0,45 
0.37 
-
0.98 
0.40 
-
0.49 
0.57 
-
0.55 
0.43 
-
0.37 
0.50 
-
0.44 
0.40 
-
0.72 
0.60 
0.51 
0.45 
-
0,43 
0.37 
145(6)' 
34 ± 19 
30 ± 13 
32 ± 13 
-39 ± 13 
-46 ± 14 
-41 ±22 
31 ± 18 
0 
0 
a 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-22 ± 9 
68(1)* 
6(2)* 
2(3) 
0(2) 
3(2) 
1(2) 
U2) 
2(2) 
3(4) 
10(2)* 
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TABLE A6.10(u): LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF 1988 MAJOR PARTY INTENDED VOTE ON PARTISANSHIP, DWICATORS OF 
IDEOLOGY. ISSUES. AND EVALUATIONS OF LEADERS (N=1350: 1988 NSSS) 
VARIABLE 
ISSUES 
Trade-Unions - Not too much power 
Trade-Uruons - Middle position, don't know 
Trade-Unions - Too much power 
Issue (rf Taxation 
Feelings towards Environmentalists - Neutral 
Feelings towards EnvironmentaUsts - Positive 
Feelings towards EnvironmentaUsts - Negative 
FeeUngs towards Peace Activists - Neutral 
Feelings towards Peace Activists - Positive 
FeeUngs towards Peace Activists - Negative 
Privatisation - Supportive 
Privatisation - Neutral 
Privatisation - Not Supportive 
Type of Economy - Mixed Economy 
Type of Ecxmomy - ScxdaUst 
Type (rf Economy - Private Enterprise except UtiUties 
Type of Economy - AU Private Enterprise 
LEADERS 
Relative Attitude to Leaders 
Freq(%) Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
346(25.3) 
13(0,9) 
1010(73.8) 
1.33 ± 1.95 
336(24,5) 
572(41.8) 
461(33.7) 
299(21.8) 
656(47,9) 
414(30,2) 
503(36,7) 
292(21,3) 
574(41,9) 
458(33.5) 
125(9.1) 
569(41.6) 
217(15,9) 
1,70 ± 4.36 
-
0.71 
0.00 
-0.05 
-
-0.54 
-1,13* 
-
0,35 
0,74 
-
0,39 
0,29 
-
-0.02 
-0.09 
0.14 
0,39' 
-
1,40 
0,40 
0.09 
-
0.43 
0.44 
-
0.43 
0.47 
-
0.46 
0,40 
-
0,65 
0,37 
0.54 
0,07 
Effea 
± Range 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-26 ± 11 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Change X^  
Deviance 
(dofO 
0(2) 
0(1) 
7(2)' 
3(2) 
1(2) 
0(3) 
39(1)' 
TABLE A6.ll: COEFHCIENTS FOR CONTINUOUS MEASURES OF PARTY EDENTIHCATION (PID) 
Measure 
LABOR VOTE (ALP V OTHER) 
OLS 7 category PID measure 
OLS 3 category PID measure 
Logit 7 category PID measure 
Logit 3 category PID measure 
MAJOR PARTY (ALP V CoaUtion) 
OLS 7 category PID measure 
OLS 3 category PID measure 
Logit 7 category PID measure 
Logit 3 category PID measure 
TWO-PARTY PREFERRED 
OLS 7 category PID measure 
OLS 3 category PID measure 
Logit 7 category PID measure 
Logit 3 category PID measure 
1967 
ANPA 
-0.16 
-0.36 
-1.51 
-2.71 
-0.14 
-0.37 
-1.57 
-2.80 
-0.16 
-0.36 
-1.52 
-2.71 
1969 
ANPA 
-0.14 
-0.33 
-1.02 
-1.97 
-0.15 
-0,34 
-1.23 
-2.28 
-0.14 
-0.33 
-1.08 
-2.07 
1979 
ANPA 
-0.14 
-0.34 
-1.31 
-2.35 
-0.14 
-0.35 
-1.51 
-178 
-0.14 
-0.35 
-1.46 
-2.61 
1984 
NSSS 
-0.11 
-0,25 
-0,83 
-1,46 
-0.11 
-0.27 
-0.99 
-1.70 
1986 
NSSS 
-0.12 
-0,24 
-0,91 
-1,40 
-0.12 
-0,28 
-1,10 
-1.60 
1987 
AES 
-0.13 
-0,28 
-1,08 
-1,76 
-0,13 
-0,29 
-1.19 
-1.95 
1988 
NSSS 
-0.15 
-0,30 
-0,98 
-1.58 
-0.15 
-0.36 
-1,09 
-1,95 
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1. These 'insurmountable' problems stem from the probable under-idendfication of the model. That is. there are too many 
parameters to estimate given the data. 
2. The possibility remains, that there are short-term factors which have no effect on vote, but are involved in the process of 
electoral choice by influencing partisanship. However, since vote and partisanship are highly correlated, the existence of such 
short-term factors would be unlikely. 
3. There is of course the possibility, that data on politically relevant issues were not collected in a particular study. Without 
comparable data from other studies conducted at the same time, it is impossible to be definitive on this point The issues of 
conscription in 1967, the Franklin dam in the early 1980s, home mortgage rates and the national debt in the late 1980s, are 
examples of issues that may be relevant, although data was not collected on these issues. However, it is unlikely that the 
studies have excluded very important issues, since the principle investigators were well aware of the issues at that time. 
Furthermore, issues on which questions were not directly asked are Ukely to be indicated by other issue measm-es. For 
example the questions on the Vietnam war in the 1967 ANPA study include attitudes to conscription, attitudes to specific 
environmental issues are likely to be encompassed by general attitudes to environmentalists and attitudes to home mortgage 
rates and the national debt are incorpwrated in responses to p>ersonal and sociotropic economic evaluations. 
4. In these two studies, data collection began immediately after the respective federal elections. 
5. The measure of major party vote excluded respondents who voted for the minor parties such as the Democratic Labor 
party, the Australian Democrats and other parties. The scoring for this variable is 1 for a Labor vote and 0 for Liberal or a 
National (Coimtry) vote. 
6. The measures of two party preferred vote employ questions on the respondents secxind preference. Such questions were 
only asked in the three ANPA studies. The variable was scored 1 for a first or second preference for the Labor party and 0 
for preference for the Liberal or National (Country) parties. It is not a true measure of two party preferred vote, since voters 
who gave both their first and second preferences to minor parties were excluded from these analyses. 
7. The employment of logistic regression (which was employed in these analyses) alleviates the problem of the interval 
assumption to some degree. The interpretation of the parameters has an ordinal rather than cardinal meaning (Aldrich & 
Nelson, 1984:41). However, since many variables are trichotomous, including a middle "don't know" category, ordinal 
interpretations would appear inap)p)ropriate. 
8. There is no problem in using dummy variables in logistic regression (Aitkin et al., 1989:72-73). 
9. It is unlikely that respondents with higher positive evaluations of a leader, are less likely to vote for the party he leads, 
than respondents with less positive evaluations of that leader. 
10. There is evidence that some issues attracted a higher proportion of "don't know" responses. For example, the issue of 
trade union power attracted 12% "don't know" responses in 1967 and 10% in 1969. In contrast, the Viemam issue attracted a 
far smaller proportion of "don't know " responses, 4% in 1967 and 2% in 1969. In general, the proportion of "don't know" 
responses was lower in the 1969 sample than in the 1967 sample. This may be atiributed to either the electorate being more 
political in 1969, or that the panel design of the study motivated opinions on political matters. 
11. These analyses were performed using the software program GLIM version 3.77. 
12. Aldrich & Nelson (1984:57) note that this procedure can at times be misleading. The calculation of correct and incorrect 
predictions does include information on the degree to which predictions are incorrect. Furthermore, the cut off at 0.5 may not 
always be appropriate if the response variable is quite skewed. These considerations are not important here, since the 
dependent variable is not skewed and very few cases had fitted values very different from the observed values. However, this 
method of assessing fit could not be used in the last chapter on ideology where the dependent variable was more often than 
not, quite highly skewed 
13. Apart from the presenting the percentage effects (discussed below) there are niunber of other ways in which to interpret 
the results from logistic regression. One way appropriate for continuous variables is take two interesting values of a 
dependent variable and to assess the difference in predicted probability (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984:44). Another approach is to 
focus on the log odds. The exponent of the logit estimate for a continuous variable is the increase in log-odds of having the 
characteristic analysed In an example of the investigation of coronary heart disease presented by Aitkin et al. (1989:203), the 
exponent (1.96) of the estimated coefficient (0.66) is interpreted as the odds of heart disease almost doubling for one unit 
mcrease on the continuous predictor. For a nominal variable, the exponent of the difference between the estimates for two 
groups can be taken, where one group is interpreted as being, so many times more likely have the characteristic of interest 
(Swan. 1985:40). Furthermore, the odds can be converted to a probability (odds/1-i-odds) denoting the increase in probability 
(of heart disease in the above example), for a one unit increase in the independent variable (Aitkin et al., 1989:203). 
14. The grand mean is the constant (or intercept) term for the model. It is based on the distribution of the response variable 
(Baker et al., 1985:51). The formulae for the grand mean (GM) is log(Pyi-Py) where P^  is the proportion of the sample with 
a score of 1 on the response variable. 
The procedure of the effect at the grand mean is as follows: 
%Effect = {[Exponent (GM-i-PE)]/l-t-[Exponent(GM-i-PE)]) - P^  
Where: 
GM & Py are defined as above 
PE is the parameter estimate associated with the nominal category. 
In the case of continuous variable the formula is altered slightly: 
%Effect = ([Exponent (GM-Km*PE))]/l-H[Exponent(GM-Km*PE))]) - P^  
where m is the score on that variable. 
These formulae are mathematically equivalent to the formula presented by Petersen (1985): 
[exp(L,)/l-Hexp(L,)]-[exp(LJ/l-Hexp(Lo)] 
where L, is the logit (parameter estimate) after the unit incn'ease in the independent variable and LQ is the logit (parameter 
estimate) before the imit increase in the independent variable. 
The term [exp(L^/l-i-exp(Lo)] becomes P^  if the effect is relative to a category with a score of zero. 
15. The logic at calculating the effect relative to the grand mean is that, if a person is already very likely (or unlikely) to 
vote for a party, then the effect of another variable is not as great as when the p>erson is no more or less to vote for either 
party (Jones & McAllister, 1989). 
16. It should be noted that these ranges are only approximate, since the range is not strictly symmetrical. 
17. The procedure was not adopted in the analyses presented in the last chapter, since those investigations were searching for 
trends rather than definitive relationships. 
18. The abbreviations for the tables are as follows: 
ALP (Australian) Labor party 
D.K./DK Don't Know 
EE. Economic Evaluations 
LNP Liberal and National Parties 
N. Northem 
NR No Response 
U.S. The United States 
V. Very 
19. The D.L.P was by far the largest minor party. In this sample, of the 70 respondents who intended to vote for minor 
parties, 59 intended to vote for the D.L.P (Aitkin. Kahan & Stokes, 1975:82, V167). 
20. This comparison of changes in scaled deviance is only a guide and has no firm statistical basis. Aitkin et al. (1989:171) 
comment that the scaled deviance provides a significant test for the importance of parameters omitted from the model, the 
unplication being absolute rather than relative importance. However, it is can be concluded that party identification with a 
scaled deviance of over 500, is 'more important', than the other significant variables in the 1967 model, which all have a 
scaled deviance below 50. 
21. Both measures were ordinal ranging from a score of -5 for five negative comments and no positive comments about that 
leader to 5 for 5 positive conmients and no negative comments about that leader. 
22. To fully investigate this proposition would require quite extensive additional analyses. 
23. The electorate was less positive towards the party leaders in 1969, than in 1967. The proportion of electorate with net 
positive things to say about Mr Gorton and Mr Whitiam, respectively, was 30.1% and 46.2% in 1969, compared to 37.2% 
and 56.0% for Mr Holt and Mr Whitiam in 1967. 
24. The change in chi-square for the measure of personal retrospective economic evaluations was found to be significant in 
relation to major party vote [X'=7(2), P<0.05], but just failing to be significant in relation to the two party preferred vote 
rx^=5(2), ns]. However, in both instances those who had negative retrospective evaluations, were significantly more Ukely to 
vote Labor, the parameter being larger in relation to major party vote. 0.92 compared to 0.68. 
25. The measure of relative evaluation of the parties was not based on the number of likes and dislikes, but was constructed 
from two questions asking resfKmdents the amount of confidence they had in the Liberal and Labor parties. This constructed 
measure ranged from -5 to 5, whereas the other measures of attitude to the parties ranged from -10 to 10. 
26. The neutral group did not agree with either statement supporting or opposing uranium mining. The 'neutral' group also 
included respondents who agreed to both statements. Details can be found in appendix 1. 
27. The rural/non-rural measure is one of the few measures of social structural factors that has effects on vote, net of the 
model for the 1984 sample. This finding is presented later in the chapter. 
28. This second measure on the eccmomic evaluations given the continuance of the same party in govemment, was not asked 
in the ANPA studies. 
29. This measure was based on feeling thermometer ratings of enviroiunentalists. Details on its construction are presented in 
appendix 1. 
30. The sign of the parameter estimate for the measure of relative evaluations of the leaders is positive, whereas in the 
analysis of the 1967, 1969 and 1979 ANPA samples, the signs were negative. This change simply reflects, that the Labor 
party was in govemment in 1984 and the measure of leadership is constructed in the same maimer - evaluation of Leader of 
the govemment minus the evaluation of the leader of the opposition. 
31. The measure of evaluation of the leader opposition was adjusted in respect to the change in the leadership of the Liberal 
party from Mr Peaccx:k to Mr Howard in September 1985. For the great majority of the 1984 NSSS sample, Mr Peacock was 
leader of the opposition. 
32. When the 'support uraiuum mining group' was the reference group, the parameter estimate for the 'against uranium 
mining' group was -0.64 with a standard error of 0.26, significant at the P<0.05 level. 
33. With the group with positive partisan sociotropic retrospective economic evaluations as the reference group, the 
coefficient of the group with negative evaluations was -0.89 with a standard error of 0.36, significant at the P<0.05 level. 
34. In the full model, the parameters for positive and negative partisan personal economic evaluations of the change of 
govemment measure were -0.11 and -0.19 respectively. After the deletion of the continuation of the Labor government 
measure, the estimates for the change of goverrunent measure were, -0.13 and -0.19, respectively. 
35. The positive coefficient meant that those with positive evaluations of Mr Howard tended to vote Labor and those with 
negative evaluations of him tended to vote for the Liberal. However, this finding was not significant and therefore, not true 
of the electorate in 1986. This result does alert researchers to problems that may arise with use of the combined measure. 
36. Exclusion of minor party voters increased the mean of this measure (towards relatively more positive evaluations of Mr 
Hawke) by 0.04 units in a measure with a range of twenty units. 
37. This measure was constructed in the same manner, as the measures of the evaluations of Mr Hawke and Mr Howard. 
38. This result contrasts with the findings of Bean & Kelley (1988), who found (using a different data set) significant and 
positive effects of evaluaticms of the Queensland premier, on the Labor vote. Although the results of Bean & KeUey's 
analyses are quite plausible, the mcxiel analysed here included more controls tiian the model analysed by Bean & Kelley 
(1988). Their model did not include party identification in 1987 (but party identification in 1984), relative evaluation of the 
parties nor the measures of sociotropic economic evaluations. Fiuthermore, Joh Bjelke Petersen opted out of the 1987 
election campaign, when the election was announced so it quite likely that evaluations of him had no effect on vote at tiie 
elections, over a montii later. 
39. The measures of tiiese social structural factors was generally the same as the measures used in chapter 5 and detailed in 
appendix 1. The measures were as follows: 
Occupational class : 6 category measure witii managers and farmers were assigned to separate categories since the measure of 
rural/non-rural residence was not included in the same analysis. Manual workers the reference category. 
Religion : 5 category measure with Anglicans the reference group. 
Region (Rural/Non-rural) : 2 category measure witii non-rural residents tiie reference category. 
Region (State) : The six states - NSW tive reference category. 
Edinicity : 6 category measure, tiie Australian bom tiie reference category. 
Class Identificaticm : 3 category measures with working class identifiers tiie reference category. 
Income : 9 category measure including an income not known category. The reference category was the group earning the 
lowest incomes. 
Trade union Membership: 2 category measure with union members the reference category. 
Religiosity : 8 categcjry measure with the group never attending church the reference category. 
Age : Cohort measures used in chapter 6. 
Gender : Men the reference group. 
Education : 3 category measure, not completed secondary school tiie reference category.. 
Class Background : non-manual background die reference category. 
Partisan Background : The five point continuous measure. 
40. The following 3 step procedure was employed First, the full model was fitted (In GLIM syntax: $FIT -(-MODEL S). The 
second step was to fit then the social structural variable of interest for instance gender (SFTT -(-SEX $). The third step was to 
add the interactive model (SFTT + GENDER*(MODEL). The (difference between scaled deviance of the two final fits was 
compared (the likelihood ratio) and assessed by the chi-square test for the degrees of freedom. If the ratio is significant then 
it can be concluded that the interactive term is a significant contributor to the model. (Statistical advice from Ms Y.E. 
Pittelkow, Research School of the Social Sciences, ANU). 
41. In these analyses vote at the last election was also added to the model. In all samples, this measure significantiy 
improved the fit of the mcxiel. The change of scaled deviance was about 80 units for loss of 2 degrees of freedom. In almost 
every case, the estimates of the model did not change substantially, measures that were significant in the analyses reported 
here were also significant after the measure of vote at the last election had been included One explanation for these results is 
that, this measure is a sunogate measure for those short term forces operating at the time of the last election, which were still 
relevant at the time the data was collected. 
42. The exception is the second (1987) wave of tiie 1984-1987 NSSS. where the question on partisan leanings was included 
in the (mail) survey. 
43. The asscx;iation between party identification and vote among leaners (in American data) has been found to be slightiy 
higher, tiian the association among weak identifiers (Shively, 1980). 
44. The contribution of 'partisanship' to the fit of the mcxiel, was found by deleting botfi partisanship measures (party 
identificaticm and relative attitude to the parties) from the model. 
45. The proportion of votes for minor parties, was generally higher in the more recent samples. Defining the minor party 
vote, as votes not for the Labor or coalition parties the proportions (of minor party voters) are 3.8% in 1967 (intended vote), 
7.6% in 1969 (vote at inunediate past election), 5.7% in 1979 (intended vote), 5.5% in 1984 (intended vote), 10.3% in 1986 
(intended vote), 6.4% in 1987 (vote at immediate past election) and 12.1% in 1988 (intended vote). This trend differs from 
the more or less constant propwrtion, that had voted for minor parties at federal elections over this time f)eri(xl (see 
Mackerras, 1987:273). 
46. These models are not properly specified since relevant short-term factors are not included. 
47. There are simply too many correlations to present here. A better test would be to note the squared multiple correlation 
coefficient (R*), of a model of party identificaticm on all other variables in the model. However, since party identification was 
a categorical variable tills test could not be performed 
48. The absolute values are the sum of the absolute values of the coefficients. 
49. Since most researchers on electoral behaviour employ OLS regression and a decline is not indicated by OLS regression, a 
debate may arise as to the suitability of logistic versus OLS regression. To put the case for logistic regression, the logistic 
function will be better a fit to the distributions of points of die dichotomous dependent variable (vote), than a straight line 
(actually a hyperplane in hyperspace), estimated by OLS regression. The functional form of tiie relationship is incorrect and 
tiierefore, the estimates are biased (Berry & Feldman, 1985:18). More simply OLS provides a linear specification to model, 
when a non-linear relationship exists. 
50. In 1979. significjant effects for negative partisan personal retrospective evaluations were found in the analyses of major 
party vote and two party preferred vote, but not in tiie analysis of Labor vote. 
51. Unfortunately, the two party preferred vote could not be analysed in die NSSS and AES samples. 
52. In 1986. partisan perscmal prospective eccmonuc evaluations were important in relation to prospects with the continuation 
of die Labor government, radier than under the altemative govemment. 
53. Unfortunately a similar analysis with this measure on the 1988 NSSS sample, was not performed since the NSW state 
election campaign occurred during the period of data collection. 
CHAPTER? 
THE CO f^FIRMATORY MODEL 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the confirmatory model of electoral choice. The 
confirmatory model is based on the empirical findings of the last three chapters and the theoretical 
framework of chapter 3. Figure 7.1 presents the confirmatory model of electoral choice, highlighting 
the relationships investigated in this chapter. 
Candidates 
Partisan 
BacXground 
Social 
Factors 
Partisanship 
Ideology 
Vote 
Issues 
Figure 7.1: The model of electoral choice investigated in this chapter. 
Investigations of this model will inform a number of questions conceming electoral choice and 
electoral change in Australia. First, conclusions can be made regarding the specification of reciprocal 
relations. That is, do issues and/or candidates have reciprocal relationships with partisanship and have 
such relationships been a constant feature of the process of electoral choice in Australia. Second, 
these investigations will estimate the direct and total effects of the general concepts - partisanship. 
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issues and candidates - on electoral choice at each time point data was collected. Finally and most 
importantly, conclusions can be drawn, as to changes that have occurred (or have not occurred) in the 
process of electoral choice between the late 1960s and the late 1980s. 
The investigations presented in this chapter will also allow conclusions about the four competing 
propositions that endeavour to explain the results of Australian elections held during the post-war 
period. These four propositions were discussed fully at the beginning of chapter 3. These 
propositions employ the concept of an 'electoral period' to account for the results of particular 
elections. There are three types of electoral periods: periods of enduring electoral advantages to either 
the coalition or the Labor party, and a period during which no party enjoys an enduring electoral 
advantage. 
The model analysed in this chapter consists of five endogenous concepts directly involved in the 
process of electoral choice. These concepts are vote, party identification, issues, evaluations of the 
Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. There are nine exogenous variables in the model. 
The detailed specification of the model showing both the endogenous and exogenous variables is 
presented in figure 7.2. 
Vote 
CLast 
Election) 
Partisan 
Background 
Tracie Union 
Membership 
¥or]cing Class 
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
O p p o s i t i o n Leader 
P a r t y I d e n t i 
Ideology (Gen.) 
Business 
Welfares/Taxes 
Deatii Penalty 
Censorship 
Vote 
Figure 12: The specification of the confirmatory model of electoral choice, investigated in 
this chapter. 
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The model has undergone a number of modifications in light of the investigations reported in 
previous chapters. These are the exclusion of direct effects of ideology on vote, the limitation of the 
concept of partisanship to the specific concept of party identification and separate variables for the two 
party leaders. 
A major modification to the model presented in chapter 3 is the removal of a direct effect of 
ideology on vote. From the Australian literature there is little evidence that the Australian electorate is 
ideological and that ideology is important in the process of electoral choice. Furthermore, the analyses 
presented in chapter 5 showed that ideology cannot be understood in terms of an underlying dimension 
or dimensions. In addition, social-structural factors have only weak associations with the indicators of 
ideology and few social groups have consistent responses to these indicators. The results of the 
previous chapter showed that few indicators of ideology do have effects on vote and the effects 
observed are not consistent over time. Therefore, a direct relationship of ideology on vote is not 
posited in the confirmatory model. 
A further modification of the model is the exclusion of the concept 'relative attitude to the 
parties' from the model. The measures of relative attitude to the parties were excluded from the 
model for the following reasons. First, exclusion of these measures allow the analyses to be more 
comparable. An analogous measure could not be constructed from the 1987 AES data and the 
measures in the ANPA and NSSS data sets are not identical. Second, the measure contributes only a 
small proportion of the explanatory px)wer of partisanship. This is demonstrated by the small 
contribution of the 'attitude to the parties' measures to the overall fit of the models investigated in 
chapter 6 (figure 6.3). Furthermore, partisanship has mainly been understood in the Australian 
literature in terms of party identification. 
The measures of relative evaluations of the leaders are not employed in these analyses. Separate 
measures were constructed for the leaders of the Labor and Liberal parties. The analyses presented in 
the last chapter found that the combined measure did not always behave satisfactorily especially when 
evaluations of one of the party leaders had no significant effect on vote. 
Inspection of figure 7.2 shows that only a selection of social-structural factors and indicators of 
ideology are included in this model as exogenous variables. The relationships between social factors 
and party identification and between the ideological indicators and issues are not of substantive interest 
to the investigations in this chapter. They are specified in this model mainly to aid in the 
identification of the model^ However, these specifications are also guided by the empirical 
investigations of the previous chapters and the theoretical framework of chapter 3. 
The variables specified to be exogenous to party identification are vote at the last election, 
partisan background, class identification and trade-union membership. Using the same logic as 
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employed in chapter 4, partisan background and vote at the last election together, are understood as 
surrogate measures for previous partisanship at the time of the last election. Furthermore, these two 
measures are important components of the model since they were found to have considerable (and 
consistent) effects on party idemification (chapter 4). Class identification and trade-union membership 
were also included in the confirmatory model. Of the social factors investigated in chapter 4, these 
variables were found to have the largest and generally the most consistent effects on party 
identification. 
The indicators of ideology are specified as affecting 'issues'. Specification of relationships 
between ideology and issues follow the theoretical framework on which this study is based. Policy 
positions on issues are understood as to some extent derived from ideological predispositions. 
Five indicators of ideology are specified as having direct effects on issues. These exogenous 
concepts are general ideological alignment, attitude to (big) business, preference for either higher 
govemment spending on welfare or lower taxes, attitudes to the death penalty and attitudes to 
censorship. These measures were included since they are common across the samples. 
The indicators of 'post-materialism' were not included in these analyses. These indicators were 
found to have only weak effects on vote and data on these indicators was not collected in tiie 1967 
and 1969 ANPA studies. Similarly, the measure of attitudes to migration and royalty were not 
included in these analyses since the measures often differed substantially between tiie smdies and 
measures could not be constructed from some of the data sets. 
7.1 DATA AND MEASURES 
The data employed in these analyses are the 7 data sets employed in the analyses of the previous 
chapters. The measures employed in these analyses have been modified according to the results found 
in previous chapters. There are five major modifications. First, the measures of partisanship, issues 
and leaders have all been included in these analyses as continuous rather than as categorical variables. 
Second, vote is measured as a 3 level ordinal variable with minor party voters comprising the middle 
category. Third, party identification is also measured as a 3 level ordinal variable rather than as a 
seven level measure. Fourth, 'issues' were measured by a composite variable comprising only those 
issues that were found to have significant effects on vote (chapter 6). Finally, all measures of 
partisanship, issues and leaders have been constmcted to range between 0 and 1, denoting coalition 
and Labor positions, respectively. This procedure was adopted so that the effects of the measures are 
comparable within each sample. A summary of the measures employed in these models is presented 
in the appendix to tiiis chapter. 
268 
The specification of continuous measures is necessitated by the statistical procedures employed 
to analyse non-recursive models. Altiiough sti-ategies to analyse models witii botii categorical and 
continuous measures have been developed (see Hayduk, 1987:329), such procedures are not generally 
available. In addition, non-recursive models of vote in the literature have employed continuous 
measures for tiie endogenous variables (Graetz & McAllister, 1986; Markus & Converse, 1979; Page 
& Jones, 1979). 
One criticism of these investigations may concern the measure of vote. The measure of vote is 
included in the model as a continuous variable, whereas vote is conceptually categorical. There are a 
number of reasons why this procedure was adopted. First, comparison of tiie results obtained (in the 
previous chapter) between analyses of Labor party vote and major party vote did not differ 
substantially and when differences are observed it could usually attributed to tiie behaviour of minor 
party voters. Second, it is more economical to include minor party voters in a single measure of vote 
rather than run separate analyses for die two measures of vote. Third, the exclusion of minor party 
voters firom these analyses may bias the sample and therefore tiie estimates. Four, one important part 
of these investigations is the electoral balance between the major parties and this is effectively 
measured by the three level ordinal variable. Furthermore, Australian electoral research has often 
adopted this practice (Bean, 1990; Bean 8L Kelley, 1988). In these analyses the groups of coalition. 
Labor and minor party voters were assigned scores of 0, 1 and 0.5, respectively. 
Party identification was measured as a three level variable rather than a seven level measure for 
tiie following reason. The propensity of the different groups of identifiers to vote in accordance with 
their identifications does not appear to follow an incremental 7 level pattem (figure 6.8). A three level 
measure would more closely approximate the voting behaviour of the different groups. The three 
groups of Labor identifiers generally display tiie same propensity to vote Labor. Although the 
propensity of coalition identifiers to vote for a non-Labor party, is more closely related to strength of 
identification, grouping these identifiers togetiier is also appropriate. Often groups of coalition 
identifiers have the same probabilities of voting Labor and forcing the relationship witii vote among 
coalition identifiers to be linear is not appropriate, given the fmdings of the last chapter. The groups 
of coalition. Labor and no major party identifiers were assigned scores of 0, 1 and 0.5, respectively. 
Issues were measured by averaging the respondents' scores on those issues found to have 
significant effects on vote. For each issue measure found (in the analyses of the last chapter) to have 
significant effects on vote, scores of 1, 0 and 0.5 were assigned to those groups of respondents who 
were more, less or no more or less likely, to vote Labor than the reference group (which was scored 
0.5). The scores were then summed and averaged. For example, in tiie 1967 sample three issues were 
found to have significant effects on vote: the Viemam issue, partisan personal prospective economic 
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evaluations and evaluation of the first most important problem. Respondents were assigned scores of 
0, 1 or 0.5, tiie scores were tiien summed and averaged to create a composite measure of 'issues'. On 
the Vietiiam issue, respondents who advocated 'tioops, but no conscripts', 'send only volunteers' and 
'withdraw' were all assigned the same score (of 1), since these groups were approximately equally 
more likely to vote Labor. 
In the case of the continuous measures of leader evaluations the variables were recoded to range 
from a score of 0 for the strongest coalition position to 1 for the strongest Labor position. Scores of 
0.5 were assigned to those cases with neutral positions. 
The variables exogenous to party identification were included in these analyses as continuous 
variables. The measures relating to past partisanship, parental partisanship and vote at the last election 
were included as continuous variables: parental partisanship ranging from -2 to 2 (as was the case in 
chapter 4) and vote at the last election, witii scores of -1 ( for a coalition vote), 0.5 (for a minor party 
vote or did not vote) and 1 (for a Labor vote). 
Vote at the last election was specified as a continuous, rather than a discrete variable. This 
contrasts with the way in which this measure was employed in the investigations of chapter 4. 
Preliminary investigations revealed very littie difference in tiie estimates obtained between the 
endogenous variables, according to whetiier measure of vote at tiie last election is continuous or 
discrete. Furtiiermore, 'vote at the last election' is employed as surrogate measure for previous 
partisanship and its major role is to help specify the influences on party identification ratiier than to 
obtain accurate estimates of its effects. 
All the indicators of ideology were included in tiiese models as categorical variables. Witii tiie 
exception of 'general ideological position' and attimde to censorship (or pomography), the 'left' or 
'liberal' category was made the reference category. In tiie case of the measure of general ideological 
position the 'centre' group were employed as the reference category since tiie 'left' group had too few 
cases. For the 'censorship* and 'pornography' variables, the non-liberal group was specified as the 
reference category .^ 
7.2 ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE 
A necessary preliminary step in the investigation of non-recursive models, is to assess whether 
the model is identified. Unique estimates cannot be obtained from unidentified models. There is no 
simple and practicable method to assess whether tiie model is identified. The order condition is 
commonly used as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for identification (Berry, 1984:39). Each 
stmctural equation in these models satisfied tiie order condition^ However, identification problems 
can still occur if the data does allow tiie model to be identified (Hayduk, 1987:145). Indications of 
270 
identification problems are, large standard errors, negative error variances, standardised coefficients 
greater tiian one and correlations between tiie parameter estimates greater tiian 0.9 (Hayduk, 1987:142; 
Joreskog & Sorbom, 1986:1.17). In tiie analysis of each model, tiiese results were checked in case tiie 
data caused identification problems. 
These models were analysed by the statistical program Lisret. Lisrel estimates the parameters 
(or stmctural coefficients) by first estimating initial estimates^ and using tiiese estimates as start 
values, estimates the parameters by an iterative maximum likelihood procedure .^ 
Maximum likelihood estimation was employed since it is likely to produce tiie most precise 
estimates in large samples (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1986:1.29). One of the assumptions of maximum 
Ukelihood estimation in Lisrel models is the assumption of multivariate normality\ This assumption 
is unlikely to be satisfied by this data since both tiie measures of party identification and vote are 
highly skewed at the extremities. However, maximum likelihood may be used to compute estimates 
tiiat depart moderately from multivariate normality (Joreskog &. Sorbom, 1986:1.29). Saris &. 
Stronkhorst (1984:173) note that 'good' maximum likelihood estimates can be obtained even if tiie 
assumptions underlying the distribution are not fulfilled*. Furthermore, maximum likelihood 
estimation is the most widely used procedure (Hayduk, 1987:334) and Saris <& Stronkhorst (1984:174) 
conclude that maximum likelihood estimation is often a good choice. 
The significance of the individual parameter estimates was assessed by noting their associated T 
ratios'. In cases where multivariate normality is not assured, the T ratios should be interpreted 
cautiously (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1986:1.29). Hayduk (1987:175) suggests that significance should be 
assessed at a nominal 0.012 level, that is T ratios above 2.5. This procedure was generally followed in 
these analyses^ **. 
In the results section the standardised estimates from the analyses of these models are also 
presented". The standardised coefficients are presented as a check on any pattems that emerge from 
comparisons of the unstandardised coefficients. Some of the pattems could be attributed to differences 
between the issue and leader measures. However, the unstandardised estimates are more comparable 
(Saris & Stronkhorst, 1984:75) and these will be focused on in the text 
The total effects of party identification, issues and leaders on vote, that is the sum of the direct 
and indirect effects are also presented. These effects are computed on the standardised variables (Saris 
& Sti-onkhorst, 1984:257-26; Hayduk, 1987:247)'^ 
A common measure of the goodness of fit of the models such as the ones here is the 
significance of the chi-square value obtained from comparing the covariances implied by the model 
(I) and the observed variance/covariance matrix (S). This difference should not be significant 
However, since the samples are large tiie chi-square test may not be appropriate (Joreskog & Sorbom, 
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1986:I.39)'^ Therefore, two otiier measures of fit are unemployed - tiie adjusted goodness fit 
index'* which ranges between 0 (a very poor fit) and 1 (a near perfect fit), and tiie root mean square 
residual'^  which is a measure of tiie residual variances and covariances (which are zero witii a perfect 
fit). In addition, tiie squared multiple correlations'* (which are equivalent to R square values) for 
each equation are presented as well as tiie total coefficient of determination'^ which indicates tiie 
overall explanatory power of the stmctural equations. 
In the summary table of results (table 7.1) the following results are presented: the 
(unstandardised) parameter estimates obtained by maximum likelihood, the T ratios associated witii 
these estimates (in parentheses), the standardised coefficients, the total effects of the measures of party 
identification, issues and leaders on vote and the various goodness of fit measures. 
The investigation of electoral periods focuses on party identification. Party identification is the 
only concept that can be unambiguously classed as a long-term electoral force, since it is relatively 
stable and it has both consistent and considerable effects on electoral choice. Durable electoral 
advantages can be assessed by party identification and its relationship witii vote. The estimate of the 
advantage a party receives from this long-term electoral force is calculated using the mean of tiie party 
identification and its effect'*. This measure allows an assessment of tiie electoral balance between 
the coalition and the Labor party in each of tiie samples investigated. 
7.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results obtained from the analysis of each sample are presented in table 7.1. 
TABLE 7.1: SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM ANALYSIS OF THE CONHRMATORY MODEL 
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Relationship 
ON VOTE 
Effects of Patty Identification on Vote (Unstandardised) 
Effects of Party Identification on Vote (Standardised) 
Effects of Issues on Vote (Unstandardised) 
Effects of Issues on Vole (Standardised) 
Effects of Evals. of the Prime Minister on Vote (Unstd.) 
Effeas of Evals. erf the Prime Minister on Vote (Std.) 
Effects of Evals. erf Opposition Leader on Vote (Unstd.) 
Effects of Evals. (rf Opposition Leader on Vole (Std.) 
Squared Multiple correlation for Vote Equation 
ON ISSUES 
Effects of Party Identification on Issues (Unstandardised) 
Effects of Party Identification on Issues (Standardised) 
Squared Multiple correlation for Issue Equation 
ON LEADERS 
Effects of PID on evals. of the Prime Minister (Unstd.) 
Effects of PID on evals. of the Prime Minister (Std.) 
Squared Multiple correlation for Gov. Leader Equation 
Effects of PID on evals. of the Opposition Leader (Unstd.) 0.03(4) 
Effects of PID on evals. of the Opposition Leader (Sid.) 
Squared Multiple correlation for Opp. Leader Equation 
ON PARTY IDENTinCATION (PID) 
Effects of Issues on Party Identification (Unstandardised) 
Effeas of Issues on Party Identification (Standardised) 
Effects erf evals. of the Prime Minister on PID (Unstd.) 
Effects of evals. of the Prime Minister on PID (Std.) 
Effects (rf evals. of Opposition Leader on PID (UnsKL) 
Effeas of evals. of Opposition Leader on PID (SlA) 
Squared Multiple correlation for PID Equation 
TOTAL EFFECTS ON VOTE 
Party Identific^ation 
Issues 
The Prime Minister 
The Leader (rf the Opposition 
FIT OF THE MODEL 
Adjusted Goodness of Rt 
Root Mean Square Residual 
Total coefficient of determination 
1967 
ANPA 
0.79(53) 
0.75 
0.27(10) 
0.14 
-0.25(-6) 
-0.08 
0.19(4) 
0.05 
0.75 
0.27(20) 
0.50 
0.30 
-0.09(-10) 
-0.28 
0.06 
0.10 
0.01 
-0.07(-2) 
-0.04 
0.09(1.9) 
0.03 
0.00(0.1) 
0.00 
0.72 
0.86 
0.21 
-0.17 
0.19 
0.90 
0.004 
0.73 
1969 
ANPA 
0.71(41) 
0.69 
0.26(11) 
0.18 
-0.15(-3) 
-0.05 
0.17(4) 
0.05 
0.68 
0.36(20) 
0.51 
0.30 
-0.04(-4) 
-0.12 
0.02 
0.10(12) 
0.33 
0.11 
-0.03(-l.l) 
-0.02 
-0.1l(-1.9) 
-0.04 
-O.OO(-O.O) 
0.00 
0.62 
0.82 
0.23 
-0.24 
0.17 
0.94 
0.003 
0.63 
1979 
ANPA 
0.73(42) 
0.70 
0.34(12) 
0.19 
-0.23(-7) 
-0.08 
0.07(1.7) 
0.02 
0.79 
0.44(35) 
0.74 
0.52 
-0.18(-21) 
-0.52 
0.23 
0.08(10) 
0.27 
0.08 
-0.32(-7) 
-0.19 
0.17(3) 
0.07 
0.04(0.7) 
0.01 
0.63 
0.79 
0.08 
-0.09 
0.10 
0.90 
0.004 
0.64 
1984 
NSSS 
0.58(35) 
0.57 
0.45(17) 
0.24 
0.26(12) 
0.15 
-0.07(-3) 
-0.03 
0.74 
0.35(38) 
0.64 
0.51 
0.45(34) 
0.74 
0.35 
-0.21 (-22) 
-0.45 
0.15 
-0.02(-0.4) 
-0.00 
-0.38(-10) 
-0.23 
0.18(5) 
0.09 
0.59 
0.71 
0.44 
-0.02 
0.05 
0.86 
0.005 
0.60 
1986 
NSSS 
0.58(27) 
0.59 
0.30(11) 
0.21 
0.23(8) 
0.14 
-0.09(-3) 
-0.04 
0.72 
0.40(24) 
0.59 
0.44 
0.44(28) 
0.72 
0.32 
-0,27(-19) 
-0.54 
0.20 
0.07(1.8) 
0.05 
-0.43(-9) 
-0.26 
0.27(6) 
0.13 
0.58 
0.66 
0.34 
-0.06 
0.09 
0.87 
0.006 
0.58 
1987 
AES 
0.58(28) 
0.58 
0.36(11) 
0.18 
0.21(9) 
0.14 
-0.17(-7) 
-0.10 
0.72 
0.30(24) 
0.58 
0.37 
0.51(33) 
0.74 
0.42 
-0.34(-21) 
-0.54 
0.24 
-0.06(-1) 
-0.03 
-0.25(-6) 
-0.18 
0.13(3) 
0.08 
0.56 
0.71 
0.32 
0.02 
-0.07 
0.89 
0.005 
0.56 
1988 
NSSS 
0.68(40) 
0.69 
0.05(1.5) 
0.02 
0.34(13) 
0.20 
-ai5(-5) 
-0.08 
0.75 
0.05(5) 
0,13 
0.23 
0.40(28) 
0.69 
0.32 
-0.29(-22) 
-0.56 
0.23 
-0.04(-l) 
-0.02 
-0.36(-9) 
-0.21 
0.23(6) 
0.12 
0.65 
0.71 
0.02 
0.08 
0.02 
0.88 
0.005 
0.71 
Key: 
T values presented in parentheses for unstandardised estimates 
Unstd. = Unstandardised coefficienu 
Std. = Standardised coefficients 
evals. = evaluations 
Gov. = Government 
Opp. = Opposition 
PID = Party identification 
273 
7.3.1 Goodness of fit 
In each sample investigated the confirmatory model of electoral choice was a very good fit to 
the data. The adjusted goodness of fit indices were aU around 0.90 and tiie root mean square residuals 
were all close to zero (table 7.1)". 
The coefficient of determination for the vote equation ranged between 0.68 and 0.79, tiie lowest 
being in the 1969 sample. These results are furtiier evidence tiie models fit tiie data well. 
The squared multiple correlations for tiie issue equation ranged from 0.23 to over 0.50. These 
results indicate that much of the issue stances of the Austrahan electorate can be attributed to party 
identification. The low squared multiple correlation for the issue measure in the 1988 sample is 
probably due to the quite low associations tiie variables included in tiie composite measure have witii 
political preference. Botii the measures comprising tiie issue measure in tiie 1988 data, 'attitude to 
environmentalists' and 'attitude to taxation' were found to be sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of 
minor party voters in relation to electoral choice (chapter 6). 
In general, more variation was explained by party identification for the evaluations of the Prime 
Minister than for evaluations of tiie Leader of the Opposition. Therefore, it appears tiiat evaluations of 
tiie Prime Minister are more partisan than evaluations of tiie Leader of tiie Opposition. The exception 
to this general finding was in the 1969 sample where tiie stmctural equation explained more of the 
variation of evaluations of tiie opposition leader Mr Whitiam, than evaluations of tiie Prime Minister 
Mr Gorton. 
7.3.2 Effects of Party Identification on Vote 
In each model analysed party identification had the greatest largest impact on vote in terms of 
botii the standardised and unstandardised estimates. The coefficients give an indication of the extent 
voters voted in accordance with tiieir party identification, tills accordance being greatest in 1967 and 
lowest in 1984. The large T ratios indicate that the effect of party identification on vote was highly 
significant in each sample. 
The direct effects (both standardised and unstandardised) of party identification on vote for each 
of the samples are presented in figure 7.3. 
From inspection of figure 7.3, the decline in the direct effects of party identification on vote 
found in the last chapter is again apparent. (The decline would be more apparent if the graph was not 
scaled from the origin). In 1967, tiie effect was close 0.80 whereas in 1984, 1986 and 1987 the effect 
had declined by 25% to below 0.60^. The standardised coefficients show almost exactiy tiie same 
pattem as the unstandardised coefficients. The effect of party identification on vote in tiie 1988 
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sample is likely to be an over-estimate, since it is likely tiiat measures of poUtically relevant issues 
were not coUected in this study. 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
CDirect Effects on Vote^ 
Parameter Estimate 
i 
0. 8 
0. 6 
Q. 4 
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—o 
_L 
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--K--
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Figure 7.3: The direct effect of party identification on vote. 
The total effects of party identification on vote are presented in figure 7.4. These results show a 
less precipitous decline from a total effect of 0.86 in 1967 to 0.71 in 1987 and 1988 (a decline of 
21%) witii the 1986 sample displaying the lowest total effect (at 0.66). A summary of total, direct and 
indirect effects of party identification on vote is presented in the foUowing table (table 7.2). 
TABLE 7.2: SUMMARY OF TOTAL, DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF PARTY IDENTinCATION ON VOTE 
Effea 1967 1969 1979 1984 1986 1987 1988 
Total 
Direct Effect 
Indirect through Issues 
Indirect through Government leader 
Indirect through Opposition leader 
Total indirect effects through Issues and Leaders^' 
Total indirect effects impUed by the Lisrel program^ 
0.86 
0.75 
0.07 
0.02 
0.005 
0.095 
0.11 
0.82 
0.69 
0.09 
0.006 
0.017 
0.113 
0.13 
0.79 
0.70 
0.14 
0.04 
0.005 
0.185 
0.09 
0.71 
0.57 
0.15 
0.11 
0.01 
0.27 
0.14 
0.66 
0.59 
0.12 
0.10 
0.02 
0.24 
0.07 
0.71 
0.58 
0.10 
0.10 
0.05 
0.25 
0.13 
0.71 
0.69 
0.003 
0.14 
0.05 
0.193 
0.03 
This table indicates that the indirect effects of party identification on vote were mainly mediated 
through issues. Only in the two more recent samples were tiie indirect effects greater tiirough tiie two 
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PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
C T o t a l E f f e c t s on V o t e ^ 
Parameter Estimate 
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Figure 7.4: The total effects of party identification on vote. 
party leaders. The indirect effects of party identification on vote were compUcated in tiie 1979 and in 
the later samples, by reciprocal (and negative) effects of short-term electoral forces on party 
identification. These reciprocal effects wiU discussed later in the chapter. 
The indirect effects of party identification on vote calculated by the Lisrel program (table 7.2, 
line 7) have been relatively constant over the time period in which this data was coUected. The 
indirect effects of party identification fluctuate around a value of 0.10, or between 10 and 20% of tiie 
total effects of party identification. As a percentage of tiie total effects, tiie indirect effects tiirough 
issues and leader evaluations appear to have increased since the late 1960s. The indirect effects 
calculated by the addition of tiie separate indirect effects (table 7.2, Une 6) also show an increases in 
the indirect effects of party identification on vote through short-term factors. 
7.3.3 Effects of Issues on Vote 
The direct effects of 'issues' on vote for each of the samples are presented in figure 7.5. Witii 
the exception of the 1988 NSSS sample, the composite measures of issues were found to have 
significant effects on vote. 
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The result for tiie 1988 sample is not surprising. The measures tiiat comprised tiie composite 
measure, attitudes to environmentalists and attitudes to taxation were found to have quite weak effects 
on vote (chapter 6). The foUowing discussion wiU ignore the results for tiie 1988 issue measure. 
The effect of 'issues' was considerable, ranging (in unstandardised terms) from 0.14 to 0.24 -
generaUy about 20% of the effect of party identification. The standard errors of tiie estimates are 
approximately a tenth of the size of the estimates. These results confirm the fmdings presented in the 
last chapter where in most samples significant effects of individual issues on vote were observed. 
'Issues' were found to have the greatest effect in tiie 1984 NSSS sample (table 7.1). This result 
is similar to the findings of the last chapter where the contribution of issues to the fit of tiie model was 
greatest in tiie 1984 NSSS sample (figure 6.9). 
Figure 7.5 presents a graph of the effects of the composite issue measure on vote. 
ISSUES 
CDirect and Total E f f ec t s on Vote]) 
Parame te r E s t i m a t e 
0 .5 
0. 4 
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Figure 7.5: The direct effects of 'issues' on vote. 
A rise is discemible with both the unstandardised and standardised estimates. In percentage 
terms the rise appears quite steep, increasing by 33% between 1967 to 1987 for the unstandardised 
coefficients, and by 28% for the standardised coefficients. The similar pattems for tiie standardised 
and unstandardised effects indicates that the issue measures are comparable between tiie samples. 
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The total effects of issues on vote display a quite dramatic rise between 1967 and tiie 1980s 
samples, witii a decUne in 1979. The decline in 1979 can be attiibuted to tiie large (reciprcxal) effect 
of issues on party identification which had a negative sign. 
7.3.4 Effects of Leaders on Vote 
The effects of evaluations of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition on vote are 
presented in figures 7.6 and 7.7. 
If the estimate from the 1967 sample is ignored, there appears to be a general increase in tiie 
direct effect of evaluations of tiie Prime Minister on vote. A similar pattem was noted in the previous 
chapter (figure 6.11). The standardised coefficients also show a quite steady increase. The exception 
to this pattem is again tiie 1967 estimate. The effect of evaluations of Prime Minister on vote in 1967 
is comparable with the effects observed in 1984 and 1986 samples. The most likely explanation to tiie 
1967 findings is a personaUty effect where Mr Holt enjoyed a honeymoon period after the long 
incumbency of Mr Menzies. However, it is difficult to conclude whetiier tiie increase between 1969 
and tiie 1980s is due the personaUties of Fraser and Hawke, or a greater emphasis of the media paid to 
the incumbent of tiie office of tiie Prime Minister. 
The total effects on vote of evaluations of the Prime Minister show a decline which is 
attributable to the significant reciprocal effects of tiie evaluations of the Prime Minister on party 
identification, with the 1979 and later samples. These effects are of tiie opposite sign to tiie direct 
effects of these evaluations on vote, so diminish the magrutude of the total effects of evaluations of tiie 
Prime Minister on vote. 
GeneraUy, evaluations of the Leader of the Opposition appear to have smaUer effects on vote 
than the evaluations of the Prime Minister (table 7.1). The exception to this general fmding was tiie 
1969 sample in which evaluations of tiie Opposition Leader, Mr Whitiam, had a larger effect on vote 
than the evaluations of the Prime Minister, Mr Gorton. A similar result was found in the analysis of 
the direct effects on vote of the evaluations of the party leaders presented in the previous chapter 
(figure 6.11). Comparison of the standardised coefficients also support the general conclusion that 
evaluations of the Prime Minister have a greater effect on vote than evaluations of the Leader of the 
Opposition. 
The effect of evaluations of the Leader of the Opposition on vote declined between : '67 and 
1979 (figure 7.7). A decUne is apparent when comparing either the standardised or unstandardised 
coefficients. A simUar pattem was observed in the previous chapter (figure 6.11)". Since the mid-
1980s, the effects on vote of evaluations of the Leader of the Opposition have increased (figure 
7.7)^. 
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Figure 7.6: The direct and total effects of evaluations of the leader of the Government on 
vote. 
Again it is difficult to conclude if these fmdings are attributable to personality effects or to 
changes in the public perception of the role of opposition leader. 
It could be argued that since the ANPA measures of leader evaluations are quite different from 
the NSSS and AES measures they cannot be compared. Therefore, comparisons of effects of, or on, 
leaders cannot be made. This argument can be addressed with tiie foUowing points. First, the 
measures have similar characteristics. They aU range from 0 to 1, with respondents neutral to a leader 
assigned a score of 0.5. The means of the measures feU into a quite narrow range ranging from 0.42 
to 0.62 (see appendix to this chapter). Second, the two measures are likely to be highly correlated. 
The correlation between tiie like/dislike and the feeling tiiermometer measures range between 0.57 and 
0.75 (Bean, 1984:406; Graetz & McAUister, 1986). Third, tiiere is no readUy available and accepted 
estimate of tiie amount of measurement error in the two measures. Furthermore, tiie error variance of 
like/disUke measure is not necessarily higher than the feeling thermometer measures. Altiiough, 
respondents may express net Ukes (or disUkes) to a leader when overaU tiiey have a negative (or 
positive) evaluation of tiiat leader, respondents could also misunderstand tiie feeling tiiermometer 
question. FinaUy, the estimates from the two groups of measures do not faU into two separate groups. 
LEADERS - THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION 
CDirect and Total Effects on Vote^ 
Parameters Estimate (Absolute) 
0. 3 
0. 25 
0. 2 
G. 15 
0. 1 
Opp. (Direct- Dnstd.) 
— e — 
L. Opp. (Direct- Std.) 
--X- — 
L. Opp. (Total) 
XV 
o.Q5;e K---_ 
• " • a . 
• • ^ v . . 
-X 
/S f^\ 
0 - - ^ ^ X 
_L T--.A 
1970 1975 1980 
Year of Survey 
1985 
279 
1990 
Figure 7.7: The direct and total effects of evaluations of the leader of the Opposition on 
vote. 
In the results discussed above, the 1967 estimate for evaluations of the Prime Minister was comparable 
to those obtained from tiie 1984, 1986 and 1988 samples. Furthermore, tiie effects of evaluations of 
the Leader of the Opposition on vote, were higher in 1967 and 1969 than in 1984, an unexpected 
result if the thermometer measures have much higher reliabUity tiian the like/dislike measures. 
7.3.5 Reciprocal effects between Issues and Party Identification 
Figures 7.8 and 7.9 display the effects of party identification on issues and tiie effects of issues 
on party identification respectively. 
Not unexpectedly, the effects of party identification on issues were substantial and significant in 
the samples analysed. The exception is again the 1988 NSSS study. These findings lend further 
support for the model since they indicate tiiat issues are evaluated tiirough the perceptual screen of 
partisanship. 
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The largest effect was found in tiie 1979 data witii a unstandardised coefficient of 0.44. 
Ignoring tiie 1988 estimate, the results presented in figure 7.8 show that party identification has had a 
more or less constant effect on issues. 
'Issues' had significant effects on party identification ortiy in 1979 altiiough the effect for tiie 
1967 sample was almost significant. The result for the 1979 sample is empirical evidence tiiat issues 
can affect party identification. The negative coefficient indicates tiiat issues had tiie effect of changing 
party identifications in the opposite direction to a voter's initial identification. However, substantial 
reciprocal effects were found in only one of the seven data sets analysed. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that changes in party identification are not generaUy brought about by those general issues 
that effect electoral choice. 
7.3.6 Reciprocal effects between Leaders and Party Identification 
Figures 7.10 and 7.11 present the effects of party identification on evaluations of tiie two party 
leaders and the leader evaluations on party identification. In tiiese figures, the estimates for the 
Liberal and Labor leaders are presented ratiier than the estimates for the incumbent Prime Minister and 
the Leader of the Opposition. 
The effect of party identification on evaluations of the leader of the Labor party, has increased 
substantiaUy in the twenty years since 1967. Although the change is less dramatic, there is also an 
increase in the effect of party identification on evaluations of the Liberal leader. 
These results suggest that during the late 1960s the party leaders tended to be evaluated by less 
partisan criteria than at later times. 
The effects of leader evaluations on party identification also differ between Labor and Liberal 
leaders. Evaluation of the Liberal leaders have had smaU but significant effects on party identification 
since 1979. In contrast, the leadership of Mr Hawke appears to be associated witii quite large effects 
on party identification. This result indicates that evaluations of Mr Hawke not only had substantial 
effects on vote, but also had substantial effects on partisanship". 
7.3.7 An ImpUcation of the Reciprocal effects 
The sensitivity of party identification to short-term forces since 1979 can account for part of the 
decline of party identification as a contributor to the model of electoral choice. This decline was 
noted in the previous chapter. Short-term factors have larger reciprocal relationships witii party 
identification in the later data sets. Therefore, deletion of the party identification measure from tiie 
model wiU have less effect on the overall fit of the model, since these short-term factors wiU become 
proxy measures for party identification. In summary, there are two components to tiie decline of party 
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identification as a contributor to tiie model of electoral choice. First, a decline in the effects of party 
identification on vote and second, an increase in the reciprocal relationships between party 
identification and short-term electoral forces. 
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Figure 7.8: The effects of party identification on issues. 
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Figure 7.9: The effects of issues on party identification. 
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EFFECTS OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION ON LEADERS 
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Figure 7.10: The effects of party identification on the two leaders. 
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Figure 7.11: The effects of the evaluations of the two leaders on party identification. 
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7.3.8 Party Identification and Electoral periods 
Figure 7.12 presents a graph of estimates of tiie electoral advantages tiie political groups enjoyed 
tiirough tiie long-term electoral force, party identification. 
ELECTORAL ADVANTAGES FROM PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
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From Direct FID Effects 
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Figure 7.12: Long term electoral advantages gained f^ om party identification. 
This figure shows a number of features. First, the coalition gained a distinct advantage from this 
enduring electoral force in 1967 and 1969. By 1979, the Labor party enjoyed such an advantage. The 
advantage for the coalition was a littie greater than that for tiie Labor party. During the late 1960s, the 
coalition had an advantage of some two percentage points. During the 1980s, tiie Labor party has 
enjoyed an advantage of between 0.5 and 2 percentage points. The smaller advantage that tiie Labor 
party enjoys is most likely a reflection of the decline of the effect of party identification on vote. That 
is, there is a greater proportion of partisans being influenced by short-term electoral forces and thus 
voting contrary to tiieir partisanship. Second, the Labor advantage during the 1980s appears to 
fluctuate^*. These fluctuations can be attributed to tiie greater sensitivity of party identification to 
short-term electoral forces during tiie 1980s. Third, tiie estimates for tiie 1967, 1969, 1979 and 1984 
samples lie on a straight Une indicating the process of change from a coalition to a Labor advantage 
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was quite gradual. This finding suggests that tiie change was not due to a momentous poUtical event 
(such as tiie dismissal of tiie Whitiam govemment), but to due to more gradual processes. 
Immediately, tiie question arises as to whetiier tiiese smaU advantages tiie political parties 
enjoyed are of such a magnitude as to assure tiiem of electoral success. The results of elections during 
this time period inform on this question. Despite the advantage Labor had in 1979, tiie party lost tiie 
foUowing 1980 election. However, it was ahead of the coalition in most of tiie opinion poUs 
published prior to the last week of the election campaign (Goot, 1983). For tiie elections held during 
tiie late 1960s and 1980s, the party that had an electoral advantage (as calculated here) also won tiiat 
election. 
A more defmitive test is to compare tiie electoral advantages parties gained tiirough issues and 
leaders and compare tiiis witii, the durable effects from party identification. The advantages to tiie 
coalition from the three short-term forces measured here were calculated and are presented in table 
7.3". These estimates indicate that short-term factors can often overcome the party advantage gained 
by party identification. However, Labor's electoral advantage during tiie 1980s were not overcome by 
short-term electoral forces, these forces worked to Labor's advantage. 
TABLE 7.3: ELECTORAL ADVANTAGES FROM SHORT-TERM FORCES 
1967 1969 1979 1984 1986 1987 1988 
Estimate for Issues 
Estimate for Labor Leader 
Estimate for Liberal Leader 
Note: Estimates of percentage point advantages, -i-ve Coalition advantage, -ve Labor advantage. 
As an aside, table 7.3 shows some interesting aspects of AustraUan politics. First, the electoral 
advantage gained by parties through issues can change quite dramatically over short periods, unlike tiie 
more constant advantages engendered by party identification. Second, it appears tiiat issues were 
responsible for Labor's near win at the 1969 election. Third, in general issues are more effective at 
transferring votes than the party leaders. Fourth, the evaluations of Mr Hawke gave the Labor party 
considerable electoral benefits during the 1980s. FinaUy, tiie political foUdore that Whitiam, Fraser 
and Hawke were beneficial to the electoral fortunes of tiie parties they led, and that Gorton, Peacock 
and Howard were electoral liabUities appears to be confirmed by these analyses '^. 
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SUMMARY 
This chapter has analysed tiie confirmatory model of electoral choice developed from tiie 
theoretical framework and tiie analyses reported in previous chapters. The main findings on changes 
in electoral choice in Australia between 1967 and 1988 are tiie foUowing. The direct effect of 
partisanship on electoral choice has declined. In contrast, the effects of issues on electoral choice have 
increased. Similarly, the effect of evaluations of the Prime Minister on electoral choice have increased 
while the effects of evaluations of the Leader of tiie Opposition declined between 1967 and 1979, but 
have increased since the mid 1980s. Party identification has had a generally constant effect on issues 
but its effects on leaders has increased, especiaUy on evaluations of the Labor leader. Since 1979, 
significant reciprocal effects of short-term factors on party identification have been observed. In 1979, 
issues had a considerable effect on party identification. During tiie 1980s, evaluations of the Prime 
Minister have had consistent effects on party identification. SmaUer effects of evaluations of the 
Leader of the Opposition on party identification during tiie 1980s were also observed. 
The analyses reported here suggest that long-term electoral forces gave a distinct electoral 
advantage to the coalition during the late 1960s. Since 1979, tiie Labor party has enjoyed a smaUer 
(and fluctuating) electoral edge. However, short-term factors can overcome this electoral advantage. 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 7 
TABLE A7.1: SUMMARY OF MEASURES EMPLOYED IN ANALYSIS 
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Measure 
VOTE 
Intended vote 
Vote »t election jtist decided 
SOCaAL-STRUCTURAL AND BACKGROUND FACTORS 
Qass identification 
Trade-union membership 
Partisan background (index 2 to -2) 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party identification 
Prior Partisanship measured by vote at [nwious election 
IDEOLOGY 
General ideological position 
Attitude to (big) business 
Choice of tax cuts at spend more on social services 
Attitude to death penalty 
Attitude to censorship 
ISSUES 
Attitude to Vietnam war 
Attitude to the power of trade-unions 
Partisan personal retrospective economic evaluations (PPREE) 
Partisan penonal (axxpective economic evaliutions (PPPEE) 
Best party at dealing with first most important problon 
Best party at dealing with second most imponant problem 
Priority lowering Inflation or unemployment 
Partisan personal prospective economic evaluations-2 (PPPE2) 
Best Party on inflation, unemployment, economic growth 
Partisan sociotropic retrospective economic evaL (PS REE) 
Partisan sociotropic prospective economic evaL (PSPEE) 
Partisan sociotropic prospective economic evaL (PSPE2) 
Attitude to taxation (Index) 
Feelings towards environmentalists 
Feelings towards the state Govemment 
Simple sociotropic retrospective economic evaL (SSREE) 
Mediated personal retrospective economic evaL (MPREE) 
Mediated sociotropic retrospective economic evaL (MSREE) 
Mediated sociotropic prospective economic evaL (MSPEE) 
LibeiaL Labor, National Parties divided 
CANDIDATES 
Evaluation of each Leader 
1967 
ANPA 
1969 
ANPA 
1979 
ANPA 
1984 
NSSS 
1986 
NSSS 
1987 
AES 
1988 
NSSS 
21 
31 
57 
60 
65 
6fi 
69 
74 
77 
82 
101 
NI 
NI 
112 
118 
NI 
22 
31 
57 
60 
65 
66 
69 
74 
77 
82 
101 
NI 
118 
NI 
22 
31 
57 
60 
65 
66 
69 
74 
77 
82 
102 
NI 
112 
US 
119 
NI 
23 
32 
57 
60 
65 
67 
70 
75 
78 
83 
NI 
Ul 
113 
121 
124 
126(2 
measures) 
-
-
-
133 
-
24 
33 
58 
60 
65 
67 
71 
75 
78 
84 
NI 
NI 
NI 
-
125 
-
129 
NI 
NI 
NI 
NI 
134 
25 
34 
59 
60 
65 
68 
72 
76 
79 
85 
NI 
NI 
NI 
NI 
NI 
144 144 144 145 145 
139 
140 
142 
146 
24 
35 
58 
60 
65 
73 
75 
78 
84 
NI 
132 
1.31 
145 
Key 
Question not in study 
NI : Not included in model 
Note : Numbers relate to questions in uble A1.3 in appendix 1. Details on the construction of these measures is shown below. 
1/2 : 1-Labor, 0.5-DiJ>., Other Parties, 0=Liberal or National (Country) Party 
21-25 : 2 dummy variables for (i) Lower or woddng-class (ii) other response. 
31/34 : 1 dummy variable for trade-union membership. 
32/33/35 : 2 dummy variables for (i) trade-union membership, (ii) don't know. 
57-59 : IMxilh parents Labor,l'K]ne Labor,0'neithcr/one each,dan't know,l=one coalition,2=both coalition. 
60 : l^Labor identification,(MDoaliaan identification,0.5=other response. 
65 : l=Voted L.abor,0»Voted coalition, 0.5=Voted other parties (including DLP or Democrats), did not vole. 
66-68 : 2 dummy variables for (i) Right (ii) Centre. Right and left defined in the same way as in shown in appendix 1. 
69-70 : 2 dummy variables for (i) Right position (not too much power/warm to big business (ii) neutraL don't know. 
74-74 : 2 dummy variables for (i) reduce taxes (ii) neutraL other response. 
77-79 : 2 dummy variables for (i) support death penalty (ii) neutral/don't know 
82-85 : 1 dummy variable for less ccnsotship/no stricter controls 
101 : We should have troops in Vietnam, including conscripts(scored 0),We should have troops in Vietnam, but only volunteers(l),We shouldn't have any troops 
in Vietnam and only send civilian experts(l),We should suy out c^  Viemam altogether<l),"don't know' (scored 0.5). 
102 : Too Much(0)J^ot Too Much(l),"don't know" (+ it depends in 1979) (0,5). 
111 ; not much difference', "don't know" (0.5) much,somewhat, or a little worse off (0), much,somewhat or a little better off (1). 
112 : not much difTerence',"don't know",not asked(0.5),worse off(0),better off(l). 
113 : not much difference, don't know, (0.5) much, somewhat, or a little worse off (1), much,somewhat or a little better off (0). 
118/119 : Liberals, National Country party(0). Labor (1), D.L.P./ Australian Democrats. No difference, don't know, not applicable (0.5). 
121 : both(0),unemployment(l)4nflation(l)."don'tknow" (0.5). 
124/125 : not much difference, don't know, (0.5) much,samewhat, or a little worse off (1), much,somewhat or a little better off (0.5). 
126 : 2 measures Q) unemployment, (ii) economic growth'. Scoring: No difference, don't know (0.5), Liberals much, somewhat better (0), Labor much, 
somewhat better (1). 
: not much difference, don't know, (0.5) much, somewhat, or a little worse off (0), much, somewhat or a little better off (1). 
; 8 point index from Liken items ; There should be ux cuts for everybody^ would prefer a society with much lower uxes than we have in Austialia today'. 
Responses combined - high score moic supportive of ux cuts. Constrtiction: subtract 2 so scores range from 0 to 8 (ii) multiplied by 10/8 and divide by 10 
to make score range from 0 to 1. Note , measure in opposite direction from measure employed previous chapters. 
: In 1984 sample - warm to environmentalists (1), cold (0), other response (0.5). In 1988 NSSS sample - Thermometer score used divided by 100. 
134 : 50 or missing (0.5), Pro-Labor/Anti-Conscrvative (1), Pro-Conservative/Anu-Labor (0). 
139 : not much difference, no response (0.5), bad effect (0), good effect (1). 
: not much difference, no response (0.5). made it worsc(0)4mproved it(l). 
: Labor united (1), Labor divided (0), not sure (0.5). 
: 2 measures, one for each leader. Construction: (No. of likes - No. of dislikes for). Add 5. Divide by 10. (Missing scored 0.5) 
: 2 measures, one for each leader. Constructian: Feeling thermometer score for leader, divide by 10 and round, divide by 10 one more. (Missuig scored 
129 
132 
133 
140 
142 
144 
145 
0.5) 
146 2 measures, one for each leader. Construction: Feeling thermometer score for leader, divide by 10. (Missing scored 0.5) 
TABIi A7.2: FREQUENCIES (PERCENTAGES) AND MEANS (± STANDARD DEVIATIONS) FOR VARIABLES IN CONnR.MATORY MODEL 
Measure 
VOTE 
Intended vote 
Vote at election just decided 
SOOAL-STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
Woiking-Class identification 
No class identification 
Trade-union members 
Trade-union membership - Unknown 
PARTISANSHIP 
Partisan backgroimd (index 2 to -2) 
Party identification 
Prior Partisanship measured by vote at previous election 
IDEOLOGY 
Left ideological position 
Right ideological position 
Business - positive 
Business - don't know, neutral 
Tax cuu. Social services - Tax cuts 
Tax cuts. Social services - don't know, neutral 
Death Penalty - Suppon the death 
Death Penalty - Dtm't Know, neutral 
Read what they like/No stricter controls 
ISSUES 
Compccite Issue Variable 
CANDIDATES 
Evaluation of the Prime Minister 
Evaluation of the Leader of the Opposition 
1967 
ANPA 
0.46 ± 0.49 
-
758(42.6) 
110(6.2) 
450(25.3) 
-
-0.14 ± 1.4 
0.46 ± 0.47 
-0.14 ± 0.93 
55(3.1) 
181(10.2) 
637(35.8) 
211(11.9) 
469(26.3) 
96(5.4) 
980(55.1) 
141(7.9) 
706(39.7) 
0.57 ± 0.25 
0.51 ± 0.15 
0.57 ±0.13 
1969 
ANPA 
-
0.50 ± 0.48 
806(45.5) 
59(3.3) 
463(26.1) 
-
-0.14 ± 1.5 
0.47 ± 0.47 
-0.17 ± 0.89 
71(4.0) 
163(9.2) 
582(32.8) 
210(11.9) 
439(24.8) 
66(3.7) 
811(45.8) 
151(85) 
742(41.9) 
0.67 ± 0.33 
0.47 ± 0.15 
0.55 ±0.15 
1979 
ANPA 
0.50 ± 0.50 
-
635(35.3) 
64(3.6) 
510(28.4) 
-
-0.17 ± 1.5 
0.52 ± 0.39 
-0.02 ± 0.94 
129(7.2) 
216(12.0) 
528(29.4) 
119(6.6) 
1049(58.4) 
72(4.0) 
1125(616) 
106(5.9) 
773(43.0) 
0.46 ± 0.10 
0.44 ± 0.18 
0.51 ± 0.13 
1984 
NSSS 
0.57 ± 0.48 
-
1201(44.9) 
49(1.8) 
595(222) 
549(20.5) 
-0.08 ± 1.5 
0.54 ± 0.47 
0.12 ± 0.94 
63(2.4) 
232(8.7) 
547(20.4) 
489(18.3) 
1732(64.7) 
83(3.1) 
1539(57.5) 
427(16.0) 
234(8.7) 
0.58 ± 0.25 
0.62 ± 0.28 
0.47 ± 0.22 
1986 
NSSS 
0.49 ± 0.47 
-
764(51.9) 
86(5.8) 
456(31.0) 
56(3.8) 
-0.30 ± 1.6 
0.51 ± 0.48 
0.10 ± 0.96 
38(2.6) 
150(10.2) 
242(16.5) 
732(49.8) 
1099(74.7) 
37(Z5) 
977(66.4) 
188(12.8) 
251(17.1) 
0.43 ± 0.33 
0.56 ± 0.29 
0.41 ± 0.24 
1987 
AES 
-
0.54 ± 0.48 
732(41.5) 
328(18.6) 
585(33.2) 
-
-0.19 ± 1.6 
0.54 ± 0.47 
0.15 ± 0.47 
144(8.2) 
409(23.2) 
870(49.3) 
580(32.9) 
1093(62.0) 
421(23.9) 
1015(57.6) 
343(19.5) 
507(28.8) 
0.57 ± 0.24 
0.62 ± 0.33 
0.49 ± 0.29 
1988 
NSSS 
051 ±047 
-
696(447) 
63(4.0) 
402(25.8) 
22(1.4) 
-0.02 ±1.6 
Q51±(M« 
006 ±095 
24(1.5) 
88(5.6) 
682(43.8) 
504<313) 
1123(721) 
37(2.4) 
1012(65.0) 
206(13.2) 
255(16.4) 
043 ±020 
059±028 
a42±Q25 
287.2 
1. The problem of identification is concemed with the question : Is there a unique set of parameter estimates that are 
consistent with the observed data? (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1986: 1.21). More simply, an unidentified model has too many 
parameters to estimate for the data. 
2. Changes in the reference category of the exogenous variables used were found not alter the estimates obtained, for the 
relationships between the endogenous variables. However, the fits of the models were found to change. 
3. One way to assess whether a non-recursive model is identified is through the order condition. 
The order condition states that for an equation to be identified: 
K.> m,-l 
where: 
Kj = number of exogenous variables in the model excluded from the structural equation being tested 
r[\ = number of endogenous variables in the model included in the equation being tested (including the equation on the right 
hand side). 
From: Berry (1984:40) 
For each equation in this model 
Note: total numbCT of variables in model = 19 or 20 depending on whether trade union membership-unknown is included. 
(i) Vote = J (Party identification. Issues, Govemment L e^ader, Opposition leader) 
No of exogenous variables excluded from equation = 14(13) (Vote at last election, partisan background, working class 
identification, no class identification, trade union membership, trade union membership-unknown*,Left, Right, Positive to 
business. Neutral to business. Prefer lower taxes. Lower taxes or increase social services - don't know, support death penalty. 
Death penalty - don't know/neutral. Liberal (1) on censorship). 
Note : trade union membership unknown* not included in every equation. 
No of endogenous variable in equation = 4 
=> Identified 
(ii) Issues = | (Party Identification) 
No of exogenous variables excluded from equation = 14(13) 
No of endogenous variable in equation = 2 
=> Identified 
(iii) Govemment Leader = | (Party Identification) 
No of exogenous variables excluded from equation = 14(13) 
No of endogenous variable in equation = 2 
=> Identified 
(iv) Opposition Leader = J (Party Identification) 
No of exogenous variables excluded from equation = 14(13) 
No of endogenous variable in equation = 2 
=> Identified 
(v) Party Identification = J (Vote at last election, partisan background, working class identification, no class identification, 
trade union membership, trade union membership-unknown*, Issues, Govemment leader. Opposition leader) 
No of exogenous variables excluded from equation = 9 (Left, Right, Positive to business. Neutral to business. Prefer lower 
taxes, Lower taxes or increase social services - don't know. Support death penalty, Death penalty - don't know/neutral, 
liberal (1) on censorship). 
No of endogenous variables in equation = 4 (Party Identification, Issues, Govemment Leader, Opposition Leader). 
=* Identified 
(vi) Issues = J (Left, Right, Positive to business. Neutral to business, Prefer lower taxes. Lower taxes or increase social 
services - don't know, Support death penalty, Death penalty - don't know/neutral. Liberal (1) on censorship). 
No of exogenous variables excluded from equation = 5(6)(Vote at last election, partisan background, working class 
identification, no class identification, trade union membership, trade union membership-unknown*. Issues, Govemment 
leader. Opposition leader). 
No of endogenous variables in equation = 1 
=> Identified 
* = trade union membership-unknown not included in all analyses 
4. A measurement model was not sjjecified for these analyses. It could be argued that a measurement model is necessary to 
take account of at least changes in the way the evaluations of the leaders were measured. However, a measurement model 
could not be employed for the following reasons. For most of the endogenous variables, there is litde guidance from the 
literature as to the reliabilities of the measures. The exception is party identification. For party identification, a reliability of 
0.80 has been estimated, indicating that diis measure comprise 64% tme variance and 36% error variance. However, this 
figure was obtained from American studies and it can be only assumed that the error variance is the same in the Australian 
context. In relation to the evaluations of the leaders, the two measures have a coirelation of between 0.6 and 0.7. However, 
this correlation gives little indication of the proportion of true and error variances of the two measures. For the issue 
measures, it would be quite arbitrary to specify the error and tme variances. 
5. The initial estimates are computed by instrumental variables and least squares methods (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1986:1.32-
35). 
6. Maximum likelihood estimation minimises the fimction: 
F =log | I | + tr(Sr') - log I S I - (p + q) 
where: 
I is the variance/covariance implied by the model 
S is the observed variance covariance matrix 
p is the number of endogenous variables 
q is the number of exogenous (independent) variables 
I SI and I S I are the determinants of Z and S, respectively. 
Z"' is the inverse of 2 where Z"'! = I (the identity matrix) 
tr refers to the trace of the matrix, that is the sum of elements on the main diagonal. 
From : Joreskog & Sorbom (1986:L28) 
More simply maximum likelihood estimation produces estimates that minimise the difference between the observed variances 
and covariances and those implied by the model. Maximum likelihood estimation maximises the probabUity that differences 
between observed and implied values are due to chance sampling fluctuations (Hayduk, 1987:130,132,138). The sampling 
distribution of the observed variance/covariance matrix follows the Wishart distribution (Hayduk, 1987:136). 
The process is iterative since estimates are obtained and these estimates are the basis for fmding a further 'better' solution 
until the improvement is marginal. 
7. The assumption of multivariate normality is that in n-dimensional space, n being the number of variables in the model, the 
distribution of the points is normal. 
8. From the advice of Hayduk (1987:334) the analyses were run again using generalised least squares which does not assume 
multivariate normality and unweighted least squares (ULS). The maximum likelihood (ML) and ULS estimates were similar, 
however the GLS estimates were quite different with some estimates above 1 (sometimes 2) and ALL T ratios close to zero. 
Given that the estimates from ML appear 'reasonable' (that is the results correspond to those foimd in previous chapters, the 
T ratios for the estimates expected to be significant were well over 2 and the estimates range between -1 and 1), ML 
estimation was employed. Therefore, the justification for ML rests on the interpretability of the results. The results using 
GLS are quite puzzling, although Aldrich & Nelson (1984:29) note that weighted least squares solutions (of which Lisrel's 
GLS is one type) will give 'worse' estimates, than unweighted estimation procedures, when linear specifications are made to 
non-linear relationships. 
9. The T ratios are defmed in the usual manner as the estimate divided by its standard error. The standard errors in Lisrel are 
the square roots of the diagonal elements of the variance/covariance matrix of the estimates (Hayduk, 1987:174). The 
assumption is die sampling distribution o/ the estimates is multivariate normal, an assumption that appears reasonable in 
samples as large as the ones here (Hayduk, 1987:175). 
10. Another way to assess whether an individual parameter is significant is to compare the model chi-square values between 
a model where the parameter is estimated to a model where it is fixed at zero. Testing the significance of individual 
parameters by this methods gave almost identical results. 
11. The standardised estimates were obtained in the usual manner by estimating the coefficients in data where all variables 
have been standardised to a mean of 0 and a variance of 1.0 (Saris & Stronkhorst, 1984:73). This is equivalent to analysing 
the correlation, rather than the variance/covariance data matrix. The interpretation of die standardised coefficients is the 
change (in units of standard deviations) of the response variable for a change of one standard deviation on the respective 
exogenous predictor variable. 
12. The total effects are calculated by the following equation: 
T = (I - B)-' -1 
where: 
I is the identity matrix 
B is the matrix of the effects between the endogenous variables. 
T is the matrix of total effects. 
From Hayduk (1987:258). 
13. The chi-square statistic could also be used to assess the goodness of fit of the endogenous part of the model. A 
significant improvement in the fit of the model should be observed between a model specifying links between the 
endogenous variables, relative to a model where these links are fixed at zero. However, the chi-square values cannot be 
compared between samples. 
14. The goodness of fit index (GFT) is calculated by the following formula; 
GFI = 1 - [ t rd 'S - DVtr(r'S)^ 
where: 
L"' is the inverse of variance/covariance matrix implied by the model. 
S is the observed variance/covariance matrix 
I is the identity matrix 
The adjusted goodness of fit (AGFI) corrects for the degrees of freedom in the model (Number of degrees of freedom = 
l/2k(k-i-l) -1 where k is the number of variables in the model t is the number of parameters to be estimated). 
AGFI = 1 - [k(k+l)/2d](l-GFI) 
where k is the number of variables in the model 
d is the number of degrees of freedom for the model 
GFI is as defined above 
From Joreskog & Sorbom (1986:140) 
The logic behind this formula is if the model is a good fit to the data then S will be close to S, then S 'S will be close to an 
identity matrix, so AGFI will be close to one. 
15. The root mean square residual (RMSR) is defined as follows: 
RMSR = [ 2 I^ . , ! • . , (s, - a,//k(k -h 1)]^ 
where: 
Sij is the observed variance/covariance between two variables in the observed variance/covariance matrix. 
Ojj is the variance/covariance between the same two variables implied by the model. 
k is the number of variables in the model 
This measure is not standardised, so the value of the measure is dependent on the magnitude of the variances and covariances 
in the variance/covariance matrix. It use should be restricted to comparing models in the same data (Joreskog & Sorbom, 
1986:1.33). It is employed in diis context, because the data are measured in the same manner and most variables have quite 
similar variances. However, not too much emphasis is put on this goodness of fit measure. 
16. Squared multiple correlations are for indicator variables are given by the following formula: 
1- eA 
where 0^  is the error variance for the ith variable and s^  is the observed variance for that variable. These coefficients range 
between zero and one. 
The coefficient of determination is defmed as 
1- Var(QA^ar(Tli) 
where Var(i^) is the error (zeta squared) variance of that stmctural equation and Var(T|i) is die total variance of that 
exogenous variable, eta(i). 
17. The formula for die total coefficient of determination (TCD) is: 
TCD = l-[|4'|/|cov(Ti)| 
where : 
14* I is the determinant of the matrix of error terms 4' 
|cov(r|) I is the determinant of the matrix of covariances between the endogenous (y) variables. 
18. This procedure is discussed by Achen (1982:71-73) which he calls 'level importance' of an independent variable. The 
problem of the base is addressed by the percentage effect relative to a 50/50 distribution of votes. The logic is that, if the 
mean is 0.50 then the measure can give no advantage to one party. Therefore, die difference between the mean of the 
measure and 0.50 is used to compute the percentage point advantage, parties receive from party identification and odier 
endogenous variables. 
19. The Lisrel program indicated that the fit of the models would be improved if a direct effect was posited from vote at the 
last election to vote. This result suggests that those short term factors politically relevant at the last election were also 
relevant at die time the data was coUected. This relationship was not si>ecified for these models since it does not follow from 
die model presaited in chapter 3. Furthermore, relaxing this restriction did not in general alter the substantive interpretations 
draw from the analyses in this chapter. 
20. This decline is likely to be attenuated by die linear specification of the model which by definition forces a straight line 
dirough a set of points on 3 levels. 
21. Calculated by summing die indirect effects of party identification dirough issues and leaders. 
22. Simply the direct standardised effects subtracted from the total effects. 
23. The effect for Mr Hayden in 1979 was not sigruficant. However, the estimate is presented since its T ratio (1.7) is close 
to 2 and it had significant effects on vote in the last chapter. Inclusion of dus estimate is of little importance, since its 
magnitude is quite low and does not undermine die conclusions that die effects of evaluations of the Leader of the 
Opposition declined between 1967 and 1979. 
24. This finding is at odds with the results presented in last chapter (figure 6.11) where generally non-significant effects on 
vote were observed for evaluations of the Leader of the Opposition during the 1980s. It is likely diat die non-reciprocal 
specification of the model analysed in chapter 6 attenuated these effects. Recursive or (non-reciprocal) specifications tend to 
over-estimate the effects of partisanship and under-estimate die effects of short term factors (Page & Jones, 1979; 
Weadierford, 1983). 
25. To readdress die issue of the measurement of leader evaluations, it should be noted dial the effects of evaluations of the 
Liberal leader on party identification in 1979 (widi die ANPA measure) was comparable to die effects found widi die 
measures employed in later samples. Similarly, die effects of party identification on evaluations of die Liberal leader were 
comparable in die 1979 ANPA sample widi die later samples. 
26. Fluctuations may have also occurred during the 1960s. However, diere are only two data points, so a trend cannot be 
ascertained. 
27. It should be noted that these estimates of the contribution of issues and leaders to vote may be argued as inaccurate. The 
main reasons why diat may not be accurate are (i) the confidence limits of die estimates are not taken into account (ii) die 
estimates are limited to the direct effects (iii) the measures of the issues and leaders may not reflect the tme electoral balance 
on these factors in the electorate at that time (iv) the estimates from the continuous measures are estimates for a linear 
specification, whereas the relationship is unlikely to be tmly linear. 
However, this j»ints can addressed. First, apart from the estimates for the opposition leader, the T ratios for diese 
effects are very large, corresponding to very narrow confidence limits. Second, direct effects are conceptuaUy clearer than 
total effects, and the total effects are complicated by the negative effects of short term factors on party identification. Third, 
die measures include those factors that were found to have an effects on vote in the last chapter. Apart from the 1988 
sample, it is unlikely that data on important short term influences has not been included in diese analyses. Furtiiermore, the 
measures endeavour to reflect the p)artisan balance of the measure by scoring diem, so that a mean of 0.5 indicates that the 
electorate was equally divided on that issue or leader. Fifth, the linear relationship most likely approximates the tme 
relationship and a non-linear specification would make this exercise extremely difficult. 
As a general principal, it is more informative to calculate reasonably accurate estimates, than not calculate estimates at 
aU. 
28. As indicated earUer diis estimate (of issues in 1988) is imlikely to be an accurate estimate. 
29. At this point, it is easy to say "Well, I knew that - what's the point of this research". The response to this point of view 
is that there are many competing common sense explanations to topics studied in the social sciences. The same statement 
could be made in response to quite different conclusions, such as, leaders have no electoral impact (die "drover's dog adage") 
or diat environmental issues aUowed Labor to win during the 1980s. 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
There are a number of general conclusions regarding both electoral choice and electoral change, 
that can be drawn from this study. 
Analysis of the model of electoral choice showed that partisanship has the greatest effect on 
electoral choice. Ideology is of little or no consequence in the process of electoral choice. In each 
sample analysed, short-term factors, that is issues and leaders, were found to influence electoral choice. 
Specific short-term factors were found to have effects on vote, net of partisanship. Furthermore, no 
social-structural factor was found to consistently have direct effects on electoral choice, net of the 
model of electoral choice, and the model applied generally across different social groups. 
This study has answered the questions posed in chapters 1 and 3. Specifically, social-structural 
factors have become less important in the process of electoral choice. Partisanship has become a less 
important influence on electoral choice and in structuring the process of electoral choice. The other 
hypothesised long-term electoral force, ideology, was found to have little influence on electoral choice 
and there is no evidence to suggest that the electorate has become more ideological during the time 
period studied. Issues have become more important influences on electoral choice. Similarly, 
evaluations of the Prime Minister have also become more important, but those of the Leader of the 
Opposition leader appear to have become less important. 
In answer to the propositions presented at the beginning in chapter 3 there is strong evidence for 
the first proposition, that the results of elections held since 1967 can to a substantial extent be 
explained by durable electoral advantages that parties hold. Two periods are indicated - a period of 
coalition dominance at least during the late 1960s and a period of Labor dominance since 1979. 
The association between many social-structural factors and partisanship was found to have 
weakened. The effects of occupational class, class identification, and income on party identification 
have declined. Trade-union membership and religiosity were found to have more or less constant 
effects. The effect of non-rural/rural residency increased between 1969 and the mid 1980s but has 
since declined. Differences in partisanship between religious denominations, state of residence, age 
cohorts and gender groups were found infrequently, and such effects were often attributable to 
transient factors. The most notable change observed from the analyses of party identification was 
among southem Europeans. This group was more likely (than 'Australians') to identify with the 
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coalition parties during the 1960s but more likely to identify with the Labor party during the 1980s. 
No social factor was found to have consistently greater effects on party identification during the 1980s 
than during the 1960s. One implication of these results is that extra-familial political socialisation 
associated with social factors is less prevalent during the 1980s than during the 1960s. 
This result has a number of implicafions for the Australian political parties. First, the social 
bases of support for the major parties has been eroded. Safe seats are now less safe and occasionally 
the major parties may lose their safe seats. Examples are Labor seats in the 1988 NSW state election, 
the Adelaide by-election and the Liberal seat of North Sydney at the 1990 federal election. Second, 
parties will find it more difficult to rely on stable support from particular social groups, since social 
groups have become less politically homogeneous. Third, the ties between political parties and social 
groups will become increasing divergent Business people and professionals cannot be assumed to be 
supporters of the coalition and similarly, manual workers, lower income eamers and working class 
identifiers are increasingly not necessarily Labor. 
In contrast, the relationship between partisan background and partisanship has remained constant 
This single relationship is responsible for the overall stability of Australian politics. The implication 
of this finding is that Australian politics is likely to be dominated by the present political parties for 
many years to come. A small increase was found in the effects of partisan background on partisanship 
since the mid-1980s suggesting that intra-familial political socialisation has if anything become more 
importanL This increase is also implied by the stable level of partisanship in the electorate, together 
with a decrease in the effects of a number of social-stmctural factors on partisanship. 
The most notable result in this study is the decline in the direct impact of partisanship on vote 
during the time period studied. Evidence for the decline of partisanship comes from a number of 
analyses performed. First, the (absolute) estimates of the effects of party identification on vote are 
generally lower in data collected during the 1980s, compared to the effects found in data collected 
earlier. Second, a decline was also found employing three or seven level continuous measures of party 
identification. Finally, analyses of the confirmatory model of electoral choice also showed a decline in 
both the direct and total effects of party identification on vote. Therefore, there is a sufficient amount 
of evidence to suggest that a decline in the effect of partisanship on electoral choice has in fact 
occurred. 
This decline has occurred because short-term electoral forces have become important. It can be 
concluded that Australian electors have become more likely not to vote in accordance with their 
partisanship by responding to issues and evaluations of the leaders. This willingness could be 
attributed to a more politically sophisficated electorate, greater disenchantment towards the political 
parties or other factors. This is one area where further research could proceed. 
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There are a number of implications of this finding for Australian politics. First, the major 
political parties cannot rely on a large group of loyal supporters. At individual federal, state or by-
elections, the major parties may find their level of support falling to unprecedented levels. Second, the 
decline in the partisanship-vote relation bodes well for minor parties and special interest groups. 
Minor parties are likely to gain substantial proportions of the vote. Although, the level of support for 
minor parties was not substantially different in elections held during the 1980s compared with 
elections held during the late 1960s and early 1970s, at the recent 1990 election minor parties 
appeared to benefit from the decline in the partisanship-vote relation. A possible third implication of 
the decline in the effects of partisanship on vote is that the major parties will be less able to control 
the political agenda. 
The investigafions of this study indicate that ideology has little direct influence on electoral 
choice. Furthermore, there is no evidence that ideology has become a more important influence on 
vote in the twenty years between 1967 and 1988. The absence of a sustained impact of ideology on 
electoral choice in the data examined indicate that 'ideological' explanations of Australian elections are 
not valid. 
The analyses presented in this study indicate that issues have become more important in relation 
to electoral choice. The impact of issues on vote in the confirmatory model was found to be higher in 
those data sets collected during the 1980s than during the 1960s. The exception is the 1988 NSSS 
study which did not collect data on relevant issues. Not only has the direct effect of issues on vote 
increased, but the indirect effects of partisanship on vote mediated through issues appears to have 
increased. 
The finding that issues have become more important could be attributed to a number of factors. 
The economic problems of the 1970s and 1980s may have may brought home to electors that their 
lives can be directiy effected by govemment policies. In addition, environmental issues have been 
added to the political agenda during the 1980s. Furthermore, the electorate of the 1980s is more 
educated and probably more politically sophisticated than the electorate of the 1960s. This is a 
another area where further research could proceed. 
A strong reciprocal effect of issues on party identification was observed in data collected in 
1979. However, this effect was noted in only one of the seven data sets analysed suggesting that party 
identification is generally not sensitive to those issues that affect electoral choice. In contrast, the 
analyses of chapter 4 found that party identification is sensitive to transient factors associated with 
social-stmctural factors. 
From the analyses presented in this study there is evidence that evaluations of the Prime Minister 
(or leader of the Labor party) have become more important influences on electoral choice. The 
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exception to this pattem is the year 1967, when evaluations of Mr Holt had comparable effects on vote 
with evaluations of Mr Hawke in 1984 and 1986. In contrast, evaluations of tiie Leader of tiie 
Opposition appear to have become less important. 
There are two explanations which may account for tiiis finding. First, there is probably a greater 
focus on tiie Prime Minister by the media and possibly, the Leader of the Opposition is given less 
credit for a difficult job. The altemative explanation is a personality effect. That is, Whitiam and 
Hawke had stiong effects by virtue of their personality, whereas Gorton, Peacock and Howard had less 
strong personalities. If it is due to a personality effect then the effects of leaders on vote witnessed in 
the Hawke era are unlikely to be maintained during the 1990s. 
Party identification was found to be more sensitive to evaluations of the leaders (especially the 
Prime Minister) in data collected since 1979. This result indicates that party identification has become 
more sensitive to short-term factors associated with leaders. 
The finding that the Labor party enjoys a small electoral edge over the coalition is useful in the 
analysis of Australian elections. This edge partially explains why the Labor party was able to win the 
1987 and 1990 elections after being well down in mid-term opinion polls. This edge could also be 
included in explanations of Labor's close victories at the Victorian, South Australian and Westem 
Australian state elections held during the late 1980s. If Labor continues to enjoy an electoral 
advantage during the 1990s, the Labor party will have a higher probability of winning a given election 
than the conservatives. However, this edge does not assure Labor of victory. The effects issues and 
leaders are able to overiiaul Labor's small electoral advantage. 
This study has made a number of contributions to the study of electoral choice and electoral 
change in Australia. The study has organised the various possible influences of electoral choice into a 
plausible causal model. This model appears to explain the electoral choices of the greater majority of 
the Australian electorate. Furthermore, changes in the process of electoral choice between 1967 and 
1988 have been identified. 
APPENDIX 1 
DATA, SAMPLING AND MEASURES 
In this appendix, the data and the measures constmcted from the data employed to address the 
research question are considered. 
1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE DATA 
The data employed in these investigations were obtained from seven large national surveys, on 
political attitudes and behaviour which have been referred to throughout the thesis. 
The first of these, the first Australian National Political Attitudes (ANPA) study was conducted 
in 1967; a second ANPA study was conducted in 1969 and a third in 1979. The 1980s witnessed an 
increase in the number of empirical studies of electoral behaviour. Those responsible for the National 
Social Science Study (NSSS) conducted three surveys between 1984 and 1988, all of which included 
variables relating to the concepts discussed in chapter 3. In addition, an Australian Election study 
(AES) was conducted in 1987*. 
The data sets derived from these surveys are the basis for the analyses which follow and were 
chosen for the following reasons. First, all seven surveys were based on systematic sampling 
techniques, which allow conclusions to be drawn about the population from which the sample was 
taken, in most cases the Austialian electorate. Second, all surveys include questions which relate to, 
the concepts that comprise the model of electoral choice on which the present work is based. Third, 
there is a high degree of consistency in the questions asked in these surveys. 
Aggregate data and opinion poU data are not employed in this study since these data sources 
characteristically lack measures cmcial for the model of electoral choice. For example, information on 
partisan background, partisanship and issues, is not usually available. 
The 1967 and 1969 surveys were directed by Don Aitkin, Michael Kahan and Donald Stokes 
(Aitidn, Kahan & Stokes, 1975 & 1976). The final (1979) survey in tills series, fonnaUy referred to as 
the Macquarie University Australian PoHtical Attitudes Survey, 1979 was directed by Don Aitkin 
(Aitidn, 1982a). The initial survey of tiie National Social Science study (NSSS) undertaken between 
1984 and 1986, was directed by Jonathan Kelley, Robert Gushing and Bmce Headey (Kelley, Gushing 
& Headey, 1987). The 1986-87 NSSS survey (referred to as tiie 'Role of government' survey) was 
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directed by Jonatiian Kelley, Clive Bean and Mariah Evans (Kelley, Bean & Evans, 1986). The 1987-
88 NSSS survey (referred to as tiie 'Inequality' survey) was also directed by Kelley, Bean and Evans 
(19788). The 1987 Austialian Election Study (AES) was directed by Ian McAllister and Tony 
Mughan (McAllister & Mughan, 1987a). 
The primary purpose of the 1967 ANPA study was to investigate the responses of voters to the 
parties, leaders and political issues in Austialia in 1967 (Aitidn, Kahan & Stokes, 1975:1). The 
precursors of the 1967 questionnaire were the American National Election Studies which began in 
1952, conducted from the University of Michigan (Kelley & Bean, 1988b:xix) and the questionnaires 
devised by David Butier and Donald Stokes, to study electoral behaviour in Great Britain, during the 
1960s (Aitkin, 1977:271). The data were coUected by personal interviews. The dimensions of the 
1967 ANPA data are 326 variables by 2054 cases. 
The 1969 ANPA study was for the most part based on a panel from the 1967 ANPA study. Its 
primary purpose was similar to that of the 1967 ANPA, to study the reactions of voters to parties, 
leaders and issues in 1969. Using the panel design, political change and stability could be 
investigated. The 1969 questionnaire included, nearly all the questions asked in the 1967 survey, as 
well as some additional ones .^ The data was collected by personal interviews. The dimensions of the 
1969 data set are 420 variables by 1873 cases (Aitkin, Kahan & Stokes, 1976:Study Description). Of 
the 1873 cases, 1453 (77.6%) were panel respondents (Aitkin, 1977:273). 
The purpose of the 1979 study was again to investigate the reactions of voters to parties, leaders 
and issues in 1979, as well as to examine hypotheses conceming changes in Austialian politics since 
the first ANPA study (Aitkin, 1982b:Preface to second edition). The 1979 ANPA suidy was originally 
proposed as a panel of the 1967 ANPA respondents, but this was found to be impractical (Aitkin, 
1982b:Preface to second edition). The 1979 questionnaire was very similar in stmcture to the earlier 
(ANPA) ones, but also included additional questions on the issues of the time. Again, the data were 
collected by personal interviews. The dimensions of the data set are 280 variables by 2016 cases. 
The purpose of the 1984 NSSS study was broader, being designed to investigate a number of 
areas of interest to sociologists, economists, and political scientists. These included social 
stratification, social mobility, inequality, the labour market, ethnicity and income (Kelley, Gushing & 
Headey, 1987:11). The 1984 NSSS continues tiie tradition of the ANPA sttidies, as well as 
incorporating items from 1965 and 1973 Australian mobility studies (Kelley & Bean, 1988b:xix). The 
data were collected by personal interviews from urban respondents and by mail from mral respondents. 
The dimensions of the 1984 NSSS data set are 681 variables by 3012 cases (Kelley, Gushing & 
Headey, 1987:i-ix). 
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The 1986-87 NSSS 'Role of Government' study was part of the second round of tiie National 
Social Science Study. The major focus was attitudes to the role of the govemment both in the 
economy and in society, generally. This study is part of an international collaborative project, the 
Intemational Social Survey Program (ISSP). The questionnaire includes a large number of questions 
asked in the 1984 NSSS survey and has questions in common with the ANPA studies. The data were 
collected by mail. The dimensions of the data file are 813 variables by 1528 cases (Kelley, Bean & 
Evans, 1990). 
The purpose of the 1987 AES was to investigate stability and change in the electorate by 
comparing this study to the ANPA studies and also to study features specific to the 1987 federal 
election. The 1987 questionnaire elicited similar information on voting, partisanship, political ideology 
and issues as did the earlier ANPA studies (McAllister & Mughan, 1987a:2). The data was collected 
by mail. The dimensions of the 1987 AES data set are 195 variables by 1830 cases. Five respondents 
retumed two questionnaires (McAllister & Mughan, 1987a:l) giving a final sample size of 1825 cases. 
The 1987-88 NSSS 'Inequality' sttidy was the fourth round of tiie National Social Science Study. 
The major focus of the study was respondent attitudes to inequality in Australia. Like the other NSSS 
studies, this study is part of an intemational collaborative project, the Intemational Social Survey 
Program (ISSP). The questionnaire includes a large number of questions asked, in both the 1984 and 
1986-87 NSSS surveys and also many questions in common with the ANPA studies. The data were 
collected by mail. The dimensions of the data file are 1,002 variables by 1,663 cases. 
Although additional data coUected at regular points intervals would be useful, the data available 
aUows conclusions to made, on both electoral choice and changes in the process of electoral choice, 
between the late 1960s and the late 1980s. Investigations of tiie model of electoral choice, at each of 
tiie time points at which data was coUected, wUl lead to conclusions as to changes or the absence of 
change. 
Apart from tiie work of Aitkin (1982b) and Bean (1984), tiie 1969 ANPA data has not been 
extensively employed in investigations of political behaviour. The 1969 data set is included in this 
study, since it serves as a further data point in tiie assessment of electoral change. Furthermore, the 
1967-1969 panel data is the only Australian data set (currentiy avaUable) that includes a large number 
of variables measured in the same manner at different time points. 
For tiie analyses performed in tiiis study, the 1967, 1969, 1979, 1984 and 1987 data was 
obtained from the Social Science Data Archives (SSDA) in Canberra. At the time of writing, the two 
later NSSS data sets had not yet been deposited with the Social Science Data Archives. For these 
analyses, tiie 1986 NSSS 'Role of Government' and tiie 1988 'Inequality' data was obtained from tiie 
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Department of Sociology, Research School of tiie Social Sciences at the AustraUan National University 
in Canberra. Table A 1.1 presents a summary of tiiese data setsl 
TABLE Al.l: SUMMARY OF STUDIES EMPLOYED 
Year 
1%7 
1969 
1979 
1984 
1987 
1986-87 
1987-88 
Reference for data, code book and 
questionnaire 
Aiddn, Kahan & Stokes (1975) 
Aiddn, Kahan & Stokes (1976) 
Aiddn (1982a) 
KeUey. Gushing & Headey (1987) 
McAUister & Mughan (1987a) 
KeUey, Bean & Evans (1986) 
KeUey, Bean & Evans (1988) 
N 
2054 
1873 
2016 
3012 
1825 
1528 
1663 
Type of Survey 
Cross-Sectional 
PaneiyCross-Sectional 
Cross Sectional 
Cross-Sectional 
Cross-Sectional 
Cross-Sectional 
Cross-Sectional 
Sample Approach 
Personal Interview 
Personal Interview 
Personal Interview 
Personal Interview/Mail 
Mad 
MaU 
Mad 
In tills appendix expUcit references are often made to the data and the respective code-books and 
questionnaires. In discussions of the 1986 and 1988 NSSS data sets, reference is made to the 
questionnaire rather tiian the code-book since, since at the time of writing final versions of the code-
books have not been produced. As was noted in the literature review, the letter ' V refers to the 
variable number in the code books, the letter 'Q' the question number and a number not preceded by a 
letter, the page number. In the case of tiie 1986 and 1988 studies, variable names rather tiian variable 
numbers were used and are presented in capital letters. 
1.2 SAMPLING 
The respondents of each sample were selected by often used sampling procedures. For each 
sample considerable efforts were made, to ensure a sample representative of the Austialian adult 
population or voters. The foUowing sections detail of Uie sampling procedures used in tiie selection of 
the samples. 
A. The 1967 ANPA 
The sample in 1967 ANPA survey was selected by a multi-stage stiatified probability 
procedure (Aitidn, Kahan & Stokes, 1975:11-111; Kahan & Aitkin, 1968). The primary strata were tiie 
six states. Electoral divisions within each state were sorted into sub-strata within each state, according 
to a variety of population characteristics'*. Different procedures were used for each stated 
In most mral electoral divisions, tiie sub-divisions were stratified, ratiier than tiie electoral 
division .^ The ranking of divisions and sub-divisions contained forty strata .^ This ranking aUowed 
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tiie grouping of simUar divisions togetiier, so tiiat divisions could be selected which differed in terms 
of the electorate's characteristics. Two divisions were selected from each of the strata, with a 
probabUity proportional to tiie size of its electoral population (Aitkin, Kahan & Stokes, 1975:11-111). 
Of tiie 122 electorates (or divisions) 80 were selected for tiie sample (Aitkin, Kahan & Stokes, 1975:11; 
Kahan & AiUdn, 1968:2). 
In each selected division (or sub-division in the case of some mral areas), a random selection of 
names was selected systematicaUy, from the electoral roU. Thirty-six names were collected from urban 
electorates and 32 names (16 from each sub-division)* were selected from mral electorates (Kahan & 
Aitkin, 1968:25). Rather complex adjustments had previously been made to the electoral roUs, to 
account for differences in tiieir accuracy (Kahan & AiUdn, 1968:17-20, 27-28). A total of 2921 
electors was selected for tiie original sample. Of tiie 2921 contacts attempted, interviews were 
obtained from 2054 respondents, giving a response rate of 70% (calculated from AiUdn, 1977:272). 
Removing the 369 out of scope elements', the response rate (caUed the completion rate in NSSS 
studies) increases to 81% (Aitkin, 1977:272). 
The number of respondents interviewed in each division (or sub-division) ranged from 11 to 32, 
with most between 20 and 30 (Aitkin, Kahan & Stokes, 1975:V7)'°. In each case, the interviewer 
attempted to interview that elector originaUy selected. If this were not possible, the interviewer 
enumerated aU those of voting age in the household and made a selection based on random numbers. 
In the final sample, 1974 of tiie 2054 respondents were originaUy selected (96%) and 80 (4%) selected 
by enumeratioa 
The data was coUected between September the 2nd and November the 27th 1967 (Aitkin, Kahan 
& Stokes, 1967:160-161, note 1). More than 90% of tiie interviews, had been secured by tiie 17tii of 
October, 1967 (Aitkin, 1982b:355). The final sample size was 2054 persons from 2921 contacts 
attempted (Aitkin, 1977:272) giving a response rate of 70%. Further detaUs on the sampling 
procedure employed in this survey can be found in the 1967 ANPA code-book (Aitkin, Kahan & 
Stokes, 1975:11-111) and in the working paper on the sampling procedures (Kahan & Stokes, 1968). 
The representativeness of the 1967 sample has been explored by AiUdn (1977:273-274), who 
concluded that in terms of the distributions of sex and state of residence, tiie 1967 sample is 
representative of the electorate. 
B. The 1969 ANPA 
The 1969 ANPA survey was, in part, a panel study of respondents interviewed in 1967, and 
contained most of the questions asked in tiie 1967 survey. Of tiie 1835 respondents in tiie 1969 
sample, 1453 (77.6%) were panel respondents. Of tiie remaining 420 respondents, 148 were selected 
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for the 1967 sample but not interviewed, but agreed to be interviewed in 1969 and 272 were selected 
by a new selection procedure. The Commonwealth Electoral Office assisted with Uie location of panel 
and first wave selected respondents, who had left their original addresses and also with, the selection 
of the supplementary sample (Aitkin, 1977:273). The data was coUected after the October 25 election, 
untU Uie 1st of Febmary 1970 (Aitidn, Kahan & Stokes, 1976:Q5a, V8). Ninety per cent of tiie 
interviews were completed by tiie 3rd of December 1969 (Aitkin, 1982b:356). 
Aitkin (1977:273) concluded tiiat in terms of sex, state of residence and vote at the 1969 
election, the 1969 sample is representative of the electorate. 
C. The 1979 ANPA 
The 1979 Macquarie University National Political attitudes survey, used tiie sampUng frame 
designed for the 1967 and 1969 surveys (Aitidn, 1982a:5). The sample was also selected by a muUi-
stage stiatified probability sample, based on the 1967 sampling frame (Aitidn, 1982a:3). The primary 
strata were as the case of the 1967 ANPA, the six states. Electoral divisions within each state were 
sorted into sub-strata within each state, according to a variety of population characteristics''. The 
ranking of divisions contained forty stiata levels. Two divisions were selected from each of the strata, 
with a probabiUty proportional to the size of its electoral population (Aitidn, 1982a:II-IlI). UnUke tiie 
sampling procedure used to create the 1967 ANPA a further selection was made, two sub-divisions 
were selected at random, from each division. Of the 122 electorates (or divisions), 82 were selected 
for tiie sample (Aitidn, 1982a:V6). 
In each selected sub-division, a random selection of names were selected systematicaUy from the 
electoral roU. Eighteen names were selected from each urban sub-division and 16 names were selected 
from each mral sub-division. A total of 2883 electors were selected for the original sample. Of tiie 
2883 contacts attempted, interviews were obtained from 2016 respondents, giving a response rate of 
70% (AiUdn, 1982a:4). Removing tiie 426 out of scope elements'^, tiie response rate increases to 
82% (calculated fix)m Aitidn, 1982a:4). 
The number of respondents interviewed in each division ranged from 14 to 29, with most 
between 20 and 30 (Aitidn, 1982a:V6). As was tiie case for tiie 1967 ANPA sample, interviews were 
attempted witii tiie electors originaUy selected. If tiiis were not possible, tiie interviewer enumerated 
aU those of voting age in the household and made a selection based on random numbers. The 
interviews were conducted between the 1st of September and the 18Ui of November 1979, 80% being 
completed in the first six weeks (AiUdn, 1982a:4)'^ In tiie final sample, 1444 of tiie final 2016 
respondents who were originaUy selected (72%) and 572 (28%) selected by enumeration. 
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Aitidn (1982b:359-360) has investigated tiie representativeness of the 1979 ANPA sample. A 
sUght over-representations of female electors was found, that is likely to be due to tiie considerably 
larger proportion of Uie sampled selected by enumeration tiian was tiie case in tiie 1967 sample 
(AiUdn, 1982b:359). Aitkin (1982b:360) also found considerable differences between the sample's 
recaU of tiieir vote in 1977 and the national figures for tiie 1977 election. The proportion of tiie 
sample voting for minor parties was much less than that at Uie 1977 election and Uie proportion 
recaUing their vote for the Liberal and Labor parties is considerably higher. However, AiUdn 
(1982b:360) concludes that there no reason to suppose that tiie 1979 sample, is not representative of 
Uie 1979 electorate. 
Bean (1984:271-272, 251) compared tiie 1979 sample witii tiie 1981 census on tiie two variables 
of religious denomination and ethnicity '^*. His results indicate that the 1979 sample, is representative 
of the Australian population, in terms of these variables. However, the 1979 survey appears to have 
over-estimated the proportion of the population in non-manual occupations (from Bean, 1984:289, 
table 8.5)'^ 
D. The 1984 NSSS 
The sampUng procedure of the 1984 NSSS survey has both an urban and a mral component. 
The sampUng frame for the urban sample of the 1984 NSSS was the 1981 census, altiiough only 
respondents 18 years or older were eligible to be selected in the sample. The urban sample was a 
cluster sample, where census coUector districts were assigned probabUities in proportion to the number 
of occupied dweUings in the district and a random selection is made. Census districts which were not 
part of an urban centre of more than 10,000 persons were discarded. A random selection of start 
points was made within each census district and a skip pattem was used in which every fourth private 
dweUing was included in the sample, up to the required number of households. No household 
substitution was aUowed (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:iii). 
Once a dweUing had been contacted, one person aged 18 years or more within dwelling was 
randomly selected using the Kish-grid selection metiiod. With this method Uie occupants of the 
dweUing are Usted and a random selection was made (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:iv). 
Problems arose witii the urban sample, since the response rates were below expectation. 
Between June and August 1984, the 376 census bureau districts selected had been exhausted and only 
1700 out of an expected 2,200 interviews, had been obtained. These 1700 interviews constitute the 
first wave. The interviews from the second wave, were the result of re-entering tiie original census 
districts and contacting those households, where the selected elector refused to be interviewed on first 
contact. Respondents were again selected by the Kish method and respondent substitution was 
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aUowed. A total of 256 additional respondents, were interviewed in this second wave. These 
interviews were conducted between December 1984 and Febmary 1985 (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 
1987:iv). 
The third wave obtained a further 252 interviews in New South Wales and Victoria. These 
interviews were conducted between March and July 1985. In this third wave, the original start points 
were used, but the cluster was extended in order to obtain tiie number of interviews required. 
Respondents were selected by the Kish metiiod and respondent substitution was aUowed (Kelley, 
Gushing & Headey, 1987:iv). 
Interviews were obtained from a total of 2208 respondents, from an original 3948 persons in the 
original (urban) sample. This gives an initial response rate of 50% (excluding the 252 interviews 
obtained from the third wave). The completion rate, defined as the proportion of successful interviews 
from households in scope was 58%. Out of scope households include tiiose persons selected, who had 
language difficulties preventing the interview being conducted in English and unoccupied dweUings 
(KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:iii-v). In the final analysis, respondent substitution was minimal -
1921 (87%) of the 2208 urban respondents interviewed were originaUy selected and only 13% were 
interviewed as a resiUt of respondent substitution. 
The mral sample was designed to supplement the urban sample. The mral sample targeted 
adults living in localities of less 10,000 persons. Data from tiie mral sample was coUected by mail 
questionnaires and were retumed between July 1985 and July 1986 (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 
1987:vi). 
The procedure for the selection of the mral sample was as foUows. Using the census master file 
with codes for electoral divisions (electorates) added, electoral divisions were sorted within each state, 
by size of rural population. Qusters of 5 electors were selected systematicaUy from each electoral 
division, from a random starting value. The number of clusters selected from each division, was 
proportional to the size of the mral population'*. Electoral divisions wiUi only a smaU proportion of 
mral voters were excluded and a selection was made from an adjacent electoral division (Kelley, 
Gushing & Headey, 1987:xi). Clusters were constmcted by taking a random number between 1 and 
the number of electors in the electoral division, and taking the name of tiie elector corresponding to 
that number and the names corresponding to every tenth foUowing number, until 10 names had been 
selected. 
The number of units in the original (mral) sample was 1554, from which data from 804 
respondents was obtained. The completion rate for tiie mral sample was 59% (KeUey, Gushing & 
Headey, 1987:v). 
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The final sample size of tiie 1984 NSSS (including boUi urban and mral samples) was 3012 
respondents (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:iii-vi, x-xiv). Since most of tiie data was coUected in 
1984 and 65% of tiie sample were interviewed by March 1985, tiie sample is referred to as Uie 1984 
NSSS. 
E. The 1986-87 NSSS 'Role Of Government' Study 
The sample Irame for the 1986-87 NSSS 'Role of Government' study was tiie electoral roU. AU 
six states and the two territories were included in die sample frame. The universe consisted of 
Australian electors competent in the English language. The original sample drawn comprised of 3819 
addresses, of which 2509 were defined as in scope". The survey was in die field between November 
1986 and July 1987, with over 75% of responses being received before Uie end of 1986. Since most 
of tiie data was coUected in 1986, this study is referred to the 1986 NSSS. The number of valid 
responses was 1528 respondents, giving a response rate of 40% and a completion rate of 61% (KeUey, 
Bean & Evans, 1990). 
F. The 1987 AES 
The sample frame for the 1987 AES was tiie electoral roU. Electors in aU six states and two 
territories, comprised the sample frame. The systematic random sample of 2762 units was selected 
systematicaUy, fi-om the electoral roU covering aU states and territories, except South Australia. For 
the South Austialian part of the sample, a supplementary sample of 299 units was selected manuaUy, 
from the alphabetical Ust of South AustraUan electors available on microfiche. A total of 3061 units 
were selected. At least 156 of these units were out of scope. The final sample consisted of 1825 
respondents, giving a response rate of 59% or a completion rate of at least 62.8% (McAUister & 
Mughan, 1987a:3). The data was coUected between tiie 9tii of July 1987 to tiie 30tii of October 1987 
(McAUister & Mughan, 1987a:3). 
The principle investigators note Uiat the proportions of electors in each state in the sample 
closely matched equivalent proportions in the electorate (McAUister & Mughan, 1987a:4). The 
proportion of the sample who indicated, tiiey had voted for tiie Labor and Liberal parties in the House 
Representatives elections were 33.4% and 50.6%, respectively (McAUister & Mughan, 1987a:Vll). 
The actual figures are 34.6% and 45.8% (Mackerras, 1988:273), indicating that the sample had over-
sampled Labor voters. 
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G. The 1987-88 NSSS 'Inequality' Study 
The sample fi-ame for tiie 1987-88 NSSS 'InequaUty' study was tiie electoral roU. AU six states 
and Uie two territories were included in die sample frame. The universe consisted of Australian 
electors competent in the English language. The original sample drawn comprised of 4151 addresses. 
The data from die 1987-88 NSSS 'Inequality' study was coUected between December 1987 and 
Febmary 1989 (Bean, Personal Communication). Most of die completed questionnaires, were received 
in late 1988 and eariy 1989. This sttidy is referred to as tiie 1988 NSSS. The number of valid 
responses was 1663 giving a response rate of 40%. Calculations are not yet available on tiie 
proportion of out of scope units and tiie completion rate. 
1.2.1 Evaluation of the Samples 
When performing comparative analyses over time, the main issue conceming tiie samples is Uieir 
comparabiUty. The possible sources of incomparable samples are, first, possible differences in the 
sampling frame employed, second, differences in Uie way the samples were drawn and finaUy, 
differences in the representativeness of the samples. 
In most of the studies the sampling frame was the electoral roU. The exception was the urban 
sample of the 1984 NSSS, in which the Australian census was used as tiie sampling frame. In tiiis 
sample respondents 18 years or older, were eUgible to be selected. The difference between tiie 
electoral roU and the census of adults 18 and over are slight. There is Ukely to be a smaU proportion 
of the population whose place of residence is recorded in tiie census, but who are not on the electoral 
role. However, these proportion is likely to be smaU enough, not to substantiaUy effect any 
comparative analyses. 
The universes of tiie samples differ very slightiy. The 1967, 1969 and 1979 ANPA studies 
excluded electors residing in tiie Austialian Capital Territory (A.C.T.) and tiie Northem Territory 
(N.T.), whereas the later studies, included tiie territories in the universe. The interpretations from 
comparative analysis are very unUkely to be effected effect by their non-inclusion in the ANPA 
studies, since only approximately 1 % of the AustraUan electorate live in tiiese two territories (Kahan & 
Aitidn, 1968:3, foomote 2). 
Respondents in tiie three ANPA studies and urban respondents in tiie 1984 NSSS, were 
interviewed by trained interviewers, while in Uie mral sample of the 1984 NSSS sttidy, tiie later NSSS 
studies and the 1987 AES smdy, the data was coUected by mailed questionnaires. There are 
advantages and disadvantages in botii approaches. Personal interviews can reduce the frequency of 
non response to particular questions since tiie interviewer can sort out any misunderstandings (Moser, 
1967:177). MaU surveys are cheaper tiian face to face surveys and allow persons living in remote 
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areas to be more cheaply included in the sample frame. MaU surveys have been criticised since tiie 
non-response rates have generaUy been higher (Moser, 1967:175) and tiiat respondents wiUi higher 
levels of socio-economic status are more Ukely to return completed questionnaires (Moser, 1967:181). 
However, in the only data set where comparisons can be made, the response rates for tiie urban and 
rural samples for the 1984 NSSS were almost identical, at just below 60% (KeUey & Bean, 1988b:xxi-
xxii). There is no reason to suppose that in the context of AustraUan national surveys, tiiere tiiat mail 
surveys wiU yield substantively different interpretations from surveys conducted by personal interview. 
Furthermore, other researchers have compared tiie results ANPA surveys and Uie later mail surveys, 
without making adjustments for any systematic biases (Bean, 1988:46-47; McAUister, 1988a & 1990). 
The major difference in sampUng procedures is that the urban 1984 sample is a cluster sample, 
while the other samples are closer to simple random samples. The ANPA samples are multi-stage 
probabUity samples whUe tiie 1984 NSSS mral, tiie 1986 NSSS 'Role of Govemment', 1987 AES 
sample and the 1988 NSSS 'InequaUty' samples are systematic random samples. Cluster samples are 
less precise than simple random samples (Kalton, 1983:28-38). To compensate for the loss of 
precision with cluster samples, the sample is sometimes weighted to decrease the sample size (Jones & 
McAUister, 1989). 
Considering tiie large size of Uie 1984 NSSS urban sample (some 2208 respondents) and that tiie 
number of interviews conducted in each cluster was smaU (about 6)'* and tiiat the interviews were 
not obtained from respondents Uving closer Uian three dweUings apart, the effect on the cluster 
sampling on drawing conclusions, would appear to be negligible". 
The ANPA samples are assumed to be representative of the populations from which they were 
drawn. Other researchers have described the samples as self-weighting (Kahan & Aitidn, 1968:9; 
Aitkin, 1982b:356; Bean, 1984:83). For the 1967 sample, the distributions of state of residence and 
gender groups between the sample and the electorate at the time were very close. For the 1969 
sample, the one-way frequencies of vote at tiie 1969 election in tiie sample and the frequencies of vote 
observed at the 1969 election are very similar (Aitkin, 1982b:357-360). A question mark hangs over 
the representativeness of the 1979 sample given tiie underestimates of tiie minor party vote and 
overestimates the major party vote (presented by AiUdn, 1982b:2). Of concern is that sample 
estimates for the major party vote are outside the 95% confidence Umits^ °. In addition, Uie sample 
appears to have overestimated Uie percentage of persons in non-manual occupations and the proportion 
of respondents who have completed secondary school '^. 
Weighting the 1979 sample which might have improved its representativeness, was not 
performed for the foUowing reasons. First, the sample itself had already been weighted by tiie way in 
which it was produced. Further weighting would have been unlikely to have improved tiie fit between 
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tiie sample and the population for variables other than the variables by which the weighting had been 
performed. Second, although on some variables the 1979 study appears to have over-represented some 
groups and under-represented others, Uttie differences were observed between tiie sample and the 
population, on reUgious denomination and ethnicity (Bean, 1984:271-272, 251). FinaUy, there is no 
appropriate population data from which weighting can be performed. The 1977 election was two years 
prior to data coUection and weighting on the respondents' recaU of their vote in 1977, is complicated 
by recaU error and changes in the composition of the electorate. The distributions of the levels of 
support for tiie parties at tiie 1980 election, is also inappropriate given that the measure in tiie 1979 
data is intended vote and there are strong reasons to suppose that intended vote in 1979 and vote in 
the 1980 federal election are not identical^. One possibiUty is to weight the 1979 sample by age at 
the 1981 census. However, the 1981 census was coUected approximately 18 monUis after tiie 1979 
survey and is from a sUghtiy different universe. FinaUy, previous investigations using this data set 
have not weighted the sample (AiUdn, 1982b; Bean, 1984; KeUey & McAUister, 1985; Graetz & 
McAUister, 1986; McAUister & Mughan, 1987b). 
In the 1984 NSSS residents of Tasmania are over-represented. The 1984 NSSS data includes a 
weight variable, (V644) constmcted to take account of over-sampling and tiie differential response 
rates between the states and the two samples. The weight variable was constmcted by comparing Uie 
distribution of urban and mral respondents by state (including the territories). However, Uiis weight 
variable was not employed since Tasmanian respondents make up less than 10% of the sample and 
there is empirical evidence that Tasmanians are not different from residents of oUier States (McAllister 
& KeUey, 1983c). Furthermore, the extensive analyses performed on this data by Graetz & McAUister 
(1988) and Bean & KeUey (1988), do not appear to have been weighted in relation to state of 
residence". The two later NSSS samples do not require weighting (KeUey, Bean & Evans, personal 
communication). 
The 1987 AES sample does not require weighting with regard to state (McAUister & Mughan, 
1987a:4). However, the sample contains a considerably higher proportion of respondents who 
indicated they voted Labor at the last election. However, a weight variable was not constmcted since 
this difference cannot be entirely attributed to a smaU bias in the selection of respondents, it could also 
be attributed to a 'bandwagon effect', or error in vote recaU. 
1.3 THE MEASURES 
In the rest of this appendix tiie measures employed in the analyses are discussed. 
There are a number of general principles guiding tiie constmction of tiiese measures. First, tiie 
constmction of measures is performed in order to, maximise comparabUity across Uie data sets. This 
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principle was foUowed in order to ensure that, any over time changes observed cannot be readily 
attributable to differences in measurement 
Second, where differences occurred in tiie number of possible responses to tiie same (or similar) 
question, the responses were coUapsed to make tiie constmcted measures as similar as possible. For 
example, income in the ANPA data sets was recorded by an eight category variables, whereas in tiie 
NSSS data sets income was recorded in raw doUars. Therefore, tiie constmcted variable of income 
from the NSSS smdies was re-coded into eight categories. A second example is tiie indicators of 
ideology, which were, in general more numerous and 'better' measured in the NSSS studies, than in 
the ANPA studies". These indicators in NSSS data had to be recoded to make tiiem more 
comparable. 
In the final table to this appendix (table A 1.4), the questions from which the measures were 
constmcted and a brief account the constmction, are presented. Measures Uiat are common across data 
sets can be easily identified. 
This section on measurement is organised in the foUowing manner. First, the measures of vote 
are discussed, foUowed by the measures of social stmctural and social background factors. The last 
section presents the measures of partisanship, ideology, issues and leaders. 
The frequencies of the measures are not presented. First the focus of this study is on electoral 
choice and electoral change, not changes in the proportion of respondents belonging to certain 
categories or their responses to questions, altiiough such changes are aUuded to where relevant. 
Second, the addition of frequency tables of every measure would make tiiis appendix extraordinarily 
long. Third, the frequencies, correcting for missing values, are presented in chapters 4 to 7 in tables 
reporting the results of the statistical analyses. Only in tiiose instances where the frequencies are 
particularly relevant are they mentioned. 
1.3.1 Vote 
The measures of vote constmcted relate to vote at Federal House of Representatives elections. 
There are generaUy two altemative ways of measuring vote, vote at the last election or intended vote. 
Both approaches have costs and benefits. Vote at last election is subject to recaU error, especiaUy 
when tiie last election was held some time prior to data coUection (Himmelweit, Jaeger & Stockdale, 
1978). BoUi Uie 1967 and 1979 ANPA surveys were carried out a considerable time after tiie most 
recent election. In addition, a bandwagon effect may be operating, increasing the reported vote for the 
wirming party. Furthermore, tiie short term factors extant during the time of data coUection may not 
be the same as those at the last election. Leaders may change, or become more less or popular and 
tiie issue agenda is Ukely to differ. For example, Mr Calwell was leader of tiie Labor party at tiie 
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1966 Federal election, but Mr Whitiam was tiie opposition leader at Uie time of data collection of tiie 
1967 ANPA survey. Similarly, Mr Whitiam was tiie leader at tiie 1977 federal election, but Mr 
Hayden was tiie leader at tiie time tiie 1979 ANPA data was coUected. 
Measures of intended vote suffer from different problems. The measure could be argued as 
hypotiietical and tiie absence of an election campaign may dampen tiie impact of short term forces and 
overestimate the influence of partisanship. However, tiiere is evidence tiiat is contrary, partisanship 
and vote were found to be more highly correlated, closer to elections (BorreUi, Lockerbie & Niemi, 
1987). 
Since, the effect of contemporary issues and leaders on vote is tiie focus of tiie study, measures 
of intended vote were constmcted, whenever possible. Ui tiie case of the 1969 ANPA and 1987 
studies, questions on intended vote were not asked, so measures of vote were constmcted from 
questions on vote at the most recent election. Since data coUection for tiiese two studies began 
immediately after the most recent election, it is unlUcely tiiat Uiese measures are very different from 
measures of intended vote since not enough time had elapsed for voters to reassess tiieir choice. 
Measures of both primary vote and where possible, two party preferred vote were constmcted. For 
chapter 6, measures of 'Labor vote' and 'major party vote' were constmcted. These measures are 
based on the primary vote measures, constmcted from eitiier questions on intended vote or vote at the 
last election. The Labor vote measure is dichotomous distinguishing between Labor and non-Labor 
voters. The major party vote measure is also a dichotomous measure distinguishing between Labor 
and coalition voters. Minor party voters are excluded from the analysis of major party vote. 
From tiie 1967, 1979, 1984, 1986 and 1988 data sets, 3 category measure of vote was 
constmcted witii the foUowing three categories, (i) intended vote for the Coalition parties, (ii) intended 
vote for minor parties and (iU) intended vote for the Labor party. From tiie 1969 and 1987 data, the 3 
category measures were based on the respondent's vote at the 1969 and 1987 elections, respjectively. 
In chapter 7, a three level ordinal measure was constmcted with scores of 0, 1 and 0.5 assigned 
to coalition. Labor and minor party voters respectively. 
The grouping of Liberal and National party voters is common practice in the study of Australian 
poUtics (McAUister & KeUey, 1983a; Bean & KeUey, 1988; McAUister & Ascui, 1988). The two 
parties have been in coalition (except for a brief period in 1987) since 1949 (McAUister, 1988a; Bean 
& Mughan, 1988:200). 
The respondents intended second preference was asked in the 1967 and 1979 ANPA survey, but 
not in the 1984, 1986, or the 1988 NSSS surveys. In tiie 1969 ANPA survey, respondents were asked 
to which party they gave their second preference at the 1969 election. A similar question was not 
included in the 1987 AES survey. The measures of two party preferred vote were constmcted by 
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grouping, in an appropriate manner, respondents who intended to vote (or had voted) for minor parties 
and who indicated a second preference for Uie Labor party or the coalition parties wiUi respondents 
whose first preference was the coaUtion parties or the Labor party. 
The measure of two party preferred vote constmcted is not a precise measure of two party 
preferred vote. This is because the two party preferred vote is based on which of the major parties, 
the coalition or the Labor party, voters gave a higher preference. In contrast, these measures are based 
on first and second preference only, so a measure of two party preferred vote could not be constmcted 
from respondents whose first and second choices were minor parties. 
1.3.2 Measures of Social Stmctural Factors 
Measures relating to the concepts associated wiUi the social factor constmct are presented in tiiis 
section. These measures relate to occupational class, religion, region (both area of residence and state 
of residence), ethnicity, woridng class identification, income, tiade union membership, self-
employment and employment sector, religiosity, age, gender, education, class background and partisan 
background. 
1.3.2.1 Occupational Qass 
In these investigations, social class is understood as occupational class and measured by five 
occupational groups. The five occupational groups distinguished are, managers, upper professionals, 
lower professionals, other non-manual workers and manual workers. This measure also included a 
sixth category comprising respondents whose occupational class could not be gauged. 
The manager group comprises administrators, managers, farmers and farm managers. The upper 
professional group consists of occupations such as doctors, lawyers, dentists and scientists. The lower 
professional group includes teachers, nurses, other medical professional workers such as pharmacists 
and therapists, and technical woricers. The other non-manual group comprises mainly clerks, sales and 
personal service woricers. The manual group consists of manual workers, regardless of their skiU level 
or employment status. 
There are several reasons for tills five category measure of occupational class. First, other 
measures of class have made similar distinctions for managers, professionals and other non-manual 
occupations (Goldtiiorpe, 1980:39-42; Wright, 1979:40). Second, tiiere is empirical evidence tiiat tiie 
non-manual group is politicaUy heterogenous. Differences in the levels of party support between 
occupational groups have been observed (Aiticin, 1982b:140; Emy, 1980:197; Kemp, 1988:354). 
Differences in changes in Uie levels of party support over time, between several occupational groups 
have also been noted (Jones & McAUister, 1989; Kemp, 1978:68-78). Third, employing a measure of 
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occupational class with a larger number of categories, aUows changes in political orientation of 
specific groups to be observed. The broad manual/non-manual distinction may hide changes. Finally, 
these occupational groups are relatively unambiguous, increasing confidence in tiie assessment of 
changes over time. 
In some studies of electoral behaviour in Australia, differences in skiU level have been used to 
distinguish groups of manual workers (Aitidn, 1982b:140; Jones & McAUister, 1989; Kemp, 1978:154-
159). This procedure was not foUowed here since it is difficult to be consistent in tiie constmction of 
skiU categories between the data sets. Furthermore, trade qualifications have been incorporated in the 
constmction of the measure of education level. 
In investigations of Australian fX)litics, farmers have been grouped with non-manual workers 
(Aitidn, 1977:126; Aitidn & Kahan, 1974), aUocated to a separate category (KeUey & McAUister, 
1985; McAUister & Mughan, 1987b; Graetz & McAUister, 1988:285; Jones & McAUister, 1989) or 
excluded ftom the analyses (Alford, 1963:70). In these investigations farmers are grouped witii 
managers, since the majority of farmers are eitiier owners or managers. Furthermore, since the 
analyses presented in this study which include class also include the measure of mrality, a separate 
class category for farmers wUl cause statistical problems (multicoUinearity), since farmers live in mral 
areas. 
The occupations in each of the surveys were coded according to the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) coding systems available, at the time of data preparation. The occupations in the 
1967 and 1969 ANPA data sets were coded according to tiie ABS Qassification and Classified List of 
Occupations (CGLO) classification system summarised in note 18 of tiie code-book for tiie 1967 data 
(Aitidn, Kahan & Stokes, 1975:226-232). The occupations in tiie 1979 ANPA data were coded 
according to a revised CGLO schema, presented in note 20 of the 1979 code-book (Aiticin, 1982a: 175-
185). The 1979 classification system has only slight differences, witii tiie classification system used 
for tiie 1967 and 1979 ANPA data". 
During tiie early 1980s tiie schema used for tiie coding of occupations by tiie ABS was changed, 
from Uie CGLO classification system to tiie Austialian Standard Qassification of Occupations (ASCO) 
coding system. The ASCO schema differs considerably from the earlier CGLO classification system. 
The occupations in the 1984 NSSS survey were coded according to an early version of tiie ASCO 
schema, presented in note 4 of the 1984 code-book (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:316-330). A 
sUghtiy different version of the ASCO schema was used to code occupations in Uie 1987 AES study 
(McAUister & Mughan, 1987a:note 1, 1-6). hi tiie 1986 and 1988 studies occupations were coded 
according to tiie ASCO (first edition) classification system (Casties, 1986). 
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The five category measure of social class employed in these analyses is based on Uie occupation 
codes found in tiie data sets. Since, the ASCO based occupational schema differs substantially from 
the CGLO census occupational codes used in earUer surveys, each occupational code had to be 
carefuUy considered, before it was assigned to an occupational class grouping. Respondents whose 
occupations were not easily classified, or did not have an occupation were assigned to a separate 
category. 
Glass is understood in the traditional manner, class position determined by the occupation (or 
former occupation) of the head of Uie household (Goldtiiorpe, 1983). There are four justifications for 
this procedure. First, most of the investigations of class and poUtical behaviour have understood class 
in terms of tiie occupation of tiie head of the household (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:285; Aiticin, 
1982b: 126; Jones & McAUister, 1989). Second, the head of Uie household, has or has had, stronger 
attachments to the labour force and therefore tiie influence of occupational class on political orientation 
is more Ukely to be based on this attachment. Third, measures of the respondent's occupation, if the 
respondent was not the head of the household, are not available for the 1967 and 1969 ANPA data. 
FinaUy, there is Uttie empirical difference between the two measures in relation to vote (Heath, JoweU 
& Curtice, 1985:22-23)^ *. 
In tiie 1967 and 1969 ANPA surveys, the occupational code for the head of household already in 
the data sets, was employed to constmct the occupational class variable (Aitkin, Kahan & Stokes, 
1975:V292; 1969:V268). If tiie respondent was not deemed tiie head of tiie household, tiie 
respondent's occupation was not recorded. The interviewer identified tiie head of household on the 
criterion of who pays the rent or owns the house (Aitkin, Kahan & Stokes, 1975:372, 64). 
For the 1979 ANPA smdy and later smdies, tiie occupations of the respondents and their spouses 
were recorded (Aitkin, 1982a:V234, V257). For tiie measures of occupational class, from these 
smdies, to be comparable to the 1967 and 1969 surveys, the head of tiie household had to be 
identified. Single, divorced or widowed respondents were assigned to occupational class groups on the 
basis of tiieir present occupation, or if retired, tiieir former occupation. If they were not presentiy 
working, they were assigned to the residual 'class not classifiable' group. For married respondents, 
the male partner was deemed as head of the household and his occupation (or former occupation) was 
used in the constmction of the measure of occupational class. 
In the 1967 and 1969 ANPA surveys the question wording of the questions on occupation of tiie 
head of the household was such that previous occupations were recorded (Aitkin, Kahan & Stokes, 
1975 & 1976 :QP2, H2a, 02A). In Uie 1979 ANPA surveys, Uie questions on tiie respondents' and 
their spouses were only asked in the present tense. However, Uiese questions were asked of boUi 
retired and unemployed respondents and spouses. It is assumed Uiat in these cases, tiie occupation 
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recorded was tiie previous main job. In tiie NSSS and AES surveys, tiie former occupations of retired 
and unemployed respondents and (if applicable) Uieir spouses, were recorded. 
The class location of smdents was based on the occupation of tiie head of tiie household (in tiie 
1967 and 1979 ANPA data) and based on Uieir own occupation in later surveys". 
1.3.2.2 Qass Identification 
From these data sets a three category measure of class identification was constmcted. The first 
category included those respondents who identified witii eiUier the working or lower class. The 
second category consisted of respondents who identified with either Uie middle or upper classes. The 
third group comprised of respondents, who did not volunteer a class identification. 
The way in which questions on class identification were asked differed between the samples. In 
the 1967 survey respondents, were first asked if they thought classes existed in Australia, foUowed by 
separate open and closed questions asking which class they belonged to, depending on tiieir responses 
to the initial question. In the 1969 and 1979 ANPA surveys, respondents were not initially asked if 
they thought Uiat classes exist in Australia, but were aU asked both open and closed questions about 
tiieir class identification. 
In the 1984, 1986 and 1988 NSSS surveys a single fixed choice question was asked on class 
identification. From the NSSS data sets a three category measure of class identification was 
constmcted, the first category comprising respondents who identified with the working or lower 
classes, the second middle and upper class identifiers and the third category consisting of respondents 
who did responded "don't know" or refused to answer the questioa 
In the 1987 AES, respondents were offered the option 'None' to indicate tiiey did not think of 
themselves as belonging to a class. Approximately 7% of respondents opted for the 'none' response 
(McAUister & Mughan, 1987a:V167). A three category measure of class identification was also 
constmcted from the 1987 AES data. 
At the individual level, the consistency wiUi which electors hold their class identification is quite 
low. Of respondents the who placed themselves in the midcUe class in 1967, only 67% also placed 
themselves in the middle class in 1969. SimUariy, of working class identifiers in 1967, only 63% stiU 
had Uiat identification in 1969 (Aiticin, 1977:128). The changes in class identification were unrelated 
to changes in occupation, altiiough manual working class and non-manual middle class identifiers were 
more stable (Aitkin, 1977:128). However, slightiy different measures of class identification were used, 
and this may account for some of the inconsistency. 
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1.3.2.3 Income 
Data on income was coUected in aU surveys witii the exception of tiie 1987 AES survey. In 
these investigations, income of the head of tiie household is used in tiie constmction of tiie income 
measure. The income of the head of the household is employed because it is a more stable indicator 
of Uie households relative economic position, and thus less sensitive to movements, in and out of the 
work force by adult women. In addition, the 1967 and 1969 ANPA studies, did not specificaUy 
coUected data on the incomes of the respondents. Therefore, comparisons of the relationship of 
respondent's income witii political orientation in later data sets, cannot be compared with these data 
sets. 
The major difficulty wiUi comparing the effect of income on any endogenous variable over time, 
is that the metric of income changes. The interpretation of income differs between different time 
points, because the unit of measurement (say the doUar) has become relatively smaUer. Since these 
investigations are concemed with changes, in the effect of income on political orientations, adjustments 
must be made for changes in the metric. 
A second problem witii measuring income in these data sets, is tiiat there are differences in tiie 
way in which incomes were recorded in the data. In the ANPA smdies, income was recorded as a 
eight category variable, whereas in the NSSS data sets tiie measures are in raw doUars. Therefore, 
comparisons of the ANPA and NSSS measures would not be possible. 
The constmcted measure of income is categorical. The categories were assigned a score between 
1 and 100, and the scores standardised so that the income category, which included the mean income, 
received a score of 50. This procedure aUows comparisons of the relationships between, income and 
political orientations. 
In tiie 1967 and 1969 ANPA surveys, respondents were asked the income of tiie head of the 
household. If they could not give the income, they were shown a card and asked which group, the 
income of the head of the household falls into. The data sets do not include the raw incomes gathered 
in response to the first question, but aU the incomes have been grouped into one of Uie eight income 
categories (Aitidn, Kahan & Stokes. 1975:V324; 1976:V300). 
The 1979 ANPA survey asked respondents both Uieir own income and Uiat of tiieir spouse. In 
both data sets, the incomes of Uie respondent and the spouse, were recorded as an eight category 
variable (Aitidn, 1982a:V276, V278). The first step in tiie constmction of tiie measure of income from 
tiie 1979 ANPA data was to identify tiie head of tiie household and create a single measure of income 
based on the income of the head of the household. The procedure used to identify tiie head of the 
household was the same as that used in Uie constmction of the measure of occupational class from the 
1979 ANPA data. 
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The constmction of the final measure of income from the 1967, 1969 and 1979 ANPA data 
involved two steps. First, the incomes of tiie heads of households were re-coded to Uie doUar amount 
mid-point of the income group their incomes belonged to. A Pareto estimate was made for the 
incomes of cases, in the highest income group (MiUer, 1966:216)^ *. The variable was then scaled so 
that the income group which included tiie mean income, received a score of 50 and oUier cases scored 
a percentage of this value. 
The 1984 NSSS smdy asked a number of questions on income. Respondents were asked tiie 
income they received from a variety of sources - wages and salaries, business, social security, pensions 
and superannuation, investments and income from oUier sources such as scholarships, alimony or 
maintenance. The income from each source was asked for, in raw doUars. The respondent was then 
asked, what period of time this income related to. If tiie respondent could not give an amount in raw 
doUars or refused to answer the first question, the respondent was shown a card and asked to indicate 
the approximate amount Only a smaU proportion of Uie sample Gess than 10%) gave Uieir incomes in 
response to this question. 
In the 1984 NSSS smdy, data on tiie income of the respondent's spouse was also coUected. 
There is incomplete information on the spouse's income, because only 60% of spouses (of urban 
respondents) completed and remmed tiie self-completion questionnaire left at the time of the 
respondent's interview (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:221). For tiie mral sample, information on 
the income of the spouse, was coUected from questions on the self-completion questionnaire sent to 
rural respondents (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:222). The incomes from the variety of sources 
asked of respondents, was also asked of tiieir spouses. 
For both respondent and spouse, measures of total income were constmcted by tiie principal 
investigators (V199, V580). These measures of total income were the sum tiie incomes obtained from 
aU sources, adjusted for period of time the income was received (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:84-
85,231). The justification for using total income rather Uian income from wages and salaries is 
comparabiUty with previous smdies. The questions in the ANPA surveys, did not limit income to 
income from wages and salaries (Aitkin, Kahan & Strokes, 1975 & 1976:QMla-c; Aiticin, 
1982a:Q99a-c, QlOOa-c). 
The measures of total income for the respondent and spouse were re-coded into eight income 
groups. Most categories had ranges of $4,000, except the lowest and highest income groups. The 
lowest group comprised of incomes less than $5,000 dollars and the highest category comprised 
incomes over $29,000. This procedure attempts to take account of inflation since 1979. Most of tiie 
income categories in the 1979 ANPA smdy had ranges of $3000 and assuming 8% inflation over 5 
years, $3000 in 1979, becomes $4207 in 1984. Therefore, $4,000 was a convenient cut off point. 
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The next step in the constmction of the income measure from the 1984 NSSS data, was to 
identify the head of Uie household. The procedure employed was exactiy the same as for the 
constmction of the measure of occupational class. 
From these eight income groups, the final step in the constmction of the 1984 NSSS income 
measure was to map the incomes on to the 1 to 100 scale. This procedure was the same as that used 
for the ANPA smdies. Incomes were first converted to the raw doUar mid-point of the category tiiey 
belonged to. Gases in the highest income group were assigned tiie mean income of incomes in that 
group. They were then scaled so that the group into which mean income feU had a score of 50 and all 
other groups a score relative to 50. As in Uie ANPA data sets, this (mean) group was tiie fifth income 
category. 
The income measures from tiie 1986 NSSS 'Role of Govemment' and Uie 1988 NSSS 
'Inequality' surveys were constmcted in the same manner. Measure of the respondent's and family 
income were already on the data set, so the spouses income was obtained by subtracting respondent's 
income from famUy income (KeUey, Bean & Evans, 1986 & 1988:1EARN, IFAMING). The ranges of 
income categories were also adjusted for inflation, $5,000 for tiie 1986 data, $6,000 for the 1988 data. 
The lowest income grouped earned less tiian $5,000. 
1.3.2.4 Trade Union Membership 
In each survey a question on tiade union membership was asked. In most surveys the question 
simply asked if the respondent belongs to a trade union. The exception was the 1988 NSSS, where 
respondents were asked:'//ave you ever belonged to trade union'. 
From each data set a three category measure was constmcted distinguishing trade union members 
from non-members. Respondents who did not answer tiie question or whose membership status was 
unknown were assigned to a separate category. 
The 1984 NSSS measure of trade union membership has a high proportion of missing values, 
because first-wave urban respondents were not asked this question in their initial interview. 
Information on ttade union membership was sought through post-election postal questionnaires, sent to 
these respondents (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:220). Of tiie 1700 first wave respondents, 1137 
(67%) respondents remmed the postal questionnaire. The variable 'trade union membership' include 
an additional code (-1) for the 563 first wave urban respondents who did not return tiie questionnaire 
(KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:V552). This group was aUocated to a separate category. 
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1.3.2.5 Employment Stams 
A measure of employment stams could not be constiiicted from 1967 and 1969 ANPA data since 
questions on self-employment and work-force status were not asked. From the otiier surveys a four 
category measure of employment status was constmcted, 'self-employed', 'works for the government', 
'worics as an employee in private enterprise' and 'otiier'. The 'oUier' category comprise respondents 
who were not in the woric force at the time the data was coUected, or could not be classified into one 
of tiie three other groups. 
1.3.2.6 Age 
From each of the surveys, cohort measures of age were constmcted. In general, the same cohort 
groups were constmcted for each data set. This was not possible for the oldest cohorts in tiie earliest 
data sets and the youngest cohorts in tiie most recent data sets. Each cohort spans an eight year time 
span. The cohorts are presented in the foUowing table (table A 1.2). 
TABLE A1.2: DEFINITIONS OF THE AGE COHORTS 
Cohort Period of Birth 
Cohort 1 Bom in 1908 or earlier 
Cohort 2 Bom between 1909 and 1916 
Cohort 3 Bom between 1917 and 1925 
Cohort 4 Bom between 1926 and 1933 
Cohort 5 Bom between 1934 and 1941 
Cohort 6 Bom between 1942 and 1949 
Cohort 7 Bom between 1950 and 1957 
Cohort 8 Bom between 1958 and 1965 
Cohort 9 Bom after 1965 
Period entering 
electorate (approx.) 
-1930 
1930-1937 
1938-1946 
1947-1954 
1955-1962 
1963-1970 
1971-1975 
1976-1983 
1984-1987 
PoUtical Events 
World War I, Conscription, 1920s 
Depression Years 
World War E, Conservative disarray 
Labor decline, Menzies Government 
Menzies Government, ALP spUt 
Conservative Party decline, Vietnam, 
Whidam Labor Govemment 
Fraser CoaUtion Govemment 
Hawke Labor Government 
These cohort groups are based on those identified by Aitidn (1977:98) in a discussion on cohort 
differences in party identification. The cohort defined by Aitidn bom between 1934 and 1946, was 
split into two cohorts. Additional cohorts were constmcted for respondents who entered the electorate 
after 1967. 
1.3.2.7 Gender 
In aU data sets the gender split was close to 50% male and 50% female. Those respondents 
whose gender was unknown were excluded from the analyses. 
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1.3.2.8 Education 
From aU the data sets a three category measure of educational level achieved was constmcted. 
The three categories were, 'did not complete secondary school', 'completed secondary school' and 
'tertiary'. The second category comprised respondents who had completed form 6 or Grade 12, or had 
trade qualifications. The third category included respondents who had completed or attempted, a 
course at a University or a CoUege of Advanced Education (CAE). 
A categorical measure of education was constmcted since the relationship between education and 
political preference is likely to be non-linear. A non-linear relationship between education and party 
preference has been observed in Uie United States, Britain and several European countries (Inglehart, 
1977:206). Furthermore, a measure of years in education could not be constmcted from the ANPA 
data sets. Other researchers have employed simUar measures (Graetz & McAllister, 1988:285; Kemp, 
1988:347). 
1.3.2.9 Qass Background 
The measure of class background was based on whetiier the respondent's faUier had a manual or 
non-manual occupation. The ANPA surveys asked respondents tiieir fathers' occupations when they 
were growing up, while the NSSS and AES surveys specified 'at the age of 14'. 
The ANPA surveys also asked respondents if their famUy of origin, was middle or working 
class. The responses to these questions were not employed in the constmction of measures of class 
background, since the questions were not asked in later surveys. Furthermore, analysis of the 1967-69 
panel respondents indicates a high level of error in recaU. Over 27% of respondents who recaUed tiieir 
famUy's class as middle class in the 1967 survey had indicated their class background as working class 
in the 1969 survey '^. 
1.3.2.10 Religion 
In these investigations, reUgion is categorised into five groups, 'Anglicans', 'CathoUcs', 'Uniting 
Church groups', 'other religion' and 'no religion'. The rationale for using this measure is that it 
distinguishes the major reUgious groupings in AustraUa. Furtiiermore, simUar measures have been 
used in other investigations, of reUgion and poUtical preference (Aitidn, 1982b: 166-167; Graetz & 
McAUister, 1988:284; Jones & McAUister, 1989). 
The AngUcan and Catholic groups comprise respondents who indicated their religion as such. 
The 'Uniting Church' group includes Presbyterians, Metiiodists and Uniting Church adherents. The 
Presbyterian and tiie Metiiodist Churches combined to form tiie Uniting Church in 1978 (Graetz & 
McAUister, 1988:122). The no-religion group comprises respondents who indicated tiiey did not have 
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a religioa The 'otiier religion' group is a heterogenous mix of 'otiier Protestant', 'otiier christian' and 
'non-Christian' reUgious groups. These religious groups were combined, because tiie numbers in tiie 
smaUer religious groups are too smaU for tiiem to be investigated singly. This group is of littie 
substantive interest. 
One difficulty in making comparisons of Uie relationship of religion wiUi political orientation 
between 1979 with other time points is tiiat 1979 data shows tiiat 25% of the sample have no religion, 
whereas in the other samples the figure is closer to 10%. The main reason for tiiis difference are 
differences in question wording. 
In 1979: Do you think of yourself as having a reUgion? (What is that?). 
In 1967: And what is your ReUgion? 
In 1984 : What is Your ReUgious Denomination? Is it Protestant, CathoUc, some other religion, no religion or what? 
In 1987 : What is your ReUgious Denomination Now? 
The 1979 question tends to be a question on reUgious identification, whereas the question in 
other surveys simply asks respondents their religion or reUgious denomination, regardless of whetiier 
they think of themselves as religious. These differences in question wording, add caution to any 
conclusions regarding differences, in the relationship between reUgious denomination on political 
orientation, between 1979 and other years. 
1.3.2.11 ReUgiosity 
In these investigations 'Religiosity' is measured by church attendance. An ordinal measure of 
religiosity was constmcted ranging from a score of 1 for respondents, who 'never' went to church or 
indicated they had no religion, to a score of 8 for respondents who attended religious services more 
than once a week. 
In tiie 1967, 1969 and 1979 ANPA, respondents who indicated Uiey had a religion were asked: 
'How often do you go to Church?'. The responses were coded with the same coding scheme in each 
of the three ANPA surveys. In the 1969 data, a variable measuring reUgiosity had to be constmcted, 
since the variable on the data set (V235) only applied to non-panel respondents. Panel respondents 
were not asked this question in 1969 (Aitidn, Kahan & Stokes, 1976:8, note). The responses of panel 
respondents in 1967, were combined with the responses of non-panel respondents in 1969, to create 
the measure of reUgiosity. 
The measure from the 1979 ANPA data may not comparable witii tiie measures from the otiier 
data sets. The 1979 smdy did not ask Uiis question to 25% of tiie sample. These respondents had 
indicated they did not have a religion in response to the previous question, so were not asked the 
316 
question on church attendance. Differences in way tiie 1979 ANPA question on religion was worded, 
compared to tiie wording used in other surveys has already been noted. 
The NSSS surveys presented respondents wiUi a more extensive response set, tiian tiiat used in 
the ANPA smdies. In order to make the ordinal measure of religiosity, as comparable as possible to 
those constmcted from the ANPA data, the 'every day' responses were combined with the 'more than 
once a week' responses and the 'nearly every week' responses were grouped witii tiie '2 to 3 times a 
month' responses. 
1.3.2.12 Region (RuraVUrt)an) 
In the investigations, measures of both place of residence (non-mral/mral) and State of residence 
were constmcted. 
The constmcted measure of place of residence is a dichotomous variable distinguishing mral 
residents from oUier residents. The 1967, 1969 and 1979 ANPA studies recorded whetiier the 
respondent Uved in a metropolitan, urban or mral electorate. Metropolitan electorates are electorates in 
the greater metropoUtan areas of AustiaUan capital cities, such as Blaxland in Sydney, Kooyong in 
Melbourne, or Port Adelaide in Adelaide. Urban electorates are those electorates associated witii one 
or more country towns, that are not capital cities (Kahan & Aiticin, 1968:10). Examples (in 1967) are 
Hunter in the Newcastie area. Darling dominated by the town Broken HiU and the electorate of 
Bendigo in Victoria (Aitkin, Kahan & Stokes, 1975:V7). Rural electorates are those electorates that 
do not include a major urban area, such as Richmond in northem New South Wales and Gippsland in 
eastem Victoria (Aitkin, Kahan & Stokes, 1975, V7). 
In this smdy residents fi^om urban and metropolitan electorates were combined and distinguished 
from residents living in mral electorates. Therefore, a dichotomous non-mral/mral measure was 
constmcted. If a mral political sub-culture does exist in Australia, it would be more apparent if mral 
residents were distinguished from non-mral residents. Furthermore, combining residents from urban 
and metiopolitan electorates assists in comparisons over time, since mral electorates tend to be more 
demographicaUy stable. In a discussion of the 1967 sample, Kahan & Aitkin (1968:10) noted that 
urban and metropolitan divisions in New SouUi Wales did not differ in any important respect, apart 
from area. Only in Victoria, did the sampling procedure distinguish between metropoUtan and urban 
electorates. 
In the 1984 NSSS smdy the type of the electorate the respondent lived in was not recorded. 
However, the respondent was asked to indicate the size of the place, he or she lived in. The same 
question was asked in tiie 1986 NSSS 'Role of Government' and tiie 1988 NSSS 'Inequality' surveys. 
The 1987 AES included a similar question on size of place. Respondents who were living in places of 
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population greater tiian 100,000 persons were considered as living in a non-mral area, and tiiose living 
in places of less tiian 100,000 persons were considered to be Uving in a mral area. 
The 1987 AES includes information on botii tiie type of tiie electorate and tiie size of tiie place 
the respondent was living in, but only Uie measure based on the type of tiie electorate was employed 
in the investigations of chapter 4. This decision was adopted so tiiat the relationship between living in 
a mral electorate with poUtical orientation could be compared between Uie years 1967, 1979 and 1987. 
To investigate tiie comparability of tiie two measures - type of electorate (found in Uie ANPA 
studies) and size of place (found in the NSSS and AES surveys) - a cross-tabulation of the two 
measures was performed on tiie 1987 AES data (table A1.3). This cross tabulation of the two 
measures of type of electorate (non-mral/mral) and size of place (greater than 100,000 personsAess 
tiian 100,000 persons), indicate tiiat for Uiose Uving in places with more than 100,000 people, neariy 
aU reside in a non-mral electorate. However, those living in place with less tiian 100,000 electors, are 
only sUghtiy more Ukely to be living in a mral electorate. 
TABLE A1.3: CROSS-TABULATION OF TYPE OF ELECTORATE(NON-RURAL/RURAL) BY SIZE OF PLACE. 
SEE OF PLACE 
Greater dian 100,000 persons TOTALS 
100,000 persons or less 
ELECTORATE n % n % n % 
Non-Rural 
Rural 
748 
29 
96.4 
3.7 
478 
531 
47.7 
52.6 
1226 
560 
68.7 
31.4 
TOTALS 777 1009 1786 
Differences between the data sets regarding the measurement of place of residence, create 
difficulties in making conclusions about changes in the relationship between place of residence, and 
political orientations over time. The three ANPA data sets are comparable witii each otiier as are the 
NSSS data sets, but in comparing the ANPA and NSSS groups, caution should be exercised. 
1.3.2.13 State of Residence 
A variable measuring State of residence was constmcted from each data set These measures 
consisted of six state categories, one category for each state. In the three ANPA studies, no 
respondents from the Australian Capital Territory (A.C.T.) or the Nortiiem Territory (N.T) were 
included in the samples. In the latter surveys, residents from tiie two territories were included in Uie 
samples. Residents of the A.C.T. were grouped with New South Wales residents and residents of the 
N.T. were grouped witii Queensland residents. The numbers of respondents from botii territories were 
too smaU to be analysed separately. These groupings are justified on tiie basis of geographical 
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proximity. The A.C.T. is surrounded by New Soutii Wales. The urban areas closest to tiie most 
populous part of Uie Northem Tenitory, Darwin, are in Nortii Queensland. 
1.3.2.14 Etimicity 
With tiie exception of tiie 1979 ANPA survey, data on tiie respondents' place of birth and the 
birth places of the respondents' parents, were coUected. In the 1979 ANPA survey, data on the 
birthplace of the respondent was coUected, but not the birthplaces of the respondents' parents. These 
variables were employed to constmct measures of etimicity. A six category measure of etimicity was 
constmcted distinguishing between \he major etiinic groups of Australians, British, Nortii West 
Europeans, Southem Europeans (mainly Italy, Greece and Malta), and Eastem Europeans. A residual 
'other ethnicity' group was also constmcted. 
The categorisation of birthplaces into broad ethnic groups differs only slightiy, from tiiat 
employed by McAUister & KeUey (1982, 1983a). The major difference is separating Northem West 
Europeans from those bom in the British Isles. Combining immigrants from the British Isles with 
immigrants from Northem Europe may be misleading, since these two groups are politicaUy divergent 
(Bean, 1984:254, note 1). The other differences are, (i) immigrants from middle eastem countries 
were not categorised with southem Europeans, (ii) those bom in Yugoslavia are grouped witii Eastern 
Europeans rather than with Southem Europeans and (iii) immigrants from Austria are classified as 
nortiiem rather than eastem Europeans. 
In contrast to most other studies of etimicity and poUtical behaviour, the countties of birth of Uie 
respondents' parents were employed, in tiie constmction of tiie measure of etimicity. It is considered 
that voters bom in Austialia, but whose parents where bom overseas may be influenced by the 
poUtical orientations of the ethnic group Uiat their parents belong to. 
The logic of the constmction of the measure of ethnicity was as follows. If tiie respondents 
were bom outside AustraUa their birthplaces were used as the measure of etimicity. For respondents 
bom in AustraUa, but with one or both parents was bom overseas the classification of etimicity was 
more complex. (In the single case of tiie 1979 ANPA data, the birthplace of the respondent's parents 
could not be used). If both parents were bom in the same region (North West Europe, Soutiiem 
Europe, Eastem Europe or 'other' region), then the respondent was assigned to the category 
corresponding to the region. In cases where one parent was bom overseas and the other parent bom in 
Australia the respondent was assigned to the Australian bom category. In those cases where the 
respondent was bom in Australia and parents were bom in different regions, then the birthplace of tiie 
father (V268) was used for the measure of etimicity. The fatiier, ratiier tiian tiie moUier was chosen, 
since tiiere is a closer fit between fatiier's birtiiplace and ancestiy^ (Jones, 1990). 
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1.3.3 Partisan Background 
The measures of partisan background were constmcted from questions asking respondents, to 
recaU tiie political preferences of both Uieir parents when tiiey were about 16 years old. Empirical 
work suggests that, tiiere is littie bias in recaU (Jennings & Niemi, 1968). 
Partisan background was measured by a five point index ranging a score of -2 for respondents, 
who had two parents that supported the Labor party, to a score of 2 for respondents whose parents 
supported either the Liberal party or National (Country) parties. Respondents who could not recaU 
their partisan background, or had one parent supporting the Labor party and one parent supporting Uie 
coalition party were assigned a score of zero. For respondents who had only one parent with a 
preference for the Labor or coaUtion parties, a score of 1 was assigned for those witii a parent who 
preferred either of the coalition parties and a score of -1 for a single Labor parent. Equal weight was 
given to tiie political preferences of tiie faUier and motiier. 
Separate measures of father's and motiier's political orientation were not employed in this study 
since they are highly associated. Nearly two-thirds of electors come from famiUes whose parents had 
the same political preferences (McAUister, 1990). 
1.3.4 Partisanship 
Two general measures relating to tiie concept of partisanship were constmcted. These are tiie 
traditional measure of party identification and a constmcted measure of relative attitude to the parties. 
1.3.4.1 Party Identification 
The measure of party identification was constmcted from Uie responses to questions on the 
direction and stiength of party identification. 
From aU data sets (with Uie exception of the 1987 NSSS panel study), the foUowing seven 
category variable was constmcted: very stiong Labor (scored 1), fairly stiongly Labor (2), not very 
strongly Labor (3), no major party partisan preference (4), not very strongly Liberal or National 
(country) party (LNP) (5), fairly strongly LNP (6), very stiongly LNP (7). The score of zero 'no 
major party preference' was assigned to respondents who identified with a minor party, or indicated 
tiiey did not identify witii any party or did not respond to the questioa 
In Uie investigations of chapter 7 and in some supplementary analyses of continuous measures of 
party identification in chapter 6, the questions on stiength of identification were not employed in tiie 
constmction of a three level ordinal measure of party identification. 
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The third foUow up question, included only in tiie ANPA surveys, asking respondents who did 
indicate a party identification in response to tiie first question, tiieir partisan 'leaning' was employed to 
constmct a second measure of party identification. This measure grouped leaners witii not very strong 
identifiers. 
1.3.4.2 Relative Attimde to tiie Parties 
A measure of relative attimde to the parties was constiucted from each data set, wiUi Uie 
exception of tiie 1987 AES. 
In tiie ANPA data, tiie measure of relative attitude towards the parties, was constmcted from 
comments respondents volunteered on lUces and disUkes to the Liberal and Labor parties. In the 1984 
NSSS, the measure was based on the respondent's confidence in tiiese two parties. The 1987 AES 
survey did not include questions, from which a measure of relative attitude to the parties could be 
constmcted. 
Attitudes towards the National (Country) party were not included in this measure for tiie 
foUowing reasons. First, the National (Country) party is not relevant to most AustraUans, since it is 
limited to rural areas. Second, the evaluation of Uie Liberal party is of much greater importance, since 
it is the Liberal party in govemment that chooses the prime minister and most ministers. Third, 
empirical evidence from the ANPA data, show that respondents were more likely to make both 
positive and negative comments about tiie Liberal and Labor parties than about the Country party 
(Aitidn, 1982b:55-56, 292-295). The Country party in tiie 1967 ANPA attracted tiie lowest number of 
responses of aU four parties, possibly due to its ambiguous status as separate party (Aitkin, 1982b:54-
55). Attitudes towards the minor parties are also not included in these measures, since tiiey are also 
not as prominent as the Liberal and Labor parties. 
In the 1967, 1969 and 1979 ANPA data sets attitude towards the parties was constmcted from 
the number of positive and negative comments respondents mentioned regarding the Liberal and Labor 
parties. The proportion of respondents who made no comments had declined between 1967 and 1979. 
In 1967, 46% and 42% of the sample had nothing to say about the Liberal and Labor parties 
respectively. By 1979 tiiese figures had declined to 32% and 35%. 
For each of the two parties tiie number of positive and negative comments were counted giving 
equal weight to each comment The number of negative comments was subtracted from the number of 
position comments, creating two separate measures of evaluation of the Liberal and Labor parties. In 
the 1967 ANPA data, these measures had already been constmcted (AiUdn, Kahan & Stokes, 
1975:V38, V42). The final step in the constmction of tiie measure of relative attitude to tiie parties 
was to subtract the measure of attitude to the Labor party from tiie measure of evaluation of the 
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Liberal party. The constiiicted measure of relative evaluation to tiie parties ranged from -10 to 10. 
Similar measures of relative attittide to parties have been constmcted by MiUer & Miller (1976) and in 
Australia, by Bean (1984:414-415). 
From the 1984 NSSS, tiie measure was based on confidence to the parties. Respondents were 
asked how much confidence tiiey had in tiie Liberal and Labor parties (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 
1987:V368, V370). The six category response set ranged from 'a great deal' of confidence to 'none'. 
The measure was constmcted by subtiacting the two variables, after adjusting for missing values and 
the direction of the scores. The constmcted measure ranged from -5 (most Labor evaluation) to 5 
(most Liberal evaluation). 
In the two other NSSS data sets, the measure of relative attittide to the parties was constmcted 
from tiieir responses to the questions asking respondents to rate their 'feelings' towards the parties on 
a feeling thermometer (KeUey, Bean & Evans, 1986:7, Q14a-c,d; 1988:7, Q13c,d). Respondents were 
asked to a give a rating between 0 and 100 (50 for no feelings one way or tiie other). The number 50 
was subtracted from these scores and tiien tiie result was divided by 10 and rounded. This 
manipulauon was performed to give the measures tiie same range as the measures constmcted from tiie 
ANPA data sets. 
1.3.4.3 Previous Partisanship 
A surrogate measure of previous partisanship was largely based on vote preference at tiie 
previous electioa This pomt was discussed in detail in chapter 4. AU surveys coUected information 
on the respondent's (primary) vote, at the last federal election. As in tiie case of Uie measure of vote, 
three category measures of Labor, coalition and oUier voters, at the last election were constmcted. In 
chapter 7, this measure was included as an ordinal variable. 
The measure of vote at the last election for the 1984 NSSS sample requires clarification. Data 
coUection for the 1984 NSSS study was carried out before and after tiie 1984 Federal election. The 
first wave of data coUection had been completed by December 1984, but the second and third waves 
had not began. The 1984 election caused confusion among some respondents to the question on vote 
at tiie 1983 election (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:Q75a). Measures of vote at tiie w83 election 
(V548) and the 1984 election (V544) were constmcted by the investigators, from interviews with 
respondents before the 1984 election and from postal questionnaires sent to respondents interviewed 
after the 1984 election (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:114-115). These variables were used in the 
constmction of tiie measure of vote at tiie last election. Vote at tiie 1983 election was used in tiie 
constmction of the measure of vote at the previous election, for respondents interviewed before Uie 
1984 election and vote at the 1984 election was employed to constmct the measure, for respondents 
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interviewed after tiie 1984 election. An altemative procedure of restiicting tiie analyses to respondents 
interviewed before tiie December 1984 federal election, was considered unwise. The sample size 
would tiien be reduced to only some 1,700 cases and tiUs group consisting of only urban respondents, 
is not representative of tiie Austialian electorate^'. 
1.3.5 Measures of Ideology 
According to the model of vote intioduced in chapter 3 there are several aspects to ideology, 
general ideological position, economic liberaUsm/conservatism, non-economic liberalism/conservatism 
and post-materialism. It should be noted that measures of post-materialism are not available in the 
1967 and 1969 ANPA data sets. The absence of post-materialist indicators in tiiese two data sets is 
understandable since post-materiaUst concems were not prevalent in the 1960s. 
A number of indicators of ideology was employed in these analyses. A measure of general 
ideological aUgnment was constmcted from each data set. The indicators of economic 
liberaUsm/conservatism are: opinion on whether (big) business has too much power and preference for 
lower taxes or increased spending on social services. The indicators of non-economic 
liberaUsm/conservatism are attitudes to the death penalty, migration and migrants, censorship and 
royalty. From Uie data sets coUected after 1979, three measures were constmcted to indicate post-
materiaUsm. These are attimde to uranium mining, the legalisation of marijuana and attitude to 
govemment assistance for Aborigines. 
The investigation of the influence of ideology on electoral choice is hampered by two factors, 
the smaU number of ideological indicators and concems of their validity as measures of underlying 
ideological orientations. 
A larger number of indicators of ideology would be beneficial. A larger number would allow 
firm conclusions as to the appropriateness of tiie tiiree ideological dimensions and it would aUow 
greater confidence, on the relationships between ideology and other factors. However, these items are 
the only possible indicators of ideology that are largely common across tiie studies. Since, a major 
focus of this study is over time comparisons these items were chosen. The variety of ideological 
indicators in tiie 1984 NSSS smdy (analysed by KeUey. 1988 and Graetz & McAllister, 1988), is not 
found in the otiier smdies. In addition, many of these items have been previously understood as 
'attimdinal predispositions' (McAUister & Mughan, 1987b). 'Ideology' can be considered as 
analogous to 'attimdinal predispositions'. 
The second point on the possibility that the indicators of ideology may not include the most 
politicaUy relevant indicators carmot be readily dismissed. The validity of indicators of ideology is of 
concern, since it may be argued that they are not 'pure' indicators of Uie underiying ideological 
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dimensions. For example, preference for lower taxes or increased spending on social services is Ukely 
to be an indicator of non-economic ideology as weU as economic liberalism/conservatism. Similariy, 
attimde to govemment assistance to Aborigines may also tap both economic and non-economic 
ideological dimensions as weU as 'post-materiaUsm'. The impurity of tiie indicators undermines 
conclusions as to the influence of specific ideological dimensions on vote. 
In Austialia, other researchers have separated economic from non-economic attitudes. 
Researchers have tended to a priori distinguish economic from non-economic attitudes and analyse 
tiiese two groups separately (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:243; KeUey, 1988:58-70). In tiie analysis (by 
factor analysis) of 14 attitude scales developed from tiie NSSS data, Graetz & McAUister (1988:261) 
note that a economic dimension is apparent but the non-economic attitudes show a confused pattem. 
The measures of post-materialism are not the same measures that Inglehart employs. Attitudes 
to uranium mining, the legalisation of marijuana and assistance to Aborigines are used as indicators of 
post-materialism for the foUowing reasons. Attitude to uranium mining is understood as general 
indicator of attitude to mining and development in general, Uie environment, nuclear power, nuclear 
disarmament. aU within the orbit of post-materialism. SimUarly, attitude to legalisation of marijuana 
encompasses oUier attitudes pertaining to freedom of expression, altemative Ufestyles, tiie counter-
culmre and victimless crimes. Assistance to Aborigines includes notions of respect for non-westem 
cultures, and possibly criticism of the materialist westem lifestyle. In addition, there is doubt as to 
what Inglehart's measures are acmaUy measuring (Flanagan, 1982a & 1982b). Furthermore, the 
Inglehart measures of post-materialism have been found not to be associated with vote in Australia, 
comroUing for party identification (Graetz & McAUister, 1988:259; Gow, 1990). 
It is conceivable that at some time points, an incUcator of ideology may have be also understood 
as a political issue. For example, migration, uranium mining and assistant to Aborigines have at some 
time points been brought onto the poUtical agenda. In the case of migration and assistance to 
Aborigines the federal parties, have generaUy adopted a bi-partisan approach. No party has adopted an 
official poUcy of stopping migration, limiting migration from only specific regions or stopping aU 
assistance to Aborigines. In the case of uranium mining tiie coaUtion parties, have had a policy of 
being less restrictive to uranium mining than tiie Labor party. However, the Hawke Labor govemment 
has aUowed limited mining and export of uranium and only in the 1979 could the Labor party be 
considered as having a distinctive policy of opposing uranium mining. 
The indicators to the three ideological dimensions were constmcted in such a manner, so tiiat tiie 
measures from different data sets were as similar as possible. However, tiiis was not always possible, 
but in general similar measures could be constmcted. 
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1.3.6 Issues 
This section discusses tiie measures of issues constmcted from tiie data sets. Measures of 
retrospective and prospective evaluations are discussed in a separate section, following. The measures 
of the issues are only briefly discussed. Details on the constmctions of issue measures are presented 
in the final table of tiiis appendix (table A 1.4). 
A. The 1967 ANPA data 
The issues available for analysis from the 1967 ANPA survey were the issues of Australia's 
involvement in Viemam, the power of tiade unions, govemment aid to non-govemment schools, trade 
with communist China and links with the United States. In addition, the survey contained questions 
on what the respondents perceive as the important problems facing the federal govemment and which 
party is best able to tackle these problems. 
The major issue at the time the time the 1967 data was coUected was Austialia's involvement in 
the Viemam war. The Vietnam war is one of Uie clearest position issues in post-war Australian 
politics. The Liberal and Country parties had a poUcy of sending conscripts and regular troops to 
Viemam and the Labor party was in general, opposed to Australia being involved in the Viemam war 
(Aitidn, 1982b:223). 
The second issue included in these analyses was the issue of the power of tiade unions. 
Conservative poUticians have portrayed the ttade union movement as too powerful and in general 
detrimental to the country. The close links between Uie Labor party and Uie trade union movement 
necessarily put the Labor party on the opposite side of this issue. Trade union power has been 
considered an aspect of ideology in tiie analyses of KeUey (1988) and Graetz & McAUister (1988). Ui 
this study, tiade union power is considered to be an issue, since unions have always been prominent 
on the political agenda. Furtiiermore. Uie positive and negative effects of trade union power, higher 
wages, improved working conditions, and of course strikes, effect a large section of the public. In the 
analyses of KeUey (1988:61), items relating to trade unions loaded on a separate factor to items on 
economic orgarusation and confidence in business. Similarly. Graetz & McAUister (1988:220) found 
that attimdes to tiade unions loaded on a separate factor, to attitudes to business power. These results 
suggest that attimdes to trade unions are distinct from economic liberalism/conservatism. 
Furthermore, the item used in this study was also considered an issue in the investigations by 
McAUister (1990). 
The third issue included in Uiese analyses was federal aid to non-govemment schools. By tiie 
time the 1967 ANPA data was coUected, tiiis issue had been largely defused, since tiie Labor party had 
adopted a policy of supporting state aid to church schools (Aiticin, 1982b: 168-169). This measure is 
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included in these investigations because tiiere were stUl elements in tiie Labor party opposed to state 
aid and ftirthermore, Uie Labor party's position was slightiy different, since it proposed to aUocate state 
aid on a needs basis. 
The next issue included in the analysis of tiie 1967 ANPA data is tiie issue of Austialia trading 
witii the People's Republic of China. Altiiough respondents were not expected to be experts on 
intemational relations, Uie question on tiading wiUi China in tiiese investigations is expected to tap any 
feeUngs towards the issue of 'communism'. 
The last issue measure employed in the analyses of tiie 1967 ANPA sample, concemed 
Australia's relations wiUi the United States. Australia's relationship witii the United States was a 
prominent issue at the time. Prime Minister Holt retumed from visiting President Johnson witii tiie 
famous slogan 'AU tiie way with LBJ'. The Labor party was less enthusiastic, adopting a position of 
greater independence from tiie United States. The Viemam war was also associated witii anti-
American feelings in some sections of tiie community. 
In the 1967 ANPA survey respondents were asked an open question about what tiiey thought 
were the most important problems facing tiie govemment. Subsequentiy, respondents were asked 
which party would be most Ukely to do what they want, on tiiat problem. The responses to tiie first 
and second problems mentioned were recorded in Uie data set These questions were employed in Uie 
investigations since tiiey measure Uiose issues most salient to tiie respondent. Similar questions have 
also been used in investigations of issue saUence (Brody & Page, 1972; Young et al., 1987; Repass, 
1976; Rabinowitz. ProUiro & Jacoby, 1982). From these two questions, three category measures of 
most salient issue and second most salient issue were constmcted. 
B. The 1969 ANPA data 
From the 1969 data the foUowing measures were constmcted, attitudes to tiie Viemam war, ttade 
unions, state aid, threat from communist China, conscription, relations wiUi tiie United States and best 
party at handling perceived problems. A measure of attitude to conscription was also constmcted. 
There are only two difference between the measures of poUtical issues constmcted from tiie 1967 
and 1969 surveys. The question on China was on tiie perceived tiireat from China, whereas the 
question in Uie 1967 ANPA survey, concemed wheat sales to communist China. The question on 
conscription presented respondents witii a number of policy positions and asked them to choose which 
came closest to their own. 
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C. The 1979 ANPA data 
From the 1979 ANPA data measures of tiie foUowing issues were constiucted. Uie priority Uie 
federal govemment should give to inflation or unemployment, tiie power of ttade unions, relations 
with China and tiie United States, and the best party at handling perceived problems. Measures 
developed from questions also asked in previous surveys, were constmcted in tiie same manner. 
The only new variable constmcted was the priority the govemment should give to inflation or 
unemployment The Fraser government had a poUcy of 'putting inflation first', while the Labor 
govemment has traditionaUy given more emphasis to unemployment This question relates to tiie 
'issue domains' of the two major parties. 
D. The 1984 NSSS 
From the 1984 NSSS data measures of Uie foUowing issues were constmcted. tiie priority the 
federal govemment should give to inflation or unemployment, the power of tiade unions, best party on 
the issues of inflation, unemployment and economic growth, attitudes to the environment and attitude 
to privatisation. 
The question of the priority the Federal govemment gives to inflation and unemployment again 
relates respectively to the 'issue domains' of the coalition and Labor parties. The power of trade 
unions is also as an issue since the Labor govemment and the Austtalian CouncU of Trade Unions 
(ACTU) agreed to an 'accord' where wage rises could be negotiated witiiout industrial disputes. The 
coalition parties were opposed to tiie 'accord' and claims were made tiiat tiie union movement 
controUed the govemment. The issues of inflation, unemployment and economic growth had remained 
on the political agenda. The major environmental issue at the time was the FrankUn dam (Maddox, 
1988:21). However, a direct question on tiie Franklin Dam issue was not asked. Instead a general 
measure of attimde to environmental issues was constmcted from feeling thermometer responses 
towards 'environmentalists'. The issue of privatisation had been added to the political agenda by the 
new right The variable used to measure this issue was a question asking respondents tiieir preference 
for how industry and business should be organised, including the radical 'new right' option, of the 
govemment not owning public utUities. 
E. The 1986 'Role of Govemment' Data 
The measures of issues constmcted from the 1986 'Role of government' data are priority to 
inflation and unemployment the power of trade unions, privatisation, taxation, tiie environment, and 
the performance of the state govemment 
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The issue of taxation was gaining prominence since tiie coalition parties were in general 
proposing lower taxes. Lower taxes were part of tiie Liberal party's 1987 election campaign (Jaensch, 
1988:61). Two measures of privatisation were included, a measure similar to tiie one constmcted from 
tiie 1984 NSSS data, witii an additional response category. The second measure of privatisation was 
constmcted by combining measures of attitiides to the sale of, tiie govemment owned airlines and 
Telecom. A measure of attitude to the state govemment was included to test the proposition, that the 
performance of state govemments has political implications at the federal level. This measure was not 
available in previous smdies. The measure was constmcted from feeling tiiermometer scores to the 
state govemment rather than a direct question on the performance of tiie state govemment or its 
leader. 
In general, questions relating to the issues common to both 1984 and 1986 were asked in same 
manner as they were in the 1984 NSSS study. There is however, one notable exception. The 1986 
NSSS survey question on the priority the govemment should give to inflation or unemployment was 
similar to that asked in the 1984 NSSS survey, but the response set did not include tiie 'botii 
unemployment and inflation' option (KeUey. Bean & Evans. 1986:44. Q25). 
F. The 1987 AES Data 
The measures of issues constmcted from the 1987 AES data were priority to inflation or 
unemployment the power of tiade unions, the importance of tiie issues of inflation, unemployment, 
taxation and tiie environment and whetiier the Labor, Liberal or National parties were united or 
divided. 
The measures of whether the parties are imited or divided were included, since these evaluations 
have been understood as contributing to the re-election of the Labor govemment, at the 1987 election 
(McAUister & Ascui. 1988:222; Woodward & Costar. 1988). Environmental issues were also 
prominent during the 1987 election, since the Labor govemment had proposed that a sizeable area of 
the north Queensland rain forests be Usted as a world heritage area, curtaiUng commercial activities in 
tiie area (Wartiurst 1988:41). 
G. The 1988 NSSS 'Inequality' data 
The measures of political issues constmcted from tiie 1988 NSSS data were: tiade union power, 
taxation, the environment, disarmament, and privatisation. The measures common to tiie 1986 data 
were constmcted in the same manner. The measure of attimde to disarmament was constmcted from 
feeling thermometer responses to 'Peace activists'. A question on attitude to tiie state govemment was 
also included in this survey. However, a measure was not consti^cted from the 1988 NSSS, as the 
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New South Wales election was held during tiie period of data collection. Since New SouUi Wales is 
tiie most populous state, and it was not always clear when tiie questionnaire was filled out and a new 
govemment does not tend to be evaluated very negatively, it was decided not to include this measure 
in tiie analyses of the 1988 NSSS sample. 
1.3.7 Retrospective and Prospective Economic Evaluations 
Measures of retiospective and prospective, personal and sociotiopic economic evaluations were 
also included in these analyses. Although such evaluations are not usuaUy prominent on the political 
agenda, measures of these economic evaluations were included for a number of reasons. First, one of 
the possible explanations of the electoral success of the coaUtion parties during tiie post-war years, was 
tiiat the govemment delivered economic growth and both the experience of being better off 
(retrospective evaluations) and the expectation of being better off (prospective evaluations), may have 
had positive electoral consequences for the coalition parties. Second, during periods of economic 
stability, there are workers being laid off and businesses failing, which may have negative electoral 
consequences for the party in govemment. The famous 'hip pocket' nerve may stiU be operating 
during periods of economic stability. Third, conservative politicians wamed electors of the Labor 
party's lack of expertise in economic management and would claim Uiat Austtalia's economic 
prosperity was the result of responsible economic management by Uie coaUtion parties. Not until tiie 
Hawke government could Labor shake off its image as being less economically responsible Uian the 
coalition. Fourth, even in times of economic stabUity. the economy does appear to be surprisingly 
relevant Empirical investigations of tiie 1967 sample, indicate that of tiie 3.855 responses to Uie open 
question on what are the most important problems facing the federal govemment. 13% were mentions 
of the economy, compared to 7% concerning the Viemam war and Uie American aUiance (AiUdn, 
1977:227). FinaUy, the inclusion of retrospective and prospective economic evaluations in Uie analysis 
of Uie data sets coUected at earUer time points, aUows comparisons to be made with tiieir effects in tiie 
later data sets, when tiie state of the economy had become a more prominent issue. 
In tiie ANPA surveys, respondents were asked if tiiey tiiought tiiey their personal financial 
situation had changed over the past 3 or 4 years and whetiier it would change in tiie next couple of 
years. According to Lewis-Beck (1986) Uiese are questions on simple personal retrospective and 
prospective economic evaluations (simple personal economic evaluations). Measures of simple 
personal retrospective and prospective economic evaluations (SPREE and SPPEE) were thus 
constmcted. 
Respondents who tiiought tiie federal government effected how 'weU off tiiey were, were also 
asked, if the poUcies of the coalition government had changed Uieir financial situation, and if a Labor 
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govemment was elected, would it alter tiieir financial situation. Measures constmcted from these 
evaluations are denoted as 'partisan personal retrospective and prospective economic evaluations' 
(PPREE and PPPEE), since Uie questions have a partisan component. These questions were not asked 
in the 1969 survey so equivalent measures could not be constmcted from this data set. 
The 1984 NSSS survey included questions relating to partisan personal retrospective and 
prospective economic evaluations (PPREE and PPPEE). These questions differed only slightiy, from 
those asked in the 1967 and 1979 ANPA surveys. However, tiie response set was more extensive witii 
seven options. An additional prospective question was asked focusing on the continuance in office of 
the federal Labor govemment as weU as personal economic prospective under the altemative 
govemment (PPPEE and PPPE2). Therefore, two measures of partisan prospective evaluations were 
constmcted. 
The 1986 NSSS survey included similar questions on partisan personal rettospective and 
prospective evaluations as did the 1984 survey (PPREE and PPPEE). Three measures were 
constmcted. the first relating to partisan personal retrospective economic evaluations (PPREE), the 
second relating to personal prospects under the altemative govemment (PPPEE) and the Uiird relating 
to personal prospects witii the continuation of the Labor govemment (PPPE2). In addition, questions 
on sociotropic economic evaluations were included. These tiiree questions were asked using a similar 
format to those questions relating to personal economic evaluations. Three measures of partisan 
sociotropic economic evaluations were constmcted (PSREE, PSPEE and PSPE2). 
From the 1987 AES survey a number of measures on economic evaluations were constmcted. 
AU but one of these measures, related to retrospective rather than prospective evaluations. 
SpecificaUy, these are simple personal retrospective economic evaluations (SPREE), simple sociotropic 
retrospective economic evaluations (SSREE). mediated personal retiospective economic evaluations 
(MPREE), mediated sociotropic retrospective and mediated sociotropic prospective economic 
evaluations (MSREE and MSPEE). The 'mediated' evaluations differ from Uie partisan evaluations 
constmcted from other data sets, in Uiat Uie question does not specify a poUtical party but make a 
general reference to the policies of Uie federal govemment. 
The 1988 NSSS survey did not include any questions on eitiier personal or sociotropic 
retrospective and prospective economic evaluations. 
1.3.8 Candidates 
Measures relating to candidates were restricted to measures relating to tiie leaders of tiie two 
major political parties. The measures of the evaluations of Uie candidates are based on the numbers of 
positive and negative comments for each of the leaders or relative feeling towards the party leaders 
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measured on a feeling tiiermometer. These measures were chosen since tiiey elicit a summary 
judgement of based on aU relevant factors including party, issues and personal characteristics (Brody 
& Page, 1973). 
In tiie 1967. 1969 and 1979 ANPA surveys respondents were asked to comment on their likes 
and dislikes towards the leaders of tiie two major parties. SimUar measures have also been constmcted 
by a number of otiier researchers (Bean, 1984:406-408; KeUey & Mirer, 1974; Jackman, 1988). In the 
NSSS and the 1987 AES surveys a feeling thermometer was employed to assess the resfX)ndent's 
evaluations of the leaders^ .^ This metiiod has also been used by otiier researchers (Brody & Page, 
1973; Page & Jones, 1979). The separate measures of Uie evaluations two party leaders used in the 
constmction of the comparative measure, were retained so tiiat the unique effects of each party leader, 
can be assessed. These measures were employed in supplementary analyses in chapter 6 and in the 
confirmatory model of chapter 7. 
1.4 SUMMARY 
This appendix summarised tiie data and measures employed in this study. The data on which 
this study is based come from poUtical surveys conducted in Austtalia in 1967, 1969, 1979, 1984, 
1986, 1987 and 1988. AU data sets were obtained by scientific sampUng metiiods allowing 
conclusions to drawn as to the behaviour of the AustraUan electorate. For the analyses presented in 
this smdy. tiie data was not weighted. 
From these data sets a variety of measures of Uie specific concepts discussed in the previous 
chapter were constmcted. These measures aUow Uie investigation of the model of electoral choice on 
each data set and the general similarity of these measures between Uie data sets aUow over-time 
comparisons to be made. The foUowing table (table A 1.4) provides a summary of tiie measures 
constmcted from each data set. 
TABLE A1.4 : SUMMARY OF MEASURES AND QUESTIONS IN THE DATA SETS 
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Measure 
VOTE 
Intended vote 
Vote at election juat decided 
Two Party preferred vote 
SOCIAL STRUCTURAL AND BACKGROUND FACTORS 
Occupational claas 
Religion 
Region - non-niral/rural 
Region - sute of Residence 
Ethnicity 
Clisi identificatian 
Income 
Trade union membership 
Self-employment/sector 
Religiosity (Church aamdance) 
Age cohoita 
Gender 
Education 
Clasa background 
Partisan background (index 2 to -2) 
PARTISANSHIP 
Party identification (index -3 to 3) 
Party id.-construction includes Qeaning) question (-3 to 3) 
Relative athtude to parties 
Prior partisanship measured by vote at last election 
IDEOUXJY 
General ideological position 
Attitude to (big) btisiness 
Choice of ux cuu or spend more on social services 
Attitude to death penalty 
Attitude to migration 
Attimde to censonhip 
Atutude to royalty 
Attitude to uianium mining 
Attitude to legalisation of Marijuaiu 
Attitude to Govemment support for Aborigines 
ISSUES 
Attitude to Vietnam war 
Attitude to the power of trade unions 
Attitude to state aid to non-govemment schools 
Simple penoiul retrospective eccnomic evaliutions (SPREE) 
Simple penonal prospective economic evaluations (SPPEE) 
Partisan peoonal retrospective economic evaluations (PPREE) 
Partisan personal prospective economic evaluations (PPPEE) 
Attitude to communist China 
Attitude to relations with the United Sutes 
Best party at dealing with first most important problem 
Best patty at dealing with second most important problem 
Attitude to conscription 
Priority lowering Inflation or unemployment 
Partisan personal prospective econonuc evaluations-2 (PPPE2) 
Best Party on infiation, unemployment, economic growth 
Preference for type of economy (new right) 
Partisan sociocnopic leuuapective economic evaL (PSREE) 
Partisan sociotropic prospective economic evaL (PSPEE) 
Partisan sociotropic prospective economic evaL (PSPE2) 
Attitude to uxation (Index) 
Feelings towards environmentalisu 
Feelings towards the sUte Cjovemment 
Attitude to privatisation 
Simple sociotropic retrospective economic evaL (SSREE) 
Mediated peisonal retrospective economic evaL (MPREE) 
Mediated sociotropic retiospective eccnomic evaL (MSREE) 
Mediated sociotropic prospective econonuc eval. (MSPEE) 
Importance of issues 
LibenL Labor, National Parties divided 
Feelings towards peace activisu 
CANDIDATES 
Relative evaluation of liberal and Labor leaders 
1967 
ANPA 
1 
-
3 
4 
8 
13 
16 
17 
21 
26 
31 
-
40 
43 
48 
49 
53 
57 
60 
61 
62 
65 
66 
69 
74 
77 
80 
82 
86 
-
-
•' 
101 
102 
106 
107 
109 
110 
112 
115 
117 
118 
119 
-
-
-
-
-
-
.. 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
• . 
" 
-
144 
1%9 
ANPA 
-
2 
3 
4 
8 
13 
16 
17 
22 
26 
31 
-
40 
44 
48 
49 
53 
57 
60 
61 
62 
65 
66 
69 
74 
77 
80 
82 
-
-
-
-
101 
102 
106 
107 
109 
-
-
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
. 
' 
^ 
-
-
-
144 
1979 
ANPA 
1 
-
3 
5 
9 
13 
16 
18 
22 
27 
31 
36 
40 
45 
48 
49 
53 
57 
60 
61 
62 
65 
66 
69 
74 
77 
80 
82 
86 
90 
94 
98 
. 
102 
-
107 
109 
110 
112 
116 
117 
118 
119 
-
121 
-
-
-
• 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
144 
1984 
NSSS 
I 
-
-
i 
10 
14 
16 
19 
23 
28 
32 
37 
41 
46 
48 
50 
54 
57 
60 
-
63 
65 
67 
70 
75 
78 
-
83 
87 
91 
95 
98 
. 
102 
. 
-
-
Ill 
113 
-
-
-
-
-
121 
124 
126 
127 
-
-
-
133 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
145 
1986 
NSSS 
1 
. 
-
6 
11 
14 
16 
19 
24 
29 
33 
38 
41 
47 
48 
51 
55 
58 
60 
-
64 
65 
67 
71 
75 
78 
81 
84 
88 
92 
96 
99 
. 
103 
-
-
-
Ill 
114 
-
-
-
-
-
122 
125 
-
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
-
-
-
. 
. 
-
-
145 
1987 
AES 
2 
-
7 
12 
15 
16 
20 
25 
-
34 
39 
42 
47 
48 
52 
56 
59 
60 
. 
. 
65 
68 
72 
76 
79 
80 
85 
89 
93 
97 
100 
. 
104 
. 
loi 
-
-
-
-
. 
-
-
. 
123 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
197 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
^ 
146 
1988 
NSSS 
1 
. 
-
^ 
11 
14 
16 
19 
24 
30 
35 
38 
41 
47 
48 
51 
56 
58 
60 
. 
64 
65 
67 
73 
75 
78 
-
84 
88 
94 
96 
99 
^ 
105 
-
.. 
. 
-
. 
-
-
. 
-
-
-
-
128 
-
. 
132 
133 
. 
136 
-
. 
-
-
^ 
-
143 
145 
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Key 
. Not Available 
Note variables in code books/questionnaires idenafied in the following manner: 
[67- refers to (Aitkin, Kahan & Stokes, 1975) 
[69- refers to (Aitkin, Kahan & Stakes, 1976) 
[79- tefeo to (Aitkin, 1982a) 
[84- refers to (Kelley, Gushing & Headey, 1987) 
[86- refeo to (KeUey, Bean & Evans, 1986) 
[87- refen to (McAllister & Mughan, 1987a) 
[88- refeis to (Kelley, Bean & Evans, 1988) 
[aa-Vbh] *ft is the variable number when aa is 67,69,79.84 or 87. 
[aa-Pcc,Qdd\ cc is the page number and dd is the question number when <M is 86 or 88. 
#n refos to number of measure. e.g. L 
1. 3 category measures constructed from answeis to questions on intended vote (67,79,84,86,88) or vole at the last federal election (69.87). In ihe case of the 
three ANPA (67,69,79) dau seU measures of two party preferred vote were be constructed. In each case votes for ihe Labor party were scored 0. and votes for 
the Liberal or National (Country) parties were scored 1. All other cases were excluded from the analysis. 
I961:'lf a federal election were held tomorrow which party would you vote for','And which party would get your second preference?' [67-V167,V168] 
I919:'lf a federal Election were held tomorrow for the House of Representatives, which party would you vou for?','And which party would get your second 
preference?'.\19-mny\7&] 
\')%A;'If a federal Election were held tomorrow for the House of Representatives, which party wouldyou vou for? If loo young or ineligible lo vole also ask 
"who would you have voted for if you could have vo(«r7'.[84-V276] 
\9i6/ii:'If a federal election were held tomorrow for tht House of Representatives which party wouldyou vo(«/or?'[86-P10,Q10;88-Pll,Q22Bl 
2. 3 categcffy measures firom questions on vote at the election just finalised were constructed from the 1969 ANPA and 1987 dau. 
1969;'WAar about the recent federal election on October 25th, to which party did you give your first preference?','And lo which party did you give your second 
preference?'.l69-Vl2Syi26] 
l9il:'Which party did you vote for in the House of Representatives?' [87-Vl 1] 
3. 2 category measures fiom responses to questions on second preference in #1 for 1967 and 1979, #2 for 1969. Scoring:Labor primary vote or (minor pany 
primary vote + second preference Labor) (1), Liberal or National (Caintry) pany primary vote or (minor party primary vote + second preference LNP) (2). All 
others missing. 
4. 6 category measure constmcted from questions:'W/ui« is (was) your (his/her) occupation?' Coding:CCLO (Aitkin. Kahan & Siokes, 1975:226-232, note 24). 
Scoring:Manager» & Farmers (1), Upper Professionals (2), Other professionals (3), Other non-manual (4), Manual (5), Not classified (6) [67-V292,69-V268] 
5. 6 category measure constructed from questions:'H'/u2r is yourihis/her) occupation? In what of business or industry do (does) you (heJher) work'. Coding revised 
CCLO (Aitkin, 1982a:175-185, note 18). Scoring as for #4.[79-V234, V257] 
i. 6 category measure constructed from questicns:'H'/u2( kind of work do you do(does your husband or wife do)? What is your (his or her) occupation called'. 
Coding:early ASCO version (Kelley, Gushing & Headey, 1987:316-330, note 4). In 1986 and 1988 'What kind of work do (does) you (your husband or wife) do? 
What is or was your occupation called (What is his or her occupation called)'. Coding:ASCO (1st ed.) Castles (1986). Scoring as for #4. Scoring as for #4.[84-
V599, V583:86-P28,Q47a-bJ^3,Q77e-f;88-P27,Q52a-b;P53,Q97e-f] 
7. 6 category measure constructed from questicns:'WA<U kind of work do you do?' 'What kind of work does (or did) your husband or wife do?'. Coding:ASCO 
codes (McAllister & Mughan. 19873iote 1, 1-6). Scoring as for #4 .[87-V162, V185] 
8. 5 category measure from question:'A/i</ what is your religion'. Scoring:Anglicans (1), Catholics (2), Melhodisu, Presbyterians, Uniting Church (3), No religion 
(4), Other (5).[67-V283:69-V234] 
9. 5 category measure from question:'/)^ you think of yourself as having a religion? (What is that?)'. Scoring as for #8.[79-V220] 
10. S category measure from queiticm.'What is your religious denomination? Is it Protestant, Catholic, some other religion, no religion or what?'. Scoring as for 
#8.(84-V335] 
11. 5 category measure from question:'tOuir is your religious denomination?'. Scoring as for #%. [86-P2,Q4:88-P38,Q72] 
12. 5 category measure from question:'{V/iar is your religious denomination now?'. Scoring as for #8. [87-V191] 
13. RespondenU living in urban electorates (Type-3) separated from those living in electorates classified as metropolitan or urban (type=l or 2). These 
classifications are detailed in the code boc^ (Aitkin, Kahan & Stakes, 1975:3-4; Aitkin, 1982a:2-3).[67.69,79-V5] 
14. 2 categories:Urban; 100,000->500,000, Rural; faims-99.000 pereons (2).[84-V538:86-P15,Q28a,b:88-P15.Q31a,b) 
15. Fallowing electorate classified as rural (alphabetically by sute):Calaie, Cowper, Eden-Monaro, Farrer, Gilmore, Gwydir, Hume, Hunter, Lyne, New England, 
Page, Parkes, Richmond, Riverina-Dailing, Ballarat, Bendigo, Buike, Corangamite, Flinders, Gippsland, Indi, McEwen, McMillan, Mallee, Murray, Sireeton, 
Waimon, Capricomia, Dawson, Fairfax, Rsher, Groom, Herbert, Hinkler, Kennedy, Leichardt, Maianoa, Rankin, Wide bay. Barker, Grey, Mayo, Wakefield, 
Forrest, Kalgooriie, Moore, O'Connor, Bass, Braddon, Lyons, Northern Territory. Classification based on the work of Aiikin (1982a;2-3) for the 1979 dau 
Newman & Kopras (1987-88). Constructed from variable in 1987 dau. [87-V73, see p73] 
16. 6 categoriesJ^SW (+ACT) (1), Vic (2), Qld (+NT) (3), SA (4), WA (5), Tas (6). 
17. 6 category measure from questions on birthplaces of respondents and his (her) paicnls:'/Voiv a few details about where you lived Where were you parents 
living when you where bom?' and 'Where your parents brought up there <where R was bom> or were they bom somewhere else?' If one or neither of 
respondent's parenu were brougjit up where respondent was bom 'Where did they come from?'. Coding in 1969 code book (Aiikin, 1982a:V220). Scoring for 
respondent, his(her) father and mothenAustraUan bom + missing (1), England or Wales, Scotland, Ireland (British Isles - scored 2), Northem Europe (3), Southern 
Europe (4), Eastem Europe (5), other (including North America, Middle East, Oceania, Asia, Africa) (scored 6). Logic:If respondeni and parents Australian bom 
= Australian bom (1). If respondent bom in groups 2-6 = appropriate group (2-6). If Australian bom and one parent bom in Australia = Australian bom (1). If 
Australian bom and both parents bom outside Australia then group which included father's birthplace. If missing= Australian bom.[67-V266,V268,V269:69-
V220,V305(V268),V306(V269)(note V305 & V306 are constructed variables from for new respondents V268 and V269, and from the 1967 variables for panel 
respondems)] 
18. 6 category measure from question:'M?w a few details about where you lived. Where were you parents living when you where born?'. Coding;schema in 1979 
code book (Aitkin, 1982a:210, note 19). The five category measure of ethnicity was constructed in the following manner. Australian bom + missing (scored 1). 
Bom in British Isles:England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Eire (scored 2). Bom in Northem Europe:. Norway, Sweden, Fuiland, Denmark, West Geimany, 
the Netheriands. Austria, Switzerland, France, and Europe unspecified (scored 3). For Southem European:PortugaL Spain, Italy, Malu, Greece, Crete and Cyprus 
(Scored 4). For Eastem European£ast Geimany, Poland, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and Lithuania (Scored 
5). Other birthplaces were assigned to the other category (scored 6). Birthplaces of parenu was not included in survey so could not be used to construn ihe 
measures, so measure based on respondent's birthplace anly.[79-V210] 
19. 6 category measure from questionsJn 1984:7« which state or territory of Australia or overseas country were you bom? 'Where was your father (mother) 
born'. In \9i6:'Where was your father bom? How about your mother? And yourself? And where do/you live now?'. In \9ii:'Where were you bom ? And where 
did you live when you were 14 years old? And where now?' 'Where was your father bom? How about your mother?'. The five category measure of clhnicily was 
constructed in a similar manner to that in the 1979 dau. Australian bom + missing (scored 1). British Isles:England, Scotland and Wales, Northem Ireland, Eire, 
England, Scotland, Wales (scored 2). Northem Europe:Austiia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Geimany, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Northem Europe not elsewhere included (Scored 3). Southem Europe:Malu, Spain, Portugal, luly, Greece or South European not elsewhere included (Scored 4). 
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Eastern EuropeanAlbania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, ihe Ukraine, ihe U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia (scored 5). 
The "Other group' comprises of other countries (scored 6). Other birthplaces were assigned to the other category. Logic as in #17 .(84-V86,V87,V88:86-
P15,Q28a:88-P15,Q31J>16,Q33] 
20. 6 category measure from quanora.'Where were you bom? And where were your mother and father bom?'. Coding;in code book (McAllister & Mughan. 
1987a3iote 1, 64-65). The five category measures of ethnicity was constructed as far as possible in an identical manner to the construction from of other dau sets. 
Australian bom + missing (scored 1). British Isles:England, Scotland, Wales and Northem Ireland, Ireland (scored 2). Northem Europe:Germany, the .Netherlands, 
Austria, France and other Northern Europe (scored 3). Southem European:Italy, Greece, Malu, Portugal. Spain. Cyprus and other Southern Europe (scored 4). 
The Eastem EuropeanJ»cJand, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the U.S.S.R. (scored 5). Other birthplaces were assigned to ihe oiher category (scored 
6). Logic as in #17.(87-V172,V173,V174] 
21. 3 category measure from questions:'SOBW people say that there are social classes in this country. Others disagree. Do you think that there are or are not 
social classes in AustraUa?' If yes:'T'o which class would you belong?' If no lo fust question:'Her« are the names that some people use for social classes (show 
card). If you were to say which of those social classes you belong to, which would you choose?' The choices v/ere:'Upper','Middle','Working','Lower'. 
ScoringJower.woricing (1), Upper,middle (2), other lesponse (3).[67-V188,V190] 
22. 3 category measure from questions:'Fu'.rt of all, to what class wotdd you say you belonged?'. To all respondenu a second question was asked:'H«r« (card 
shown), are the names that some people use for social classes. If you had to say which of those social classes you belong to, which would you choose?'. 
Construction J*riority given to responses U> first (open) question. If not classified into lower.woridng (1), Upperjniddle (2), responses to second question 
employed. Final categories & scoring as in #21 .[69-V161,V162:79-V143,V144] 
23. 3 category measure from question:'//you were asked to use one of four names for your social class, which would you say you belong in? 
Would it be <READ OUT>, Lower class, working class, middle class or upper class?'. ScoringJower.working (1), Upperjniddle (2), olher response (3).[84-
V203] 
24. 3 category measure from question:'//you were asked to use of these four names for your social class, which one would you say you belong in?' 
RespoDset:'Lower Class'.'Working Class','Middle Class','Upper Class'. Scoring:lower,working (1), Upperjniddle (2), oiher response (3).[86-P35,Q56b:88-
P32,Q59a] 
25. 3 category measure from question:'7'o what social class would you say you belong?'. Kesponses.'Upper','Middle','Working' 'None'. Scoring:woricing (1), 
upper & middle (2), none, no response (3).[87-V167] 
2i. 6 category measure from questions:'Couii you tell me what the yearly income of the Head of the household is?' If Respondent could'nt think in terms of 
Annual Asnoants.'Well about how much do you (does he earn)?'. If the respondent did not know the income of the head of the household, the respondent was 
shown a card and asked the following question. 'Would you mind telling me which of these income groups the head of the household belongs to?'. The responses 
to these questions were summarised by a single variable with 8 income categories. This variable on the dau set was re-coded lo assign each income group the 
income of the mid-point of the lange. Far the highest income group the income was assigned by a Pareto estimate (Miller, 1966:215-216). The incomes were than 
scaled so that income group (5) received a value of 50. The frfth group was chosen since it contains the mean income. Missing values were assigned lo a separate 
category. [67-V324.69-V300] 
27. 6 category measure from questions :Respondent:'CouU you tell me what your yearly income is before any deductions such as tax or superannuation?' If 
respondent can't think in terms of annual amounu:'H'«{/ about how much a week do you earn • again, before any deductions such as tax or superarumalion?'. If 
respondent does not know his annual or weekly income a card is shown to respondents. 'Would you mind telling me which of these income groups you belong 
to?'. For spouse:'An<i how about your Wife/Husband ? Do you Happen to Know her/his yearly income before any deductions, such as tax or 
superannuation,^'.'V/eU about how much a week does she/he cam - again before any deductions, such as ux or superannuation?'.' Would you mind telling me 
which of these income groups she/he belongs to?'. The measure of income was constructed in same manner as for the 1967 and 1969 dau sets based an the 
income at the head of the household. Pareto estimate used for top category. Standardised so fifth category scored 50. The fifth group was chosen since it conuins 
the mean income. Missing values were assigned to a separate caiegoiy.[79-V276,V278] 
28. 6 category measure from questions:. 'Could you tell me what was your income in the last twelve months from all wage and salary jobs before the lax was 
deducted?'. 'Is that amount <Read Out>, per week, per 2 months, per month per year, period of weeks worked, 3 months, 6 months or 9 months'.<U 
refused/Don't Know, Show Card 14>. 'Well could you tell me the approximate amount/ Just say the letter on the card.' A similar series of questions were asked 
for the other sources of income, that is from:business, welfare, pensions and superannuation, dividends, interest or rent, and olher sources. Dau on the income of 
the respondent's spouse was also coUected. As in the case of constructing ihe measure of occupational class, there is incomplete information on the spouse's 
income, since 60 % of spouses (of urban respondenu) completed and returned the self-completion questionnaire left, at the time of the respondent's interview. In 
the case of rural respondenu, information on the spouse was coUected from questions on the self-completion questionnaire sent to mral respondents. Spouses were 
also asked the incomes they received from different sources. The dau contains ihe foUowing variables for the different sources of spouses income:wages, 
business, welfare, pensions and supeiaimuation, dividends, interest or rent, and other sources. For both the respondent and the spouse a measure of toul income 
were constructed by the researcheis (V199,V580) which was the sum of the componenu of income per annum (KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:84-85, pg. 231). 
These measures of total income was used in the investigatioos peifoimed in this study. The justification for using total income rather than income from wages and 
salaries is comparability with previous studies. The measures of total income far the respondent and spouse were re-coded into eight income groups with the 
foUowing income categoties:<5,00O,50Ol-9O0O,9O01-1300O,13001-1700O,17001-21000,21001-25000,25O01-29000,>29000. Missing values were assigned to a 
separate category. Excepting the lowest and highest income groups, the income categories encompass ranges of S4,000. The logic behind this decision was that 
most of the income categories in the 1979 ANPA study used ranges of $3000 and assuming 8% inflation over 5 years, J3000 in 1979 becomes $4207 in 1984. 
Therefore, $4,000 was a convenient cut off point The head of the household was identified and the incomes were re-coded to the value of the mid-point of the 
income range. The incomes of the highest income were scared so that received the average of the incomes in this group. AU incomes were standardised so that 
the 5th group (17001-21000) received a score of 50. The fifth group was chosen since it contains ihe mean incomc[84-V199,V580] 
29. 6 category measure. Respondenu were asked ihe income they and their spouses received from wages and salaries, business, social security, pensions and 
superannuation, investmenu and dividends and income from other sources such as scholarships, alimony or maintenance. The principle investigators had 
constructed two summary measures, family income (incomes of respondeni + spouse) and respondent's income. A measure of spouses' income was constmcted 
by subtracting respondent's income from spouse's income. The measures of total income for the respondent and spouse were re-coded into eight income groups 
with the foUowing income categories;<5,000,5001-10000,10001-15000,15001-20000,20001-25000,25001-30000,31001-35000,>35000. Missing values were 
assigned to a separate category. Excepting the lowest and highest income groups, the income categories encompass ranges of $5,000. The head of the household 
was identified and the incomes were re-coded to the value of the mid-point of the income range. The incomes of the highest income were scored so that received 
ihe average of the incomes in this group. AU incomes were standardised so that the 5ih group (21000-25000) received a score of 50. The fifth group was chosen 
since it contains the mean incame.[86-P34,Q44a-g] 
30. 6 category measure. Respondenu were asked the income they and their spouses as in #29. The measures of total income for the respondent and spouse were 
re-coded into eight income groups with the foUowing income caiegories:<5,000,5001-11000,11001-17000,17001-23000,23001-29000,29001-35000,35001-
41000,>41000. Missing values were assigned to a separate category. Excepting ihe lowest and highest income groups, ihe income categories encompass ranges of 
$6,000. The head of the household was identified and the incomes were re-coded to the value of the mid-point of the income range. The incomes of the highest 
income were scared so that received the average of ihe incomes in this group. AU incomes were standardised so ihat the 5ih group (23000-29000) received a 
score of 50. The fifth group was chosen since it contains the mean income. [88-P34,Q62a-ql 
31. 2 category measure from question:'Do you belong lo a trade union?'. Scoringinembcr (1), non-member (2).[67-V253,69-V200,79-V189] 
32. 3 category measure from question:'Oo you belong to a trade union?'. The measurement of trade union membership is compUcated by the question only being 
asked in (i) the post-election postal questionnaires sent to urban respondenu inuaviewed, in the first wave erf sampling, and (ii) the interviews conducted with the 
second and third waves of the urban sample and the rural sample (Kelley, Gushing & Headey, 1987:220). The variable includes an additional code of -1 for the 
(563) respondoiu who did not return the questionnaire. Therefore, a ihree category measure was constructed .members (1), non-members (2), non-
responsc+rrfused (3). [84-V552] 
33. 3 category measure fnjm questicm:'/5o you belong lo a trade union, yourself?'. 3 category measure.-members (1), non-members (2), missmg (3).[86-P12,Q25a] 
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34. 3 category measure from question:'i)o you belong to a trade union?'. 3 category measure construcied:members (1), non-members + skipped question (2), non-
response (3).[87-V165] 
35. 3 category measure from question:'//av« you ever belonged to a trade union?'. Responses:'No, never belonged!,'not now, but I used to','Yes, now belong'. 
Scoringaiow a member (1), used lo, never a member (2), missing (3).[86-P10,Q21a] 
34. 4 category measure from questions:'Do you work for yourself or somebody else?'. If somebody ebe:'/j your employer a Government or Govemment body?'. 
Scoring:Self-employed (1), govemment (2), Private enterprise (3), olher response (4).[79-V237,V238] 
37. Question:'/)o (did) you work for a private company, are (were) you self-employed or in partnership, do (did) you work for the government or what?'. 
Responses:'/"nvat* Company','Federal Government','State Government'. 'Local Government'. 'Family Farm Business','Self-employed','Partner'. 4 category 
measure:Self-employed (1). govemment (2), Private enterprise (3), olher response (4).[84-V158] 
38. 4 category measure from question:'/)o you work for a private company, or what?'. Respoi^ea:'Private Company or Business working for wages or 
salary' 'AustralianJCommonwealthlFederal Government','Stale Government'.'Local Government','Working without pay on a family Business or Farm','Self-
Employed, in partisanship-.conducting own business','other'. 4 category measure:Sclf-employed (1), govemment (2), Private enterprise (3), olher response (4).[86-
P28,Q47d;88-P27,Q52d] 
39. 4 category measure from question:'Z)o you work for a privaU company, or what?'. Responses:'Pnvai« Company or 
Business'.'Australian/Commonwealth/Federal Government','Slate Government','Local Government'.'Family Business or Farm'.'Self-Employed'. 4 category 
measure;Self-emfdoyed (1), govemment (2), Private enterprise (3), oiher response (4).[87-V163] 
40. 8 category measure from question:'//ow often do you go to Church?'-.Respot^sa:'Several times a week'.'Once a week'.'Several times a monitC.'Once a 
month','Several times a year'.'Once a year','Less than once a year'.'Never'. 8 point constructed ranging from 1 (never) to 8 (several times a week). Differences 
in 1979 dau noted in text.[67-V284. 69-V304,79-V221] 
41. 8 category measure from question:'How often do you attend reUgious services?' In addition lo the response codes used in the ANPA studies, responses 'every 
day' and 'nearly every week' were employed. In order to make these responses codes comparable to the ANPA dau, the responses 'Several times a week' and 
'Every day' were combined aa were the responses '2-3 times a month' and 'Nearly every week'. Scoring:8 point index constructed, 1 (never) - 8 (more than once 
a week).[84-V336:86-P2,Q3b;87-P38,Q71] 
42. 8 category measure from question:'Apart//-om weddings, funerals and baptisms, about how often do you attend religious services these days?'. Responses 
(similar to those in the ANPA surveys):'Wo« than once a week','Once a week'.'Several times a monlh'.'At least once a mo nth','Several times a year' .'at least 
once a year'.'Less than once a year' .'Never'. Scoring:8 point scale constmcted. 1 (never) - 8 (more than once a week). 
43. Cohorts (1967) constmcted [age range (cohort number)]:59- (1), 51-59 (2), 42-50 (3), 34-41 (4), 26-33 (5), -25 (6). 
44. Cohorts (1%9) constmcted [age range (cohort number)]:61- (1), 53-60 (2), 44-52 (3), 36-43 (4), 28-35 (5), -27 (6). 
45. Cohorts (1979) constmcted [age range (cohort number)):71- (1), 63-70 (2), 54-62 (3), 46-53 (4), 38^5 (5), 30-37 (6), 22-29 (7), 18-21 (8). 
44. Cohorts (1984) constmcted [age range (cohort number)l:76- (1), 68-75 (2), 59-67 (3), 51-58 (4), 43-50 (5), 35^2 (6), 27-34 (7), 18-26 (8). 
47. Cohorts (86/87/88) constructed [range of yean of birth (cohort number)]:before 1917(2),1917-25(3),1926-33(4),1934-41(5),1942-49(6),1950-57(7),1958-65(8), 
after 1965 (9). 
48. Scoring:Men (l),Women (2). 
49. 3 category measure from question:'Now about Education:Looking at this card (card shown), could you tell me what is the highest level of edtu:ation you have 
had?' Raponsa."Didn't go to Schoor.'Attended Primary School'.'Completed Primary School'.'Attended Secondary School'.'Completed Secondary 
School".'Attended Technical College'.'Attended University'.'Completed University'. Scoring:less than completed secondary + missing (1), completed secondary + 
attended technical coUege (2), attended/completed. Univeisity (3).[67-V251:69-V236:79-V208] 
50. 3 category measure from questions:'W/ia( is the highest grade or year of (primary or secondary) school you have completed?'. 'Are you now attending or 
enrolled in school or any other educational Institution?'. 'Have you obtained a trade qualification, a degree or diploma, or any olher qualification since leaving 
schooH. The third question was coded using the 1981 Population and Housing Australian Census codes for educational qualifications (Australian Bureau of 
Sutistics Informatian Paper, Catalogue Number 2149.0, cited by KeUey, Gushing & Headey, 1987:284). The qualifications and their respective codes are also 
presented in the 1984 NSSS code-book (Note 2, pg. 284-308). The 3 category measure of education was constructed in foUowing manner. First, aU respondents 
who had completed less than 12 years of education were categorised as 'not-completed secondary school' (scored 1). Second, those respondenu who had 
completed the highest level of secondary school (form 6, Grade 12) are categorised as completed secondary school (scored 2). The tertiary education category 
comprised of respondenu who were now attending a university or coUege of advanced education, or had received a higher degree (Codes 001-059), a graduate 
diploma (101-171), or bachelor's degree (201-276) or a diploma (301-373). Those respondenu who had received a trade cemficaie (Note 2, codes 401-578) were 
categorised with respondenu who had completed secondary school (scored 2).[84-V121,V125,V27] 
51. 3 category measure from questions:Fint two questions as in #50. Third question:'lVAal is your highest qualification?'. This question was also coded in the 
same manner as the 1984 question. The 3 category measure of education was constructed in the same manner as for the 1984 dau [86-P18 to 
P20,Q35a,e.Q37a:88-P20 to P22.Q41a,Q41g.Q45] 
52. 3 category measure from question:'WAd/ is the highest grade or year of (primary or secondary) school you have completed?'.'Have you obtained a trade 
qualification, a degree or a diploma or any other qualification since leaving school?'. 'What is your highest qualificalionT. Scoiing:less than Form 6 (1), form 6 
or trade certificate C). degrec,diploma (3).[87-V156,V160] 
53. 2 category measure from question:''WAur was your father's occupation was when you were growing upT. 'In what kind of business or industry did he work?'. 
Coding:same as head of household's/respondent's occupation. Manual worken were identified using the same logic as was used for the measurement of the 
respondenu's occupational class. Merging performed for 1969 dau. Scoring:manual occupation (1), not manual occupation (2).[67-V275.69-V228.79-V217] 
54. 2 category measure from question:'WA«ii you were 14 years old what kind of work did your father (sup father etc) do? (What was his occupation called. 
Manual workers identified by the same logic as respondent's occupational class. Scoring:Manual (1), not manual (2).[84-V587] 
55. 2 category measure from question:'lVA<ii you were 14 years old. what kind of work did your father do. what was his occupation?'. Coding:same as 
respondent's occupation. Manual wodteis identified by the same logic as respondent's occupational class. Scoring:Manual (1), not manual (2).[86-P15,Q30a:88-
P16,Q35a] 
54. 2 category measure from que8tion:'WA*n you were 14 years old. what kind of work did your father do? Describe in two words or more.'. Coding:same as 
respondent's occupation. Manual wodteis identified by the same logic as respondent's occupational class. Scoring:Manual (1), not manual (2).[87-V176] 
57. 5 category measure from questions:'/)<<< you Father have any particular priference for one of the Political Parties say when you were about 16 years 
old?'.'How about your Mother? Did she have any particular preference for one of the parties when you were young? (Which party was that?)'. Construction ;3 
category measure constructed for each parent, parent Labor (-1), parent coaUtion (1), other, none, don't know (0). The two variables were ihen summed so 
constructed variable ranged from -2 to 2. No weighting. Scoiing:bolh parenu Liberal or National (Country) pany (scored 2), net of one parent Liberal or National 
(Country), (1), both parenu Labor party (-2), net of one parent Labor (-1), oiher responses + missing, or one parent Labor, oiher coalition (0).[67-V144,V149:69-
VI 11,V112:79-V113,V114:84-V284,V285] 
58. 5 category measure from questions:'/)i<i you Father have any particular prtference for one of the Political Parlies say when you were about 16 years 
old?'.'And your Mother?'. Constmction and Scoring;as for #57 .[86-P17,Q33:88-P17,Q38] 
59. 5 category measure from questions:'Z)<</ you Father have any particular pr^erence for one of the Political Parties say when you were about 16 years 
old?'.'Haw about your Mother!'. Constmction and Scoring:as for #57 .[87-V179,V180] 
60. 7 category measure, from questions on direction and strength of pany identification. 
l%7/69-DirBction:'G««ra//y speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Liberal. Labor. Country party, or DLJ'.?' Strength:. 'Now thinking of federal parties, 
how strongly (name of party preferred) do you feel, very strongly, fairly strongly or «of very •J'^ on«'y'"(67-Vl 29 ,V134:69-V98,V101) 
1979-Direction:'C«n«ra//y speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Liberal, Labor. National Country party, or Australian Democrat?' Strength:. 'Now 
thinking of federal parties, how strongly (name of party preferred) do you feel, very strongly, fairly strongly or not very strongly?' [79-VlOl ,V104] 
1984-Direction:'G«(i«ra//y speaking, in federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as Liberal. Labor, National Country party, or Australian Democrat?' 
Strength:. 'How strongly (name of federal party preferred) do you feel, very strongly, fairiy strongly or not very strongly?' (84-V281,V282) 
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1986/88-Directian:'G««ra//y speaking, in federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as'. Responses:. 'Liberal' .'Labor'.' National (Country) 
party','Australian Democrat'.'other'. Strength:'//ow strongly do you feel about that'. Responses:'v«0' strongly','fairly strongly'.'not very strongly'.[%(>-
PI 1Q22A,Q22B:88-P12Q23A,23B] 
1987-Direction:'C«iMra//y speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Liberal. Labor, National or what?'. The response set presented to respondenu:. Liberal, 
Labor, NationaL Democnt, New Nationals (Joh party), other. Strength:. 'Would you call yourself a very strong, fairly strong or not very strong supporter of that 
party' Responses:'v«ry strong supporur'.'fairly strong supporur'.'not very strong supporter' [87-V29,V30] 
The seven category constmcted measurervery strong Labor (2), fairiy strongly Labor (3), not very strongly Labor (4). no major pany partisan preference (includes 
minor party partisanship) (1), not very strongly Liberal or National (country) pany (LNP) (5), fairly strongly LNP (6), very strongly LNP (7). For chapter 5, 
measure ranged from -3 (very strong Labor),through to 0 (no major party identification), to 3 (very strong coaUtion). For chapter 7, the above 1 to 7 scoring 
procedure was used. For chapter 8, 3 category measure employed: 1 (Labor identifiers), 0.5 (no major pany identifiers), 0 (coaUtion identifiers). 
61. 7 category measures constructed from the 1967,69,79 ANPA dau seU third question employed. Asked only if respondent had indicated no pany preference m 
response to the initial question in #60. Question :'W«//, in federal politics do you generally feel a little closer to one of the parties than the others?(Which parry is 
that?)'. Constmctiondf closer to Labor (Liberal or National/Country party) scored as not very strong Labor (LNP) ideniifier.[67-V140;69-V107:79-V109] 
62. 21 point index (No. of Ukes - No. of dislikes for the Liberal Party) - (No. of likes - No. of dislikes to the Labor Pany) from questions on Ukes and disUkes lo 
the parties. Range:-10 (most pro-Labor) to 10 (most pro-Liberal). The questions were of the form 'Is there anything in particular you (don't) like about the 
Uberal (Labor) Party? What is that? Anything £ii<.''.[67-V38,V42:69-V42,V43,V44,V45:79-V27,V28,V29,V30] 
63. 11 point index from question 'Using this card as a guide, how much confidence do you have in ... (g) The Liberal party (h) The Labor party'. Responses (on 
card) -.'Very great deal' (coded \),'greal deal' (2).'some' {'i).'only a little' (4), 'hardly arty' (5), 'none' (6). Construction: recode don't know, refused to some (3). 
Subtract both scores from 3. (Confidence in Liberal Pany) - (Confidence in Labor Pany). Range -5 (most pro-Labor) to 5 (most pro-Liberals) [84-V368,V370] 
64. 21 point index (Feeling thermometer score for the Liberal pany) - FeeUng Thermometer score for the Labor pany. Missing=50, 50 subtracted from score, 
subtraction performed. Divided by 10 and rounded [86-P7.Q14C,D;88-P7,Q13CJD] 
65. 3 category measures of prior partisanship measured by vote at the last election. Scorediabor (1), minor parties, don't know and missmg (2) and Liberal or 
National (Cotmtry) parties (3). In chapter 8 scored -1 (Labor), 1 (coaUtion), 0 (other, did'nt vote). From the foUowing questions: 
1967:Vote at 1966 election.:'Now think of the General Election in November last year, when the Liberals were led by Holt and Labor by Calwell. Which party 
did you voufor then?' 
1969:Vote at 1966 election.:'Now think of the general election in November 1966, Ihree years ago, when the Liberals were led by Mr Holt, and Labor by Mr 
Calwell. Which party did you voU for then?' Not asked of voters who first voted in 1966, but this infoimalion added lo variable 
1979:Vote at 1977 election:'Notv think of the General Election in December 1977, when the Liberals were led by Mr Fraser and Labor by Mr Whitiam. Which 
party did you vou for then?' 
1984:Vote at 1983 or 1984 Election. For those interviewed before the 1983 election (ID l-'i096):'Thinking about the last Federal Election, in March of I9S3. 
when the Liberals were led by Mr. Fraser and Labor by Mr Hawke. Which party did you voU for in the House of Representatives?' For those interviewed after 
the 1984 election (ID > 3096 + Rural respondenu):'Now Think of the Federal Election in December 1984, when the Liberals were led by Mr. Peacock and Labor 
by Mr Hawke. Which party did you voU for in the House of Representatives?' . 
1986:Vote at 1984 election: 'Please think of the federal election in December 1984, when the Liberals were led by Mr Peacock and Labor by Mr Hawke. Which 
party did you voU for in the House of Representatives?. And which in the Senate?' 
1987:Vote at 1984 election:'Now, thinking back to the election in 1984. when Labor was led by Mr Hawke and the Liberals by Mr Peacock which party did you 
voU for in the House of Representatives? And in the Senate?' [87-V15] 
1988:Vote at 1987 election:'PICOM think of the last federal election, in July 1987. when the Liberals were led by Mr Howard and Labor by Mr Hawke. Which 
party did you voU for in the House of Representatives?. And which in the SenaU?'.[Sl-W\Sl.Wl5i,W\59:69- VI 17:79-V117,V118,V119:84-V268(V548),V544:86-
Pll,Q21c:87-V15.88-Pll,Q22c] 
66. 3 category measure of left, centre and right constmcted from responses to two questions :'/)o you think of yourself as being to the left, the centre or the right 
in politics or don't you think of yourself in that way?'. If yes 'Where would you say you are?'. Response (scoring):'C</Ur«','no« ideological',"don'I know" 
(\).'Uft' {2).'right' (3).[67-V120,V121:69-V93,V94:79:V9iV93] 
67. 3 category measure, from question 'In political maturs. people ofun talk about ihe left and the right. Would you say you are lo the left, the centre or to the 
right?'. Responses:'j(rong(y left'.'somewhat left'.'centre'.'somewhat right'. Scoring:Centre, dcn't know, missing, somewhat left or right (1), strongly left (2), 
strongly right (3).[84-V426:86-Pll,Q23:88-P9,Q51 
68. 3 category measure, from ten point ideological self-placement scale Question:"//! political maturs, people generally talk about the 'left" and ihe 'right". 
Generally speaking, where would you place your views on the scaleV. Respondenu were presented with a ten point scale (1 Left,10 Right). Scoting:l-3 left (2), 
4-6 centre (1), 7-10 right (3).[87-V32] 
69. 3 category measure, constructed from the quesiion:'Z>o you think big business in this country has too much power or not loo much power?'. Responscs:'roo 
much','Not too much'. & 'too little' • only in 1979). Scoring:Too much (1), don't know (2), does not have ux) much power (+ too Utile) (3).[67-V92:69-V77:79-
V67] 
70. 3 category measure constmcted from Liken item 'Big Business in this country has too much power'. Responses:'.rrrong/y 
agree'.'agree'.'neutral'.'disagree','strongly disagree'."don't know". Scoring:Strongly agree, agree (1), don't know (2), disagree, strongly disagree (3).[84-V63] 
71. 3 category measure constmcted from likert type question:'//ow o^ul business and industry, do they have too much power or loo little power?', 
Responses:'Far loo much power' .'Too much power'.'About the right amount of power" .'Too little power'.'Far too little power'. Scoring:neutral, missing (1), loo 
much power (2), too UtUe power (3).[86-P44,Q27] 
72. 3 category measure constmcted from question;'A»ui how about big business? Do you think they have too much power, or not enough power'. Responses:'foo 
mi4ch power".'iK>t too much power'.'it depends". Scoring:too much power (1), it depends, no response (2), does not have too much power (3).[87-V102) 
73. 3 category measure constmcted from feeling theimometer question on Big Business. Scoring 50, don't know (1), 1-49 'cold' (2), 51-100 'waim'(3).[88-
P7,Q13I] 
74. 3 category measure from question:'//' the govemment had the choice of reducing taxes or spending more on social services, which do you think it should 
take'. Respotiset:'Reduce Taxes' .'Spend on social services' ."don' l know". ScoringJJon't Know (1), Spend on social services (2), reduce uxes (3).[67-V107:69-
V82,79-V68) 
75. 3 category measure from question in #74 ('do' replaces 'take'). Responses:(6 categories) 'very strongly','fairly strongly'.'mildly favour' for both general 
positions - reduce taxes or increase spending on social services. Scoring:don't know (1), spend (2), reduce uxes (3).[84-V49:86-P9,Q19:88-P13,Q26] 
76. 3 category measure from same question #74. Responses:'/! depends'.'Strongly favour'.'mildty favour' for both general position - reducing taxes or spending 
more on social services. Scoringdt depends, no response (1), spend (2), reduce uxes (3).[87-V100] 
77. 3 category measure from question:'Do you want to see the death penalty kept or abolished?'. Respcnsa:'Kept'.'Abolished'."Don't Know". Scoring:don't 
know (1), keep ff), AboUsh (3).[67-V94,69-V71,79-V57] 
78. 3 category measure from Liken item. 'The death penalty for persons convicted of murder'. Respanses.'Strongly in favour'.'in 
favour".'undecided".'neither'.'opposed.'strongly opposed'. Scoring:Undecided, Don't Know (1), favour (2), oppose (3).[84-V51:86-P4,Q7F:88-P3,Q4F] 
79. 3 category measure from Liken item 'Bring back the death penalty'. Responses.'Strongly agree','agree','not sure','disagree'.'strongly disagree'. Scoring:Not 
sure. No response (1), agree to bring back (2), disagree (3).[87-V122] 
80. 6 category measure from quesnon.'There" s a good deal of talk about migration. Which of these statements comes closest to what you yourself feel should be 
done? If you don't have an opinion just say so.' In the 1987 AES, the phrase 'these days' was included after 'talk' and the second sentence was not presented to 
respondenu. Responses (Scoring):'Aru»i» should be allowed to enUr Australia as migrants just like people of European descent' (.\).'There should be a small 
quota of Asian migrants' (2). 'Asians should not be allowed lo enter Australia as migrants' 0).'We should only let people from Britain and Northem Europe to 
enUr Australia as migrants' {4),'We should not allow any more nugrants al the present time' (5)."Don't Know". {'No response' in 1987 AES) (6). In 1987 AES 
any response with 5 was coded as 5.[67-V99:69-V74:79-V64:87-V124] 
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81. 10 point index from addition of feeling thermometer scores to Italian, Greek, British and Vietnamese migrants. Constmciion :Missing scored 50. score 
subtracted from 50, Scares summed, divided by 40, rounded. Range -5 to 5. High score, less positive towards immigrant groups. [86-P7,Q13H4JX] 
82. 3 category measure from quaaoai'Do you think thai there should be some censorship of books and films, or do you think that people should he able to read 
and see what they like?". Responses:'.ronw censorship".'read and see what they like"."don't know". Scoring:what ihey Uke (1), don't know (2), some censorship 
(3).[67-V104:69-V79:79-V72] 
83. 3 category measure constmcted from Liken item 'There should be stricur controls on pomographic material'. Responses:'strongly 
agree'.'agree'.'neither",'disagree'.'strongly disagree'. Scaring:(Strongly) Disagree (1), neither, don't know (2), (strongly) agree (3).184-V343J 
84. 3 category measure constmcted from Liken item 'There should be slricUr controls on pomographic material - are you in favour'. Respot\ses:'strongly in 
favour",'in favour'.'neither in favour or against" .'opposed" .'strongly opposed". Scoring: (Strongly) in favour (1), neither, don't know (2), (strongly) opposed 
(3).[86-P4,Q7A:88-P3,Q4A] 
85. 3 category measure from same question in #82. Responses:'iom< censorship'.'read and see what they like'.'it depends". Scoring:what they like (1), it depends, 
no response (2), some censorship (3).[87-V132] 
86. 3 category measure constmcted from question: 'How important do you feel are the Queen and Royal family are to Australia, very important, fairly important, 
or not very important'!. Responses:'v«ry important'.'fairly important'.'not very important',"don't know". Scoring:not very important (1,, fairly important (2), or 
not very important (3), don't know (4).[67-V93:79-V56] 
87. 3 category measure from question:'//ow important do you feel are the Queen and Royal family are to Australia, very important, fairly important, not very 
important or not at all important'!. Responses:'very important','fairly important','not very important",'not at all important','don'I know". Scoring:not very 
important, not at aU important (1), fairly important (2), very important (3), don't know (4).[84-V296] 
88. 3 category measure from question:'//ow important do you feel are the Queen and Royal fanuly are lo Australia"!. Responses:'very important','fairly 
important'.'not very important'.'not at all important'."don't know". Scoring:not very important, not at aU important (1), fairly imponant (2), very imporunt (3), 
don't know (4).[86-P5,Q10A:88-P4,Q7Al 
89. 3 category measure from question:'//ow important are the Queen and Royal family are to Australia'!. Responses:'v«;y important' .'fairly important','not very 
important'. Scoringniot very important (1), fairiy important (2), very imponant (3), no response (4).[87-V117] 
90. 5 category measure from que8Cion:''(/ranxum mirung is an issue now in AustraUa. Which of these statements comes closet lo how you feel? If you don't have 
an opinion just say so.". Responses:(scoring) 'Australia should mine its uranium and sell it on the world market' (\)," Australia's uranium should be mined but its 
sale should be subject to strict safeguards' (2)," Australia's uranium should be mined but reserved for only use in Australia" (i)." Australia's uranium should slay 
in the ground' {4),"don't know' (5).[79-V62] 
91. 3 category measure constmcted from two Likert items. 'Australia should mine its uranium and sell it on the world market' and "Australia's uranium should 
stay in the grouncT. Scotii\g.'Strongly agree' or 'agree' to both suiemenu, or not scores of 2 or 3 (following) (,l).'strongly agree' or 'agree' to second statement 
(2).'strongty agree' or 'agree' to first sutement (3).[84-V69,V70] 
92. 6 category measure from question:'(/ronxum Mining is an issue now in Australia. Which one of these statements comes closet lo how you feel?'. 
Responses:(Scoring) 'Australia should mine ils uranium and sell it on the world market'(X)."Australia's uranium should be mined but its sale should be subject to 
strict safeguards' l^),'Australia's uranium should be mined but reserved only for use in Australia" (3),"Australia's uranium should slay in the ground" 
(/S,),"doesn'tmatU/' (S),'no response' (6).[87-V114) 
93. 3 category measure from two Liken items. 'Australia should mine its uraruum and sell it on the world market' and "Australia's uranium should slay in the 
ground'. %cann%:'strongly in favour'.'in favour' to both sUlemenu or not scores 2 or 3 (foUowing), (\).'strongly in favour' or 'in favour' of second sutement 
(2),'strongty in favour'.'in favour" of first sutement (3).(86-P15.Q15HJ;88-P3,Q10GJfl 
94. 4 category measure from <fia^on.'Drugs have become something of an issue in recent years. For example, some people say that the smoking of marihuana 
can lead lo the taking of addictive drugs such as heroin and should stay banned, while others say marihuana is harmless or al least no more harmful than, say. 
alcohol and should be legalised Which of these slaUments come closest lo what you feel about Marihuana? If you don't have an opinion just say so.' 
Responses:(Scoring),'The ban on nuuihuana should remain and aU people possessing it should be prosecuted' (1). 'Marihuana should be legalised and openly 
available for sale' (2),'/( should not be an offence for individuals lo grow and use their own marihuana, but commercial production and sale should be illegal' 
Ci),'don"t know' (4).[79-V69] 
95. 5 category measure from Liken item 'Legalising the use of marijuana'. Respanses:(Scaring),'Sirong/y agree legalisation' (\).'son'iewhat agree legalisation' 
{2),'somewhat disagree legalisation' Ci).'strongly disagree legalisation' (A),'neutral, don't know' (S).[84-VS2] 
96. S category measure fn»n Likert item 'Legalising the use of marijuana - are you in favour'. Responses:(Scoring),'.^ (rong/y agree legalisation' (2).'somewhat 
agree legalisation' (y),'somewhat disagree legalisation' (A).'strongly disagree legalisation' (5).'neutrai. don't know' (1).[86-P15,Q15H:88-P3,Q10) 
97. 5 category measure from question:'5/iou/ii the smoking of marijuana be made legal or should it remain illegal ?'. Resp<xises:(S<x>Ting,).'Strongly favour 
legalisation' (IX'favour legalisation' (2),'favour remaining illegal" (i).'strongly favour remaining illegal' (5),'i( depends, no response' (3).[87-V115] 
98. 5 category measure from question:'Do you think that Aborigines should get special benefits from the government, or do you think Aborigines (they in 1984) 
should be treated no differently from everyone else'. Raponsea:'special benefits'.'no differently','it depends','gel too many'. Scoring:special benefiu (1), no 
differently (2), get too many benefiu (3) it depends (4), don't know (5).[79-V70:84-V62] 
99. 3 category measure from Liken item 'We should spend more to improve conditions for Aborigines". Responses.'Strongly in favour'.'in 
favour".'neither'.'opposed,'strongly opposed. Scoring:Neither. don't know (1), strongly in favour, in favour (2) opposed, strongly opposed (3).[86-P15,Q15D:88-
P3,Q10F] 
100. 5 category measure from questian:'Z>o you think that. Aborigines should get special benefits from the government, or do you think they should be treated no 
differently from everyone else'. Responses:'special benefits','no differently','it depends'.'gel too many benefits'.'no differently'.'it depends'.'get too many'. 
Scoring:special benefiu (1), no differently (2), get too many benefiu, other response + get too many (3) it depends (4), don't know (5).[87-V125] 
101. 5 category measure from questian:''A> you know, there is a lot of discussion around Australia (today in 1969) about what we should be doing about Vietnam. 
Which of these statements comes closes! to what you yourself feel should be done? If you don't have any opinion about this, just say so." Responses:(Scoring) 
'We should have troops fighting in Vietnam, including conscripts' (1),'W« should have troops in Vietnam, but only volunteers' (2), "We shouldn't have any troops 
in Vietnam, and only send civilian experts" (i),'We should slay out of Vietnam altogether' (i)."don'l know" (5).[67-V85:69-V63] 
102. 3 category measure from question:'/}o you think that the trade unions in this country have too much power or not too much power?'. Responses (coding):. 
•Too Much' (2),'No( Too Much' (3),"don"I know' (+ 'it depends' in 1979) (1).[67-V92:69-V70:79-V701 
103. 3 category measure firom question:'//ow about the power trade unions have. Do you think that they have far too much, a bit loo much, about right, not 
enough or not nearly enough?'. Scoim%:'have far too nmch, a bit too much' (3),'ai>ou« right, not enough or not nearly enough' (\)."don't know" (2).[84-V378] 
104. 3 category measure from question:'i)o you think that trade unions in this country have too much power or too little power?'. Responses:'/ar loo much 
power",'too much power'.'about the right amount of power".'loo little power','far too little power'. Scoring:far loo much, loo much (3), about right, too Utile, far 
too UtUe (1), don't know (2).[86:P44,Q26:88-P10,Q20c] 
105. 4 category measure from question:'/)o you think that the trade unions in this country have loo much power or not loo much power?'. Responses (Scoring):. 
Too Much" (l).'i< depends" (2),'No( Too Much" (3),'no response' (4).[87-V1011 
106. 5 category measure from question:'/'eop/« have been talking a lot. too, about government aid lo Schools. Which of these statements comes closest to what 
you yourse^feel should be done?. If you don't have an opinion about this, just say so'. Responses:(scoting) 'The government should not give any financial help 
at all lo private or church schools' (,\).'the govemment should not give any financial help lo these schools until slate schools have been brought up to daU' (2) 
'the government should give help, but only to really needy church schools' (A),'the govemment should give as much help as possible lo both private and church 
schools' (5).'don"t know" (3).(67-V109:69-V83] 
107. 3 category measure from question:'^'* are also inUresud in how well off people are these days. Are you and your family betur off now than you were three 
or four years ago. are you worse off or have you stayed about the same?'. Responses:(scoring) 'no change','don'I know" (l),'wor« off (2).'better off (3).[67-
VI 22:69-V95:79-V94] 
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108. 3 category measure from question:'//ow does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago?'. Responses:'a lot 
betur off,'a UtiU betUr off,'about the same'.'a tittle worse off .'a lot worse off. Scoring:a lot better off, a Uule better off (3). about the same, no response (1) a 
UtUe worse off, a lot worse off (2).[87-V96) 
109. 3 category measure from question:'Now looking ahead over the next ihree or four years, do you think you will be belUr off. worse off or will you slay about 
the same?". Responses:(scoring) 'stay about the same'."don't know' (l),'won* off (.2).'betur off (3).[67-V124:69-V96:79-V96] 
110. 3 category measure from question:'TV«H, has Ihe Liberal govemment in Canberra made you betur off. worse off or has'nt it made much difference?". 
Question only asked of respondenu who answered yes to the qucstion:'/)o you think that what the federal govemment does makes any difference to how off you 
are?' Responses:(coding) 'not much difference".'don'I know', or not asked question (l),'wori* off (2).'betur off (3).[67-V127:V69-V98:V79-V99] 
111. 3 category measure from question:'//aj the Labor govemment in Canberra made you (personally- in 1986 NSSS) betur off. worse off or has'tM it made 
much differaice (so far - 1986 NSSS)?'. Responses:'muc/i better off .'somewhat better off .'a little better off .'no difference','a little worse off,'somewhat worse 
off .'much worse off,'don't know'. Scaiing:not much difference, don't know, (1) much.somewhat, or a UtUe worse off (2), much,somewhal or a Uttie belter off 
(3).[84-V287:86- P35,Q57a] 
112. 3 category measure from question:'//'a Lafcor govemment came in would you be belUr off, worse off or would'nt it made much difference?". Question only 
asked of respondenu who answered yes to the question:'Z)o you think that what the federal government does makes any difference lo how off you are?' 
Responses:(scoring) 'not much difference','don't know'.'not asked (l),'wor« off {2).'betur off (3).[67-V128:V69-V99:V79-V1001 
113. 3 category measure from question:'// a Uberal government came in would you he better off. worse off or would nt it made much difference?'. 
Responses:'much betUr off,'somewhat betUr off .'a little better off .'no difference'.'a Utile worse off .'somewhat worse off .'much worse off .'don't know". 
Scoringaiot much difference, don't know, (1) much, somewhat, or a Utile worse off (2), much,samewhat or a Utile belter off (3).[84-V289) 
114. 3 category measure from question:'Wou/</you be betur or worse off if a Liberal government came in?' Responses and coding as for #113.[86-P35,Q57C] 
115. 3 category measure from question:'/)o you think that Australia should or should not sell wheal to communist China!' Responses (Sconn^.):'Should 
(W'don't know' (2).'should not' (3).[67-V97] 
116. 3 category measure from question:'Looting into the future, do you feel (think- in 1979) that AustraUa will have a lot lo worry about in regard lo Communist 
(adjective communist dropped in 1979) China, or do you feel that China probably won't be much of a problem for us?'. Responses (Scoring) :''won'( be a 
problem' (l),'don't know' (2),'wilt have a lot to worry about' (3).[69-V90;79-V60] 
117. 3 category measure from question:'£>o you think Australia's Unks with the United Slates should be very close, fairly close or not very close?'. 
Respanses:(scaring) 'not very close' (\).'fairly close' (2).'very chse" O).'don't know' (4).[67-V103:69-V78:79-V63] 
118. 3 category measure constructed as foUows. Respondenu were asked the foUowing open question:'//! your opinion, what are the most important problems the 
federal govemment should do something about?". In reference lo first problem mentioned respondenu were asked 'Which party would be mast likely lo do what 
you want on (first problem mentioned) - the Liberals, Labor. National (Country) party, or Ihe DL.P. ?'. In 1979 - AustraUan Democrau i^laces DLP. 
Responses:'Liberals' .'Labor" .'Country party','D LJ'J Australian Democrats'.'olher'.'no difference'.'don't know'.'not applicable (no problems mentioned)'. 
Scoring:. Liberals, National Country party (2). Labor (3), DL.P./ AustraUan Democrau, No difference, don't know, not appUcable (1).[67-V82:69-V60:79-V47] 
119. As for #118 but in reference \a the second problem mentioned.[67-V83:69-V61:79-V48] 
120. 3 category measure from qiiestian:TA<re has been a lot of discussion in the last few years about conscription or national service. Which of these siaUments 
comes closest to what you yourself feel should be done? If you don't have an opiruon about this, just say so." Responses: (scoring) 'we should have conscription 
for miUtary service, and it should be for all young men. not just some' (l),'The present sysum of the ballot for conscription should be continued' {2),'We should 
have conscription, but those who are opposed to fighting should be allowed to do their national service in olher ways' (3), "We should'ru have any form of 
conscription at air (A)."don'l know" (5).[69-V85] 
121. 4 category measure from question:'//i/Zalio/i and unemployment are both major problems in AustraUa at present, which do you think the Federal govemment 
should concentrate on solving first ?' Responses:(scoring),'bol>i' (\).'unemployment' {2).'ir^tion' ('i),"don't know' (4).[79-V50:84-V50] 
122. 3 category measure from question:'^ the govemment had lo choose between keeping down inflation or keeping down unemployment, to which do you think it 
should give the highest priority?'. Responses:(scoiing).'Keeping down inflation'.'Keeping down unemployment' (2).[86-P44,Q24] 
123. 4 category measure from questions on the importance of inflauon and unemployment. Respondenu were asked to rate a number of issues as 'extremely 
important'.'quite important" at 'not very important' (3). Scoring:Inflation more impoitant (2), unemployment more imponant (2), rated equal importance. (1). no 
response to either question (4).[87-V19,V20] 
124. 3 category measure from question :'Loo/tuig ahead over the next few years, do you think that the Labor government in Canberra wiU make you betur off. 
worse off or won't it make much difference?'. Responses:'/nucA belUr off .'somewhat belUr off .'a Utile better off,'no difference'.'a Uule worse off .'somewhat 
worse off .'much worse off .'don't know". Scoring:not much difference, don't know, (1) much,somewhat, or a Utile woise off (2), much,somewhat or a Uule better 
off (3).[84-V288] 
125. 3 category measure from questian:'/4n^ looking ahead over the next few years, do you think that ihe Labor govemment in Canberra will make you betur off 
or worse off?". Respcnses:'/ni«;/i betur off .'somewhat betur off.'a Utile betur off','no difference".'a Utile worse off .'somewhat worse off .'much worse 
off .'don't know". Scoringniot much difference, don't know, (1) much,somewhat, or a Utile worse off (2), much,somewhat or a Utile better off (3).[86-P35,Q57b] 
124. Three separate 3 category measures from question:'(/.n'/tg this card as a guide, do you think Ihe Liberal or the Labor party would be better al handling..(a) 
inflation, (b) unemployment, (c) economic growth and the economy'. Responses:'Labor much belUr".'Labor somewhat betur'.'both about the same'.'Liberals 
somewhat better'.'Liberals much better'. ScoringJSo difference, don't know (1), liberals much, somewhat better (2), Labor much, somewhat better (3).[84-
V290,V291,V292] 
127. 3 category measure from questian:'Z?o you think Australia wotdd be betUr off with a socialist economy or with a private enterprise economy, or would some 
combination of Ihe two be better? Which type of government shown on this card would be best for AustraUa?'. Response set.:'Entirely socialist, with the 
government owning all businesses, big and smaW,'Mostly socialist, with the government all big businesses but not small businesses','Somewhat socialist, with the 
government awning about ha^of big business'.'Mixed with the government owrung a few big businesses, together wiih public UtiUties Uke electricity and 
Ulephones'.'Entirely privaU enterprise, with Ihe govemment not even owning UtiUties like electricity and ulephones'."don't know". Scoring:Mixed (1). Entirely, 
mostly, somewhat, socialist (2), entirely private enterprise (3).[84-V61] 
128. 3 category measure from same question as in #127. No card, maU survey, responses presented to respondent. An additional response was presented 'Mostly 
privaU enterprise, with the government owning only public utiUties'. Scoring:Mixed (1), Entirely, mostly, somewhat, socialist (2), Mostly, Entirely private 
enterprise (3).[86-P5,Qll:88-P4,Q8] 
129. 3 category measure from question:'//ai the Labor govemment in Canberra made AustraUa as a whole betur off. worse off or has'nt it made much difference 
so far?'. Responses:'much betur off .'somewhat betur off.'a Utile better off .'no difference'.'a Utile worse off .'somewhat worse off .'much worse off ."don't 
know". Scoting:not much difference, don't know, (1) much, somewhat, or a Utile worse off (2), much, somewhat or a Uule belter off (3).[86-P45,Q31] 
130. 3 category measure from question:'WAaf if a Liberal govemment came in - would AustraUa as a whole be better off?". Responses:as for #129. Scoring:not 
much difference, don't know, (1) much, somewhat, or a Uttie worse off (2), much, somewhat oi a Utile bettci off (3).[86-P45,Q33] 
131. 3 category measure from qaesitian:'And looking ahead over the next few years will the Labor government make AustraUa better off?'. Responses:as for #129. 
Scoringiiot much difference, don't know, (1) much, somewhat, or a Utile worse off (2), much, somewhat or a Uule better off (3).[86-P45,Q33) 
132. 8 point index frxjm Likert items 'There should be tax cuts for everybody'.'I would prefer a society with much lower taxes than we have in AustraUa today'. 
Responses.'Yesll".'Yes':??','No':NOI!". Responses combined - high score more supportive of ux cuu.[86-P9,Q18CJ3:88-P13,Q17A.Q17B] 
133. 3 category measure from feeling thermometer question on 'Environmentalists'. Scoring 50 or missing (1), 51-100 (2),0-49 (3).[86-P7,Q13G) 
134. 3 category measure from feeling thermometer question on 'The slate govemment, here in this state'. Responses adjusted for poUtical complexion of sute 
government. Scoring 50 or missing (1), 51-100 (2),0-49 (3). Question included in 1988 survey but not employed in investigations since the period of dau 
coUection included the 1988 NSW sute elecuan.[86-P7.Q14b] 
135. 3 category measure from questions:'7A*r€ has been talk about privatisation - about selUng government owned industries lo the private sector. Do you think 
the govemment should, (i) sell Telecom to privaU industry, (j) sell the airlines. Qanlas. and AustraUan airUnes (TAA)?'. Responses (score):'definitely should 
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(l),'probably should not" C2),'probably should not' {i),'definitely should not' (4). Scoring;Missing -2.5, Responses summed, scores 2-4.5 (1), score 5 (2), scores 
5.5-8 (3) [86-P45,Q30IJ] 
134. 3 category measure from same questions as in #135. Different responses with a neutral category was offered. Responses:5 
cstegories.'Yesll".'Yes','??".'No'.'Noir. Scoring:Missing =3, Responses summed, scores 2-5 (1), score 6 (2), scores 7-10 (3) [88-P8,Q17B,C] 
137. 4 category measure from question:'//ow do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months?'. Responses:'a lot 
betur".'a Uttie betur'.'about the same','a Uttie worse'.'a lot worse' 'no response'. Scoring:about ihe same (1), a Unle, a lot worse (2), a Uttie a lot better (3), no 
response (4).[87-V95] 
138. 4 category measure from question:'Co/npar«<i with a year ago, would you say that the government's policies have had a good effect, a bad effect, or that 
they realty have not made much difference with, regard to the general financial situation of your household?'. Respor\ses:'good effect'.'bad effect".'not much 
difference".'no response'. Scoting:not much diffaence (1), bad effect (2), good effect (3), no response (4).[87-V96] 
139. 4 category measure from same question in #138 with the foUowing quesiion added 'And how about the country's general economic situation?'. Responses 
and coding as in #138.(87-V971 
140. 4 category measure from question:'/)o you think that, a year from now, the government^ s policies will have improved the country's general economic 
situation, will have made it worse, or that they will not have made much difference one way or another?'. Responses:improved it, made it worse, not much 
difference, no response Responses (scoring):"no! much difference' (\),'made it worse' (2).'improved it' (3),'/io response' (4).[87-V99] 
141. Four separate 4 point indices on the importance of the issues of inflation, interest rates, taxation and the environment. Qaes\ion:'Here is a Ust of issues that 
were discussed during the election campaigrL When you were deciding about voting, how imponant was each of these issues lo you?. Inflation, Interest rates, 
taxation, the environment'. Responses (final scores):'Extremely unportant' {2),'quiu important' (\).'not very important' (0) 'no response' (missing). A proportion 
(9%) of respondenu answered in an unexpected manner by indicating the importance of only 3 (of Uie 10) issues (see note McMLister & Mughan, 1987a:9). 
Those issues that these respondenu did not an indicate an importance to, were categorised as 'not very important'. 'No response' declared as missing. Indices 
reversed, so higher scores denotes greater importancc.[87-V20,V21,V25,V271 
142. Three separate 4 category measures of opinion on if each of the three major parties are united or divided. Question:Fi/ia//y, in this section would you 
describe each of the parties as uniud or divided?" Responses:'Uniud'.'Not Sure'.' Divided. Responses:United, Not Sure, Divided, no response. Scoring:United 
(1), not sure (2), divided (3), no response (4). 
143. 3 category measure from feeling thermometer question on 'The Peace Movement'. Coded 50 or missing (1), 51-100 (2),0-49 (3).[88-P7,Q110] 
144. 21 point index (No. of likes - No. of disUkes for the Leader of the govemment) - (No. of Ukes - No. of dislikes to the leader of the Opposition) from 
questions on likes and dislikes to the pany leaders. The questions were of Uie (oim.'Is there anything in particular you (don't) like about Mr HoU 
(Gorton/WhillamJFraser/Hayden)? What is that? Anything Else?'. Constmction onissing^O, sum Ukes, sum dislikes, subtract disUkes from likes for each leader, 
subtract summary measure of opposition leader from govemment leader. For 1967 dau, measure had been largely constmcted. Range -10 to 10.[67-V68,V72:69-
V53,V54,V55,V56:79-V38,V39,V40,V41] 
145. 21 point index (Feeling thermometer score for the Leader of the govemment) - Feeling Theimometer score for leader of Uie opposition party. The 
thermometen ranged between 0 to 10. Canstmction:Missing=50, 50 subtracted flora score, subtraction performed. Divided by 10 and rounded. For the 1984 
measure, adjustment made for change in the leader of the opposition in September 1985, from Mr Peacock lo Mr Howard. Measure ranged from -10 to 10. [84-
V302,V303:86-P6,Q12A3:88-P6,QllAJn 
144. 21 point index (Feeling theimometer score for Uie Leader of the govemment) - (FeeUng Thermometer score for leader of the opposiuon party). The 
thermometeis ranged between 0 to 10. Conslmction:Missing=5, 5 subtracted from score, subtraction performed, rounded. The measure ranged from -10 to 10. [87-
V40,V41] 
1. Two further election studies were carried out at the time of the 1990 election. One was carried out by the organisers of the 
NSSS studies and the other by Ian McAllister and others (Gow et al., 1990). Due to time constraints data from these surveys 
was not used in the analyses presented in this thesis. 
2. The questions that are common to both data sets can be ascertained from the Variable Description List of the 1969 code-
book (Aitkin, Kahan & Siokes, 1976:1-8). 
3. The appropriate addresses are; 
Social Science Data Archives, Research School of the Social Sciences, Australian National University, G.P.O. Box 4, 
Canberra, A.C.T. 2601 
Department of Sociology, Research School of the Social Sciences, Australian National University, G.P.O. Box 4, Canberra, 
A.C.T. 2601 
In addition, the data sets have (or will soon be) deposited with American data archives: 
ICPSR, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. 
4. The characteristics that were collected in order to sort the electoral divisions were as follows:(a) the strength of the ALP 
vote at the 1961, 1963 and 1966 elections, (b) average per cent ALP vote, 1961-1966, (c) change in ALP vote between 1961-
1966, (d) per cent DLP vote at the 1966 election, (e) per country party vote at the 1966 election, (f) the pauems of 
candidature 1961-1966, (g) per cent Catholic at the 1961 census, (h) per cent foreign-bom at the 1961 census, (i) dominant 
rural industry (Wool, Wheal, Dairying, Sugar and tropical agriculture, wool and wheat, mining, mixed farming and orchards, 
grazing and dairying and no rural industry), (j) area of electorate in square miles and (k) and the size of the electoral 
population in the electorate in 1963 (Kahan & Aitkin, 1968:9-10). In addition electorates were distinguished according to the 
proportion of the population living in urban areas as being metropolitan, urban, urban/Viiral or rural electorates. Urban 
electorates were coimtry electorates dominated by one or more large towns (Kahan & Aitkin, 1968:10). Only a small amount 
of this information was used in the creation of the strata for each state (domain). 
5. In New South Wales, the first strata distinguished between metropolitan (including urban electorates and rural (including 
urban/rural) electorates. In the urban group the 31 divisions were distinguished into four groups of six electorates (or 
divisions) and one group of seven electorates according to the average ALP vote in the 1961, 1963 and 1966 federal 
elections. The 5 groups were further divided into 2 strata containing 3 electorates with electoral populations as equal as 
possible. One stratimi contained four electorates (Kahan & Aitkin, 1968:10-11). The rural electorates were distinguished on 
the basis of the average ALP vote (1961-1966) and the predominant rural industry. Groups of three electorates formed each 
stratum. Two sub-divisions were selected from each rural electorate and in the non-rural electorates of Mitchell and Darling. 
In the case of Darling one sub-division was selected from the Broken Hill area and one from an area outside Broken Hill 
(Kahan & Aitkin, 1968:11-12). 
In Victoria, electorates were first grouped as metropolitan, urban and rural. The metropolitan group contained 21 
electorates, the urban group 3 and the rural group 9 electorates (Kahan & Aitkin, 1968:13). The metropolitan electorates were 
divided into 7 groups of 3, according to the average ALP vote in the 1961, 1963 and 1966 federal elections. The 9 rural 
electorates were divided into three strata according to the per cent country party vote in 1966. Two sub-divisions were 
selected from each rural electorate. The 3 urban electorates formed one stratum (Kahan & Aitkin, 1968:13-14). 
In Queensland, the electorates were first distinguished into two primary strata, metropolitan (including urban) and rural 
(including urban/rtiral) of 9 electorates each. The urban divisions were further divided into 3 groups of 3 divisions each 
according to average per cent ALP vote in the 1961, 1963 and 1966 elections. The rural electorates were grouped in 3 strata 
(containing 3 electorates each) according to the main rural industry. Two sub-divisions were selected to represent each rural 
division and the seat of Herbert (Kahan & Aitkin, 1968:15). 
In Westem Australia, the 9 electorates were divided into one strata of 3 electorates and the remaining 6 (5 urban and 1 
urban/rural) electorates into 2 strata according to average ALP vote at the 1961, 1963 and 1966 federal elections (Kahan & 
Aitkin, 1968:15). 
In South Australia, two divisions were combined with a Tasmanian urban division and the remaining 9 electorates 
were separated into one group of six urban divisions and one group of 3 rural divisions. The six urban division were 
distinguished into 2 urban strata according to ALP vote at tiie 1961, 1963 and 1966 federal elections. The 3 rural electorates 
in Soutii AusO-alia formed a single stratum (Kahan & Aiticin, 1968:16-17). 
In Tasmania, one electorate was combined with two urban south Australian electorates to form a single stratum. These 
tiiree electorates resembled each other in terms of size and per cent ALP vote. The remaining four Tasmanian electorates 
formed a single stratum from which two electorates were selected (Kahan & Aitidn, 1968:16). 
6. The rural electorates in sub-division were stratified are detailed by Kahan & Aitidn (1968). 
7. The number of strata in each state were 15 in New Soutii Wales, 11 in Victoria, 6 in Queensland, 3 in botii Soutii 
Australia and West Australia and 1 in Tasmania. An additional stratum was added by combining some Soutii Australian and 
Tasmanian divisions giving a total of 40 (Kahan & Aitidn, 1968:5). 
8. In Darling 28 names were selected from tiie Broken-Hill sub-division and 8 from tiie other rural sub-division (Kahan & 
Aiddn, 1968:12) 
9. Out of scope elements include 280 electors who have moved away from original address, 40 in which the original address 
non-existent or could no be located, 11 electors who had died since tiiat last upxlate of electoral role and 38 for other reasons 
(Aiddn, 1977:272). 
10. The letter ' V stands for variable number. 
11. The characteristics used to sort the electoral divisions were the same as those used in the preparation of the 1967 sample. 
These were as follows:the strength of the parties in the elections between 1974 and 1977, the proportion of the population 
living in rural and urban areas, the dominant rural industry (wool, wheat, dairying, sugar and tropical agriculture, wool and 
wheat, mining, mixed fanning and orchards, grazing and dairying and no rural industry); and tiie size of the electoral 
population in tiie electorate in 1977 (Aitidn, 1982a;n). 
12. Out of scope elements are those selected who had moved away from original address or the original address was non-
existent or not locatable (Aitkin, 1982a;4). 
13. There is a discrepancy in the dates between which tiie interviews were conducted. In the introduction to the 1979 ANPA 
code-book the last date interviews were conducted was the 18th of November (Aitkin, 1982a:4), whereas according to note 1 
(Aitkin, 1982a: 103-104), the last date interviews occurred was December Uie 12th. 
14. The measure of Religious Denomination in the 1979 ANPA sample is problematic since a high proportion of the sample 
(25%) indicated that they had no religion. This is discussed later in the chapter in tiie section on measures of religion. 
15. The 1979 sample and the 1981 census are not strictly comparable since tiie universe of the 1979 sample is the electoral 
role which is smaller than the census population. However, the estimates from the 1979 survey should not differ substantially 
from the 1981 census. 
16. The exceptions are clusters in Tasmarua and the northem Territory. In Tasmania, 15 clusters were selected for tiie 
electorate of Lyons, & from Braddon, 6 from Franklin and 3 in Bass. In the Northem territory 7 clusters were used although 
only two names were selected from each cluster. Among tiie mainland states, the number of clusters ranged from 1 to 4 
(Kelley, Gushing & Headey. 1987:xi-xiv), 
17. The 'out of scope' addresses include 720 marked 'return to sender', 235 retumed with no further information, and 37.1 % 
of these not responding after six mail outs. This estimate of 37.1 % was based on a study of 245 randomly chosen non-
responding addresses in the state of New South Wales (Kelley, Bean & Evans, 1990). 
18. A total of 2208 interviews were coded in the 376 census districts selecting, giving an average of 5.9 interviewers per 
cluster. 
19. The design effect of cluster sampling is minimal if there are a large the number clusters in the population and tiie clusters 
are selected randomly (Kalton, 1983:30-31). In the case of tiie NSSS urban sample tiiese conditions applied. 
20. Take for example the Liberal and Labor vote at tiie 1977 election in the 1979 ANPA sample. The respective percentages 
are 46.9 % and 45.7% (Aitidn, 1982b:360). The standard errors are calculated from tiie following formula (Kalton, 1983:15-
16): 
SE=/[F*P(100-P)/n-l)] 
where F is the sampling fraction (close to 1 in this instance) 
P is the proportion 
n is the sample size 
For die Liberal party vote tiie standard error of tiie estimate is /[1*(46.9(53.1)/2015)] = 1.1. 
For tiie Labor party vote die standard error of tiie estimate is /[1*(45.7(54.3)/2015)] = 1.1. 
Therefore tiie 95 % confidence limits are between 44.7 and 49.1 for tiie Liberal party and between 43.5 and 47.9 for tiie 
Labour party. The actual percentages gained are outside tiiese confidence limits at 38.1 % and 39.6 for tiie Liberal and 
Labour parties respectively (calculated from Aitkin, 1982b:360). 
21. Bean (Table 8.5:289) presents figures comparing the proportion of sample respondents in non-manual occupations and the 
percentage calculated from the 1981 Australian census. The sample estimate was 57 % compared to 51.3 % calculated from 
tiie census. 
In terms of the education the estimate of the proportion of respondents who had not completed secondary school was 
40.7% according to tiie 1979 ANPA. This figure compares witii 64.5% in tiie 1967 ANPA. 48.2% in tiie 1984 NSSS and 
50.6% in the 1987 AES (Figures calculated by the autiior). 
22. The Labor party was ahead of tiie coalition parties imtil tiie very last week of tiie 1980 campaign (Goot, 1983). 
23. No weighting on any variable, appears to have been performed in these analyses. 
24. In diis instance, 'better' refers to tiie larger number of response categories offered in tiie NSSS studies tiian in tiie ANPA 
studies. 
25. There are a small number of discrepancies in tiie coding of occupations in tiie 1969 and 1979 ANPA data. In the 1969 
data two new occupation codes were used 145 for 3 cases and 860 for 45 cases. These codes were not presented in note 18 
of tiie 1967 ANPA code-book (Aitidn, Kahan & Stokes. 1975:226-232). It is assumed tiiat tiie code 145 referred to some 
kind of clerical occupation. The code 860 is likely to refer to those not in the work force and this code was categorised in 
the residual group. In the 1979 data a code of 832 was employed to code tiie occupations of 3 respondents although this code 
is not found in note 20 of the 1979 code-book (Aitkin, 1982a:175-185). It is assumed that these respondents are 'athletes, 
sportsmen or related workers' a code of 835 in the 1979 code-book. 
26. There is unlikely to any substantial difference since the two measures are highly correlated. In the construction of 
measures of class, from the occupations of both respondent and spouse, it was observed that in only one third of the cases in 
the samples is the occupation of the respondents' spouse used in tiie construction of the measure of social class. Of this 
group only a proportion of this group would have different class positions if their occupation rather than tiiat of their spouse 
was used in the construction of the measure of social class. 
27. The numbers of students is so small in each data set (2.6% in the 1984 NSSS. V151) that these differences are unlikely 
to make any difference to the interpretation of tiie results. 
28. The Pareto estimate comes from Vilfredo Pareto who at the end of last century observed that the upper ranges of the 
income distribution could be described by a curve of a general type: 
Y = AX' 
where; 
X is the income size 
Y is then number of persons having that income or larger 
A is a constants 
V defines the form of the relationship. V is estimated by the limits of the preceding income group and frequencies in tiiis 
group and the (highest) open ended group. 
V= (c-d)/(b-a) 
where; 
a = die log of die lower limit of the preceding income group 
b = the log of the lower limit of the open-ended income group 
c = the log of the sum of the frequencies in the open-ended and preceding income groups 
d = the log of frequencies in the open-ended income group 
This relationship can be used to estimate the mean income for the upper ranges of tiie curve. 
X = \XYdxl IXYdx 
where | defines the limit of the open ended interval from tiiat income level to infiiuty. X any Y defined as above. 
Taking tiie first derivative of Y = AX" gives an expression for Y. 
Y = - (AV/X**'). tiie non-cumulative form 
insertion of tiiis expression for Y in the above formula for the mean income gives: 
X = i X[-(AWPC*')]dx/ lXl-(AWPC*'])dx 
which when integrated yields 
X = X [V/(V-1)] 
from Miller (1966:216). A computer p r^ogram developed by Professor Frank Jones was used to estimate the mean income for 
tiie highest group. 
29. Analyses performed by the author. 
30. Ancestry is a more satisfactory indicator of ethnicity than country of birth, since national boundaries do not always 
coincide with ethiuc groups (Jones, 1990). In tiie 1986 census ancestry was asked witii the question: "What is each persons 
ancestry? For example. Greek, Indian, Armeruan, Aboriginal. Chinese, etc." (Jones. 1990). 
31. These 1700 respondents are all urban respondents. 
32. Links can be made between these measures of leader evaluations. Correlations between a measure based on favourable 
and unfavourable comments of leaders and a measure based on the thermometer score (for leaders) on New Zealand data was 
between 0.65 and 0.75 (Bean, 1984:406). Similar correlations (between 0.57 and 0.70) were fotmd in comparisons of 
measures of leaders in the Uruted States and Canada (Graetz & McAllister, 1986). 
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